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Since legal reasoning is reasoning on what is the law for a particular case, it presupposes a theory of
law. The two are linked by the plausible proposition that the law applying organs have a (legal) duty to
apply the law. The relations between the two is the subject of this thesis. The first chapter revisits the
analogy, popularised by H L A Hart, between games and law.
The existence of games (belonging to the class of what I call 'autonomous institutions') shows that
Hart's open texture thesis (i.e. his claim that no rule expressed in natural language's terms can fail to
have an area ofpenumbra, and that this is the explanation for disagreement about what the law is for a
particular case) had to be abandoned. I suggest in chapter 1 that legal disagreement is a normal
consequence of the law being seen as (what is there called) a regulatory institution, since in regulatory
institutions substantive reasoning has to be used to apply general norms to particular cases.
This observation is open to a strong objection, namely Joseph Raz's authority-based argument for
what he calls the sources thesis. According to it, the law has to belong to the kind of things that can be
understood and applied without using substantive reasons. In chapters 2 and 3 the thesis is first
introduced and then criticised on the basis that it does not allow for legal disagreement. It is claimed
that under the sources thesis, the application of the law would not be qualitatively different from the
application of rules of games. Since they are different (this was the pre-theoretical observation), this
amounts to a refutation (or to the beginning of a refutation) of that thesis.
Chapter 4 discusses some of these issues in the light of concrete historical examples. I argue there that
though Roman legal reasoning was formal to a remarkable extent, Romans did not think of their legal
material as furnishing exclusionary reasons. I claim that it is sometimes difficult to make sense of the
particular forms those formal arguments adopted, which at least to a modem observer seem to be
based on the wrong kind of distinctions. It seems as though we are missing some important piece of
information about how the Romans thought of the law.
What kind of information were we missing? This is be the subject of the last chapter. The connection
between ideas about the law and the law itself is examined in the last chapter. The task is to identify
the sort of ideas that are relevant and the nature of that connection. In brief, the argument is that ideas
about the law (what in the last chapter is called an 'image of law') have the direct consequence of
determining the sort of argument that counts as legal arguments; they shape what Honore called the
'canon of legal argument'.
I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself.
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Games and the Law: Two
Models of Institution
Football is not a matter of life and death: it's much more important than that
Bill Shankly
The Game-Analogy
Games have usually been taken as offering a good analogy for the analysis of legal concepts. Indeed, it
has been argued (though admittedly from a rather different perspective) that this is not only a useful
analogy, but that the law is in some sense, essentially similar to games (Huizinga, 1970: 97, passim).
Among many other authors, as we shall see, Herbert Hart seems to have shared this view and, in The
Concept ofLaw, relied heavily on the similarities between them. In fact, he relied upon that analogy so
heavily that it is certainly not too big an exaggeration to say, with Judith Shklar, that games were
"Hart's obsession" (Shklar, 1986: 105; on Hart's 'obsession', on addition to Hart, 1994: 310 [index
entry for 'Games'], see Hart, 1953, passim), or that "H. L. A. Hart described law as a complex game"
(Morawetz, 1992: 16).
In what follows I want to focus upon the differences between games and the law. As I hope to show, a
clear account of those differences is important not only because the game-analogy has been used so
repeatedly in the tradition of analytic jurisprudence, but also because it is the difference between two
models of institution that seems to have been overlooked. These differences are particularly important,
or so I shall argue, regarding precisely one of the features of games Hart and others have been most
interested in, i.e. their certainty.
Indeed, one of the most important functions of the game-analogy in The Concept ofLaw was to help
Hart in ascertaining the rights and wrongs of formalism and rule-scepticism. One of the rule-sceptics
arguments, Hart tells us, is based upon the fact that
[a] supreme tribunal has the last word in saying what the law is and, when it has said it, the statement
that the court was 'wrong' has no consequences within the system: no one's rights or duties are
thereby altered [...]. Consideration of these facts makes it seem pedantic to distinguish, in the case of a
supreme tribunal's decisions, between their finality and their infallibility. This leads to another form
of the denial that courts in deciding are ever bound by rules: "Hie law (or the constitution) is what the
court says it is' (Hart, 1994: 141).
To answer this argument, Hart considered what a game would be like if this were in fact the case.
According to him, such a game would not be like any ordinary game, but a rather odd one called by
him 'scorer's discretion'. In it, 'rules' are mere predictions of what the referee will do, since they are
what the scorer says they are. Hart argued that rule-sceptics view the law as 'scorer's discretion'. But
this is a mistake, he claimed, since a normal game like football or cricket is not 'scorer's discretion'.
Though it is strictly possible that any game be transformed into 'scorer's discretion', this possibility
does not imply that all games are, actually, 'scorer's discretion': "[t]he fact that isolated or exceptional
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official aberrations are tolerated does not mean that the game of cricket or baseball is no longer being
played" (Hart, 1994: 144-45).
I do not want to discuss the whole of Hart's argument against the mle-sceptic (which might be right
regardless of the flaws in the 'scorer's discretion' argument), but only to note that this particular
argument is not very convincing. The sceptic could answer by saying that in games people do not
disagree about what the rules are, nor about how should they be applied. They discuss whether or not
Maradona used his hand to score his famous goal against England (though nobody would still like to
deny that), rather than about what a handball or a goal 'really' are: is it not an amazing fact that
however passionate participants and spectators can be (as we know all too well nowadays, particularly
in Europe, particularly in England) no serious disagreement exists as to what the mles mean and what
they demand? (this point calls for a significant amount of refining and qualifying, something that will
be undertaken later in this chapter. That refining and qualifying will not, however, affect the central
claim of these paragraphs: that there is a difference of kind between the certainty a football referee has
when he is applying the rules of football and that a judge has when applying the law).
It seems, though, that Hart would not agree with this:
"[w]e are able to distinguish a normal game from the game of the 'scorer's discretion' simply
because the scoring mle, though it has, like others rules, its area ofopen texture where the scorer has
to exercise a choice, yet has a core of settledmeaning" (Hart, 1994: 144; italics added).
It is at least arguable that this assimilation of mles of games to legal mles, on which Hart relied so
heavily in his discussion of formalism and mle-scepticism in chapter VII of The Concept of Law,
distorts the way in which mles of games are applied: they are not controversial (except in special
cases, like the 'dangerous play' mle, as we shall see). If this is correct, then there is no reason why the
mle-sceptic must be committed to a denial of the difference between football and 'scorer's discretion',
and Hart's argument (at least his analogy with games) would become harmless. If, as Paul Valery has
said, "no scepticism is possible where the mles of a game are concerned" (quoted in Huizinga, 1970:
30), then the analogy cannot be used against legal mle-scepticism, where scepticism is (to say the
least) possible.
In other words, Hart thought that whatever was true concerning mles of games was also true
concerning legal mles in virtue of the fact that in both games and the law 'mles' are an important
element. There is no obvious reason why the sceptic has to go along with this unstated premiss and
Hart did not offer a non-obvious one.
As was said at the beginning, however, Hart was not alone in thinking the game-analogy to be useful
for the analysis of legal concepts. Ronald Dworkin's case is interesting for two separate reasons: on
the one hand, he uses the game-analogy in two cmcial moments: first, when introducing his (now
famous) distinction between mles and principles (1977: 24) and then, to present his (almost equally
famous) thesis of what he called 'the interpretive attitude" (Dworkin, 1986: 47-48). On the other hand,
while in the first case he was interested in the similarities between games and the law, in the second
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his point was to distinguish one from the other. And in both cases the feature of games he relied upon
was the same, i.e. the certainty of their rules.
In Taking Rights Seriously, he argued that
[t]he difference between legal principles and legal rules is a logical distinction [...]. Rules are
applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a mle stipulates are given, then either the rule is
valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes
nothing to the decision [...]. This all-or-nothing feature is seen most plainly ifwe look at the way mles
operates, not in law, but in some enterprises they dominate—a game, for example (Dworkin, 1977:
24).
The interesting point is, in my view, that the reason why "this all-or-nothing feature is seen most
plainly" in the case of games is the very same reason why 'scorer's discretion' is so different from
cricket or football: because of the certainty of the mles of games. The game-analogy was meant to
throw light on something important about the law, but it was (in both cases) based upon a feature of
games that the law does not share. Here again, the unstated assumption is that 'legal mles' are, so to
speak, the same kind of entity as mles of games. But Dworkin himself later distinguished the law from
games when he wanted to explain what is to have an "interpretive attitude":
[t]he two components of the interpretive attitudel are independent of one another; we can take up the
first component of the attitude toward some institution without also taking up the second. We do that
in the case ofgames and contests. We appeal to the point of these practices in arguing about how their
mles should be changed, but not (except in very limited cases) about what their mles now are; that is
fixed by history and convention (1986: 47-48).
According to this passage, Dworkin would probably say that precisely because no interpretive attitude
is adopted either by players or spectators of, say, football, the interpretation and application of the
mles of football can have the very high level of certainty it does have. This, however, creates the
problem of establishing in which way what we call 'mles' in games are the same sort of thing we call
'mles' in the law. Dworkin claimed that 'legal mles' were all-or-nothing standards, and that this 'is
seen most plainly' if we look not to legal but to game-mles. There was, for Dworkin in 1967, a
common feature between mles in games and mles in the law: they were both rules, i.e. standards that
were 'applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion'.
Twenty years later, however, we were told that there was, after all, a fundamental difference between
law and games: only the former is an 'interpretive concept'. So we can legitimately wonder: does this
fundamental difference affect the 'all-or-nothingness' of legal mles? Maybe the mles of games are all-
or-nothing standards not because of a feature they have in virtue of their being mles, but because
players and spectators have developed no interpretive attitude towards football. If this is true, then the
conclusion would be that in Dworkin's definition (a definition that, I will claim later, is common to
mainstream analytical legal philosophy) there is no such a thing as a legal mle (this particular point
will be taken up infra at 67f).
lThe two components are "the assumption that the practice [...] has some point", and that "the requirements of (the practice) are
sensitive to its point" (Dworkin, 1987: 47).
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The fact is, we are told both by Hart and Dworkin, that some (quite important) features of rules are
easier to see if we look at games but harder if we are looking at the law. This, however, does not
necessarily mean that those features are to be equally found in the latter with only an extra effort of
observation; maybe, they can be easily seen in the former only because they cannot be seen at all in
the latter.
Institutional (In) determ in ac y
Consider the case of the (now not-so-) recent modification of the offside rule in football. As is known,
'a player is in an offside position if he is nearer to his opponents' goal line than both the ball and the
second last opponent': ' a player is not in an offside position if [...] he is levelled with the second last
opponent [or with the last two opponents]' (Law 11). A player in any of these last two situations
would have been in an offside position under the old offside rale. We are told that, after the 1990
World Cup played in Italy, in which most teams adopted extremely conservative and defensive
strategies (therefore diminishing the quality of a football match as a spectacle), FIFA modified the mle
in an effort to make the game more aggressive and more attractive to audiences and so forth.
The following I take to be rather obvious: in the period between the (end of) the 1990 World Cup (or
even before) and the issuing of the new offside mle, all the reasons for having the new mle existed, but
they were irrelevant at the moment of applying the old mle. They are equally irrelevant after FIFA's
decision: an umpire could not, after the new mle has been introduced, decide that he should apply the
mle in the light of its goals, and hence that he is going to be (say) 'more strict' in the application of the
mle in those cases in which the involved play was likely to be part of an aggressive strategy, even if
we are prepared to imagine that in so doing the referee would be likely to increase the desired effect of
the new regulations. After the decision was taken, the reasons for it were as irrelevant in the context of
adjudication as they were before. The very suggestion that the referee could apply the mle in this way
seems to be nonsensical (in fact, it is not clear what "more strict" could mean in this context3).
But in legal adjudication things are different. This will be discussed in considerably more detail below,
but for the time being suffice it to say that lawyers do speak of interpretations being more or less strict,
and the idea that a law should be interpreted in the light of its purpose is all too common. Needless to
say, this is not the only kind of argument that can be used to interpret a law (some will say that it is not
even a good argument), but I only need, for the time being, to claim that this makes sense, in a way
that the offside argument does not. The idea that interpretation should be purposive is not necessarily
controversial insofar as it is limited: nobody would deny that legal mles should sometimes be
interpreted in the light of the goals they are supposed to advance. What is controversial, as we shall
see, is whether or not this is always the case. But we need not adopt this strong position to see that a
2ln this context, to say of an argument that is nonsensical is to say that the fact of a speaker seriously offering that argument
would be taken by others either as a joke or as proof that the speaker is not really playing, or does not understand the game, etc.
See Rawls, 1955: 164f, quoted shortly below.
31 am ignoring some complexities of the offside rule, like the so-called 'passive' offside. They are not an objection to the thesis
presented here, anymore than the existence of 'discretion-giving' rules like the dangerous play or advantage rules are (on rules
of this sort, see infra, at 16ff).
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football referee is not supposed, except when the rules explicitly grant him that power, to consider the
purpose of the mles at the moment of applying them. This general feature of adjudication in games is
absent in the law: even according to a positivistic theory of law there will be cases in which
"assumptions about the purposes the rule is meant to advance would take a prominent—perhaps even
pre-eminent—role in solving the particular difficulties encountered" (Marmor, 1994: 154).
The point is that in games the application of a rule is always straightforward, while in law at least
sometimes the application of an otherwise valid and clear mle can be contested. Notice that this claim
does not amount to saying (not now, anyway) that there are no cases in which the application of legal
mles is not as clear as the application of mles of games. This will be considered with some detail in
chapters to come. My claim here amounts to the rather obvious observation that, while it would not lift
a lawyer's eyebrow to notice that the application of a clear general mle to a particular case can
sometimes be problematic, to find out that referees and players disagree about what a penalty, or a
goal, or a handball is would indeed surprise any football fan:
In a game of baseball if a batter were to ask, 'Can I have four strikes?' it would be assumed that he
was asking what the mle was; and if, when told what the mle was, he were to say that he meant that
on this occasion he thought it would be best on the whole for him to have four strikes rather than
three, this would be most kindly taken as a joke. One might contend that baseball would be a better
game if four strikes were allowed instead of three; but one cannot picture the mles as guides to what
is best on the whole in particular cases, and question their applicability to particular cases as particular
cases (Rawls, 1955: 164f).
But this is precisely, as any lawyer would immediately notice, what at least sometimes judges and
lawyers do in order to know what the law is for the case (I hasten to say that I am not begging any
question here, since the really controversial point in this regard is whether purposive or otherwise
evaluative interpretation is always necessary. There is no serious disagreement about it being
sometimes necessary. But in games it is never justified if it is not explicitly authorised. Notice, in the
'dangerous play' mle in football, quoted below at the explicit granting of discretion: 'in the opinion of
the referee').
If this is correct so far, then it would naturally follow that an explanation of legal disagreement, or a
criticism (like Hart's) ofmle-scepticism cannot be based on an analogy between games and the law. A
good starting point for an explanation of legal disagreement is, therefore, to give a closer to look at the
similarities and differences between the two.
A General Theory of Institutional Facts
Both games and the law figure profusely in the literature on institutions. Both games and the law are
(or allow), it is claimed, paradigmatic instances of 'institutional facts'. I think that there is an important
truth here, but that truth is obscured when some crucial differences (like the one we have just seen)
between the two are disregarded. The argument offered in the last section was designed to give this
point initial plausibility: in some important sense mles seem to be much more well-behaved, so to
speak, in games than in the law. If this feature of mles in games is not taken account of, the game-
analogy can easily backfire: after all, it might be the case that precisely because mles of games are
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certain in their application when rules of law are not that the rule-sceptic Hart was arguing against is
right, or that precisely because of this certainty in application of the rules of games legal rules are not
all-or-nothing, as Dworkin claimecK
Though without relying on it as Hart did in The Concept on Law, the analogy between games and the
law has also been used by many writers in philosophy of language, and particularly in speech-acts
theory. Indeed, it has been said that "philosophy of law should feel particularly challenged by the
theory of speech acts", since in the law "philosophers of language felt that they had found a domain
particularly suited to illustrate and test their ideas" (Amselek, 1988: 187). If there is an important
distinction between games and the law, a distinction, that is, that will help to explain some important
features of the law, then it would be useful to begin with what we could call a 'unified' theory of
institutional facts like goals, contracts, handballs and the like. This is now possible since John Searle
has recently offered what he called 'a general theory of institutional facts' (Searle, 1995). I will try to
show that a theory that does not recognise the existence of two kinds of institutions cannot but fail to
account for some peculiarities of the neglected kind. Therefore, we will take a detour to consider such
a general theory.
Regulative and Constitutive Rules
In an often-quoted passage, Searle introduces his now famous distinction:
I want to clarify a distinction between two different sorts of mles, which I shall call regidative and
constitutive mles [...]. As a start, we might say that regulative mles regulate antecedently or
independently existing forms of behaviour; for example, many mles of etiquette regulate inter¬
personal relationships which exist independently of the mles. But constitutive mles do not merely
regulate, they create or define new forms ofbehaviour. The mles of football or chess, for example, do
notmerely regulate playing football or chess, but as it were they create the very possibility ofplaying
such games (Searle, 1969: 33).
Searle argues5 that this reflects an intuitively obvious distinction between two different kinds ofmles.
He himself acknowledges that he was "fairly confident about the distinction, but do[es] not find it easy
to clarify" (Searle, 1969: 33). However obvious that distinction looked to Searle, it proved
controversial. Among others, Anthony Giddens6 has argued that "that there is something suspect in
this distinction, as referring to two types of mle, is indicated by the etymological clumsiness of the
term 'regulative mle'. After all, the word 'regulative' already implies 'mle': its dictionary definition is
'controlled by rales'" (Giddens, 1984: 20). In other words, all mles can, in one way or another, be said
to be regulative.
I do not know whether Searle would agree with Giddens in that all mles are regulative, though at times
he seems to hint at an affirmative answer (notice, in the following quotation, his qualification of
4l do not want to pursue these arguments here, since they are not important for the point discussed in the main text. It might be
the case that, in the end, Hart is right against the rule-sceptic or Dworkin is right in his claim about the logical distinction
between legal principles and rules. In both cases, however, once account is taken of the uncontroversial nature of the
application of the mles of games, the game-analogy ceases to be a supporting reason (i.e. supporting Hart's or Dworkin's
arguments, as it was used) and provides the reader with a (not necessarily conclusive) reason to believe exactly the opposite.
5As he said at the Marvin Faber conference in Applied Legal Ontology (Buffalo, NY, May 1998).
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'purely regulative' rules, and also his claim, in the previous quotation, that 'constitutive rules do not
merely regulate'). In this case, then it cannot also be the case that all rules are also constitutive, since in
that case there would be no distinction whatsoever. Are, then, all mles constitutive? Searle answers:
There is a trivial sense in which the creation of any mle creates the possibility of new forms of
behaviour, namely, behaviour done in accordance with the mle. That is not the sense in which my
remark is intended. What I mean can perhaps be best put in the formal mode. Where the mle is purely
regulative, behaviour which is in accordance with the mle could be given the same description or
specification [...] whether or not the mle existed, provided the description or specification makes no
exphcit reference to the mle. But where the mle (or system ofmles) is constitutive, behaviour which
is in accordance with the mle can receive specifications or descriptions which it could not receive if
the mle ormles did not exist (Searle, 1969: 35)
Some critics of Searle have not been convinced by this argument, and have pressed the point that all
mles are, really, both constitutive and regulative. One of them is Joseph Raz, who invites us to
compare the following two pairs of act descriptions:
1 (a) 'Giving £50 toMr Jones'
2 (a) 'saying 'I promise"
In Raz's view,
descriptions 1 (a) and 2 (a) specify acts which are in accordance with the rales in a way which could
be given regardless of whether or not there is such a mle. Therefore, the mles are regulative.
Descriptions 1 (b) and 2 (b) describe actions in accordance with the mle in a way that could not be
given if there were no such mles. Therefore, the mles are constitutive, as well. Since for every mle
one can formulate a similar pair of act descriptions, all mles are both constitutive and regulative (Raz,
1992: 109).
But here there is a clear non sequitur. From the fact that both in 1 and in 2 'one can formulate a similar
pair of descriptions' it does not follow that that is the case 'for every mle'. This is the more obvious
when we notice that Searle would probably not object to Raz's claim that both taxes and promises are
institutional facts. Searle would (rightly) claim that one can think of (other) mles for which the (b)
item of the pair is missing. In other words, it is not the case that all actions in accordance with mles,
because of that very fact, admit of this dual description. That is the case concerning tax law and
promising, but not concerning mles of, say, the decalog. The following is not a complete pair of act-
descriptions:
3 (a) Honouring one's father and mother (b) (empty)
since, though in the relevant circumstances 'giving £ 50 to Mr Jones' and 'saying 'I promise" counts
as paying taxes and promising, 'honouring one's parents' does not count as anything. Hence not all
mles are constitutive?.
61 begin with Giddens' criticism because he is the only critic to whom reference is made in The Construction ofSocial Reality
(at 230 n 10).
7what about
4 (a) Being nice towards one's parents (b) Honouring one's parents?
In this case the description contained in 4 (b) is a form of appraisal rather than a specification (Searle, 1969: 36; see also
Cherry, 1973: 302). If instead we had something like
5 (a) Not honouring one's parents (b) To be guilty of a sin
then the rule in question (the forth commandment, Exod. 20: 12) would indeed, 1 believe, be constitutive. But this would
depend upon the (contingent, i.e. not necessarily implicated by the fourth commandment) existence of the institutional concept
ofsin.
Notice that the concept of sin is not conceptually (as opposed to theologically, as the case might be) needed in order either to
understand or to apply the ten commandments: they can be understood as simply stating what it is right and wrong to do. The




Which means, some rules are purely regulative. But this presents, I believe, an interesting question:
can 'purely regulative' rules exist in the context of institutional systems? ('institutions' being,
following Searle for a while, 'systems of constitutive rules'). Are there purely regulative (say) legal
rules, for example?
Tony Honore, for example, has claimed that a satisfactory theory of individuation of laws must allow
for the following kinds of laws:
1. Existence laws create, destroy or provide for the existence or non-existence ofentities.
2. Rules of inference provide how facts may or must or should preferably be proved and what
inferences may ormust or should preferably be drawn from evidence.
3. Categorizing laws explain how to translate actions, events, and other facts into the appropriate
categories.
4. Rules ofscope fix the scope ofother rules.
5. Position-specifying rules set out the legal position ofpersons or things in terms of rights, liabilities,
status, and the like.
6. Directly normative rules (which are a few in number but important) guide the conduct of the
citizen as such (Honore, 1977: 112; on the (alleged) importance of a theory of individuation of the
law, which gives the background ofHonore's article, see Raz, 1980: Ch. 4).
I hope it is clear that items 1 through 5 cannot be purely regulative. Rules of the third type, for
example, 'A young person is any person who has attained the age of 14 years and is under the age of
17 years' (Honore, 1977: 102), clearly constitute paradigmatic instances of constitutive rules, i.e. rules
of the form 'X counts as Y in C' (Searle, 1995: 43ff). The same can be said of items 1, 4 and 5. Rules
of inference, I believe, are also typically constitutive: they specify what counts as evidence for the
existence of an institutional fact like a contract or a will.
This leaves out only 6, 'directly normative rules'. Are they not purely regulative? They certainly do
not constitute what they regulate: if they did, they would fall into another category. The problem is,
these rules cannot be purely regulative since they are expressed in institutional terms. These rules are
almost tautological (Searle seems to believe that they are, in fact, tautologies: Searle, 1969: 191)8. As
Honore argued,
institutional concept of sin is born, so to speak, when someone offers an interpretation of a (up-to-then-not-institutional)
practice in term of institutional facts. This has important consequences for an understanding of the evolution of institutions. I
will return to this subject.
Notice further that, ifwe introduce the institutional concept of sin, not only the fourth, but all the ten commandments suddenly
become constitutive: killing a human being, stealing, lying, etc count as a sin. Every commandment becomes a constitutive
rules that specify what counts as a sin.
Perhaps this is the gist of Raz's critique of Searle. Perhaps Raz should be understood as saying that concerning legal rules in
developed legal systems, there will be always a description available for the (b) item. This is, I believe, true, but it fails to
follow that all rules are both regulative and constitutive. What follows is that a rule gets its character (i.e. regulative or
constitutive) from the normative system to which it belongs (more on this later).
8Though 1 will not pursue this matter further, it is interesting to notice that it is dubious whether they can be tautologies. Barry
Smith argues, following Adolf Reinach, that in (what Searle calls) 'systems of constitutive rales' one must "eventually arrive at
basic institutional concepts [BICs], which is to say: institutional concepts not capable of being further defined on the
institutional level" (Smith, 1993: 318). They are not capable of being defined in non-circular ways in terms of non-institutional
concepts, since then "all institutional concepts would turn out to be thus definable". This reinforces my conclusion that there is
no space for purely regulative rales in 'systems of constitutive rales'. See Sergot et al. (1986), for an attempt to translate an
actual piece of legislation, i.e. the British Nationality Act, into a set of definitions (i.e. rales of the form 'X counts as Y in
context C). One could then take 'citizenship' to be a basic institutional concept (or to be definable in BICs, or to be definable
on the basis of concepts that are in turn definable on the basis ofBICs, etc). The nature of these BICs raises problems I need not
pursue: Smith goes on to say that the only explanation available to Searle would be to accept that truths about BICs "express
irreducible material necessities of the Reinachian sort, that is, express necessary relations between certain uninventable sai
generis categories" (Smith, 1993: 318-9). Smith's reference is to Reinach (1913).
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the fact that criminal legislation by and large defined what constitutes an offence and does not directly
forbid the obnoxious conduct [...] reveals, [...] that the directly normative rules of a modem system
are for the most part platitudinous generalities. 'Do not commit an offence'. 'Abstain from torts'.
'Perform contract'. 'Pay debts'. 'Discharge liabilities', 'Fulfil obligations' [...]. These basic norms are
not tied to specific act-situations, and this confirms, if it needed confirmation, how unsatisfactory
would be any general programme of individuating laws on the basis of act-situations. But of course
the norms presuppose for their application in legal discourse that the system contains rules which do
specify the act-situations falling within the general categories 'offence', 'tort', 'contract', 'debt',
'liability', 'obligation'" (Honore, 1977: 118).
Given that the act-situations these rules regulate are constituted by other rules, i.e. those defining 'tort',
'contract' and the like, these rules cannot be purely regulative. A rule like 'perform contracts', for
example, is not purely regulative, since mles are required for some descriptions of the action done in
accordance with it. Nor is it constitutive, since it is not required for such a description. This highlights
a feature of the distinction ofwhich Searle does not seem to be fully aware: the distinction is not one
between mles, but one between systems ofrules'5.
Before pursuing this point any further, let us go back to the beginning and consider the criteria offered
by Searle to distinguish regulative from constitutive mles. In Speech Acts Searle offered two different
criteria: one at p. 33 and another at 35 (I will call them '33' and '35', respectively. Both of them were
quoted above, at 6). What is the relation between these two criteria? I think it can be shown that they
do not necessarily coincide, because they answer different questionslO. As Geoffrey Wamock said:
This supposed distinction between 'two sorts' ofmles is really, I think, a confused groping after two
other distinctions. There is, first, a distinction between two ways of saying what people do—one way
which, as for instance walking, or hitting balls about, or waving flags, involves no reference to any
mles, and another which, as for instance playing tennis, or signalling, or bequeathing property, does
essentially make reference to mles, or presupposes them [this constitutes Searle's first criterion—FA].
Then, second there is a broad and rather woolly distinction between two different 'objects' ofmles, or
reasons for having them [this being Searle's second criterion—FA]. It is not the object, presumably,
of the criminal law to 'create the possibility' of committing criminal offences, though it incidentally
does so; the object is to 'regulate' in certain respects the conduct ofmembers of society. By contrast,
while the mles of, say, soccer do 'regulate' the way in which balls are kicked about in fields, it is in
this case the object of (some of) the mles to 'constitute' a certain exercise in physical skill and
ingenuity, to 'create' a particular game for people to play (Wamock, 1971: 38).
Now having Warnock's idea in mind, let us consider the two criteria of Searle's distinction. As should
be remembered, the first criterion was
regulative mles regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behaviour [...]. But
constitutive mles do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behaviour. The mles of
football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or chess, but as it were they
create the very possibility ofplaying such games (Searle, 1969: 33).
Strictly, as Searle saw, what creates the possibility of playing chess or football is not a mle, but a
system of mles ('the rules of chess...'). That is to say, this is not a criterion to distinguish constitutive
9To be sure, he parenthetically recognises that it is not only rules, but also systems of rules which can be constitutive (1969:
35). But constitutive rules are constitutive because they belong to institutions, not when they are floating in some kind of
normative vacuum (on this point see Cherry, 1973, and keep in mind that depending on the principle of individuation of rules
that one adopts, a system may well consist of one rule).
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from regulative rules but systems of rules. Some systems of rules exist, as Wamock said, in order to
'regulate in certain respects the conduct of members of society", i.e. to regulate antecedently or
independently existing behaviour. The point of some other systems of rules is, on the other hand, to
'create' particular activities (both Wamock, as we have seen, and Searle (Searle, 1995: 50) agree that
while chess is an instance of the latter, criminal law is one of the former).
The second criterion was
Where the rule is purely regulative, behaviour which is in accordance with the mle could be given the
same description or specification [...] whether or not the mle existed, provided the description or
specification makes no explicit reference to the mle. But where the rule (or system of mles) is
constitutive, behaviour which is in accordance with the mle can receive specifications or descriptions
which it could not receive if the mle ormles did not exist (Searle, 1969: 35).
Now, this criterion tells a rather different story: criminal law, for example, is typically regulative in the
first sense, a point that, as we saw, is uncontroversial. Criminal law does not exist in order to create the
possibility of committing offences, but to regulate antecedently existing forms of behaviour. But in
(not necessarily too) developed legal systems, the mles of criminal law are needed to describe, for
example, that Jones is 'guilty' of 'murder in the first degree' though he is excused by 'mitigating
circumstances' etc. Hence according to the second criterion the mles of criminal law are constitutive
(see MacCormick, 1998: 335, where he argues that "the boundary between regulative and constitutive
is unclear in Searle's schema"; MacCormick and Weinberger, 1986: 23, where they claim that
"particularly unsatisfactory is the Searlian distinction between constitutive and regulative mles").
Searle's new general theory of institutional facts is still liable to this problem. This time the distinction
makes its appearance in the book with the help of the following pair of examples: 'drive on the right-
hand side of the road' (regulative) and 'the mles of chess' (constitutive). Here we can see Searle using
the first criterion. The 'drive on the right' mle is said to be regulative because it regulates driving and
driving is an antecedently existing form of behaviour (Searle, 1995: 27), while mles of chess are
constitutive because they 'create the very possibility' of playing chess (notice again the singular of the
former as opposed to the plural of the latter).
Now consider for a moment Searle's new paradigmatic regulative mle: 'drive on the right-hand side of
the road'. If the mle's literal formulation is (something like) 'drive on the right-hand side of the road,
or you shall be forced to pay £5' the mle does not create 'new possibilities of behaviour' and is,
therefore, (purely) regulative. What if the mle's formulation were 'failure to drive on the right-hand of
the road shall constitute an offence'? In this case, the mle would indeed be creating such a new
possibility (to wit, to commit an offence), and it would be constitutive.
I do not believe Searle would like to accept that the self-same mle can be regulative or constitutive
according to its literal formulation. But the only way in which this can be avoided is to focus not upon
the mle, but upon the whole system ofmles to which the mle belongs: if it is part of the highway code,
lOAt the Conference referred to above (supra, 6n), Searle argued that he did not offer two criteria: the criterion is 33, and 35 is
only a pedagogical device. I would then argue that the pedagogical device fails to fulfil its function, since it does not yield the
same result the true criterion does. This is, I would further claim, not a mere mistake for the reasons to be explained in the text.
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then chances are it is constitutive, since it, along with other rules, will probably constitute the
institutional fact of 'an offence'. If it is only a rule of etiquette (like the 'stand on the right' rule that
applies in the London Tube's escalators), then it would be purely regulative.
Neglecting these possibilities, Searle could insist that according to the second criterion the rule is
clearly regulative, since it is not needed to describe the actions that accord to it. But even if he is right,
and the rule is obviously regulative according to the second criterion, this would only show again that
both criteria do not overlap (since in this case according to the second criterion the rule is obviously
regulative, but according to the first you need to know the system the mle belongs to: it could even be
a mle of a weird game: 'driving on the right counts as scoring one point').
I agree with Searle that the important criterion (the only criterion, says Searle) is 33 rather than 35. 33
does not depend on the rale's literal formulation, as 35 does. But 33 is not a criterion to tell a
regulative from a constitutive rule, but one to differentiate systems of rules. The distinction is,
therefore, between systems of rales that have as their main point the creation of a new activity and
those whose main point is to regulate a pre-existing practice. Systems of the first kind, however, do
regulate pre-existing forms of behaviour (e.g. the rales of football regulates the ways in which players
can get the ball moving), and systems of the second kind do constitute new forms of behaviour (e.g. to
be guilty of an offence). The distinction is not based on the fact that some systems constitute and
others regulate, but on the fact that some systems (e.g. games) regulate pre-existing forms of
behaviour in order to create a new activity, while systems of the second kind create the possibility of
new forms of behaviour (if they do it at all) in order to regulate some pre-existing form of behaviour.
This is not an objection to Searle's original claims: for some purposes it might be of use to focus upon
particular rales only. But I submit that to put systems of rales, rather than rales, under the spotlight
provides a far greater insight into the way rales work than Searle's original distinction between rales.
A Critique of Searle's General Theory
The Evolution ofInstitutions
The first problem in the general theory is related to the issue of the evolution of institutions. Can an
institution evolve without the participants being aware that they are evolving one?
Searle's answer is: indeed they can. Consider the example ofmoney: people can go around buying and
selling and exchanging, without their thinking that the particular goods they use as a medium of
exchange is 'money':
The evolution may be such that the participants think, e.g. 'I can exchange this for gold', 'this is
valuable', or even simply 'this is money'. They need not think 'we are collectively imposing a value
on something that we do not regard as valuable because of its purely physical features', even though
that is exactly what they are doing [...]. In the course of consciously buying, selling, exchanging, etc.,
they may simply evolve institutional facts (Searle, 1995:47).
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Now, why is it possible for people to evolve institutional facts without being aware of it? The answer
is that they can keep doing what they were doing all along, and the institution will grow up, so to
speak, on the back of the practice. As Zenon Ba | kowski has argued
the institution [ofpromising] comes about because gradually a practice grows up where, for example,
we do something we say we will, not merely because of the substantive reasons we had in saying we
would do it, but also because of the reason that we said we would do it. At first that is one among all
the reasons but gradually it excludes the others and so we might say the convention of promising
grows up. We do it because we promised and the other reasons are excluded. Thus the institution
grows up on the back of the substantive reasons since the reason that it is a promise can be seen as the
universalisation of the substantive reasons (Ba| kowski, 1993: 13; see, for a similar point, Atiyah,
1981: 120).
This, however, is something that can only happen regarding institutions that 'constitute to regulate',
that is, institutions that create the possibility of institutional facts because of the improved regulatory
effects this technique allows. Because the institutions of criminal law are not needed to sustain the
practice of punishing people for failing to behave according to what Hart called 'primary' rules (in
much the same way in which we saw that the concept of sin was not conceptually necessary either to
understand or to apply the ten commandments), those who administer the punishments need not think
of the rules of criminal law in constitutive terms (in an undeveloped system, it could be enough to
have a list of 'do's' and 'don'ts'; or, rather, a list of 'don'ts—or else'). They can simply continue the
practice of punishing people, and at some point in time a writer (what in Scotland, for example, is
called an institutional writer) can offer an interpretation of the practice of punishing people in terms of
institutional facts (see MacCormick, 1974: 62f; MacCormick, 1998: 333; MacCormick and
Weinberger, 1986: 12)11. But when the institution is one that 'regulates to constitute' (i.e. one that
specifies how things are to be done in order to create a new activity: how, e.g. a ball is to be moved
around in order to create the game of football) it cannot evolve on the back of the practice, since
without the institution there is no practice at all. There cannot be a pre-institutional practice of football,
in the sense in which it is possible for a pre-institutional legal practice to exist (Hart called this a
'regime ofprimary rules': see Hart, 1994: 91-4). The first group of people who thought of football, for
example, must have been aware of the fact that they were imposing a particular meaning on three
wooden posts that did not have that meaning in virtue of their physical characteristics.
(But they could, couldn't they, think that the posts had some magical feature, so that football was
something that had to be played in those terms because of broader considerations (such as the aim of
not insulting the Gods, etc)? This answer is not available to Searle, who would not be willing to call
this 'game' a game (Searle, 1995: 36n): "to the extent that professional sports have such [broader]
consequences, they cease to be just games and become something else, e.g. big business")l2.
111 am not saying that the writer creates institutional facts were there were none; she makes explicit what was up to then
implicit in the practice (this is Searle's point).
12When I was a boy we used to play football in a park. As there were, of course, no goal posts in the park, we had to use our
jumpers and bags as goalposts. The first time my friends did this I could not understand what were they up to, until one of them
said: 'this is your goal, and that is ours'. We could not have played football in the park had we not been aware of the fact that
by placing those bags and jumpers where we placed them we where collectively assigning meaning to them, a meaning that
was not exhausted by the physical properties of the bags and jumpers. But the POWs who, in German concentration camps, as
the standard story goes, started to give and accept packages of cigarettes in exchange for other goods need not have been aware
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Systematic relationships between institutionalfacts
One feature of institutional facts, according to Searle, is that they "cannot exist in isolation but only in
a set of systematic relationships to other facts" (Searle, 1995: 35). For money to exist a system of
exchange has to exist beforehand, and for a system of exchange there has to be a system of property
and property ownership. "Similarly, in order that society should have marriages, they must have some
form of contractual relationships. But in order that they can have contractual relationships, they must
have such things as promises and obligations" (ibid).
Generally speaking, the existence of systems that 'constitute to regulate' presupposes the existence of
the practice the system is created to regulate. Rules of grammatical style can exist only because there
are mles of grammar, contract law can exist only because there are (bmte) exchanges and so on.
The reason why the existence of a system that 'constitutes to regulate' presupposes that of the practice
it is called to regulate is rather obvious: the point of the development of the system is its regulatory
impact on the practice. But this shows again that this (i.e. the fact that some institutions presuppose
other institutional and non-institutional facts) is not the case in virtue of some mysterious characteristic
of institutional facts, but because of the particular kind of institutional facts under consideration.
Concerning games, again, the point is less straightforward.
Searle, however, thinks that games are not counterexamples to his claim, though "it might seem" that
they are, "because, of course, games are designed to be forms of activity that do not connect with the
rest of our lives in a way that institutional facts characteristically do". When this point is looked at
carefully, Searle claims,
even in the case of games there are systematic dependencies on other forms of institutional facts. The
position of the pitcher, the catcher, and the batter, for example, all involve rights and responsibilities;
and their positions and actions or inactions are unintelligible without an understanding of these rights
and responsibilities; but these notions are in turn unintelligible without the general notions of rights
and responsibilities (Searle, 1995: 36).
It is not clear whether Searle thinks that baseball is unintelligible without such notions as rights and
responsibilities or, as he later claims, that this fact (i.e., the fact that baseball so depends) is a
consequence of games generally "employing] an apparatus—of rights, obligations, responsibilities,
etc—that is intelligible only given all sorts of other social facts" (1995: 56). In any case, this does not
seem to be the case. We can understand, make sense of, and even play chess without knowing a thing
about the 'apparatus' used in India during or before the 6th century (or wherever and whenever it was
invented: that we do not need to be sure of its origins to play is another way of making the point).
Baseball and football are played all over the world, and that is not a proof that the notions of 'rights,
obligations and responsibilities' are common to the human race at large, unless one wants to hold on to
Searle's point and claim that the fact that we can understand games is a proof of a shared 'apparatus'
between human beings of all times and places (a weird argument, would it not be, for a natural law
doctrine).
of the fact that by their giving and taking cigarettes in those circumstances they were assigning to cigarettes a meaning not
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Institutions and their Consequences
So let us go back to Searle's statement in page 36 of The Construction ofSocial Reality, where he
claims that "It might seem that games are counterexamples to this general principle, because, of
course, games are designated to be forms of activity that do not connect with the rest of our lives in a
way that institutional facts characteristically do" (Searle, 1995: 36). To the best of my knowledge he
does not explicitly refer to this characteristic of institutional facts elsewhere in the book, and it is not
clear what he has in mind. One characteristic way in which institutions (i.e. systems of constitutive
rules) connect with our lives is that they allow us to do things that we could not otherwise do: we can
promise, we can play football, and so on. But in this sense games do connect with our lives in the same
way, hence this is not the sense in which Searle intends his remark on page 36 (where he claimed that
games do not connect in the way institutional facts characteristically do). The sentence that
immediately follows the one discussed here seems to imply that the way in which institutional facts
characteristically connect to our lives is that the former have consequences for the latter: "Today's
philosophy department softball game need have no consequences for tomorrow, in a way that today's
wars (...etc) are intended precisely to have consequences for tomorrow".
Hence, the fact that institutional facts have 'consequences for tomorrow' is characteristic of them. But
this is very odd indeed, since Searle himself accepts that games need not have such consequences, and
games are paradigmatic instances of institutions (in Speech Acts the distinction was introduced with
the help of games). And the problem presents itself not only concerning games. Does geometry have
'consequences for tomorrow'? Do we need to share Euclid's background 'apparatus' to understand
Euclidean geometry?
I do not want to object to the thesis that some institutions stand in systematic relationships with other
institutional and non-institutional facts. In fact, this is an extraordinarily important feature of
institutions like the law. But this is not a characteristic of institutions qua institutions (since there are
institutions that have no systematic relationships to other facts), but only of institutions that 'constitute
to regulate', because they do so. The reason for this is simple: since the institutional (i.e. constitutive)
apparatus is used to regulate a practice that exists independently, that apparatus must, of necessity,
have 'systematic relationships' with the institutional and non-institutional facts that are part of the
practice to be regulated.
I take Searle's point of institutions 'having consequences for tomorrow' to be his way of singling out
what I have been calling institutions that 'constitute to regulate' from those that 'regulate to
constitute'. My last claim can, therefore, be expressed in Searle's terms by saying that institutions have
'systematic relationships to other facts' because they have 'broader consequences': games do not have
consequences, hence they need not have those relationships. Indeed, insofar as games do develop
those relationships, Searle himself believes that they 'cease to be just games' (cf. 1995: 36).
exhausted by their physical characteristics.
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Constitutive and Regulative Institutions
I agree with Searle when he says that the important criterion to characterise institutions is the first one
(i.e, 33). According to it, the law is a 'regulative' institution, since its point is to regulate antecedently
existing forms of behaviour (and to do that in a better and more efficient way it creates the possibility
of new forms of behaviour). Games, on the other hand, are 'constitutive' institutions, that is, systems
of rules whose point is to create new possibilities of behaviour rather than to regulate antecedently
existing forms of it (though they doubtless do regulate some pre-existing forms of behaviour in order
to do this). A distinction of this kind is obviously behind Ronald Dworkin's claim that
Chess is, in this sense, an autonomous institution; I mean that it is understood, among its participants,
that no one may claim an institutional right by direct appeal to general morality [...]. But legislation is
only partly autonomous in this sense (Dworkin, 1977: 101).
Thus it turns out that the important distinction is not based on whether the rules are constitutive of
institutional facts or regulative of pre-existing forms of behaviour, since we might find rules of both
kinds in either system, depending on which principles of individuation one chooses. Thus 'thou shall
not drive on the left' would be regulative (because it is not needed to describe the action), but 'it is an
offence to drive on the left' counts as constitutive (since it is required to describe the action of
committing an offence).
Because 'regulative' (regulatory) institutions are justified by their regulatory effects those effects have
an impact upon the application of the rules. In regulative (regulatory) institutions we shall see that the
rules set out only what is 'presumptively' the case. In 'constitutive' (autonomous) institutions, since
the institution is not justified by its regulatory effects, consideration of those effects need not affect the
application of the rules, which can (but need not) be indefeasible: here we go back to the initial
observation, i.e. the fact that disagreement about what is the law is a common phenomenon while it is
most uncommon concerning games. The defeasibility of legal reasoning, then, is a consequence of the
kind of institution the law is understood to be (we shall soon see that some forms of ancient law can be
said to have been 'autonomous': see below, 30ff). But to see this, to understand legal reasoning, we
need a theory of institutional facts that can account for this distinction^.
A note of the word 'institution'. As should be by now evident, I am using this word in a loose sense.
Or rather, I am using it as defined by Searle, i.e. as "systems of constitutive rules" (Searle, 1969: 51). I
understand 'constitutive rules' in this definition as meaning 'rules that provide for the existence of
institutional facts'. Therefore, both 'constitutive' (autonomous) and 'regulative' (regulatory)
institutions are in this sense institutional: both of them allow for the existence of institutional facts (an
13From now on I will cease to talk of 'constitutive' and 'regulative' institutions. I believe that the argument presented in this
section is best viewed as a way of taking Searle beyond Searle, that is to say, as a constructive criticism of Searle's 'general
theory of institutional facts'. But even ifmy argument fails as a critique of Searle's views, I still think it has intrinsic value. For
this reason, from now on I will label 'autonomous' institutions those that 'regulate to constitute', like games (i.e. those systems
of rules that if my argument is correct correspond to Searle's 'constitutive rules'). The other kind (i.e. those that 'constitute to
regulate') 1 will call 'regulatory' institutions; they would correspond to Searle's regulative rules. In choosing these labels 1 have
tried to give them a Searlean flavour while at the same time suggesting that they represent a different (i.e. hopefully improved)
version of Searle's two kinds of rules. Beyond that there is nothing to be read in the labels. They could be replaced by 'A-' and
'B-institutions' (In fact, labels of this latter kind were used in a previous version of this chapter, and I am grateful to Professor
David Garland who suggested to me the labels I am using now).
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example of a non-institutional system of rules is Hart's 'regime of primary rules' in Hart, 1994: 91ff).
My reason for using the word 'institution' in this sense is to emphasise the fact that what I take to be
the true distinction between the regulative and the constitutive is not the fact that only the former
regulates and only the latter allows for institutional facts. Both kinds of institutions do both, but in
different directions, so to speak: one regulates in order to constitute, the other constitutes in order to
regulatel4.
There still remain, however, some objections that could be presented against the thesis that there is a
difference in kind between two models of institution. These objections take the form of alternative
explanations for the differences between legal and game-adjudication, explanations that would not be
committed to the claim that they are qualitatively different. To them we should turn now.
The Game of Law
In this section I want to address some objections to the thesis presented above, i.e. objections that
amount to the claim that the difference between institutions like games and institutions like the law is
not one of kind, but one of (at most) degree 15. Needless to say, since the argument up to now has
effectively claimed precisely the contrary, I have to show why all these objections are wrong.
To begin with however, it could be said (i) that I have overvalued the certainty ofnorms of games. Is it
not the case that some norms of games are, after all, indeterminate in a Haitian sense? Any football-
lover knows that some actions are core-instances of, say, dangerous play, but also that the referee will
have to exercise discretion to decide whether or not some actions—which can be said to be penumbra-
instances of 'dangerous play'—are to be punished. Furthermore, (ii) the fact that these controversial
applications do not generate the same controversy as hard cases in law might be due to the existence of
a secondary rule of adjudication in football according to which decisions must be produced on the spot
and without further consideration (in fact, it is very difficult to imagine a game like football without
such a rale).
In my view, however, both of these facts are explained not by the fact that natural languages are
necessarily open-textured, but by the existence of rales to that effect. With regard to (i), the use of
vague standards like 'dangerous play'16 is, Hart himself tells us, a particular legislative "technique"
(Hart, 1994: 132) that it is reasonable to use when "it is impossible to identify a class of specific
actions to be uniformly done or forborne and to make them the subject of a simple rale" (ibid). This
must be distinguished from the philosophical claim about language according to which "whichever
14Again, this is basically a stipulative definition, and for that reason it is important to see the implications of it. It follows
Searle's stipulation, but it would not be agreed upon by, e.g. Neil MacCormick, who claims that a definition of institution in
terms of constitutive rules "would simply involve an obvious confusion between the law of contract and the legal institution
'contract' itself which is regulated by that branch of the law" (MacCormick, 1974: 51). It would also commit one to say that a
contract is a different institution in Germany than in France, while it could at least be claimed that the (same) institution of
contract exists both in German and in French law, though subject to different rules. I believe that MacCormick is quite right in
making the distinction between the system of rules and the institution that exist under it, but for ease of exposition 1 will use
one word to refer to both, hoping that the context will make the precise meaning clear.
1 5a further objection is dealt with infra, at 27n.
16 'An indirect free kick is awarded to the opposing team if a player, in the opinion of the referee [...] plays in a dangerous
manner' (Law 12, my italics).
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device [...] is used to communicate standards ofbehaviour, these [...] will prove indeterminate" (1994:
128, my italics), since even if the latter claim were false that 'legislative technique' could still be
useful in many cases. With regard to (ii), it clearly cannot be the case that we have no disagreement
about what the rules of football are for concrete cases because the referee has the final say on the
matter, since if that were the case we would not be playing (or watching or talking about) football but
some form of'scorer's discretion'.
So let us look elsewhere for an explanation. It could be argued, to support the thesis that the difference
between law's controversiality and games' uncontroversiality is not one of kind, but rather one of
degree, that this difference of degree is explained by the difference in the complexity of the regulations
that games and the law involve: games restrict the reality they deal with, and so they create a world
artificially simple (Huizinga, 1970: 28). The law, on the other hand, regulates at least potentially any
situation. In a more restricted world, it is possible to predict and to anticipate any problem the
application of a rule will present in the future, while this is impossible in law. The law has what
following Emilios Christodoulidis we could call a 'complexity deficit' (Christodoulidis, MS).
This view appears at first sight promising, but it is wrong. And to see why, compare the two following
cases:
Edson's Case. In a football match, each team is allowed to replace a given number of players only
(three in the last World Cup). If one team has already made those replacements, it cannot make a
further one in any circumstance whatsoever. Now suppose that this is the case, and that one of the
players of team A (call him Edson) is an extraordinarily good player: the performance of A is largely
improved when Edson is playing. Now, team B's manager knows this, so he decides to instruct
Arnold, one of his players, severely to injure Edson. The manager knows that ifArnold succeeds, he is
likely to be sent off, but he also knows that if the injury Edson suffers is bad enough, Edson will not be
able to continue playing and, since A cannot make further replacements, both teams will continue the
game with ten players (with a significant advantage for B, since Edson will not be playing for A). So
Arnold breaks Edson's leg.
Elmer's Case. Now imagine that Elmer wants his grandfather's money. He knows that his grandfather
has made a will in his favour, but he needs the money now (and his grandfather is, alas, very healthy).
So he kills him. Imagine further that none of the provisions of the statute ofwills said anything about a
legatee killing the testator, and all the requirements it does contain for the validity of a will have been
fulfilled by Elmer (and Elmer's grandfather). After he has been convicted for the killing, Elmer goes
on to claim the inheritance (Riggs v. Palmer, 115 NY 506, 22 NE 188 [1889]).
Elmer's case is regarded, in the jurispmdential literature, as a standard example of a hard case. On the
other hand, I submit that Edson's cannot be but a clear case, and that any football fan will agree with
me if I say that, however reasonable from a moral point of view that might be, the referee cannot
(without violating the rules of football) allow A to make a fourth replacement. I want to argue that no
difference in complexity can account for this fact (i.e. the fact that the former is or at least can be a hard
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case while the latter is definitively a clear one). In Edson's case, the rule does not leave any space to
the referee to decide... what? to allow Edson's team a third replacement? to declare Edson's team the
winner? to grant it a penalty kick? a free kick? an extra yellow card for every player in B? In Elmer's
case, however, though the rule does not appear to leave the judge any space, it does: the possibility of
discussing the application of the rule contained in the statute of wills is present: any sensible counsel
would see the possible arguments each side could use in court (it does not matter for the time being
whether or not these arguments are good enough to carry the day).
To be useful in this context, the recourse to the different level of complexity between a game like
football and the law must be related to the (supposed) inability of the law-maker to predict future cases
in such a complex normative system as the law is said to be. This was the idea behind Hart's view on
the convenience of uncertainty given by our 'relative ignorance of fact' and 'relative indeterminacy of
aim' (a view we shall come back to, below at 62ff). The solution would then be: in a 'simple'
normative system (e.g. football) the legislator (i.e. FIFA) can predict all the possible combinations of
relevant facts in the future, so that any participant can safely assume that the solution provided by the
rule is the solution actually sought by the authority. Hence, as all participants acknowledge the
authority ofFIFA, the rule can be applied to any conceivable case without controversy. In a 'complex'
normative system (e.g. law), on the other hand, participants cannot assume this knowledge on the part
of the authority, because, as the reality the law is dealing with is so complex, it is empirically
impossible for any legislator actually to predict all the possible combinations of relevant factual
features in the future. So the complexity of the system (strictly: the enormous number of possible
combinations of relevant factual features the system purports to take into account) allows space for the
following argument: 'this rule should not be applied to this case because it was not meant to'. This
would be the reason, on this interpretation, why purposive interpretation is so useful in legal hard
cases.
The problem with this approach is simply that there is no reason at all to assume that a case like
Edson's was actually predicted by FIFA (in fact, I would think that Elmer's case is more easily
predictable than Edson's, for that matter). The referee has to do what he does in Edson's case not
because he thinks that FIFA so decided (when, at the moment of enacting the replacements-rule, it
presented to itself the possibility of a case like Edson's), but because he has (given the nature of the
game) no other alternative. In other words, the correct solution is correct not because FIFA wanted this
solution for this particular case when it was passing the replacement rule, but because, given some up
to now mysterious peculiarity of games as institutions, what (the members of the relevant committee
of the) FIFA had in mind when the rule was passed is completely irrelevant. This becomes obvious if
we notice that even if the referee happens to know that FIFA did not think of this case his predicament
is the same.
Notice how to explain the difference between Edson's and Elmer's case on the basis of a complexity
deficit must necessarily beg the whole issue. In both cases there is a complexity deficit in the sense
that for each of them we might feel that there are some features of the case that should be relevant for
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the application of the rule. In Edson's case, however, the fact that the rule does not recognise those
features in its operative facts is the end of the issue, while this is not necessarily the case in Elmer's
case.
The fact that reality is infinitely variable is irrelevant to the problem of completeness, since the
legislator has no need at all to foresee all possible individual cases. The legislator does not issue
norms for each individual case [...]. His function consists in the creation of general norms, by means
ofwhich he resolves generic cases (Alchourron and Bulygin, 1971:30).
The difference, therefore, is not that the law has a complexity deficit that football does not have: both
of them can have it. The question rather is why is this complexity deficit relevant in legal adjudication
while it is not in football-adjudication. But this is the problem for which we are seeking an
explanation.
The argument begs the question even more clearly if we were to say that Elmer's case is more
complex because the law does not restrict (as games do) the considerations that can be referred to in
courts to those explicitly contained in the mles. This is true, and I will have something to say on this
issue later (infra, 28). Correct though it is, it is not a good answer to our problem here: according to
this explanation, the difference would indeed be one of complexity, but then again, the issue would be:
why cannot the law exclude such considerations? or rather: why does the fact that a football-rule does
not mention some feature X counts as the rale excluding that feature while in the law (at least
sometimes) the same fact does not necessarily imply that consequence? Thus it turns out that the
complexity deficit is not really an explanation, but a different way of describing the same problem:
why does the deficit matter in law and not in games?
It could be useful here to consider another possible explanation, one that seems backed by common
sense. According to it, the difference between games and the law is that games are not serious or
important. So we don't really care about achieving the right result in the application of the rales.
Because we don't really care, we have such a formalist type of adjudication.
There seem to be some important truth in this explanation, but we cannot take it at face value. The
reality is, many people would think that what is at stake in (say) some football matches is (for them)
more important than many things that are or may be disputed in courts. I will, however, return to this
point below (infra, 28), because there is a sense in which an explanation of this kind can be useful.
One last explanation could be offered on the basis of the arbitrariness of some norms: some norms are
arbitrary in the sense that the reasons for each of them are not reasons for their content, but only for
their existence. They have what Atiyah and Summers (1987: 13) called content-formality. On the other
hand, most (though by no means all) legal norms have low content-formality: the reasons for having a
norm regarding murder are reasons for the content of such a norm as well (that is, to punish murder).
Some legal norms are like rales of games in this sense (e.g. some traffic laws), and some rales of
games are like legal norms (e.g. the rale of dangerous play). And it could be claimed that rales that
have a high degree of content-formality cannot but be applied formalistically.
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This explanation would explain precisely the point posited at the beginning, i.e. that some norms of
games seem to be open-textured in the same way the norms of law are. But, conversely, it would seem
to imply that the application of (some) legal norms (i.e. those that have high content-formality) is
beyond plausible contestation in the same way that the application of rules of games is, and this is the
reason why it fails: the interesting feature of rules of games which is in need of explanation is that they
are (at least can be) indefeasible, while legal norms are always defeasible (though of course
undefeated many times). Even a legal norm with the highest content-formality, like the "drive-on-the-
left" norm is defeasible IB.
After Fuller (cf. infra, 7Iff) it is difficult to believe that there are kinds of legal rules that are beyond
defeasibility. Fuller taught us that regarding every (legal) rule cases can be imagined in which doubts
would legitimately be felt concerning the application of that rule. And this is the reason why the
explanation we are now considering fails: it explains the defeasibility of legal rules on the basis of
peculiar features of particular rules (i.e. the level of content-formality), thus implying that some other
rules (i.e. those that have high content-formality) are indefeasible.
We have already seen that failure to tackle this question affects (though of course need not invalidate)
John Searle's general theory of institutional facts, even though (maybe precisely because) Searle did
not deal with the subject of defeasibility. It is about time, therefore, to consider whether (and how) the
defeasibility of legal rules is a source of similar difficulties for an 'institutional theory oflaw\
Law as Institutional Fact
In his inaugural lecture some twenty five years ago, Neil MacCormick put forward the thesis that "if
the law exists at all, it exists not on the level of brute creation [...] but rather [...] on the plane of
institutional facts". What makes propositions of law true or false, he tells us, is not "merely the
occurrence of acts or events in the world, but also the application of rules to such acts or events"
(MacCormick, 1974: 51). Contracts, for example, are legal institutions. But legal institutions are not
identical with rules, since the institution of a contract is one thing, the contract I have with Edinburgh
University another. MacCormick's claim is that institutions are 'concepts', concepts that are regulated
by rules in the sense that instantiations of them can be brought about, have consequences and be
terminated according to those rules:
The term 'institution of law', as I shall use it, is therefore to be understood as signifying those legal
concepts which are regulated by sets of institutive, consequential and terminative rules, with the effect
that instances of them are properly said to exist over a period of time, from the occurrence of an
institutive act or event until the occurrence ofa terminative act or event (MacCormick, 1974: 53).
According to MacCormick, institutive rules are those that "lay down that on the occurrence of a
certain (perhaps complex) act or event a specific instance of the institution in question comes into
existence" (1974: 52); consequential are those rules that provide for the consequences the existence of
17 Witness Bill Shankly (cf. above, at 1).
18Consider the problem facing an ambulance driver when he arrives to a traffic jam and realises that the opposite lane is free
and nobody is coming that way (or rather the problem of the judge who has to decide if he deserves a sanction for having used
that lane).
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an instance of a given institution has. The existence of one instance of the institution in question is part
of the operative facts of these rules. Lastly, rules are terminative when they provide for the termination
of the particular instance of the institution under consideration (53).
Contrary to what the title of his article could make us believe, MacCormick claims that from the fact
that legal concepts (or at least some of them) are 'institutions' (and hence that the existence, effects
and termination of instances of them are determined according to rules) it does not follow that the law
itself is an institution: "there is an almost overwhelming temptation [...] to treat the concept Taw' like
the concept 'contract' as denoting an institution which is defined and regulated by the relevant set of
institutive consequential and regulative rules" (MacCormick, 1974: 57). This temptation must be
resisted, for
even ifwe accept the view that the social institutions concerned with making, declaring, elaborating
and enforcing the law are and ought to be governed in their action by legal norms we cannot eo ipso
assume that all the norms in question are like statutes in that they can be conceived as existing
'validly' in virtue of clearly statable institutive mles. It is at least contestable whether there are clear
criteria for the existence of mles of common law. Some have indeed contended that it is a fallacy of
positivism to suppose that the common law can be represented as a system or mles (1974: 57).
MacCormick believes that legal norms can exist that 'cannot be understood as being established in
virtue of necessary or sufficient criteria of validity'. This constitutes an objection to the claim that the
law is an institution, at least if we accept his definition of institutions as 'concepts regulated by some
set of institutive, consequential and terminative mles'.
But the consequences of this admission might be more important than MacCormick thinks they are.
For consider: if there are legal norms that can validly exist without having been produced according to
some institutive rule, then the existence, consequences and termination of those mles of law is not
controlled by institutive, consequential, and terminative mles alone (this is MacCormick's
concession). Because (assuming that) the institutive, terminative and consequential mles relating to the
common law as a source of law do not render sufficient and necessary criteria of validity, then the
common law cannot be an institution (MacCormick, 1974: 57, just quoted). But if that is the case, then
all legal concepts MacCormick is willing to call 'institutions' and whose institutive, consequential and
terminative mles are (at least partly) to be found in the mles of the common law cannot be institutions
because of the very same reason, i.e. because those mles would not completely regulate the (creation,
consequences and termination of instances of the) concept. Sometimes legal norms validly exist
though no institutive mle has been followed to bring them into existence. But very much the same
happens concerning not only legal norms but also instances of what MacCormick does want to call
'institutions of law': a contract, for example, can exist even if the institutive mles have not been
followed (see the example discussed by MacCormick, 1974: 68), and it can fail to exist even if the
institutive mles have been followed (see MacCormick and Weinberger for an example 1986: 12) Thus
it seems that either the law is an institution along with the others, or none of them is.
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Later in his lecture, MacCormick returns to this subject. He accepts (as did Hart, 1948) that institutive,
consequential and terminative rules are defeasible, with the consequence that they cannot specify
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an instance of an institution of law:
It is the open-ended nature of the exceptions justified by the principles of natural justice, abuse of
discretion, and such like, which would be fatal to any attempt to represent the express institutive mles
as containing necessary and sufficient conditions for valid adjudication by tribunals or whatever.
Even if, for any given administrative institution, we were to write out the statutory mles, including in
them all the exceptions hitherto imposed by the courts in that and analogous cases, we could not be
confident that we had succeeded in listing the sufficient conditions for validity of a determination or
an act ofdelegated legislation or whatever (MacCormick, 1974: 70).
And what he says here about institutive mles can equally be said "in relation to the other types ofmles
which I have mentioned, and indeed of 'mles of law' generally" (1974: 73). What mles of law lay
down are only 'presumptively sufficient' conditions:
in so far as at any moment in time statute or common law imposes clear requirements for the validity
of an act in law any act which conforms to those requirements ought to be presumed to be valid
unless it is challenged; such challenge must be based either on the proposition that the legal
requirements have nor 'really' been satisfied, i.e. should be construed more narrowly or widely that
hitherto [...] or that the presence of some further factor should be taken as vitiating the validity of the
act or institution (1974: 72).
But if this argument can do the trick for legal concepts, I cannot see why it could not do it for the law
itself. In both cases we would have institutive, consequential and regulative mles that specify what is
presumptively the case; and in both cases this would not prevent instances of the 'institution' (i.e. a
particular contract or a particular legal norm) from validly existing even though no institutive mle has
been used to produce it.
MacCormick would not be so easily persuaded: "we neither have criteria of validity for legal
principles, nor therefore a distinction between valid and invalid principles of law" (MacCormick,
1974: 73). Though it is possible to give an account of what makes true the statement 'the principle 'no
one may profit from his or her own wrong' is a principle of English law', how those conditions
actually work is something that cannot be understood without considering the values and purposes of
the law. And considering the values and purposes of the law is to consider the values and purposes the
participants to a legal practice ascribe to them: "mles do not themselves have purposes, except in the
sense that people may ascribe purposes to them" (MacCormick, 1974: 74).
The legal philosopher, according to MacCormick, has at this point to recognise that the explanation
that is needed is not philosophical but sociological: "the philosopher may still pose questions, but he
will have either to become a sociologist to answer some of them, or alternatively, have to wait for his
sociological colleagues to give him the answers" (1974: 74).
My objection to MacCormick's solution (i.e. treating legal concepts but not the law as an institution) is
this: the lack of criteria for the validity of legal principles implies, up to the same extent, lack of
criteria for the validity of instances of legal concepts like 'contract' and the like. Because of that lack
of criteria we might be surprised to find out that a given principle was part of the law though we did
not know it. But (at least sometimes) the normative consequences of this 'unexpected' (so to speak)
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principle will be to deny validity to some instance of the institution in question (e.g. to a contract) that
has been produced according to the relevant institutive rules (or, conversely, to lend validity to an
instance that has not been so produced); hence insofar as we lack criteria for the validity of legal
principles we lack criteria for the validity of instances of 'institutions of law'; insofar as the lack of
those criteria is a reason for something not to be an institution, then neither the law nor contracts are
institutions.
If, on the other hand, we follow MacCormick's advice and focus upon the fact that we do have
presumptively sufficient conditions for the validity of instances of institutions of law, then could we
not say that we also know what the presumptively sufficient condition for the existence of legal
principles are?
Notice again how all these complications would not in the least affect a theory of 'football as
institutional fact': the rule that specifies what a 'goal' is does not especify 'presumptively sufficient'
conditions for something to be a goal, but necessary and sufficient conditions of anything to be one.
And here we can see how MacCormick's philosopher can go one step further than he thought: instead
of taking it as a brute fact, she can try to explain what it is about the law that makes it so different from
other normative systems in this regard. Such an explanation, we shall see, is partly empirical and
partly conceptual. The argument in this chapter (and in chapters to come) is (I hope) the beginning of
itl92.
Two Models of Institution
It is time to pull the threads of the argument together. To do this we can start with the distinction
Searle failed to make between systems of rules (i.e. institutions) rather than rules. As was said before,
this is a distinction between system of rules (i.e. institutions) that constitute (i.e. create the possibility
of institutional facts to be brought about) in order to produce some regulatory effect in the world
(hence, as stipulated above: regulatory institutions) and systems of rules (i.e. institutions) that regulate
some forms of behaviour in order to create the possibility of institutional facts to be brought about
(hence autonomous institutions).
I think a distinction very much like the one I am trying to defend was in Wittgenstein's mind when he
wrote
19ln his "The Epistemology of Judging" (Morawetz, 1992), Thomas Morawetz stops, I believe, at the same point
MacCormick does. He criticises, in a way congenial to my own, the metaphor of games as 'misleading' when applied to the law
and others 'deliberative practices' (ofwhich he offers at 9 the following examples: "aesthetic debate, moral reasoning, historical
discourse, and judicial decision-making"). But he does not offer an explanation of why our deliberative practices are
deliberative. The closest he gets to that is his remark that, in games, "the rules are fixed, and assumed to be known to all. But
only the least important aspects of experience have this kind of simplicity. Only the least important aspects of life leave
participants the option whether or not to play. In more immediate and important practices [...] we have a stake unavoidably and
the shared rules-and-strategies are endlessly controversial" (Morawetz, 1992: 14-15).
This passage could be read as stating that non-deliberative practices are such either because they in some way 'deal' with the
'least important aspects of experience' or because they are 'optional' in the sense that people can exercise an option not to play.
Morawetz seems to believe that the latter is implied by the former, that is, that because non-deliberative practices deal with
non-important aspects of experience they allow for people to withdraw from them if they want. We have already seen (above, at
16f) that it is not 'importance' what makes non-deliberative (in my terms, autonomous) practices non-deliberative
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Why don't I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar
arbitrary? Because 'cookery' is defined by its ends, whereas 'speaking' is not. That is why the use of
language is in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and washing are not. You cook badly if you
are guided in your cooking by rules other than the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those
of chess you are playing anothergame, and ifyou follow grammatical rules other than such-and-such
ones, that does not mean you say something wrong, no, you are speaking of something else
(Wittgenstein, 1966: § 320)20.
The reason that for participants justifies the existence of an autonomous institution is the value they
recognise in being able to engage in the particular kind of activity the institution sets up. Though there
are (I believe) other examples of autonomous institutions, games are paradigmatic instances of them.
Concerning institutions of this kind, it is pointless to look for an underlying activity the system is
designated to regulate: it either does not exist, or, if it does, the point of the institution is not to regulate
it, but to create a new, institutional thing using it. Of course, there are reasons why we want these new
activities to exist: but these are reasons for inventing the institution. It is not the case that we invent the
institution because we want the underlying activities regulated in some particular ways: we do it
because we want to be able to do something new: to play football, or to spea a language, and so on
(this is why for Wittgenstein these rules are, in a sense, 'arbitrary' and speaking 'autonomous').
Consider, e.g., the case of boxing. At first sight it might be said that mles of boxing regulate a fight in
a way that is perfectly analogous to that in which the law regulates fights. But in the sense I have been
using the expression, this is clearly inaccurate. The point of the institution of boxing is not to regulate
fights (as, e.g. criminal law does), but to create a new, institutional, form offighting. Of course, the
creation of this institutional form of fighting called boxing is achieved (inter alia) by regulating the
brute fact of a fight. But the point of (or the reason for) inventing the institution of boxing is not to
regulate fights, but to create the game. Hence the mles are applicable only if you participate in the
game, because you do so; if you are not boxing, then you are under no boxing-obligation to apply the
mles of boxing, even if you are a professional boxer (you might or course have some other reason for
so doing: maybe you are better at fighting when you follow them, or you think that that is the only fair
way of fighting, etc... but these are not counter-examples here: in fact, I would claim that in such cases
you would not be applying the mles).
Regulatory institutions are different: it is clearly wrong to say, regarding them, that we invent (say) the
law because we want to create ex-novo new activities. Rather, we want to regulate in a certain way
some pre-existing activities, actions, relationships etc (and in this sense the mles are, at least partially,
'defined by their ends'). We want to be able not only to exchange goods, but also to have notions such
as futurity and obligation linked to the exchange, because an exchange in these conditions (contract)
seems to us more useful than a 'brute' exchange (see Atiyah, 1982a: 1)21. Of course, to do this we
(autonomous). As we shall see in the next section, Morawetz's second criterion (i.e. that those practices are in some way
'optional') is, in my view, closer to the correct explanation.
20wittgenstein's last claim is obviously false in many cases: see below, at 65n.
21 Atiyah argues against the idea of contract law being 'about' contracts. He rightly says that that view "presupposes that 'a
contract', like a railway or a ship, is itself something which exists outside the law" (Atiyah, 1982b: 1). I have no quarrel with
this. He then goes on to say that "while 'exchange' may exist in a pre-legal or a non-legal world, contract is crucially different
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have to invent institutional concepts like contract and the like, but the reason for so doing is our
interest in the regulation of some forms of behaviour that exist outside the institution. Furthermore, it
is not only not bizarre, but substantially accurate to say that because we want to regulate the killing of
one human by another and economic transactions we have to invent the law22. Notice that if a given
legal rule concerning an action cp (the celebration of a contract, the transfer of property, etc) exists,
then you are under a legal obligation to apply that rule every time you do (p. But you do not have a
(football-) obligation not to touch the ball with your hands if you are not playing football (see Rawls,
1955: 164).
As an illustration, consider Ba | kowski's explanation of the development of an institution (in this case,
promising):
The institution comes about because gradually a practice grows up where, for example, we do
something we said we will, not merely because of the substantive reasons we had in saying we would
do it, but also because of the reason that we said we would do it. At first that is one among all the
reasons but gradually it excludes the other and so we might say the convention of promising grows
up. We do it because we promised and the other reasons are excluded. Thus the institution grows up
on the back of the substantive reasons since the reason that it is a promise can be seen as the
universalisation ofthe substantive reason (Ba | kowski,: 13, my emphasis).
In this model, institutions (like promising) are (and are understood as) universalisations of substantive
reasons. The institution is not autonomous from the reasons for it. Notice, further, that what we say
here of 'institutions' could very well be applied to the rules of them: legal rules are seen as
universalisation of substantive reasons, as 'entrenched' generalisations (Schauer, 1991). This is the
reason why, though the rule might (some would say: has to) have some autonomy with regard to those
reasons, it cannot be completely cut off from them in the way the offside rule can, as we have seen.
Therefore, if instead of trying to explain the emergence of an institution like promising we wanted to
explain that of a game like football, or that of an institution of football like the penalty kick, we would
find that Ba | kowski's interplay between the mle and the substantive reasons is quite different.
Granted, there is always a sense in which football grew on the back of substantive reasons, and to see
this we can avail ourselves of the distinction between 'to play' and 'to play a game'(Opie and Opie,
1969: 2). Once upon a time, we can say, people did not play games, because no game had been
invented. They only played. In some moment, one of the players told the others that it would be much
more fun if they were to kick the ball through three posts instead of just among them. So they decided.
Then other players noted that it would be even more fun if there were a limited field, and two teams
with the same numbers ofplayers, and so forth. Sooner or later they will start playing football, or some
primitive form of it.
As we saw when discussing Searle's general theory, there is an asymmetry between regulatory and
autonomous institutions here. When participants in a given social practice are evolving the institution
from mere exchange". The claim merely is that the point of (the reason that justifies the existence of) contract law is precisely
to bring about this 'crucial transformation' of a mere exchange into a contract.
22lt goes without saying that the language I am using is in a sense particularly inaccurate: of course, "we" did not "invent" the
concept of contract "because" we "wanted" such-and-such. The history of the emergence of legal institutions is more complex a
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of money, they need not be aware that they are imposing on whatever they are using as medium of
exchange a meaning that is not exhausted by the physical properties of it. But football cannot be
played if the participants are not aware that those three posts at each end of the pitch have meaning in
addition to their physical properties: they are goals, and if the ball crosses them a point is scored.
Because regarding regulatory practices participants need not be aware of the fact that they are evolving
it, the interplay Ba | kowski sees between the rules and the reasons for them is quite different. This
relationship in games is, I would argue, 'one way only': because of the reasons discussed above
{supra, 4) FIFA decided to modify the offside rule. Once FIFA so decided, and only because of it, the
new rule is a rule of football. There is no going back to the reasons at the moment of applying the mle,
as we have seen. Now, some people claim that this is the same in legal adjudication. Much of this
work is devoted to showing why this is false, that the relationship between rules and reasons for them
is reciprocal. For the time being (and pending the full argument to be deployed in chapters 2 through
5), we can notice that in the evolution of the law we find the reasons growing in importance, and as
their importance grows the bearing they have upon legal decisions also grows. There is, needless to
say, an important conceptual difference between the beginning and the end of this process, but there
need be no precise moment in which the transformation of reasons into rules is effected. Because of
this, a 'genetic' account of the emergence of football along Ba | kowski's lines might be of interest for
the historian of football: it shows how football was brought out. But it would not help a referee that
needs to apply the rules: compare the case of promising, in which such an account would indeed help
someone who has to decide whether the fact that a friend is ill is relevant to her decision to keep a
promise to be somewhere else at the moment her friend needs her company. In other words, the
interesting thing about Ba | kowski's explanation of the emergence of moral or legal institutions is that
it illuminates the interplay between the rules and the substantive reasons they are supposed to advance,
interplay that is in turn explained because Ba | kowski shows the rules as 'universalisation of the
substantive reasons'. In the case of games there is no such interplay because the rules, though they
might be universalisation of substantive reasons, are not to be seen as such by participants. They are
seen as 'simply what we do'.
This last point is important since it shows why I do not have to deny that there are substantive reasons
for the mles of autonomous institutions (hence they need not be 'arbitrary'). Imagine that we are in a
convention inventing a game. We can decide, e.g. that we want a game of physical ability. That would
mle out any game like chess or bridge. Furthermore, we can also decide that our game is to be one of
team work, so tennis is excluded, and so forth; progressively, we write down the mles of football. We
might decide that we want to allow any physical ability, including the ability to injure the adversary if
this is useful. Or we can take a more sensible approach, and decide that we do not want to allow any
move that can affect the physical integrity of any player. Once we have decided that, we need to
introduce the pertinent mles: even in the first case, will have to forbid the use of weapons (at least
subject. But I think that the argument stands any level of complexity in relation to that history, and so I am using this inaccurate
language to facilitate the exposition.
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those which do not require the exercise of some physical ability). Furthermore, we could find that we
want to make the game safer, and to punish any move that can be dangerous for a player. We shall
find that there are two ways of achieving this aim (Hart, 1994: 125f): we can either elaborate a list of
the moves we consider dangerous, or we can give the referee discretion to determine if a given move
is dangerous (of course, we can mix these two approaches up: this is what happens today in football).
We will have to decide ifwe want more safety at the price of discretion, or if instead we want to deny
umpires discretion at the price of some safety. My point is that, given that we are deciding how to
build an autonomous institution, everything is up for grabs, though after each decision our space of
manoeuvre will be reduced. At the very beginning, when we decided to invent a new game, every
conceivable game was the possible outcome of our convention. After our first decision, as we saw,
games like chess were ruled out; after our second, tennis was. And so on. Some of the decisions we
will have the consequence of making the rules of our new game more or less defeasible. Indeed, I see
no a priori reason to believe that we cannot make the rules of our game completely indefeasible
(witness chess)23.
23lf chess is a better example than football (since the latter has rules like the dangerous play rule or the advantage rule and the
like, that require the referee to exercise discretion at the moment of application), it could be argued again that the distinction
between games and the law is not one of kind but rather one of degree: chess would be, according to this objection, at one end
of the spectrum, then a game like football, then a very formalistic legal system, then one less formalistic, etc..
This is wrong. An intuitive reason why chess might be a better example than football in this regard is due to the fact that
football is a game of physical contact while chess is not. What relevance does this fact have for a theory of institutional facts?
Consider the following: a handball occurs when a player (other than the goalkeeper in his penalty box) touches the ball with his
hands. What is a 'hand'? In the rules of football there is no definition of what a hand is, so if a mutant player with a fifth limb
touches the ball with it there might be a problem of application after all. But a bishop in chess has nothing to do with an actual
bishop, nor a knight with an actual knight, and so on. The rules of chess completely define what a bishop in chess is. There
cannot be a mutant bishop. As Grotius said, "certainty is not to be found in moral questions in the same degree as in
mathematical science. This comes from the fact that mathematical science completely separates form from substance, and that
the forms themselves are generally such that between two of them there is no intermediate form, just as is no mean between a
straight and a curved line. In moral questions, on the contrary, even trifling circumstances alter the substance, and the forms,
which are the subject of enquiry, are wont to have something more closely to this, now to that extreme" (Grotius, 1646: Book
II, Ch. 23 § I, p. 557 [393]).
Now, as Pufendorf was ready to argue, "the dictum 'in morals the least circumstance alters the matter' [i.e. Grotius' 'even
trifling circumstances alter the substance', quoted above], is ambiguous. For if the meaning is that the least circumstance alters
the quality of an action, that is, causes an evil quality to take the place of a good, this does not work towards uncertainty in
moral knowledge; for it is also true that a line which varies in the slightest degree from straightness, tends to curvature, but that
fact does not produce any uncertainty in geometry. If, however, the saying means that the slightest circumstance increases or
lessens the quantity of an action, we answer that this is not always true, at least in a civil court, where the judge often pays no
regard to trifles. And even granting this, the fact does not lessen the certainty of moral matters, since even in mathematics the
slightest addition or detraction makes a change in the quantity" (Pufendorf, 1688: Book I, Ch. 2 § 10, p. 34 [23-4]).
Does this mean that there is no 'latitude' in morals? Not at all: "as a matter of fact, a certain latitude is found in moral
quantities". But the explanation for this lies in the "different nature of physical and moral quantities. For physical quantities can
be exactly compared with one another, and measured and divided into distinct parts, because they are in a material way object
of our senses. Hence one can determine accurately what relation or proportion they have to one another, especially since with
numbers, which we use, all such relations are most exactly set forth [...]. But moral qualities arise from imposition, and the
judgement of intelligent and free agents, whose judgement and pleasure is in no way subject to physical measurement and so
the quantity which they conceive and determine by their imposition, cannot be referred to a like measure, but retains the liberty
and laxness of its origin. Neither did the end, for which moral quantities were introduced, require such a measure of exactness,
and such straining after details, but it was enough for the purpose ofman's life that persons, things, and actions be roughly rated
and compared (Pufendorf, 1688: Book I, Ch. 2 § 10, p. 35 [24]).
We shall shortly see that the law can attain the high level of certainty games have if only it is seen as being part of the
'physical' world. Insofar as the law is seeing as something that 'arises from imposition', as something regulatory in character,
there is space to question the application of its rules to any particular case, and that introduces 'a certain latitude'. Further
differences in the vocabulary should not bother us at this stage. The point is, when we leave the football-creating convention
and start playing football, the rules of the game are seen by players to belong to the structure of the world in the same way in
which the 'rules' of bridge-building belong to the world for engineers: if you want to build a bridge, do such-and-such; if you
want to score a goal, do such-and-such. But consider: if you want to write a will, do such-and-such (but actually, if you don't, it
might still be the case that you succeed in writing a will; if you do, it might be the case that you fail, etc).
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But a legal system is in this respect different from games, and to see this it could be useful to use an
example here. Consider Fuller's rule (to which we shall return in chapters to come): "It shall be a
misdemeanour, punishable by fine of five dollars, to sleep in any railway station". Now imagine that
two men are brought before me [i.e. the judge] for violating this statute. The first is a passenger who
was waiting at 3 AM for a delayed train. When he was arrested he was sitting upright in an orderly
fashion, but was heard by the arresting officer to be gently snoring. The second is a man who had
brought a blanket and pillow to the station and had obviously settled himself down for the night. He
was arrested, however, before he had a chance to go to sleep (1958: 664).
If we are to follow what I shall later call the standard (or: first) interpretation of Hart's 'open texture'
thesis, we would have to say that, insofar as the first man was doing something that it would be non-
controversial to classify as a 'core' instance of the word 'sleeping', he (and not the second, who wasn't
sleeping) must be fined. But this solution would strike any sensible lawyer (and many lay persons as
well) as, at best, odd. If the first man is to be acquitted, however, this is not because we can say that he
was not 'really' sleeping, but because we think that the mle should not be applied to this case (I shall
be more precise about what this 'should not be applied' means in chapters to come). But imagine now
that the mle is not a legal mle, but the mle of a peculiar game called 'staying awake in railway
stations'. The game consists in avoidance of falling asleep in the station, and if you do you have to pay
£ 5 to the other player. In this case, I think it is easy to see that the first man must pay but the second
should not, ifthey are playing this peculiar game.
In other words: the traditional (Hartian) insistence upon indeterminacy of meaning as the master
explanation of legal disagreement is clearly insufficient. The problem is not that we are not sure about
whether the first man was or was not sleeping in the station (because his was a 'penumbral' instance of
'sleeping'): we know he was (anyone who is not sure has to look 'sleeping' up in the Oxford
Dictionary). The problem is, rather, that we are unsure that the mle should be applied to this particular
case to the exclusion of all other considerations, though their explicit operative facts are indeed
fulfilled.
And here we can go back to the point made before, about games being somewhat less serious or
important than the law. As should be remembered, this explanation was rejected because some games
can be much more serious, for participants and spectators, than many legal disputes. So the point
cannot be one about seriousness simpliciter. But if we read it in the light of the distinction between
autonomous and regulatory institutions drawn above, we can reformulate it. We can say that the point
of some institutions is to invent new activities while the point of others is to select, from a vast array of
ways in which things can be done, those which are to be preferred. In the first case, then, the decision
to participate in the activity amounts to a decision to abide by the mles, i.e. not to question the
application of the rules to particular cases. If you do question that point, you fail to participate (see
below at 60ff). A football player that thinks it is better to score goals with the hands will not be
allowed to do so under present-day football regulations. Imagine him saying: 'the point of football is
to create a challenging game. If I am allowed to score with my hands, it will be more challenging than
it actually is', and then going on to do it, Maradona-like. The relevant football mle should be applied,
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and the goal should be invalidated. His insistence on the validation of the goal for the reasons given
will be taken as a signal that he did not really want to play football, but to invent another game (Rawls,
1955: 164). And if he is allowed to do so, nothing happens, except that the whole group starts playing
a new game, certainly not football (some people like to say that this is how Rugby was invented). In
this context, the most 'serious' thing that can happen is that these people fail to play football. But
(usually) there is nothing sacred about football, so they could perfectly say "yes, we are not playing
football: we prefer to play this new game, Rugby". It is in this sense that we can say that there is
nothing serious about games: we can always decide to play another game.
It is for this reason that in autonomous institutions it sometimes appears that the "normative becomes,
in a certain sense, descriptive" (Bankowski, 1996: 33)24. The rules are binding insofar as you want to
participate in the activity. If you don't, the rules don't matter. Hence the mles of an autonomous
institution can be seen as descriptions of how should you behave if you want to play the game.
If the argument so far is correct, then all the considerations made about games can be applied to other
institutions whose point is to invent a new activity: language, mathematics, and the like. Consider, for
example, the distinction between the mles of grammar and those of games, on the one hand, and those
of style and offair play, on the other (I am not implying that regulatory and autonomous institutions
always come in pairs). To create the possibility of speaking English or of playing football, we need the
mles of English grammar and those of football respectively. Before these mles are invented it is
impossible to do one thing or the other. These institutions do not exist in order to regulate the sounds
or marks we produce, nor the activity of running around a ball (though they indeed, in a sense, do
precisely that), but to create the very possibility of speaking (English) and playing (football). But once
they have been created, then we can treat these activities as pre-existing for another purposes, and so
we can think that, given that we can speak English or play football, we want to do so in special ways:
we want to speak beautifully, or to play in an elegant and sporting manner. This is the context for the
emergence of a regulatory institution: now we need a set of mles to regulate the activities of speaking
and playing (i.e. norms that single out some of many alternative ways of speaking and playing as
preferable). In other words, when we are trying not to set up the activity but to establish normative
standards for the better way to do something we can anyway do (like speaking English or playing
football or, indeed, performing exchanges), we leave the model of autonomous institutions and enter
into the regulatory model25. And, correspondingly, we lose the certainty the mles had in the former:
now it is not beyond plausible contestation what the standards of style or fair play demand, since now
mles are (and are seen as) universalisations of substantive reasons. It is important to notice here that
the mles of style and those offair play are clearly not mles of language/football: you don't have to
master the mles of English style/fair play to be able to speak English/play football, though of course
your speaking/playing will be better if you do. They exist precisely because it is possible to participate
24This is an important point, and we shall see it reappearing every now and then in the following chapters.
251 am aware that I am stretching the meaning of the word 'institution' when I say that fair play and style are institutions. The




in the activity of speaking English or playing football in different ways, and their point is to signal
some of these ways as preferable to others.
The Weightier Matters of the Law
The distinction I have drawn above is not an empirical distinction: it purports to be an conceptual one,
between two different models of institution. But the fact that the difference is conceptual does not
mean that the law is, as a matter of conceptual truth, necessarily 'regulatory'. The model a given
institution belongs to is an empirical question (though not the distinction itself), that is settled by the
way the participants understand their institution.
Consider the following analogy: it is a matter of conceptual truth (i.e. something that is settled by the
concept of 'mode of production') that a mode of production includes humans, raw materials and
means ofproduction. Whether a particular mode of production is capitalist or feudal or something else
is an empirical question, i.e. one that is settled by the kind ofproduction relations that actually obtains
in a particular society. But given that a mode of production is capitalist, it is a matter of conceptual
truth that, inter alia, proletarians are free. Similarly with the law: I would not object if someone were
to claim that the law is what I call 'regulatory' as a matter of conceptual truth. This would amount to a
verbal stipulation concerning the meaning of the word 'law', and as such would be both
unobjectionable and quite unhelpful. 1 would prefer to claim that this is an empirical question (indeed,
we shall be looking here at concrete instances of legal practices that I would like to call
'autonomous'). But if the answer to this empirical question were to be that a given legal system is a
regulatory institution, then some consequences would conceptually follow, consequences that will be
spelled out in this and the following chapters and explain why this distinction is important.
So let us consider what a legal system conceived of as an autonomous institution would be like. The
point I want to make is nicely illustrated by the way in which formalities can be regarded in different
legal cultures. Though any formality could be used here, I want to focus particularly on the formalities
required for the validity of a contract.
It seems to us completely obvious that formalities are required for some reason, a reason that is related
to the act to which the formality is attached (in other words: we are used to seeing rules as requiring
some formalities for the validity or enforceability of a contract as 'the universalisation of some
substantive reason': regulatory institutions). The contract of guarantee, e.g. is (was) considered
particularly liable to be agreed between parties of unequal bargaining power, so if the contract has to
be written down the weaker party will be in a better position to counter that inequality than if it is oral.
So the (English) law requires the contract of guarantee to be in writing (this is Atiyah's explanation: cf.
1995: 164). The formality is required because some reason of substance suggests the convenience of
its existence.
This way of looking at formalities is nowadays commonsensical: "insistence on form is widely
thought by lawyers to be characteristic of primitive and less well-developed legal systems" (Atiyah,
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1995: 163). But the question is, why are (so-called) primitive legal systems more rigorously
formalistic? The thesis I want to entertain here is that law has not always been regarded as a (to put it
in my words) regulatory institution. The insistence upon formalities, in a way that seems so bizarre to
us, is one of the consequences of the law being understood as an autonomous institution.
Here we would have to imagine a society in which officials and subjects understand the law (and the
world) in ways very different from us. We would have to imagine a society in which the law is seen
not as an artefact used to regulate social interaction, but as a technique to produce some desired
changes in the world. They could, for example, think of the law as a technique that rests upon
regularities that pertain to the very fabric of the world, very much like the way we understand the
technique of bridge-building (or cookery). They would think of 'obligation' as meaning literally a
(quasi-) physical bond, a bond that can only be brought about following a predetermined procedure, in
very much the same way in which we take a bridge to be a physical thing that can be brought about
following a predeterminate set of technical rules (or a prawn cocktail to be a physical thing that can be
created following certain procedures).
This is not a purely fantastic idea. Indeed, something like this is what the ancient Romans seem to
have believed, as Reinhard Zimmermann has claimed (Zimmermann, 1990: If, 82f). To be able to put
someone under an obligation would then mean to be able to create such a bond. But the way in which
this bond is thought of is not the way in which we think of an obligation. Neither is it, however, a
relation of pure power. Precisely through the use of such formalities "the creditor's real power over the
body of the person who was liable came to be replaced by a magical power over him, and it was for
this purpose that a formal ritual had to be performed" (Zimmermann, 1990: 83). The function of the
formalities of the stipulatio26, in this context, is quite different to the functions we are used to thinking
the formalities perform. We are used to seeing formalities as protecting or promoting some value,
interest etc. (i.e. as the universalisation of some substantive reason): the interest of third parties which
can be affected by the transaction, the interest of the weaker party in front of that of the stronger, the
facilitation of proof, hence the possibility of having less and cheaper controversies, etc. But for
(ancient) Roman lawyers, according to Zimmermann, all of this was beside the point. The ritual was
not required for policy-based considerations, but just because that was the only way of getting things
done:
it was only by means of these rituals that legal transactions could be effected: compliance with the
ritual formalities brought about a real (but invisible and in so far magical) change in the relationships
between the parties concerned. The slightest mistake would wreck the whole transaction: every
reader of fairy tales knows that magical effects can be engendered only by a most punctilious recital
of a set formula [...]. The actual reason for the desired legal result was not the consent between the
parties but the formal exchange ofthe words (Zimmermann, 1990: 83-84; my italics)27.
26The stipulatio was one of the most important contractual forms in Roman law. It was defined only by its form. Any
obligation could be created using it. See Zimmermann, 1990: 68ff.
27The issue of the magical character of law in Rome is a controversial one: compare Hagerstrom (1953: pp. 56ff), for whom
the role of magic in Roman law was ubiquitous, with G. MacCormack's criticism of this thesis (MacCormack, 1969). The
magic character of ancient Roman law is less controversial, though.
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It is not part of my argument that a formalistic understanding of formalities is only possible in
autonomous institutions. Some legal formalities are nowadays thought of in a very formalistic way
indeed. But the formal-ness of these areas of modem law is based upon considerations of policy: they
are (seen as) universalisations of substantive reasons. Hence it is always possible, at least in special
cases, to go back to the raw 'policy question'—and how 'special' a case has to be is a substantive
matter, i.e. something to be decided in the light of the policy-reasons underlying the formality (more
on this later). In (ancient) Roman law, on the other hand, there was no 'raw' moral (policy-) question
to go back to: the formalities were not required for substantive considerations, but just because that
was the only way in which a given effect could be brought about. This has as a consequence that the
application of the rules becomes highly certain and predictable:
The most characteristic feature of archaic Roman jurisprudence is its tendency to endow every (sacral
and) legal act with a definite form. Specific rituals had to be meticulously performed, precisely set
forms ofwords to be uttered with great punctiliousness. The smallest mistake, a cough or a stutter, the
use of a wrong term invalidated the whole act. This actional formalism corresponded to a similarly
strict formalism in the interpretation of those ancient legal acts. No regard was had to the intention of
the parties; what mattered were the verba used by them. The more rigid the interpretation, the more
care was, in turn, bestowed on the formulation of the formulae. The drafters had try to eliminate
every risk of ambiguity. This lead to scrupulous attention to detail [and] to cumbrous enumerations
[...]. Anyone who failed to employ such devices ran the risk of having to face unwelcome and
unexpected consequences: as was experienced, for instance, by those who had taken the vow to
sacrifice 'cuaequmque proximo vere nata essent apud se animalia' ('whichever animated things were
bom in their house next spring'). Not only animals but their own children also were taken to be
covered by these words (Zimmermann, 1990: 623).
To have an idea of what the law would be like in this context, we could well follow Zimmermann's
advice and think of fairy tales: if you don't say the magic formula exactly as it should be said, you fail
to produce the results you were looking for. Elmer's case would not have been a problem in this
setting: it does not matter who (and for what reasons) gets the magic lamp, the genie will obey. In the
terms of the argument presented here, there is no space for more or less reasonable interpretations of
what the formalities are: interpretations are either correct or not (more strictly, one interpretation is
correct and all the rest are not): qui cadit a syllaba, cadit a causa: the stipulatio was an institutional
fact whose existence, consequences and termination was completely controlled by institutive,
consequential and terminative rules. The rales did not (as modem legal rules do) provide mere
'presumptively sufficient' but necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of one instance of
it.
If we are to accept Zimmermann's claim about Roman law, my contention is that for ancient Roman
lawyers the law was not regarded as anything like a social technique "to induce human beings—by
means of the notion of this evil threatening them if they behave in a certain way, opposite what is
desired—to behave in the desired way" (Kelsen, 1934: 29) or the "enterprise of subjecting human
conduct to the governance of rules" (Fuller, 1964: 106), but as a magical language that had to be
mastered if some effects were to be produced, magical language that was created by the Gods and
communicated to humans by priests—remember that in ancient Rome the law was administered by the
32
GAMES AND THE LAW
Roman Pontifices, who were state priests28. Note that there is no need of justification in this legal
system: imagine one Roman farmer asking his lawyer: 'why should I answer precisely "spondeo" to
celebrate a stipulation Is it not enough to manifest my consent with any appropriate word?' The lawyer
would say: 'you simply cannot do otherwise if you want to celebrate such a contract' The situation is
entirely similar to that of a boy asking 'why cannot I move the king more than one space at a time?' or
a naive engineer asking 'why should I build bridges in this particular way?' ('because if you don't
you'll fail to play chess/build a bridge').
If I am right in this regard, then we should expect to find a different conception of legislation. Since
the formalities for the validity of contracts were not universalisation of substantive reasons, policy-
considerations did not have any bearing on the selections of the specific forms required, nor upon the
consequences of failing to follow them.
And we do find, for example, that though the Romans did have statutes forbidding the conclusion or
the content of certain contracts, they used a system of statutory prohibitions that seems very peculiar to
the modem observer:
Three different types of statutes were distinguished [...]: leges imperfectae, leges minus quam
perfectae and leges perfectae. Only acts performed in violation of leges perfectae were void. Leges
minus quam petfectae threatened the violator with a penalty, but did not invalidate the act itself.
Infringement of a lex imperfecta led neither to a penalty nor to invalidity (Zimmermann, 1990: 697-
8).
The question presents itself immediately: what was the point of leges imperfectael If the contract was
to be forbidden, why not to use a lex perfectal The answer is that
[i]n the early days of Roman law the validity of a transaction seems to have been judged only from
the point of view of the required form. If the formalities were not complied with, the transaction was
invariably and irremediably void; where, on the other hand, they had been observed, it was
unquestionably valid. That statutory prohibitions could interfere with and indeed completely
invalidate formal private acts was inconceivable to the lawyers and the law-makers of the earlier
Republic (Zimmermann, 1990: 698; see, for a different explanation Stein, 1966).
A similar point has been made by David Daube from a different perspective: Daube was intrigued by
the peculiar verbal forms Romans used, and by how those forms changed during the centuries. Roman
statutes usually contained the imperative form ('shall', 'shall not'); in some of them, however, the
imperative form is replaced by phrases like 'it is needful', 'it is proper' etc. Daube focuses upon the
different meaning of verbal forms of the following kind: 'if anyone damages another's property, it will
be needful for him to pay' and 'if anyone damages another's property, he shall be bound to pay'
(Daube, 1956: 4). According to Daube, phrases of the former type
express, not a direct command—'I order you to do this or that'—and not even a freely formed
opinion—'Inmy view you should do this or that'—but a reference to some higher authority—'There
are compelling reasons to do this or that' (Daube, 1956: 8).
28The main point holds even is this claim is historically false, i.e. even if the ancient Romans did not see their law as
something given by the Gods: we do not think (not all of us, at least) that the laws of gravity were given by God, and that is not
an obstacle of conceiving of bridge-building as a technique that rests upon the basic structure of the world. In other words, how
and why the participants come to view the world as they actually do is immaterial here.
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So the reason why this verbal forms are so common in Roman law was, according to Daube, that the
legislator did not see himself as creating the obligation to pay damages (to use the former example). It
would be odd for us to say: 'if anyone wants to build a bridge (or to prepare a prawn cocktail), he or
she is bound to...' rather than 'if anyone wants to build a bridge (prepare a prawn cocktail), it will be
needful for him or her to...'. Hence it should not be surprising by now to find out that these special
verbal forms
belong without exception to the sacred law. 'If a man is killed by lightning [...], it is not permissible to
celebrate the funeral rites for him.': evidently, this is not the decree of a free lawgiver, a lawgiver who
might, if he liked, enjoin the opposite. It is, essentially, interpretation; It is the wise men's reading of
the divine will. The priests [...] do not dictate to you. They inform you of the results of their studies of
sacred things (Daube, 1956: 9).
The interesting point is that this indirect imperative form ('it is proper to...') is not used by republican
and classical lawyers to speak of the requirements of the praetorial law (ius honorarium), but only to
the old ius civile. Only the ius civile was understood in the magical sense with which I am now
concerned: "a praetorian or aedilician obligation cannot be inferred from a search into the law or
legally recognised transactions" (Daube, 1956: 15): it rests only upon the praetor's (aedile's) authority.
So Daube's remarks lend support to Zimmermann's view: the law (i.e. the old ius civile) was not seen
as a social institution created by humans to regulate their affairs, but as something that was part of the
very structure of the world, something that could be mastered and put to use by humans if only they
came to know it.
This is why "insistence on form is widely thought by lawyers to be characteristic of primitive and less
well-developed legal systems" (Atiyah, 1995: 162). Insistence on form, just for form's sake, is
demonstrative of a magical understanding of law, an understanding in which the law is given, not
made (just as the rules of chess are given to the players, not made by them29). This attitude changes
according to changes in the respective legal culture: "the attitude of a legal culture towards form
reflects its self-image and maturity" (Zimmermann, 1990: 88). The important point is that when this
attitude towards form has changed, controversies can arise:
even when specific forms are still required [in modem law] a tendency is often observable in the
practices of the courts to water down such rules. They have all been introduced in order to achieve
certain legislative purposes [...]. It is of course perfectly possible that, in an individual case, these aims
could have been realised in other ways, even though the formal requirements were not met by the
parties [...]. The sanction of invalidity therefore seems to overshoot the mark: it is not demanded by
the policy underlying the rules requiring formality of the act [...] Equitable inroads have therefore
from time to time been made in the domain of statutory forms (Zimmermann, 1990: 86-87)30.
The transition from an autonomous to a regulatory conception of the law can also be seen in the Bible.
Isaac's blessing of Jacob instead of Esau is valid, even though it was obtained with deceit (Gen. 27:
29My argument above was that in autonomous institutions the legislator is free to decide whatever she wants, so there seems to
be a difference between games as autonomous institutions and a magical conception of law. But this should not bother us. What
is important is that rules, both for the umpire and for a Roman judge are not to be seen as universalisations of substantive
reasons, but as a description of the world. Think of a football team coming to the World Cup: the rules of football are there,
they are part of the world for them.
30Cf Zimmermann (1990: 118-119), for the same point concerning the sponsio (suretyship): once ritual requirements have
been relaxed (because there is no magic in them) "intricate problems of interpretation could arise" (concerning the unitas actus
—the requirement of the sponsio to follow immediately the celebration of the respective stipulatio).
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18-40): Jacob disguised as his brother and made his father believe he was Esau. Because of his father's
mistake, he received the blessing though he was not the first-bom. The case is revealing because Esau
"wept bitterly": "Bless me, too, my father", but what was done was done: "your brother came full of
deceit and took your blessing" (Gen: 35). The blessing was a (quasi-) physical thing, something Jacob
had taken from Isaac though he was not, under the law, entitled to it. The deception, having
succeeded, could not affect the fact that Isaac did not have a blessing for Esau other than "by thy
sword shalt thou live, and shalt serve thy brother" (Gen. 27: 40): if someone takes the prawn cocktail I
am about to eat, I cannot eat it or give it to you, since I do not have it any more; Jacob took the
blessing and Isaac could not go back and 'invalidate' it, anymore than I could 'go back' and
'invalidate' someone's taking ofmy prawn cocktail and then eat it myself.
Notice the huge difference between this understanding of the law and Jesus' 'new law'. What was
important was not the ritual fulfilment of the rales. The ruler of the Synagogue was indignant with
Jesus for healing a possessed woman on the Sabbath: "there are six working days: come and be cured
in one of them, and not on the Sabbath" (Luke 13: 14). This ritualistic way of understanding the law is
scorned by Jesus:
What hypocrites you are! He said. Is there a single one of you who does not loose his ox or his
donkey from its stall and take it out to the water on the Sabbath? And here is this woman, a daughter
ofAbraham, who has been bound by Satan for eighteen long years: was it not right from her to be
loosed from her bounds on the Sabbath? (Luke 13: 15-16).
The ruler could have answered 'if she has waited eighteen years, can't she wait one more day?: the
law ought to be followed'. But he didn't: he was "covered with confusion while the mass of the people
were delighted at all the wonderful things [Jesus] was doing" (Luke 13: 17)31.
One could think from this that Jesus' law was not law at all, that his was a particularist ethics. But he
clearly did not see his message in his way: "do not suppose that I have come to abolish the law and the
prophets; I did not come to abolish, but to complete. Truly I tell you, so long as heaven and earth
endure, not a letter, not a dot, will disappear from the law until all that must happen has happened"
(Matthew 5: 17-18). Jesus' new law was regulatory law; an alternative translation ofMatthew 5: 18 in
The New English Bible makes this point clearer: "Truly I tell you: so long as heaven and earth endure,
not a letter, not a dot, will disappear from the law before all that it stands for is achieved" (Italics
added). So the message was precisely that the law was not a ritualistic-formalistic-magical set of rales
that had to be fulfilled in detail (autonomous law), but something with a point, something that stood
for something else (regulatory law). Later Jesus was to come back to this point:
Alas for you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! You pay tithes ofmint and dill and cumin; but you
have overlooked the weightier demands of the law—justice, mercy and good faith. It is these that you
should have practised, without neglecting the others" (Mt. 23: 23).
Commenting on this passage, Harold Berman has said "what the whole passage says is first, that the
heart of the law is 'justice and mercy and good faith', and second, that the lesser matters, the
31Jesus was constantly accused of not keeping the Sabbath: cf. John 7: 22-23; 9: 16, etc.
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technicalities, the taxes, the 'mint and anise and cumin' are also important, although they should be
subordinated to the main purpose" (Berman, 1993: 391).
In an autonomous institution the 'mint and anise and cumin' is all that matters, insofar as you are
participating in the activity the institution sets up (or: in autonomous institutions there is no distinction
between the 'mint and anise and cumin' and the 'weightier matters'). But a regulatory institution is
characterised by the fact that 'justice and mercy and faith' must be done. This means that the
'technicalities' do matter, but they are not (as in autonomous law) all that matter. Legal disagreement
is explained by the fact that these two dimensions of regulatory law should be weighed up somehow: it
is a disagreement about the correct way to balance them. We shall come back to this crucial point in
some detail in chapter 3.
Jesus and the Pharisees would probably agree that they have to follow God's will. The difference was
that the Pharisees believed that God's will was (as far as they could know it) the law. Hence, the law
had to be followed blindly. To follow God's will was to follow God's law, because the law was the
will: hence if you want to follow God's will, just follow the law; you need not ask what the law is
really about, because it was given by God—he must know. But Jesus changed this: when the lawyer
asked for a clear-cut definition (who is my neighbour?), he got a story and after that only the answer
"go and do as he did" (Luke 10: 37)32. Now to follow God's will (not only—or necessarily—the law
in the formalistic-ritualistic view) was important: the (formalisticly conceived) law was not enough.
To the man who had followed the law since he was a boy, Jesus said: "one thing you lack; go, sell
everything you have, and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven. Then come and
follow me" (Mark, 10: 21).
Remember one of the characteristics of games, according to Huizinga:
inside the play-ground an absolute and peculiar order reigns. Here we come across another, very
positive feature of play: it creates order, is order. Into an imperfect world and into the confusion of
life it brings a temporary, a limited perfection. Play demands order absolute and supreme. The least
deviation from it 'spoils the game', robs it from its character, and makes it worthless (Huizinga 1970:
29).
In this view, a religion (if understood as an autonomous institution) is, as David Lodge so funnily
showed, not at all far from a game, particularly if we have in mind that in Huizinga's terms to play a
game can be extremely 'serious'. Hence Huizinga's analysis of religion as a form of play. But to say
of modem Judaism—or of modem Christianity, for that matter—that "the least deviation from it
makes it worthless" is not correct, because Judaism today allows scope for deviations,
reinterpretations, re-readings and so on. The same could be said of (ancient) Roman law: the least
32peter Winch has rightly emphasised that the parable of the Good Samaritan was offered as an explanation of what the law
was. Jesus' first answer to the lawyer's question was : "what is written on the law?", and after the lawyer's answer, he said:
"thou have answered right. This do, and thou shalt live". It was only when the lawyer, "willing to justify himself' asked Jesus
about the interpretation of the law that "Jesus, answering, said, A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho..." (Luke
10: 26-30. Cf. Winch, 1987: 155f). Winch, furthermore, calls our attention to the fact that Jesus' answer to the lawyer's
question was not linked to the latter's sharing a belief in God: "[the parable] did not appeal to the conception [of God as law¬
giver]: it challenges it. Or at least it commented on the conception in a way which presupposed that the moral modality to
which the Samaritan responded would have a force for the parable's hearer's independently of their commitment to any
particular theological belief'(Winch, 1987: 160).
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deviation from the wording of the stipulatio (for example, if the promisor answered the ritual question
not with the word 'spondeo' but with any other word, however similar or even identical in meaning)
made the whole thing worthless. In classical Roman law (and even before) however, the raising of the
ius honorarium and the actiones bone fidei changed this: it was no longer true that "the least deviation
from it makes it worthless". Now some form of 'justice, mercy and good faith' had to be done, without
neglecting to pay 'tithes ofmint and dill and cumin': how these two things were served at the same
time became debatable; hence the parties had now space for offering different views about what the
law required, regardless of the words and the rituals used.
The distinction between two models of institution that was put forward in this chapter is by no means
new. Probably the clearest formulation of it, along with a realisation of its consequences for law and
legal reasoning can be found in Max Weber's Economy and Society.
Law [...] is 'formal' to the extent that, in both substantive and procedural matters, only unambiguous
general characteristics of the facts of the case are taken into account. This formalism can, again, be of
two different kinds. It is possible that the legally relevant characteristics are of a tangible nature, i.e.
that they are perceptible as sense data. This adherence to external characteristics of the facts, for
instance, the utterance of certain words, the execution of a signature, or the performance of a certain
symbolic act with a fixed meaning, represents the most rigorous type of legal formalism. The other
type of formalistic law is found where the legally relevant characteristics of the facts are disclosed
through the logical analysis ofmeaning and where, accordingly, definitely fixed legal concepts in the
form of highly abstract mles are formulated and applied. This process of 'logical rationality'
diminishes the significance of extrinsic elements and thus softens the rigidity ofconcrete formalism.
But the contrast to 'substantive rationality' is sharpened, because the latter means that the decision of
legal problems is influenced by norms different from those obtained through logical generalization of
abstract interpretations ofmeaning. The norms to which substantive rationality accords predominance
include ethical imperatives, utilitarian and other expediential mles, and political maxims, all ofwhich
diverge from the formalism of the 'external characteristics' variety as well as from that which uses
logical abstraction. However, the peculiarly professional, legalistic and abstract approach to law in the
modem sense is possible only in the measure that the law is formal in character. In so far as the
absolute formalism of classification according to 'sense-data characteristics' prevails, it exhausts
itself in casuistry. Only that abstract method which employs the logical interpretation of meanings
allows the execution of the specifically systematic task, i.e. the collection and rationalization by
logical means ofall the several mles recognized as legally vahd into an internally consistent complex
ofabstract proposition (Weber, 1967: 61-2, my italics).
What Weber calls "formalism of the 'external characteristics' variety" is the formalism of ancient
Roman law, i.e. the formalism of autonomous law. As in modem legal systems, cases had to be solved
according to the mles, not evaluated according to their particular and concrete features. But, unlike
modem legal systems, the 'external features' of the case, as Weber calls them (features the applicable
mle makes explicitly relevant, I would prefer to say) are all that there is to it: if the defendant did say
spondeo in the correct setting, he was bound by a stipulatio. Otherwise, he was not. This 'system', as
Weber says, 'exhausts itself in casuistry' since no principle can control or defeat the application of the
mle in the same way in which no principle of, say, 'favour the most aggressive team' can control or
37
FERNANDO ATRIA
defeat the application of the offside rule regardless of the level of institutional support the rules could
offer to a principle like the one mentioned33.
For a completely different example, consider Hegel's criticism of mathematical knowledge (as
discussed by Cohen, 1996). According to him, a mathematical explanation or proof is external to the
subject, in so far as
[t]he necessity does not arise from the nature of the theorem: it is imposed; and the injunction to draw
just these lines, an infinite number of others being equally possible, is blindly acquiesced in, without
our knowing anything further, except that, as we fondly believe, this will serve our purpose in
producing the proof (Hegel, 1971: 102).
Qua result the theorem is, no doubt, one that is seen to be true. But this eventuality has nothing to do
with its content, but only with its relation to the knowing subject. The process ofmathematical proof
does not belong to the object; it is a function that takes place outside the matter at hand (1971: 100-1,
my emphasis).
Hegel's point here, if I have understood him correctly, could be expressed saying that the truth of a
theorem is to be found in the definitions and rules ofmathematics, not in "the object"—whatever that
means. To understand a theorem is to be able to reproduce its demonstration: "if anyone came to know
by measuring many right-angled triangles that their sides are related in the way everybody knows, we
should regard knowledge so obtained as unsatisfactory" (Hegel, 1971: 100). But—though the result is,
'no doubt' seen to be true—the knowing subject cannot see the necessity of the proof: "the proof takes
a direction that begins anywhere we like, without our knowing as yet what relation this beginning has
to the result to be brought out" (102; my emphasis).
In other words, an institution like mathematics allows us to have absolute certainty with regard to
mathematical knowledge, but this knowledge is in a way defective, because the process of proof is not
internally related to the subject matter: we have to follow the process of proof in the hope that it will
lead us to the demonstration we are seeking. The stages of that process are strictly determined by the
(mathematical) rules, and the result is true in accordance to these rules.
The same happens, I would say, in any formal institution. Precisely because all that matters is the
solution-according-to-the-institution, the process of finding it is external to the subject-matter. All of
this is, however, entirely irrelevant to the solution of the case, because all that matter is the
demonstration of what has to follow according to the (autonomous) law. The justification of what
(autonomous) law requires in these particular cases is not related in any way to the point at issue, but
to the mles in question. As in mathematics according to Hegel, this understanding of law allows us to
have absolute certainty about what it requires, but this absolute certainty has its price.
33Paul Amselek has also noticed that games are not analogous to law in important respects for reasons similar to those
developed above. The difference is, according to him, that while in games 'existence precedes essence' in law (and other
institutions) essence precedes existence. Cf (Amselek, 1988: 211). His remarks on this regards are, I believe, fully compatible




In this chapter I will try to defend the view that legal reasoning cannot be correctly understood from a
positivistic (this will, for the time being, mainly mean a Hartian or Razian) perspective. This chapter
focuses upon Joseph Raz's 'sources thesis' and specifically on his authority-based argument for it, and
goes on to claim that the explanations of legal disagreement Raz's argument allows cannot do the job
they are supposed to do. The next chapter will survey alternative explanations, all of them compatible
with the sources thesis, but the conclusion will remain the same: all these explanations fail, and that
counts as a refutation of the sources thesis. Raz's arguments for it, however, are not refuted by the
problems the thesis faces. Any plausible alternative, I shall further claim, cannot be positivistic but at
the same time has to be able to answer Raz's argument. That these two are not easy conditions
simultaneously to meet is something I hope will be clear by the end of the fifth chapter.
The Sources Thesis and the Problem of Authority
We begin with an examination of Raz's 'authority-based' argument for what he calls 'the sources
thesis'. Raz's own starting point is the assumption that "law, every legal system which is in force
anywhere, has defacto authority" (1985: 199). Having defacto authority implies, according to Raz, at
least claiming de iure authority. Therefore the claim to (legitimate) authority is, according to Raz,
"part of the nature of law" (Raz, 1985: 199). The notion of de iure authority is thus explanatorily
fundamental in relation to that of defacto authority.
Now, in Raz's elaborated theory of authority, an authority is legitimate insofar as it complies with the
three following requirements (1985: 198; see also Raz, 1986: 38-69):
1. "All authoritative directives should be based, among other factors, on reasons which apply to the
subjects of those directives and which bear on the circumstances covered by the directives" (the
dependence thesis);
2. "The normal and primary way to establish that a person should be acknowledged to have
legitimate authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better
to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he
accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding, and tries to follow them,
than if he tries to follow the reasons which apply to him directly" (the normal justification
thesis); and
3. "The fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance
which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should
replace some of them" (the pre-emption thesis).
According to Raz, since it is a matter of conceptual truth that the law claims to have legitimate
authority, it follows (unless one wants to claim that most of the people have been deceived for most of
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the time regarding an important aspect of an important social institution) that the law, unlike (he says)
a tree, has to be the kind of thing that can have authority. It has to have, in his words, 'authority-
capacity'.
Authority-capacity requires, according to Raz, the presence of the non-moral features of legitimate
authority (the moral features, on the other hand, being those whose presence make a defacto authority
a legitimate one). These features are two: (a) the authoritative directives must be presented as the
authority's judgement of how the subjects ought to behave and (b) "it must be possible to identify
[them] as being issued by the alleged authority without relying on reasons or considerations on which
[the] directive purports to adjudicate" (1985: 202).
Note how these two features follow from the dependence and normal justification theses. If the
authoritative directives are supposed to reflect the reasons that apply to the subjects directly, then for
anything to be an authoritative directive it must at least be possible to regard it as reflecting someone's
view of the right thing to do on the balance of reasons. On the other hand, if the authority is legitimate
only insofar as its subjects are likely better to comply with these reasons if they follow the directives
rather than their own judgement, then it must be possible for the subjects to follow (hence: to identify
and understand) the directives without relying on their own judgement. Raz's favourite example in this
point is that of an arbitrator. The arbitrator's judgement is supposed to reflect the balance of the
reasons that were directly applicable to the parties (dependence thesis: the arbitrator is not supposed to
create new reasons for the parties, but to adjudicate on the existing reasons). Her judgement can have
authority, therefore, only if it is presented as the arbitrator's view of the right balance of reasons (first
condition). The decision, on the other hand, has to be such that its identification does not require going
through the whole substantive reasoning again (second condition). What would a decision like 'I have
considered the matter and I have decided that you should do what you ought to do on the balance of
reasons' be useful for? (Raz, 1985: 203. We shall see, however, that the example of the arbitrator is
misleading in one crucial sense—below, at 45).
Raz believes that this argument holds even if his conception of authority is not accepted. All that is
needed is "the claim that it is part of our notion of legitimate authority that authorities should act for
reasons, and that their legitimacy depends on a degree of success in doing so" (1985: 204). This weak
assumption is enough, for Raz, to "hold that only what is presented as someone's view can be an
authoritative directive" (204). Regarding the second feature, all that has to be assumed is that
authorities make a difference, i.e. the fact that an authority issued a directive changes the subject's
reasons. It follows that the existence of reasons for an authority to issue a directive does not, by itself,
without the directive having actually been issued, lead to this change in the reasons which face the
subjects [...]. The existence and content ofevery directive depends on the existence of some condition
which is itself independent of the reasons for that directive (Raz, 1985:204)
The upshot of Raz's argument is the sources thesis: all law is (only) source-based law, and "a law is
source-based if its existence and content can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without
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resort to any evaluative argument" (1985: 195). Raz argues that the traditional sources of law
(legislation, custom, precedent) comply with this constraint34.
Note that the argument is not necessarily a moral argument (though see Perry, 1995: 131n). All it
presupposes is the normativity of law, that is, that the law gives rise to reasons for action. This point
being granted, the argument goes on to explain that the law makes a practical difference by way of
being understood as authoritatively reflecting the reasons that applied to the subjects anyway.
Naturally, if it is also held, as a moral argument, that the law serves, e.g. the common good by
providing solution for co-ordination problems, then the sources thesis becomes stronger than before.
But it does not need such a moral ground.
This ends my (very brief) summary of Raz's argument for the sources thesis. Now the first thing that
should be asked is precisely what the sources thesis requires. Ifwe try to answer this question we shall
find two preliminary problems. In first place, It must be remembered that for Raz the sources thesis
requires that "it must be possible to identify the directive as being issued by the alleged authority
without relying on reasons or considerations on which [the] directive purports to adjudicate" (1985:
202, my italics). Here, the requirement sets a condition for the identification of the directive. Only a
directive that can be identified as such without relying on considerations of substance can have
authority-capacity. But later the requirement mutates. "[The subjects] can benefit by [the authority's]
decisions only if they can establish their existence and content in ways which do not depend on raising
the very same issues which the authority is there to settle" (1985: 203. My italics. Later Raz talks of a
directive's "existence and content" as subject to this requirement: 1985: 204). So, is the requirement
one related to the identification of law or to the determination of its content? Is it possible to make a
sensible distinction between the two?
Is it the same to talk of the identification of something as a species of a certain kind and of the
determination of its content? In some cases the distinction is not easy to draw. On way of identifying
something as a novel is, for instance, to look at its content. But it cannot be said that the task of
identifying something as a member of a certain kind and that of ascertaining its content are the same,
however important connections may exist between the two. You may not know what the meaning of
Picasso's Guernica is, but still be able to identify it as a work of art. Similarly, to know if something is
a judicial decision one has to inquire if it was decided by a legally appointed court, if it was given
following the appropriate procedure, etc. It is not necessary to know the content of the decision to
determine if it is to count as one or not. Therefore it is not the same to say that the content of an
authoritative directive is to be grasped without reference to substantive considerations than to say that
it must be possible to identify it as a directive without relying upon these considerations {see
Mitrophanous, 1998: 623). Which of these claims is Raz's?
34Raz only makes casual references to custom, only to say that it complies with the sources thesis (Raz, 1985: 205; 1980: 214).
This does not seem to me so straightforward, but 1 will not press the issue here, because I will argue that the sources-thesis is
false, at least regarding the law as it is today.
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The reason for the requirement is that "authorities make a difference". If the issuing of a new law
changes the subject's practical situation {i.e. if it is going to enter into their practical deliberation in
any way35), this can be only if they can establish both its existence and its content with independence
of the reasons that already applied to their situation.
Raz's arbitrator {cf. supra at 40), who says 'I have reached a decision, and that is that you have to do
what you have to do' has rendered a decision easily identifiable by its non-evaluative features, but the
content of it is impossible to ascertain without considering the substantive reasons on which he was
supposed to adjudicate. Raz thinks this to be an example of an authoritative directive that fails to have
authority-capacity: the parties in the example "were given a uniquely identifying description of the
decision and yet it is an entirely unhelpful description" (1985: 203). Therefore, he has to claim that his
requirement applies not only to the identification of a directive but also to the determination of its
content.
The second ambiguity in Raz's argument concerns precisely what this requirement rules out. Looking
back to more or less the same paragraphs (with different italicisation) we can see that the formulation
changes in each of them. Originally, what could not be done was to identify a directive (and its
content) "relying on reasons or considerations on which [the] directive purports to adjudicate" (202),
but later the requirement was mutated to exclude the "raising [of] the very same issues which the
directive is there to settle" (203) and sometimes it is very broad indeed: "a law is source-based if its
existence and content can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any
evaluative argument" (195), or "without resort to moral argument" (218; all these italics are added).
These statements contain different requirements (I will identify them according to the pages in which
they appear). 195 is the strongest: it excludes any evaluative consideration whatsoever. Depending on
the meaning of 'moral', of course, 218 could be equally strong or weaker than 195 (Raz switches the
meaning of 'moral' in different places: cf. 1994, 88n 6, 244n 12). On the other hand, 203 is the
weakest: it only excludes the raising of the very same substantive issues the directive is there to settle.
202 is somewhere in between: it allows the use of some moral (or evaluative) considerations, but it
excludes those among which the directive is supposed to adjudicate. Hence, we could distinguish
various versions of the sources-thesis: the strongest version requires 195, while the weakest one
requires only 203. Raz appears to hold the strongest version, since his was presented as an argument
against what has been called 'inclusive' (or 'soft-') positivism, i.e. a form of positivism that allows
moral standards to be part of the law insofar as they are entailed by the source-based law. Therefore, I
will bypass his question here and in the rest of this section I will refer to the sources thesis meaning its
strongest version {i.e. 195).
I am not interested in the details of Raz's argument here. But note how weak the premises of the
argument are: if the law is normative, it makes a normative difference; if it makes a normative
difference it follows that it can make a normative difference; if it can make a normative difference, it
35That is, either as a protected reason for action, as Raz would claim, or as an 'ordinary' first order reason. See Marmor (1994:
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must be the case that you can identify, understand and apply it (at least in normal cases) without
considering the reasons for it (more on whether the sources thesis covers the application of the law
below, at 45). Note further that the thesis is not that the subjects have, even in normal cases, a moral
duty to apply the law. It is only that they will be able to do so. The same argument could be grounded
in Alexy's notion of 'discursive possibility':
The need for legal discourse arises out of the weakness of the mles and forms of general practical
discourse. This weakness consists in the fact that these mles and forms define a decision-making
procedure which inmany cases leads to no results at all and which, when it does lead to a result, in no
way guarantees inclusive certainty [...]. In fact, some normative statements are required by the mles
of discourse as being discursively necessary. Their negation is inconsistent with them (that is
discursively impossible). However, there remains a wide range of discursive possibilities in which
both a particular normative statement and its negation may be justified without infringing the mles of
discourse (1989: 287-8).
If legal discourse is to provide a solution for that weakness of general practical discourse, it seems that
the sources thesis has to be true. In other words, it has to be possible to identify the law and ascertain
its content without reopening the questions of general practical discourse that the law was supposed to
answer (the existence of law as a social institution is explained by the fact that general practical
discourse is insufficient to settle issues that have to be settled). If the need for legal discourse arises out
of the weaknesses of general practical discourse, then it cannot be the case that legal discourse mirrors
those weaknesses (if the need for air arises out of the need of human beings for oxygen, then air has to
be the kind of thing that can supply oxygen to human beings).
The point to be discussed is not, then, that of the plausibility of a positivistic conception of law, though
the argument will have same impact on that: it is, rather, that some features of legal reasoning, as I will
try to show, seem to imply that the law is structurally dependent on general practical reasoning. If this
is true, it would seem as though legal discourse cannot 'improve' general practical discourse, for it
reproduces, instead of settles, Alexy's 'discursive possibility'. This concern is not restricted to
members of the so-called positivistic tradition (indeed, Alexy can hardly be considered a positivist; cf.
Alexy, 1994: 26ff). Looking outside that tradition, for example, we find that Lon Fuller was well
aware of the risk of the law becoming pointless once evaluative arguments are allowed in the
identification of the law:
Fidelity to law can become impossible if we do not accept the broader responsibilities (themselves
purposive, as all responsibilities are and must be) that go with a puiposive interpretation of law. One
can imagine a course of reasoning that might run as follows: This statute says absinthe shall not be
sold. What is its purpose? To promote health. Now, as everyone knows, absinthe is a sound,
wholesome and beneficial beverage. Therefore, interpreting the statute in the light of its purpose, I
construe it to direct a general sale and consumption of that most healthful of beverages, absinthe
(Fuller, 1958: 670).
This passage shows Fuller's awareness of the tension between his own ideas on 'purposive
interpretation' and his conception of the law as the enterprise of 'subjecting human behaviour to the




discuss the issue all over again? The sources-thesis could be said to specify the 'broader
responsibilities that go with a purposive interpretation of law': the point of the law is to provide for the
common good (or to subject human conduct to the guidance of rules), and this cannot be achieved if
the law cannot settle controversial moral questions. Hence the plausibility of Raz's authority-based
argument for the sources thesis: if at the moment of applying the directives the subjects have to go
back to the 'raw moral question' then the advantage of having an authority (i.e. the advantage of
having the law) is lost. IfRaz's sources-thesis is wrong, then the law appears to be pointless.
Raz made this point in order to justify the sources thesis: "the authoritative nature of law gives a
reason to prefer the sources thesis" (1985: 214). In the rest of this chapter I want to argue that this is
indeed true, but it does not stop the sources thesis from being false, and this is shown by the fact that it
cannot explain legal disagreement without distortion.
Before answering that question, it is important to be clear about what, following Dworkin (1986: 3ff),
I am calling 'legal disagreement'. This leads us to Raz's distinction between what he calls the 'narrow'
and the 'broad' sources theses, and to the problem, mentioned above, of whether or not the sources
thesis covers the application of the law. This distinction will be rather important for the argument to be
developed in the following chapters, and we shall come back to it every now and then. For the
moment, I am concerned with it only for the sake ofRaz's argument. First, the distinction:
Let us distinguish between what source-based law states explicitly and what it establishes by
implication. If a statute in country A says that income earned abroad by a citizen is liable to income
tax in A, then it only implicitly establishes that I am liable to such tax. Formy liability is not stated by
the statute but is inferred from it (and some other premises). Similarly, if earnings abroad are taxed at
a different rate from earnings at home, the fact that the proceeds of export sales are subject to the
home rate is implied rather than stated. It is inferred from this statute and other legal rules on the
location ofvarious transactions.
The two examples differ in that the statement that I am liable to tax at a certain rate is an applied legal
statement depending for its truth on both law and fact. The statement that export earnings are taxed at
a certain rate is a pure legal statement, depending for its truth on law only (i.e. on acts of legislation
and other law-making facts). The sources thesis as stated at the beginning can bear a narrow or a wide
interpretation. The narrow thesis concerns the truth conditions of pure legal statements only. Pure
legal statements are those which state the content of the law, i.e. of legal mles, principles, doctrines,
etc. The wide thesis concerns the truth conditions of all legal statements, including applied ones. It
claims that the truth or falsity of legal statements depends on social facts which can be established
without resort to moral argument (1985: 214-5).
Using Raz's distinction, we can say: legal disagreement is disagreement about which 'applied legal
statements' follow from true 'pure legal statements' when some factual premisses are true. It follows
that even if the argument I am about to develop is correct that would not affect the validity of the
narrow sources thesis, which is silent concerning the application of the law. The thesis (in this version)
does not claim that what the law is for a particular case (for any particular case) is something that can
be established according to social facts alone, at least not before a court has so decided (see Raz, 1980:
212). I believe that if Raz's authority-argument is an argument for the sources thesis, it has to be for
the wide sources thesis. But Raz is cautious concerning the wide thesis:
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All the arguments so far concern the narrow sources thesis only. Nothing was said about its
application to applied legal statements. I tend to feel that it applies to them as well, since they are legal
statements whose truth value depends on contingent facts as well as on law. If one assumes that
contingent facts cannot be moral facts, then the sources thesis applies here as well. That is, what is
required is the assumption that what makes it contingently true that a person acted fairly on a
particular occasion is not the standard of fairness, which is not contingent, but the 'brute fact' that he
performed a certain action describable in value-neutral ways. If such an assumption is sustainable in
all cases, then the sources thesis holds regarding applied legal statements as well (1985:218).
We can now see that the example of the arbitrator is misleading, since it hides away this important
qualification. 'You should do what you should do on the balance of reasons' is useless, but 'the buyer
ought to transfer the ownership of the bought thing' is equally useless unless the parties to a contract
of sale can apply the decision to their particular case, that is to say, unless they can get, from the (pure)
legal statement quoted above, an (applied) legal statement like 'Jones ought to transfer ownership of
his copy of The Concept ofLegal System to Watson'. It follows that the very same considerations Raz
used to support the sources thesis against the 'coherence' and the 'incorporation' theses can be used to
support the wide against the narrow version of it.
Indeed, what are we to make of Raz's statement (at 218) that "all the arguments so far concern the
narrow sources thesis only"? The 'arguments so far' were advanced to claim that only if the law
complies with the sources thesis it can have authority. The reason for this was that authority-capacity
required the two features we have been discussing, and that they in turn required the sources thesis.
Let us focus upon the second feature, i.e. that authoritative directives can be identified and their
content ascertained without using evaluative considerations. Why was this condition required? The
answer is: because if it were not met the would-be directive would fail to be able to fulfil its function,
and subjects would fail to be able to be benefited by the existence of the authority: the subjects "can
benefit by [the authority's] decisions only if they can establish their existence and content in ways
which do not depend on raising the very same issues which the authority is there to settle" (Raz, 1985:
203). Only if this condition is met would an allegedly authoritative directive be able to comply with
the normal justification thesis. But now we are told that the 'argument so far' concerns the narrow
version only, with the obvious implication that authority-capacity requires only the narrow sources
thesis. This means that the argument turns out to be that the law can have authority-capacity even if
the wide sources thesis is untenable, that is, even if subjects can never get any 'applied legal statement'
without raising all the moral considerations that were pre-empted by the authoritative directive, even if
the authority is fully legitimate.
I believe that given Raz's claim that 'all the arguments presented in the first four sections of
"Authority, Law and Morality" concern the narrow sources thesis only' the authoritative nature of law
ceases to be an argument for the sources thesis. For consider: Raz claims that "a decision is serviceable
only if it can be identified by means other than the considerations the weight and outcome of which it
was meant to settle" (Raz, 1985: 203). Serviceable for what? For the parties to be able to act upon the
decision rather than their own judgement. But to be serviceable in these terms what is required is the
wide sources thesis, i.e. that (provided that the authority is legitimate), we can stop thinking about the
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substantive problem behind the authoritative directive and simply do as it commands. If this cannot be
done no authoritative directive can ever comply with the normal justification thesis.
But maybe I have just been labouring the obvious, since Raz believes that, if we are prepared to grant
one further point (i.e. that moral facts are not contingent) then the wide thesis follows from the narrow
thesis. I think the point should readily be granted. Therefore, if the distinction were used as an
objection to the argument to follow, we could easily answer: since the narrow version plus the extra
premise of moral facts not being contingent implies the wide version, if the wide version of the
sources thesis is defeated by reasons other than the rejection of that extra premise, the narrow version
would be defeated by implication. On this assumption I shall proceed36.
Legal Indeterminacy
Without any claim whatsoever to originality, I will take it as a brute fact that the law is often
controversial. This means that it is often the case that informed people, lawyers and judges, disagree
about what the law is in particular cases. Can the sources thesis explain why and how the law is
controversial?
To succeed, a sources thesis-based explanation of legal disagreement has to meet two conditions: on
the one hand, it has to show that legal disagreement is disagreement offact, i.e., about the social facts
that constitute the content of the law. On the other hand, it has to offer an explanation that makes sense
of the explanandum, i.e. one that shows as controversial at least most of those cases that are seen by
participants to be controversial37.
The first requirement is the sources thesis, so it must be asserted if that thesis is to be defended. The
explanation, that is to say, has to proceed more or less along the following lines: if only social facts
can determine the existence and content of a law, when these sources exist the court has to apply them
(i.e. apply the norms the validity of which is grounded upon such sources). But given the kind of
social facts that determine the content of the law, it will often be the case that they are silent or vague
as regarding some particular cases. In those cases there is no source-based law on the subject, and
since all law is source-based there is no law.
Here we go back for the first time to the distinction between the wide and the narrow versions of the
sources thesis, if only to prevent misunderstandings. Raz does not claim, of course, that courts have
36As a matter of fact i do not think that this is an instance of labouring the obvious. Raz's last-minute restriction of his
argument to the narrow sources thesis only stems, i will later claim, from his unwillingness to draw the conclusions that his
theory of law implies for a theory of legal reasoning. Cf. below, 151 ff.
37Raz's main argument for the sources thesis was that, since the law claims to have authority, it has to belong to the kind of
thing that can have authority. But, strictly speaking, from the fact that I claim X it does not follow that I can have X. Raz, of
course, knows this: "since the law claims to have authority it is capable of having it. Since the claim is made by legal officials
wherever a legal system is in force, the possibility that is normally insincere or based on a conceptual mistake is ruled out [...].
Why cannot legal officials and institutions be conceptually confused? One answer is that while they can be occasionally they
cannot be systematically confused. For given the centrality of legal institutions in our structures of authority, their claims and
conceptions are formed by and contribute to our concept ofauthority" (Raz, 1985: 201). i think that Raz is right in thinking that
to claim that most of the people are conceptually confused most of the time concerning an important aspect of an important
social institution is not plausible. This very argument constitutes this second condition for any explanation of legal
disagreement: it cannot be committed to claim that most of the people most of the time are insincere or conceptually confused.
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the moral duty to decide according to the law, that is to say to apply the rules identified according to
the sources thesis. Hence he would not accept the second sentence of the last paragraph if it is
understood as the judge having the all-things-considered duty to apply the rules.
Naturally, it would not affect the sources thesis (in any of its versions, strong or weak, broad or
narrow) to recognise that the application of source-based law can be defeated for moral reasons. The
description the sources thesis gives to this situation would have to be that the legal obligation of the
court is to follow (i.e. to apply) the source-based law, but the court might because of moral reasons
find that its moral obligation is not to apply it. Since according to the sources thesis the fact that the
law ought to be different does not imply that it actually is different the court's having the moral duty
not to apply the source-based law would not affect the legal status of the latter. The argument
proceeds, therefore, on the assumption that, unless otherwise stated we are concerned only with the
question 'what is the law (as opposed to 'the morally correct solution') for this case?'.
We shall soon see that this is a crucial point, so let me emphasise this stipulation: unless otherwise
explicitly stated, hereinafter words like 'ought' or 'should' or 'must' and the like will be used in a
legal sense. Thus, 'the court ought to JC will mean 'the legal obligation of the court is to A" (or:
'legally, the court ought to X), whatever the morality ofX. Since I am following Raz in assuming that
a legal obligation does not necessarily imply a moral one, this stipulation is of no moral consequence
at all.
According to the sources thesis, then, there can be disagreement about what the law is (disagreement
that can only be disagreement offact), or disagreement about what the law ought to be. Hard cases, as
usually discussed in the jurisprudential literature, are of the second kind: in hard cases the law is
unsettled, hence there is no law in the matter, hence what is really going on in a hard case is a
discussion about the best way to use the court's discretion, i.e. about what the law ought to be.
Though in solving these (hard) cases the courts will have to use evaluative arguments, this is not an
argument against the sources thesis, insofar as it has been previously established that there is no law in
these matters. In hard cases the court is not trying to identify a source-based rule nor trying to ascertain
its content, but deciding how best to use its law-making powers. Given that most legal systems
nowadays contain a non liquet rule or principle this is not surprising at all. Hence in hard cases two
stages can, for analytical clarity, be distinguished: in the first stage, the court examines the (source-
based) law, and arrives to the conclusion that the law is unsettled, i.e. that there is no law on the
matter. In the second stage, the court is allowed to use its discretion to 'fill in' the gap just discovered
(NB: discovered, not created). Some clarification is called for here.
In the first place, this analysis of hard cases in two stages (to which I will came back later at 154) is
required by the sources thesis. What courts are supposed to do is one thing if they are using their
discretion, and quite a different one if they are applying the law. And they ought (remember the
If we were allowed to assume this to be the case concerning legal adjudication, then the reasons for believing otherwise
concerning the law's claim to authority (a crucial step in Raz's argument) would be greatly weakened.
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stipulation) not to use their discretion (or: they do not have discretion) unless the source-based law
fails to provide an answer to the case, while at the same time it requires the court to decide it. This
does not mean that in any ruling it will be easy, or even possible, actually to distinguish these two
stages. But the conceptual possibility of drawing such a line is essential to the sources thesis: the
operation of deciding whether a case is clear has to be grounded in non-evaluative considerations.
Legal rules, if the (broad) sources thesis is right, can be applied without evaluative considerations.
This is possible only if the cases to which the rules apply can be distinguished from those to which
they do not without using the considerations the rales are, according to Raz's argument, supposed to
pre-empt.
Secondly, we can grant for the moment that the fact that courts have to use discretion does not
necessarily mean that they "either do or should act on the basis of their personal views on how the
world should be ideally ran" (Raz, 1985: 219). There is no reason why conventions cannot exist about
the kind of arguments allowed in the solution of hard cases. Hence it is not the case that "a self¬
consciously strict conventionalist [i.e. sources-thesis holder] judge would lose interest in legislation
and precedent at just the point when it became clear that the explicit extension of these supposed
conventions had ran out" (Dworkin, 1986: 130)—at least not necessarily true. There can be either
moral principles, or social (second order) conventions that demand from judges attention to legislation
and precedent even when solving a hard case (in this case, however, precedents and legislation would
not be used as rales to solve the case—they don't—•, but as substantive reasons that, coupled with (for
example) a principle of formal equality, can help and guide the court in the exercise of its discretion.
But the sources thesis does not need to deny this. All it has to claim is that the law is not settled in
these cases, in the sense of the solution to the particular case not being given by the law).
Finally, it has to be said that the sources thesis is meant to be a conceptual explanation of law as we
know it. So Raz and his followers have the burden of proving that there is an independent conceptual
base for this qualitative distinction between creating and applying the law in this sense (i.e,
independent from the sources thesis itself: if the only reason we have for accepting the distinction is
the fact that ifwe don't the sources thesis would be wrong, then the thesis would be a stipulation of the
meaning of the word Taw'—and I don't think that this is the way in which Raz expects us to see the
thesis).
In a recent book, Andrei Marmor (Marmor, 1994: 124) has tried to secure such a base. He argued that
Hart's distinction between 'core' and 'penumbra' can provide such a foundation in a way that it is
compatible with the sources thesis. Though I will consider Marmor's argument in some detail below,
it seems useful to summarise its main tenets now.
Hart's argument, which Marmor develops, is beautifully simple, and widely known. It is based upon
an account ofmeaning which will be questioned neither in this nor in later chapters: the meaning of a
word is given by its use, hence "either a word has a meaning, in which case it can be used, and hence it
must also have standard examples, or it is devoid of meaning, in which case it simply cannot be used"
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(Marmor, 1994: 134-5). We cannot understand a word ifwe are not able to recognise something as an
standard instance of it. These instances are said to constitute the 'core' of the meaning of the word. But
words also have a 'penumbra' of meaning, i.e. the application of a word to some facts will prove
controversial or uncertain (it is not clear to me whether the thesis is about the meaning of rules or
about the meaning of the words in which rules are expressed; but I will not consider this point here).
Marmor then goes on to link Hart's argument to a "highly sophisticated conception of meaning and
language, namely, that ofWittgenstein" (1994: 125). His point in doing this was (as I understand it) to
give further support to the idea that there must be cases in which no interpretation is needed for the
application of a rule:
if a rule could not determine which actions were in accord with it, then no interpretation could do this
either. Interpretation is just another formulation of the mle, substituting one rule for another, as it
were. Hence it cannot bridge the gap between rule and action (1994: 149 [commenting Wittgenstein,
1958: § 198]).
In the rest of this chapter, I will focus upon the distinction between hard and clear cases. For reasons
given above, the sources thesis can hold only if it is possible to draw such a distinction in some
particular (i.e. non-evaluative) way. The argument will be that it cannot, i.e. that cases are hard or clear
only in the light of evaluative considerations of the kind the sources thesis is supposed to mle out, and
that Hart's (and Marmor's) quest for an 'independent conceptual base' for such a distinction is
misconceived. My contention will be that even if we accept both Hart's point (about core and
penumbra of meaning) and Wittgenstein's (about interpretations still hanging in the air along with
what they interpret), there is no non-evaluative line to be drawn between hard and clear cases.
Hard and Clear Cases
The distinction between hard and clear cases, though common in modem jurisprudence, is not
uncontroversial, nor clear itself (one telling cause of this is the fact that legal positivists, with the
remarkable exception of Neil MacCormick, to be discussed in chapter 5, do not usually give actual
examples of hard or clear cases: they just acknowledge the possibility of their existence). In the sense
positivism needs the distinction it refers to cases covered or not covered by the law. As such, however,
the distinction is question-begging, since what needs to be explained is how are we to find out whether
or not a case is covered by the law. An answer to this problem provides the criterion that differentiates
clear from hard cases.
One possible answer that should, however, be screened out from the outset is 'when the law is
controversial the case is hard, otherwise it is clear'. This may sound odd, since the distinction itself
was introduced in order to explain disagreement in legal reasoning. But upon closer examination, I
hope, it should be rather obvious why the criterion that distinguishes clear from hard cases cannot be
the bmte fact of (dis)agreement. First, people may disagree concerning all sort of things: they may
differ about what is the meaning of the law, what the proven facts of a case are, what should (this time
in the moral sense of 'should') the court do, etc. It could be said that since we are trying to find an
explanation for legal disagreement that is compatible with the sources thesis only the first kind should
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concern us, i.e. disagreement about the meaning of the law. But here we find a different reason why
the brute fact of (dis)agreement cannot be what characterises a case as clear or hard: people may
disagree because of all sorts of reasons. To focus on the obvious example, some people may disagree
simply because they are mistaken. Hence it cannot be the sheer fact of disagreement that makes a case
hard. And conversely, a case is not clear when people mistakenly think that the law is settled in its
solution for it. If disagreement is important, it can only be so when it reflects different interpretations
of the law none ofwhich is mistaken.
In other words, a theory has to explain when disagreement is 'true' and not mistaken disagreement.
Thus a theory could, without violating the second condition as discussed above (supra at 46), classify
some controversial cases as clear cases and some non-controversial cases as hard (and in both cases
explain the controversy or lack of it away as a mistake). Nevertheless, and unless an argument is
offered to claim that lawyers (or, generally, people when discussing what the law is) are particularly
prone to make mistakes, the cases that are hard according to whatever criterion the theory offers and
the cases that are in reality controversial must overlap over a significant range of instances (this was
the second condition). This is the single most important test we could possibly have to test the
adequacy of a theory of law and legal reasoning.
That clear cases exist is a truism. The problem is how are they to be characterised (see Stavropoulos,
1996: 12). For the purpose ofmy discussion I want to distinguish three (in fact, as we shall see, two)
ways in which the distinction can be drawn (with no claim whatsoever to exhaustivity: see
Bengoetxea, 1993: 185ff for much longer a list):
In a semantic sense, the distinction is grounded upon the fact that laws are expressed in words, and
sometimes words are not clear, i.e. sometimes their meaning is elusive. But since to know the meaning
of a word is to be able to produce standard examples of its application to some cases, there must be
cases in which there is no doubt about their meaning. Sometimes at least it must be possible to
understand and apply a rule without having to interpret it, because 'interpretations still hang in the air
along with what they interpret' (Wittgenstein, 1958: § 198). This is, however, no reason to think that it
will never be necessary to interpret it. When interpretation is thus necessary the case is said to be hard.
In a hard case the ambiguity or vagueness of the meaning of a rule gives the decision-maker a space of
discretion to concretise the meaning of the ambiguous terms (or to create a new mle).
In a semantic hard case arguments are needed to specify the precise meaning of ambiguous terms in
the canonical formulation of the applicable rule. Since the law as it stands is obscure or ambiguous
(etc), there is no legal solution to the case. A judicial decision in these circumstances has to be
creative.
In a regulative sense, the distinction between clear and hard cases is one between regulated and
unregulated cases. When a case is regulated by the law, the decision-maker has to apply the solution
provided by it. When it is unregulated, there is a gap in the law, and the applicator has discretion to
solve it (see Raz, 1979: 181). In a regulative hard case the problem is that the law does not settle the
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issue, so arguments are needed to show how the law ought to be: judicial decisions in regulative hard
cases are creative decisions.
In a pragmatic sense, it is an undeniable distinction between a bulk of cases that are solved
unreflectively by courts and subjects, on the one hand, and a minority of them which are
problematised, on the other. It is highly unlikely that legal systems as we know them could exist
without a broad majority of cases treated as (pragmatically) clear. In fact, it is common to see that
different systems adopt the policy of making some kinds of cases clear in this sense, not necessarily
because in them interpretive problems are unlikely to occur, but because there is some extra value
attached to the mechanical application of the law in these areas (parking offences and the like are
usually a good example of this).
A pragmatic hard case is one in which the law could be applied without any argument beyond
semantic ones. In other words, the case fits the operative facts of the applicable mle in a clear and
straightforward manner. The problem is that even though the operative facts are fulfilled, given the
nature of the particular case, what is in need of justification is the application of the mle itself {i.e. the
solution provided by the rale is clear, but what is unclear is whether or not the rule should be applied).
Note that the first two criteria can be collapsed. Indeed, for people like Raz and Hart they are basically
the same or at least the regulative is the genus and the semantic the species. This is so because for
them the content of the law is given by the meaning of the legal rales. The fundamental criterion is: a
case is hard if there is no applicable law. If the meaning of the prima facie applicable rale is unclear,
then that rale does not provide a solution for the case, hence there is no law for the case.
Notice further that only the regulative and the semantic criteria could comply with the sources thesis,
since according to the pragmatic one some rale is clearly applicable but it should not be applied
because of some of the substantive considerations the rale is supposed to have pre-empted.
As was said, the precise meaning of the 'should' that appears in the last sentence is rather important.
Since the sources thesis has nothing to do with the question 'what should I do?' when this is a moral
question, a pragmatic hard case presents no problem at all for the sources thesis if the 'should' is
interpreted as meaning a moral should. As stipulated before, however, I am understanding that
'should' as a legal 'should'. In other words, a pragmatic hard case is one in which what the law is for
the case is not clear because of non-source-based considerations. This stipulation, needless to say,
does not beg any questions, since for the time being I am not claiming that pragmatic hard cases do
exist (I will be doing that shortly below). Indeed, we shall see that if the sources thesis is correct their
existence will have to be denied, and we shall be forced to give the 'should' a moral interpretation.
The argument to follow will prove, I hope, (1) that referential or pragmatic hard cases do exist, and (2)
that this amounts to a refutation of the sources thesis unless we are willing to distort them, forcing a
moral meaning into what (I will claim) is a legal 'should'. The complete deployment of the argument
will take until the end of chapter 5, but we should start with the traditional jurisprudential subject of
the (in)existence of legal gaps. If there are unregulated cases, this is because there are gaps in the law.
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If there are no gaps in the law, there are no unregulated cases; according to the sources thesis, if there
are no unregulated cases, courts would never have discretion: "in a legal system which contains a rule
that whenever the courts are faced with a case for which the law does not provide a uniquely correct
solution they ought to refuse to render judgement [...] there would be no judicial discretion" (Raz,
1972: 845).
On Gaps in the Law
There are three answers that a theory of law could possibly give to the problem of the (in)existence of
gaps in the law:
(i) Legal systems are necessarily gapless.
This is, as we shall see, Hans Kelsen's position.
(ii) Legal system do necessarily have gaps.
The third possibility was the one preferred by Carlos Alchourron and Eugenio Bulygin (1971):
(iii) Whether or not a particular system is gapless is an empirical question
Let us begin with (i). As was said, this was Hans Kelsen's position. Kelsen believed that, for any
conceivable case,
either the court ascertains that the defendant or accused has committed the debet as claimed by the
plaintiff or public prosecutor and has thereby violated an obligation imposed on him by the legal
order; then the court must find for the plaintiff or condemn the accused by ordering a sanction
prescribed in the general norm. Or the court ascertains that the defendant or accused has not
committed the delict and therefore has not violated an obligation imposed on him by the legal order;
then the court must dismiss the action or acquit the accused—that is, the court must order that the
sanction ought to be directed against the defendant or accused (Kelsen, 1960: 242).
The law is always applicable: a gap in the law is not a legal gap, but a situation in which the
application of the law as it is to the particular case is so absurd and unjust that the judge assumes that
the law is not to be applied to the case. In Kelsen's words:
the existence of a gap is assumed only when the absence of such a legal norm is regarded as
politically undesirable by the law-applying organ; when, therefore, the logically possible apphcation
of the valid law is rejected for this political reason, as being inequitable or unjust according to the
opinion ofthe law-applying organ (1960: 246).
According to Alchourron and Bulygin (1971), Kelsen's case is instructive because he tried to support
his argument for the inexistence of legal gaps in two different ways. According to Alchourron and
Bulygin, these are the two ways in which such a claim could be justified. We shall consider them in
some detail.
For a system to be gapless (or: closed), it has to contain some closure rale according to which if no
deontic property can be ascribed to a certain action a deontic property is ascribed to that action. The
obvious candidate for such a closure rale (or principle) is what Alchourron and Bulygin call the
'principle of prohibition': everything that is not prohibited is permitted. According to the meaning of
'permitted' in it, Alchourron and Bulygin distinguished two versions of this principle, one weak and
one strong: in the strong version, 'permitted' means positively permitted, while in the weak version it
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means simply not-prohibited. In its weak version (i.e. when 'permitted' is understood as meaning
simply 'not-prohibited'), the principle of prohibition
is analytic and therefore necessarily hue. On this interpretation the principle states that if the
prohibition ofp in q is not a consequence of [the normative system] a, then the prohibition ofp in q is
not a consequence ofa, and this is just a particular case ofthe principle of identity (1971: 125).
Thus though the weak version of the principle of prohibition is necessarily hue (i.e. it is logically true
to claim that it is part of every conceivable legal system), for Alchourron and Bulygin its existence in
every system is compatible with those systems having gaps, "for it does not close any normative
system and hence does not exclude the possibility of incomplete systems" (126). In fact, they said, "a
gap is a case in which there is an action p such that it is weakly permitted (and is not strongly
permitted) by the system" (ibid). The strong version of the principle of prohibition, on the other hand,
is strong enough to close any system, but "far from being necessary, is a contingent proposition"
(127). Since Kelsen did not offer any argument to show how and why a norm could have "the
mysterious property of belonging to all legal systems" (1971: 132), they can be closed or open
according to whether or not they contain, as a matter of empirical fact, a strong principle of
prohibition. This would amount to a rejection of (i), Kelsen's thesis, and an endorsement of (iii).
In Kelsen's early work, according to Alchourron and Bulygin, the completeness of legal systems was
based upon the strong version of the principle of prohibition. But precisely to avoid having to claim
that there was a norm that existed in all conceivable legal systems, Kelsen abandoned the strong and
adopted, in the second edition of The Pure Theory of Law, the weak version of the principle of
prohibition. For Alchourron and Bulygin, having made this move Kelsen could not maintain the
completeness of legal systems, and had grudgingly to accept the possibility of gaps:
the permitted behaviour of one individual is opposed by a behaviour [...] of another individual—a
behaviour that likewise is permitted. Then [...] a conflict of interests is present which the legal order
does not prevent; no legal order can prevent all possible conflicts of interest (Kelsen 1967: 243).
Alchourron and Bulygin see in this an implicit recognition of the existence of legal gaps, because
"what else are gaps ifnot 'a conflict of interests which the legal order does not prevent'?" (Alchourron
and Bulygin, 1987: 18738). This is very implausible indeed. Consider the following case: there is no
rule of Scots law that specifies where a recently married couple has to spend their holiday. Imagine
that he wants to go to France, but she wants to go to South Africa. They have a conflict of interests,
because (imagine) both of them have to and want to travel together. Imagine further that he sues her,
and asks the judge to find in his favour that they have to go to South Africa. What will the judge do?
She will probably say that there is no rule about it, so that she has to dismiss the suit39.
381 have not been able to trace this sentence back to the original 1971 English edition. The quotation is taken from the 1987
Spanish edition (Alchourron and Bulygin, 1987: 187). In the original English version this passage seems to correspond to the
following: "Kelsen himself seems to admit that there may be a conflict of interests which is not solved by legal order, because
no legal order can solve all possible conflicts of interests" (1971: 131).
39For a similar position, see Ruiz Manero, 1990: 43f: "according to Kelsen, if no norm provides a deontic qualification for the
defendant's behaviour, the judge does have an specific obligation: that of finding for him. Kelsen certainly distinguishes
between prohibition in a negative [i.e. weak] and a positive [strong] sense, but this does not imply, in his view, that the judge
has the obligation to find for the defendant only when his behaviour is positively permitted, and only the generic obligation to
decide the case when that behaviour is negatively permitted. In other words, the absence of a rule that deontically qualifies the
defendant's behaviour has for Kelsen [...] exactly the same consequences than the existence of a norm that permits it (42:
53
FERNANDO ATRIA
This example shows that there are two different questions that Alchourron and Bulygin fail to
distinguish: (a) what is the law in Scotland concerning married couples' holidays?; (b) what is the
correct legal solution for this case? In Raz's terms, (a) is a question about a pure legal statement, while
(b) is one about an applied legal statement. Alchourron and Bulygin believe that an answer to (a) is an
answer to (b):
When there is a gap, what ought the judge to do? Should he find against the defendant or reject the
petition? The answer is clear: if the primary system says nothing at all about the action under dispute,
the judge has no specific obligation either to find against the defendant or to reject the suit. He has
only the generic obligation to decide the case and he fulfils his obligation by deciding in one of two
possible ways: finding against the defendant or rejecting the petition (provided that these are the only
two ways ofdeciding it). In other words, the judge has the obligation to decide, that is, to admit or to
reject the suit, but he has neither an obligation to admit it nor an obligation to reject it (Alchourron
and Bulygin, 1971: 156-7).
Alchourron and Bulygin's mistake, in my view, stems in part from their characterisation of judges and
other jurisdictional organs40. Without offering any arguments, they take the "solving conflicts of
interests" to be the 'primary function' of them (1971: 147). If this is assumed, then a strong case can
be made for their claim that a conflict of interests not solved by the legal order is a gap. In other
words, an arbitrary definitional fiat is Alchourron and Bulygin's link between (a) and (b).
I do not want to claim that judicial decisions do not, as a matter of fact, solve conflicts of interests
most of the time. Neither do I need to deny that that is a correct characterisation of the judicial
function in modem Western legal systems. But from a conceptual or logical point of view, which is
Alchourron & Bulygin's, this is the wrong way of characterising the function of courts. They mistake
the role courts have in the context of modem liberal societies with the structural role they play in the
working of legal systems as such.
Indeed, not even in modem Western legal systems it is always the case that judicial decisions solve
conflicts of interest, if not for other reasons than it is not always the case that there is a conflict waiting
to be solved: in many jurisdictions, for instance, a judicial decision is needed in order to convict a
criminal, even when the latter has confessed to the offence: the fact that the defendant is willing to be
punished does not always make the judicial decision superfluous. But even if in some way one could
claim that there is a conflict in those situations, that would not be enough to warrant Alchourron &
Bulygin's claim. Mirjan Damaska, for example, has argued that the link between jurisdiction and
conflict-resolution is strong in liberal countries but less important in systems where the law is seen as a
means ofpublic policy (Damaska, 1986: 84; see below at 176f).
parentheses deleted and square brackets added). It is not clear, however, whether Ruiz Manero agrees with Alchourron and
Bulygin concerning the possibility of gaps in the law. He claims that "Alchourron and Bulygin are right when they claim [...]
that gaps are 'conflicts of interests which the legal order does not prevent', but they seem not to notice that it is possible to
allow for the existence of 'conflicts of interests which the legal order does not prevent' without implying in any way an
acknowledgement of the possibility of gaps". 1 fail to see how Ruiz Manero can square these two propositions: if gaps are
'conflicts of interests... (etc)', then surely nobody can believe in the existence of the latter without believing (at least implicitly)
in the existence of the former. As will be clear shortly, in my view the correct solution is to recognise that the existence of
conflicts of interests which the legal order does not prevent is not enough for the existence of a gap.
40l say 'in part' because even if this point is granted to Alchourron and Bulygin there would, 1 believe, be space to reject their
conclusion. But if their characterisation of jurisdictional organs is mistaken as I believe it is (at least if offered as a logical
characterisation) their failure to distinguish (a) from (b) is more evident.
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How should we characterise judicial activity, if not upon the basis of conflict-resolution? One
plausible alternative is to characterise it as Hart did when he introduced his notion of secondary rules
of adjudication. On this view, what is distinctive of jurisdictional activity is not that it solves conflicts
of interests but that it provides "authoritative determinations of the fact of violation of the primary
[and, I (F.A.) would say, other secondary] rules" (Hart, 1994: 97). On this view, conflict-resolution
will appear as the characteristic activity of the courts only if that is taken to be the main point of the
rules courts are supposed to apply. But if those rules are understood as having as their main point a
different one (implementing public policy, maximizing utility, and so forth), then conflict-resolution
might well be seen as a mere by-product of the application of the rules.
If this is correct, then there is no warrant for Alchourron & Bulygin's move from (a) to (b), at least not
without further argumentation not provided by them. To see this, let us consider Alchourron &
Bulygin's own example, as commented upon by Aleksander Peczenik:
Assume that a statute stipulates that (1) the restitution of legal estate is obligatory, if the transferee is
in good faith, the transfer is made with consideration, and the transferor is in bad faith; and (2) the
restitution of legal estate is obligatory if the transfer is made without consideration. Assume now that
the transferor is in good faith and the transfer is made with consideration but the transferee is in bad
faith. Is the restitution of legal estate obligatory? The norm does not answer the question. A gap
occurs. One can establish such gaps in an objective, 'value-free' manner but to fill them up, one must
complete the statute with an additional norm, such as the following one: An action is permitted, if it is
not explicitly forbidden by the law [...]. Such a normmay be established in a statute or another source
of the law. If it is not, then filling up the gap demands that one makes a value judgment (Peczenik,
1994: 25).
As regards question (a), we can safely say: Argentinean law was (at least in 1971) silent concerning
the restitution of real estate by the possessor when the possessor {i.e. the transferee) is in bad faith (call
this property of the case A), the transferor is in good faith (5), and the transfer is made with
consideration (C). We can indeed, as Peczenik claims 'establish such a gap in an objective, value-free
manner'.
Things are, though, quite different concerning the second question, (b). Here the problem is, 'what
ought the court to do?'41. The generic answer is: apply the law. Assume the rightful owner is suing the
possessor for restitution. There is no applicable rale, in the Alchourron-Bulygin-Peczenik case (this
was our conclusion regarding the first question). Therefore, the judge has to say 'there is no rale to be
applied', that is, there is no rale whose application is triggered by properties ABC. But this is precisely
what the defendant will be claiming, that is, that he is under no obligation to restitute the property
since there is no rale whose application has been triggered by properties ABC. Given that the court is
supposed to 'provide authoritative determinations of the violation of primary rales' the court has to
say in a case like the one now under consideration that it has no rale to apply, i.e. that it has to find for
the defendant. It follows that the existence of a gap in the law is not enough to establish that the court
41 Remember my stipulation before (supra at 46) in virtue of which 'what is the correct legal solution for this case?' becomes
identical in meaning to 'what should the court do?'.
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has discretion to solve the case. In other words, Peczenik makes the same mistake Alchourron &
Bulygin made when he claims that 'filling up the gap demands that one makes a value judgment'.
I am not claiming that legal systems are necessarily complete, but only that the existence of a
'normative' (as opposed to an 'axiological') gap is not enough to explain the court's having discretion.
Recall the case of the married couple in Scotland. That might well be called a gap, since the answer to
question (a) has to be that Scots law is silent on that issue (at least in 1998). And this is what, I believe,
Alchourron and Bulygin would indeed say (cf. Alchourron and Bulygin, 1971: 161ff). My point has
merely been that if this is a gap, then the (regulative) sense of the clear/hard cases divide is useless to
the sources thesis: can we really say that this case is 'unregulated' and hence that the court has
discretion to solve it? If it finds for the plaintiff, shall it not be breaking the law? Of course it will: the
case is a regulated case, and the answer to the legal problem posed by it is: 'the law does regulate the
case, instructing the court to dismiss the claim' (cf. Machan, 1979: 125, on what he calls decisions that
'prevail by default').
Ronald Dworkin has also argued that a conception of law as an institutional fact (his argument is
clearly designed to apply also to a sources thesis-based conception of law) necessarily implies the
existence of gaps. He also collapses Kelsen's distinction between a legal gap and a 'conflict of
interests not regulated by the law', because
the internal logic of a rule is one that allows three truth values because it allows for a distinction
between what the logicians call 'internal' and 'external' negation. That is, there's a difference
between saying 'There is no mle permitting me to take my bicycle into the park' and 'There is a mle
not permitting me or forbidding me'. Since that is a logical feature of rules, if we think of law as
institutional fact, we will think there are many cases in which it is true neither that a mle has been
created permitting me to enter the park nor that a mle has been crated forbidding me to do so, and in
those circumstances that the proposition 'I am permitted to do so' is neither true nor false (Dworkin,
1991:86).
This view suffers from the same defect as that of Alchourron and Buligyn: it considers only what
Dworkin calls the 'internal logic of rules', but not the effects that the existence of law-applying organs
has upon such an 'internal logic'. A law-applying organ has the role of applying legal rules once their
operative facts are fulfilled. If no mle's operative facts are fulfilled, no mle can be applied. This will
mean that many conflicts of interest will not be solved by the law, but it does not mean that the courts
will have discretion. If no mle concerning bicycles in the park exist, then Dworkin cannot be fined by
law-applying organs if he takes his bicycle into the park. If he is prosecuted because of his driving his
bicycle in the park, there is one right legal answer: he should be acquitted. In both cases what the court
must do follows from its characterisation as a law-applying organ42.
Peczenik, Alchourron and Bulygin want to say that an Argentinean judge in 1971 would have have
discretion to solve a case characterised by properties ABC, because the law did not offer a solution for
42Needless to say, I am assuming that no norm exists in the system that grants every person a general right to do whatever is
not prohibited by the law: if this is the case (as it is in most legal systems today) the answer to Dworkin's point is even simpler:
the logical distinction between 'internal' and 'external' negation holds only if there is no rule in the system that makes an
external negation equivalent to an internal one.
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that case. I submit that their position is made plausible because, as Kelsen said, to apply the law
according to its literal meaning is (assuming that the rightful owner is suing the possessor) deemed to
be morally-politically objectionable. I would follow Kelsen in saying that if in a case like this the
judge has discretion this is not because there is a 'normative gap', but because there is an 'axiological
gap'. In support of this claim I would simply point out the very many cases (like the case of the
Scottish married couple) of 'normative' gaps in which, because there is no gap in the 'axiological'
sense, we would not be inclined to think of the judge having discretion. In brief: it is impossible to
discriminate, without evaluative arguments (of the sort the sources thesis rules out), between cases that
are to be treated as legal gaps and those that are to be treated simply as cases in which the plaintiff did
not have a legal ground for his claim. How can it be said (without using such arguments) 'if the law
does not punish the theft of electricity43 that is a gap' and at the same time 'if the law does not punish
drinking orange juice that is not a gap'? A normative gap {i.e. what is common to the theft-of-
electricity case and the drinking-orange-juice case, i.e. the fact that none of these actions figures on the
operative facts of any valid legal rale) is not enough for the court to have discretion. Only axiological
gaps can be a source of discretion for the court. But according to the sources thesis axiological gaps
are not legal gaps, since they are defined as cases in which the law offers a solution that is morally
objectionable. Hence the existence of gaps cannot provide an explanation of legal disagreement
compatible with the sources thesis44.
Let us now consider the reasons why Raz believes that legal gaps exist. In fact, he thinks that they
must exist:
A dispute is regulated if questions of the form 'In this case should the court decide that p'V have a
correct legal answer. It is unregulated if some of these questions do not have a correct answer, i.e. if
there is a gap in the law applying to the case (Raz, 1979: 181).
Are such gaps inevitable? It seems that the sources thesis makes them unavoidable since it makes law
dependant on human action with its attendant indeterminacies (1979: 73).
According to Raz, there are three independent situations in which the sources thesis 'makes legal gaps
unavoidable':
1. Open texture. "A cause of legal gaps [...] is the indeterminacy of language, of intention and of
other facts" (Raz, 1979: 73) The first kind of legal gaps that the sources thesis makes unavoidable is
explained by the open texture of language. I hope that by now it is clear why this explanation will not
work as an explanation of legal disagreement: on the one hand, open texture (in the first of the two
senses in which Hart used the expression that will be distinguished below, at 62f) does not by itself
imply the kind of uncertainty that is characteristic of legal disagreement, as was argued in the previous
chapter and Hart himself recognised (for this, cf. infra, 63f). Indeterminacy is not an interesting
problem in autonomous institutions {e.g. chess), hence the fact of an institution being what I called
43This is Kelsen's example: cf. Kelsen, 1960: 246.
44As this passage suggests, I would not follow Kelsen in claiming that there are no gaps in the law: 1 would rather claim that
what Kelsen saw as political or ideological considerations are legal considerations. And then I would be in a position to agree
with Kelsen in that only when these considerations are taken into account there is space for legal gaps. But the sources thesis
has to go along with Kelsen all the way.
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'regulatory' makes a difference that an open texture-based solution cannot explain. The same could be
said about the indeterminacy of intention—though this will be given slightly more attention later.
2. Conflicting laws. The second kind of gaps is due to the possibility of conflict between laws. Raz
distinguishes two types of conflict: One the one hand there can be a conflict because two conflicting
legal reasons are balanced: "they cancel each other and it is false that there is a conclusive reason for
the act and false that there is a conclusive reason for its omission [...]. This kind of situation involves
no unresolved conflict nor any legal gap" (1979: 75). Completely different, however,
is a situation of unresolved conflict. It arises when conflicting reasons fail to override each other, not
because they are equally matched, but because they are not matched at all: for whatever reason, the
conflicting reasons are incommensurable as to strength. In such a case it would be wrong to say that
the agent is permitted to perform the act. But it would be equally wrong to say that he is not permitted
to perform it (1979: 75)45.
Is this situation at all possible? Note the special vocabulary Raz is using here: he is not talking of
conflicting Taws' but conflicting 'legal reasons'. I will take them, however, to be the same (cf. 1979:
65-66)46. How can two (or more) laws be incommensurable?
In The Morality of Freedom, Raz gives three independent sources of incommensurability: 1) the
"'incomplete' definition of the contribution of criteria to a value" (Raz, 1986: 326)47; 2) the
"vagueness and the absence of sharp boundaries which infect language generally and therefore apply
to value measured by a single criterion as well" (1986: 327)48; and 3) the fact that "value is often
determined by the probability that the option will produce certain effects. Judgements of probability
are infected by considerable incommensurabilities of their own" (1986: 327).
If the sources thesis is true, the existence and strength of a legal reason will depend upon its source
only. Hence the first and the third sources of incommensurability are of no use here: the first because
there will be only one criterion—the relevant social source—to the determination of value—the
correctness of a legal answer, the third because if the sources thesis is true, then the test to determine
the existence and content of any law will be backwards-looking: it will look for a social source in the
past, not for the consequences in the future. Only the second could explain why legal reasons (i.e. legal
rules, laws) could be incommensurable. Unfortunately for Raz, the second sense is the most doubtful
of all. In the first place, it is not clear at all that the situation in the second is to be regarded as one of
incommensurability. In Raz's signpost example, it seems to me that the proper way to describe the
situation would be to say that if the signpost is too small it is not visible (or barely visible) while if it is
too big it is difficult to see as well. Some of the sizes in between will be better than others, but many of
45Ronald Dworkin has drawn a very similar distinction between these two cases of conflicting laws: cf. 1991: 89. As he rejects
the sources thesis, however, his distinction is not liable to the objection presented below against legal incommensurability.
46"Two common answers to 'Why ought one to <j>T are 'Because there is a new law to that effect' or 'Because last year
Parliament decreed so'. Both come much to the same thing" (1979: 65).
47"This is most obvious where a value is a function of several criteria, so that a good novelist, for example, might be judged by
his humour, his insight, his imaginativeness and so on. It is possible that our weighting of the different criteria does not
establish complete ranking of all possible combinations" (1986: 326).
48"Suppose one is judging how good a signpost is by its visibility. Its visibility depends, let us simplify, on its size only. The
bigger it is the more visible it is, until it reaches a certain point beyond which its visibility declines [...]. There is likely to be a
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them will be equally visible. This description would involve no incommensurability, since different
sizes are definitely more, less or equally visible than others (Raz did not think an argument was
needed to show why the contrary was 'likely to happen').
Nevertheless, even if I am wrong in this respect, and the situation with the visibility of the signpost is
one of incommensurability, as an explanation of legal gaps it amounts to a repetition of the argument
of open texture: if there is incommensurability in the second case it will be due to the "vagueness and
the absence of sharp boundaries which infect language generally" (Raz, 1986: 327). Hence the
possibility of conflicting laws involves no new reason for us to think that the sources thesis makes
legal gaps unavoidable.
3. Discretion. The last kind of gaps that the sources thesis makes unavoidable arises as well "out of
conflict situations" (1979: 75):
The law may make certain legal mles have prima facie force only by subjecting them to moral or
other non-source-based considerations. Let us assume, for example, that by law contracts are valid
only ifnot immoral. Any particular contract can be judged to be prima facie valid if it conforms to the
'value-neutral' conditions for the validity of contract laid down by law. The proposition 'It is legally
conclusive that this contract is valid' is neither hue nor false until a court authoritatively determines its
validity (1979: 75).
As a matter of fact, however, the proposition 'It is legally conclusive that this contract is valid' is false:
the court can decide otherwise, because "by the sources thesis courts have discretion when required to
apply moral considerations" (1979: 75). If the courts have discretion in this case, then it is hue that the
contract is not (conclusively) valid (of course, it is also hue that the statement 'it is legally conclusive
that this contract is invalid' is false). Anyway, this case is not interesting, for it is far too contingent. It
would explain only those hard cases in which the law explicitly refers to moral standards. We do not
need any explanation for interpretive disagreement in those cases: a theory of law need not have an
explanation ofmoral disagreement.
*
Suppose the first case of 'theft' of electricity arises (c/ Kelsen, 1960: 246). In court, the judges will
have to answer Raz's question: 'What does the law require in this case?'. The answer is: 'the law
requires nothing'. This is, according to Raz, a 'secondary' answer and the situation a gap (1979: 71).
The problem is that, if the sources thesis is hue, 'secondary' answers are answers in exactly the same
sense as 'primary' answers, because 'the law requires nothing' mutates to 'the law requires the court
to find in favour of the defendant'. Thus Raz makes the same mistake as Alchourron and Bulygin,
Peczenik and Dworkin: he believes that an answer to (a) is an answer to (b). But if courts are supposed
to give authoritative determinations of what the source-based law requires (a claim that against Raz
should not be particularly controversial), then a negative answer to the first becomes a positive answer
to the second question. Recall the case of the orange juice-drinker. When he is brought before the
range of sizes regarding which it will be neither true nor false both that different signs are of equal visibility and that one is
more visible than the other" (1986: 327).
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court, the court has to say: 'the law requires the court to find in favour of the defendant'. Both cases
are equally regulated.
No gap can make a case hard if the sources thesis is true. There are no 'regulative' hard cases in chess,
for example: that is the reason why autonomous institutional systems can be formalised (a computer
can 'play' chess, and modem word-processors can check the grammatical accuracy of a text). No rule
of football allows, nor specifically permits, players to dye their hair yellow: was the case of the
Rumanian team in their 1998 World Cup match against Croatia 'unregulated'? Did the referee have
discretion? An autonomous institution strictly complies with the sources thesis: the existence and
content of the rules of chess can be completely determined without using evaluative arguments. But
precisely because evaluative arguments are out ofplace in chess- or football-adjudication, there are no
unexpected hard cases in football or in any other autonomous institution49.
In short, legal gaps produce a dilemma for the sources thesis: they either do not exist, and then all
cases are regulated, or they exist in an amazing quantity: not only stealing electricity, but also
gardening, wearing dark clothes, sleeping at night, sleeping at day, and an enormous number of other
actions which are not explicitly forbidden nor explicitly allowed would constitute, if brought before a
court, 'unregulated cases', meaning that the court would have discretion to solve them in the most
appropriate way.
Meaning and Application
Playing on Railway Stations
Let me go back to the 'staying awake on railways stations' game mentioned above (at 28) Imagine that
you are playing it. Recall that this game has only one rule, forbidding the players to sleep in railways
stations. According to this mle, if a player falls asleep in any railway station, he will have to pay the
others players £ 5. The mle is,
(1) Itwill be a violation ofthe rule ofthe game, punishable by fine of5 points, to sleep in any railway
station.
Imagine now that it is the law that
(2) It shall be amisdemeanour, punishable by fine of£ 5, to sleep in any railway station.
Now imagine that you are the referee (in the first case) or the judge (in the second) and that
two men are brought before me for violating this statute. The first is a passenger who was waiting at 3
AM for a delayed train. When he was arrested he was sitting upright in an orderly fashion, but was
heard by the arresting officer to be gently snoring. The second is a man who had brought a blanket
and pillow to the station and had obviously settled himself down for the night. He was arrested,
however, before he had a chance to go to sleep (1958: 664).
We have seen that if you are a referee your decision has to be in some sense mechanical, i.e. you've
nothing to do except to apply the mle. Here there is still another way of putting the last chapter's
49'Unexpected': the attentive reader will remember a hard case in chess like the one discussed by Dworkin (1977: lOlff). I call
that an expected hard case because it was make hard by the rule's use of a verbal formulation ('unreasonable annoyance') that
had the precise point of giving the referee some discretion, like the dangerous play or advantage rules in football. This point
was dealt with above, at 16f.
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argument: if you are playing the game you cannot avoid applying the rale; if you don't apply it, you
are caught in a performative contradiction: the propositional content of the presuppositions of your
action contradicts what you are saying or doing (for the idea of a performative contradiction, see
Habermas, 1993: 55-6; for a similar idea, called by him 'performative inconsistency', see Finnis,
1980: 74)
(3) We are playing the game 'sleeping in the railway station'
(4) 'Sleeping in the Station' is defined {inter alia) by the rule (1) above
(5) This playerwas found sleeping in a railway station
(6) It is not the case that this player should pay £ 5.
It is obvious that, for a number of reasons, (6) can indeed be true. But if you accept (6) you have to
reject (3), because part of the content of (3) is, in the case, the negation of (6), as specified in (4). In
other words, the players cannot say: 'we are doing something that is defined by the fact thatfor allp's,
ifp then q, and we are faced with ap, but q is not the case'. Or, better, they can decide not to q, but if
they do so they are giving up the game (or playing a new game).
In other words, the special circumstances of Fuller's two defendants are, insofar as the application of
(1) is concerned, irrelevant. Nothing in the example introduces the least complication. The application
of (1) does not become 'hard' because the first man was sleeping while waiting for his delayed train.
This is perfectly compatible with (we could even say: this is) Hart's thesis concerning the open texture
of language: the reasons why the man fell asleep (and what else the second was doing at the moment
of his arrest) are immaterial to the classification of his behaviour as 'sleeping in the railway station'.
Since that classification is the only important issue for the application of the rale, everything that has
no bearing on how to classify their behaviour has equally no bearing on how to apply the rale. Recall
the reasons why the 'complexity deficit' of rales was rejected (supra at 17) as an explanation of the
difference between games and the law. We see these reasons at work here: an additional argument is
needed to explain why the complexity deficit is important concerning (2), but irrelevant concerning
(1).
Now, if we simply look at (2), we shall not see any difference. Its operative facts are the same, hence
the application of (2) should be triggered by the same facts than the application of (1). But,
interestingly, its application is much less straightforward. For a start, we can say that there are two
different descriptions of the problem Fuller's example poses. On the first version, it does not raise a
legal, but only a moral, problem for the judge:
(7) The law is that it is amisdemeanour, punishable by fine of£ 5, to sleep in any railway statioa
(8) Thisman was found sleeping in the station
(9) The law is that thisman should be fined
On this description, the facts ofFuller's example can well justify the judge saying
(10) Because ofsubstantive (moral) considerations I should break the law.
but this is scarcely of interest, since we have stipulated that we are not concerned with the moral
question of what the judge has to do, but only with the legal question of what the law requires him to
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do. This is, I take it, the description positivists have to offer of cases of this kind (Marmor, 1994: 136-
7).
Compare this description with the following one, which is Fuller's preferred one (or my version of it):
(11) The law is that it is amisdemeanour, punishable by fine of£ 5, to sleep in any railway station.
(12) Thisman was found sleeping in the station
(13) Because ofsubstantive (moral) considerations, and without denying (11) nor (12), it is the law that
thisman should not be fined.
Under both descriptions, what the judge has ultimately to do is not to fine the man. According to the
second, however, that is the legal obligation of the judge, while according to the first the judge would
be breaking the law in not fining him, however justified he might be from a moral point of view. The
question is, of course, whether (13) can be uttered without performative contradiction. If this is
answered in the affirmative, as I think it can, the question of which description is the correct one will
then have to be addressed.
I will not, however, address these issues directly, partly because I cannot think of what a knock-down
argument for preferring one or the other description would look like. Instead, in what remains of this
chapter and the next, I will try to approach the first issue from different angles, in order to show that
the reason why (3)-(6) cannot be uttered without performative contradiction is that in autonomous
institutions getting the meaning right is all that is to rule application, while in regulatory institutions
this is not necessarily the case. If this conclusion is correct, there will be some conceptual space open
to discuss how best to describe the application of rales like (2) to cases like Fuller's, if in terms of (7)-
(10) or in terms of (11)-(13). This will be undertaken in the next chapter. But now I want to begin with
a careful reading of chapter 7 of Hart's The Concept ofLaw, in order to distinguish two different (I
believe incompatible) versions of the 'open texture' thesis.
Hart on Open Texture
In this section I want to argue that, if chapter 7 of Hart's The Concept ofLaw is read carefully, the
contrast between his views and those of Fuller on the subject of legal adjudication becomes less
obvious than it is usually though to be (the contrast I have in mind is made bright and sharp in, e.g.
Marmor, 1994: 129ff).
I will not offer here a full exposition of Hart's open texture thesis, which has already been touched
upon in the previous chapter. Suffice it to say that he tried to strike a middle way between what he
called 'rale formalism' and 'rale scepticism', and that to do this he borrowed from F. Waismann
(Waismann, 1951) the idea of open texture. According to the text-book exposition of this thesis, the
argument was that, since meaning is use, concept-words cannot have any meaning whatsoever without
there being clear instances to which they apply. To be able to recognise those examples as instances of
the relevant concept-word is to know the meaning of it. By the same token, however, in many
instances the application of those concept-words to some state of affairs will not be completely
obvious, and disagreement between competent users will arise. In these circumstances, failure to use
the relevant concept-word to refer to those states of affairs is not evidence of ignorance of their
62
SOURCES, CLEAR CASES, LEGAL GAPS
meaning (as failure in the clear cases is), since these states of affairs are said to be in the penumbra of
meaning of them, where different opinions might exist between competent users as to whether or not a
particular concept-word applies. To make an often-quoted passage even more often quoted,
Ifwe are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the most elementary form of law, we are
to express our intentions that a certain type ofbehaviour be regulated by rales, then the general words
we use [...] must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about [their] application.
There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in
which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out (Hart, 1958: 63).
So understood, Hart's is a thesis about the limits of certainty that general classificatory terms can have
in natural languages: "[open texture is] a general feature of human language; uncertainty at the
borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in anyform ofcommunication
concerning matters of fact" (1994: 128; my italics). It is an inescapable feature of natural languages as
we know them, and hence is part of the human predicament: ifwe are to communicate with each other
using natural (rather than artificial) languages, then it is pointless to strive to achieve complete
certainty: there is nothing we can do to exclude open texture, at least insofar as we also want to use
general classificatory terms:
my view was (and is) that the use of any language containing empirical classificatory general terms
will, in applying them, meet with borderline cases calling for fresh regulation. This is the feature of
language I called 'open texture'" (Hart, quoted by Bix, 1993: 24).
On this first reading of it, the open texture thesis is one about language, and only derivatively about
the law. 'Open texture' is not a feature of law but, as Hart explicitly says, one of natural languages.
Needless to say, since (or: only because) legal rales are expressed in natural languages, the open
texture of the latter communicates, so to speak, to the former. Thus it is not surprising at all to hear
from Hart that, for example, "whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the
communication of standards of behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the great mass of
ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is in question, prove indeterminate" (Hart,
1994: 127-8). In this account, since what makes hard cases hard and clear cases clear is 'uncertainty at
the borderline', Fuller's example has to be described according to (7)-(10). What the first man was
doing was as 'core' an instance of the concept-word 'sleeping' as it could have been.
Immediately after presenting the notion of open texture, and in an apparent effort to cheer the reader
up, Hart explains that uncertainty at the borderline is certainly nothing to be afraid of. But in the
course of this consolation the nature of the open-texture thesis switches: it becomes a thesis no longer
about one of the inescapable features of natural languages as we know them, but about the
convenience of having open-textured (i.e. not completely certain and predictable) rales. It ceases to be
a feature of language to become one of the law (or, in general, of 'regulatory' institutions).
Of course, there is no reason why you cannot argue that X is the case and then go on to argue thatX is
also desirable, which is the way in which the relevant passages on The Concept ofLaw seem to have
usually been read. But Hart did something more: when arguing about the desirability of open texture,
and contradicting his statements quoted above (and many others) Hart conceded that it is possible, for
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us now and here, to eliminate the uncertainty at the borderline, i.e. "to freeze the meaning of the rale
so that its general terms must have the same meaning in every case where its application is in
question" (1994: 129).
He even explained to us how:
To secure this we may fasten on certain features present in the plain case and insist that these are both
necessary and sufficient to bring anything which has them within the scope of the rule, whatever
other features it may have or lack, and whatever may be the social consequences of applying the rale
in this way (1994: 129).
And ifwe were to follow his advice,
we shall indeed succeed in settling in advance, but also in the dark, issues which can only reasonably
be settled when they arise and are identified (1994: 130; my italics).
If we can indeed succeed in settling in advance the outer limits of the law, it follows that the
explanation of the fact that these limits are uncertain must be in the reasons why it is not convenient
for us to do so, i.e. in the reasons why these cases 'can only reasonably be settled when they arise and
are identified'. In other words, if we can eliminate the uncertainty at the borderline, then it is simply
wrong to say that the reason why the law is uncertain is because the uncertainty at the borderline
cannot be eliminated; the reason why the law is uncertain in hard cases is not some inescapable feature
of general classificatory terms in natural languages, but the very different one that it is unreasonable to
try to settle 'in advance, but also in the dark' issues we cannot yet identify.
Following this second line of argumentation, Hart explains that he is dealing not with a limitation on
the levels of certainty imposed on human beings by the language they (we) happen to have, but with
the very different issue of striking a right balance between two competing social needs, i.e.
the need for certain rales [...] and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official
choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete case
(1994: 130).
And furthermore, this tension is one that "in fact, all legal systems, in different ways" solve reaching
some kind of compromise {ibid. Italics added). Open texture then is not an external limit language
imposes on the levels of certainty human beings can achieve, but the consequence of a normative
decision, i.e. a decision about how best to balance the requirements of certainty with those of
appropriateness. Given this alternative account, then, the correct description of Fuller's example would
be the second one ((11)-(13), assuming that, as a matter of fact, the case was one of those 'left open'
for future settlement).
(Some stipulations will be of use here: (a) I will call 'certainty' the first of the social needs Hart
distinguished and (b) 'appropriateness' the second; (c) I will talk of 'application' when referring to the
problem of whether or not a rale should be applied to a particular case, and (d) of 'meaning' when
referring to that of grasping a rale's meaning).
It is important to emphasise that, as we have seen, what a hard (clear) case is varies according to each
of these interpretations of the open-texture thesis. In the first interpretation, a case will be hard when
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the facts are such that they do not fit naturally and uncontroversially one or more of the general
classificatory terms of the relevant rules, i.e. when it is what I have called a 'semantic' hard case
(when, e.g. the rule forbids you to go into the park with a vehicle and you want to use a toy car in it).
On the second interpretation, however, the point is not uncertainty at the borderline. As we can
'indeed succeed' in having clear and certain rules (regardless of the features of natural languages), a
case will be hard because what is an issue is not the classification ofparticulars in the world, but the
very different one of whether or not this case was one of those left 'open, for later settlement by an
informed, official choice' even if it is covered by the semantic meaning of the rule in question (was the
case of the veteran's memorial settled when the 'no vehicles' rule was issued or was it 'left open'?).
The second explanation of open texture contained in The Concept ofLaw is thus based on the idea of a
pragmatic, not a regulative or semantic, notion of the clear/hard cases divide.
We go back now to the case of the man sleeping in the station. According to the first Hartian
explanation of open texture, the case is clear insofar as what the man did is a core-instance of the term
'sleeping'. In Fuller's example this is true by stipulation, hence the case cannot but be clear. But on the
second explanation the situation is different. Though the man was indeed sleeping in the station, it is
possible to think that this case is not covered by the rule in the sense that it was 'left open for future
settlement' (indeed, many would say something stronger than this: that the case wasn't really left
open: the rule does not apply, obviously, because in this case appropriateness requirements are much
stronger than certainty's).
We can link this conclusion to the last chapter's main argument: this is what makes the law so
different from games. In games there are no pragmatic hard cases, because in autonomous institutions
they involve a performative contradiction. The rules only purport to refer to what they themselves
have created. If the rules are not applied you are not participating in that activity: in autonomous
institutions there are no issues that are 'left open for future settlement' unless they are explicitly left
open (see the dangerous play rule, quoted above at Error! Bookmark not deflned.n). So all we will
have to do is to determine the meaning of the rules, and then, providing that we are participating in
that activity, the rule will be, in a sense, self-applying. The rules define what you have to do to
participate in the activity: if you do participate, your doing so implies your not questioning the
application of the rules. If you do question that, you will simply fail to participate in the game (or
make a mistake or—which amounts much to the same thing—violate the mles of the game). You can't
be a participant if you don't participate; hence the performative contradiction50.
50Let me insist on one point, to prevent misunderstandings: my argument does not imply that participants have an all-things-
considered duty to apply the rules of the institution: there is no reason to think that, because he is refereeing a match of football,
an umpire has an overriding or all-things-considered moral duty to apply the rules. There are many reasons why he can indeed
have a (moral) duty not to do it. Imagine that the match up to then is a tie, and that a member of the local team commits a foul
inside the penalty box. The referee knows that if the local team loses it is highly likely that there will be violent riots, and he
also has (good) reasons to believe that if there are riots there will be many casualties, perhaps even deaths (unfortunately, this is
not too fantastic an example). Imagine, in short, that the situation is such that the correct thing to do for the referee is not to
award the penalty kick. One way of describing the situation would be to say that they are not playing football any longer. But
of course this, in a straightforward sense, is not true. What (1 think) we would say is that, however justified the referee's action,
he violated the rules of football. If the penalty is not awarded we know that, according to the rules of football, he was definitely
wrong, wrong beyond plausible contestation from the point of view of the rules of football. If they are playing football at all,
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Regulatory institutions, in which the norms that make them up are (and are seen as) universalisations
of substantial reasons, are always open-textured in the second Hartian sense, in the sense, i.e., that the
solution to the problem of application is not solved by them. The institution requires a solution to the
competition between certainty and appropriateness, but the norms are not in a position to give that
solution-, the problem is how formally these norms are to be applied, and on this issue these norms
cannot but be silent—in Hart's terms (1967: 106), "rules cannot provide for their own application".
Rules and Exclusionary Reasons
This point is clearer if we consider the third of Raz's theses about authority, what he calls the 'pre¬
emption thesis'. According to it, rules are exclusionary (or: 'protected') reasons. This means that the
rule X, which is a universalisation of substantive reasons A, B, C, to M, is not to be added to ABC to
form ABCX (in the process of deliberation previous to the decision to M), but it replaces ABC and
excludes them from consideration. Hard cases, in the pragmatic (Hart's open-texture thesis' second)
sense, are cases to which the norm evidently applies according to its meaning (the man was sleeping in
the station), and what is discussed is precisely whether or not the norm should be applied as a rule (i.e.
as an exclusionary reason). Regarding this particular issue, it is clear that the norm itself cannot
provide any guidance. In fact, if the norm is a mle (i.e. an exclusionary reason), we would not have
had any problem in the first place. To see the problem we have to consider the substantive reasons. If
we are prevented from looking back at them, no problem can arise. It is clear, though, that the problem
of ascertaining whether or not (2) should be applied as a rule (i.e. an exclusionary reason) has to be
answered before any application of it is possible. And it has to be answered for every application of it.
And where, ifnot in the rules, will the answer be found?
I will have something to say on this issue in the last chapter. What for the time being is important to
notice is that we do have different answers for different instances of the application of the same mle.
Lawyers in most (or, at least: in some) countries will find that the legal solutions for the two men in
Fuller's example are qualitatively different: they would agree that the first man should not be fined,
because the purpose of the mle does not cover that case (leave aside for the moment the question of
the rules have to be applied. If, for whatever reasons, the rules are not applied by the referee, then he is either wrong or not
refereeing a match of football. I hope this is uncontroversial.
This is the reason why, even though in autonomous institutions 'the normative becomes descriptive' (Bankowski, 1996: 33),
this does not imply that no criticism is possible. Remember Wittgenstein's point: "You cook badly if you are guided in your
cooking by rules other than the right ones; but if you [...] follow grammatical rules other than such-and-such ones, that does not
mean you say something wrong, no, you are speaking of something else" (Wittgenstein, 1967: § 320).
The fact is, if I (here and now) follow rules other than those of English grammar here (saying for example, 'he have thought a
lot about it') nobody would think that I am writing in a language ofmy own invention, but that I made a mistake. This points
out the obvious fact that, when we are dealing with autonomous institutions, our criticism of other participants is based on the
assumption that they are playing as well. This assumption will be natural in many contexts; but I could say, couldn't 1, that I
wasn't writing in English after all (and then what you will say is that I am wrong in writing in this peculiar language without
making that clear; your complaint will not be that I violated the rules of grammar—I wasn't trying to apply them in the first
place—but that I failed to do what, for a number of reasons, I had to do: either to write in English or to say that I was not doing
so).
This is the reason why we can follow MacCormick and Weinberger's advice and avoid being "saddled with the thesis that the
rules of games {e.g. of chess) can never really be broken. For someone who does not conduct himself as the rules requires {e.g.
by making diagonal moves with his knight) is by definition failing to play this game, viz., chess. So cheating at chess would be
impossible" (MacCormick and Weinberger, 1986: 24). The distinction between failing to follow the rales of chess and cheating
at chess is not internal to the rules of chess, so to speak, but external to them: it depends on whether one is wanting to play
chess, intentionally misapplying a rale to get an advantage, etc.
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whicli is the best description of this opinion), even though he was actually sleeping. I submit that
lawyers would not be troubled by the fact that the case of the first man is literally covered by the rule.
But the case of the second man is different. In that case, I submit that the fact that he was not doing
that to which the literal formulation of the rule refers (to wit, sleeping) would be more important in the
sense that many lawyers would think that he should not be fined: nullum crimen sine lege. The
criminal law protects every potential sanctionee by limiting the state's punitive power only to those
cases and circumstances in which the sanction was previously intimated. Therefore the second man,
who was not sleeping cannot be punished. But it is clear that ifwe do not fine the first man, the literal
meaning-based argument will be rather weak to exclude the second. The explanation for this
asymmetry is based on the different position in which the balance between certainty and
appropriateness is struck in different situations: because of substantive, moral (or political) reasons, we
regard the case of the first man as a (pragmatic) hard case and that of the second as a clear one.
The argument could be expressed saying that it is misleading to speak of laws as rules, at least if by
'rules' one understands something like an exclusionary reason. The fact is, the issue of ascertaining the
content of a norm (i.e. its meaning) can and should be distinguished from that of establishing how it
should be applied (i.e. its application): norms can be more or less formal(7y applied). If (2) is applied
as an exclusionary reason, the substantive merits of the case will cease to be relevant once it has been
shown that the man was sleeping in the station. But (2) could be applied in a less formal way, i.e.
assuming that some of the substantive merits of the case are to be taken into account, but not all of
them (hence, for example, neither the first nor the second man should be fined) or with a very low
degree of formality, saying that the first man should not be fined but the second should (this decision
is even less formal than the former because not only in the case of the first, but also in the case of the
second man the decision-maker has gone directly towards the substantive reason of which the norm is
a universalisation). The concept of law does not imply any of this solutions. The solution is not a
conceptual one: as Hart said, "in fact all systems, in different ways, compromise" (1994: 130) between
form (certainty) and substance (appropriateness). Legal norms might indeed be exclusionary reasons,
but if this is offered as a conceptual explanation of what (to follow) a rule is the problem of application
is begged. This is so because in this sense, 'rules' are "norms with built-in application procedures"
(Habermas, 1996b: 220)
To illustrate this point it would be useful to have a look to what Patrick Atiyah and Robert Summers
have to say about formality and formal reasoning. According to them, reasons can be formal or
substantive. A substantive reason "is a moral, economic, political, institutional or other social
consideration" (1987: 1). A (legal) formal reason "is a legally authoritative reason on which judges
and others are empowered or required to base a decision or action, and such reason usually excludes
from consideration, overrides, or at least diminishes the weight of, any countervailing substantive
reason arising at the point of decision or action" (1987: 2). In these terms, Atiyah and Summers's
concept of formal reason is close to that of a rule for Raz (an 'exclusionary reason') or Hart (a
'content-independent reason': cf. Hart, 1982). But Atiyah and Summers do not argue that a rule is, by
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definition, an exclusionary reason (though they do argue that legal rules must be treated as generating
reasons with some degree of formality; 1987: 70). They distinguish amongst four senses of 'formality'
and then suggest that a rule can score differently in each sense.
Atiyah and Summers's four types of formality are: authoritative formality, content formality,
interpretive formality and mandatory formality. Authoritative formality is divided, according to Atiyah
and Summers, into two ideas: the validity formality of a rule (i.e. a rule has a high degree of validity
formality if its validity is determined only with reference to its sources) and its rank formality (i.e. its
level inside the legal hierarchy of the respective legal system). A mle's content formality is determined
by two factors: "the extent to which the rule is shaped by fiat and the extent to which it is under-
inclusive or over-inclusive in relation to its objectives, that is, the extent to which cases which the
purpose of the rule would embrace are omitted from the rule's coverage, and cases which the purpose
of the rule do not embrace are in fact covered by the rule" (1987: 13). Interpretive formality refers to
the process of interpretation of the mle. This process can be less formal and more substantive in two
ways: it
may be substantive to the extent that the interpreter searches for and gives effect to underlying
purposes and rationales which are implicit in the text or which can be ascertained from other sources
(such as legislative history). Sometimes no such purposes or rationales can be identified, but
interpretation can still be substantive to the extent that the decision-maker then relies on substantive
reasons [...] drawn from other, non legal, sources" (1987: 15).
Finally, mandatory formality is a function of the "extent to which otherwise relevant substantive
considerations are [...] excluded, overridden, or diminished in weight" (ibid).
How similar are Atiyah and Summers's 'formal reasons' to Raz's exclusionary reasons? I think that
they stem from the same basic idea, but are very dissimilar indeed. If have understood him well, Raz
would say that the pre-emption thesis implies that legal rules have mandatory formality (he called this
exclusionary force), and that they have, if they are rules at all, interpretive and validity formality.
Rank- and content-formality would be irrelevant.
Above all, I do not think that Raz would be at ease speaking of 'higher' and Tower' formality. He
would, I suppose, argue that formality ('exclusionary-ness') is an all-or-nothing feature (the fact that
he allows for discussion as to what the scope of an exclusionary reason is—cf. Raz 1992: 46ff—is not
an objection to but a proof of this point: given whatever scope the rale happens to have, it is
exclusionary, in Raz's view, inside these boundaries). In fact, Atiyah and Summers explicitly reject
Raz's and Hart's analysis in this regard5l.
In Atiyah and Summers's view, the level of mandatory and interpretive formality of a rale is not
determined by the ride itself. If we are trying to know how the rale should be applied, a reference to
the rale itself is quite unhelpful. But here we come full circle to the question we by-passed before:
once we have grasped the meaning of the rale, should it be applied regardless of other considerations
51 "Here in particular we depart from Raz, Hart and others who see mandatory formality as categorical or on-off rather than a
matter of degree" (Atiyah and Summers, 1987: 17n. See also 1987: 408).
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of substance? One answer that will not do is: if the rule is a rule (i.e. an exclusionary reason), it should
be applied regardless of any substantive consideration, because these substantive considerations are
pre-empted by the rule. From Atiyah and Summers's point of view (as for Hart in the second
interpretation of his open texture thesis), this would not be so straightforward. Sometimes, when
presented with a case in which the application of a rale has unexpected consequences the right solution
might well be to disregard those consequences because of considerations of predictability (certainty).
In others, the right solution will be to look for the appropriate norm to be applied, regardless of the
literal meaning of the rule. But what is interesting in Atiyah and Summers's model is that it makes
clear the point noted above, i.e. that 'formality' is not something that is attached to some normative
standards (therefore called rales) but a mode of reasoning (Klaus Gtinther has made a similar point:
see Giinther, 1993: 269). When facing a problem, the decision-maker will have to decide if the norms
to be applied are to be applied as rules (i.e. exclusionary reasons). To decide that they are to be so
applied is to assume that predictability's (rale of law's, etc) requirements are more important than
those of appropriateness.
A useful example of this point is Atiyah's explanation of what he called "the decline of formal
reasoning" (Atiyah, 1984: 116ff). Formal reasoning is taken to mean, in this sense, reasoning with
exclusionary reasons (the only difference Atiyah notes here between his account and Raz's was one of
terminology; see Atiyah, 1984: 94):
a will, for example, or a contract required to be in writing, may be declared void or unenforceable if
the formalities are not observed. In such cases we do not stop [...] to ask whether the failure to comply
with the formal requirements is outweighed by some other substantive reason in favour of giving
legal force to the will or contract. Once the legal rule of ineffectiveness for lack ofform is clearly
established, the application of that ride shuts out from consideration the substantive arguments in
favour ofvalidity or enforcement (ibid: 94; my italics).
Interestingly enough, Atiyah acknowledges not only that legal reasoning is both substantive and
formal, but also that there has been a trend "in contract law and, indeed, perhaps in all of the law"
towards substantive in detriment of formal reasoning (1984: 93). The reason Atiyah gives for this
change of attitude towards form is that one of the presuppositions of formal reasoning is that
"substantive reasons either will be, or have been, or at least could have been, more appropriately and
satisfactorily dealt with another time, or in some other manner, or by some other person" (1984: 118).
This same point is stressed by Giinther:
suspending appropriateness argumentation when applying norms is justified only to the extent that
we are dealing with unequivocal decisions under conditions of limited time and incomplete
knowledge, because otherwise a symmetrical observance of justified norms in every situation at all
times, and by every person cannot be guaranteed. This qualification rests however on a special
premise: that the appropriateness ofthe norm be decided elsewhere (Giinther, 1993: 270; my italics).
And this presupposition is deemed to fail each time more frequently: "one of the reasons why formal
reasons are today less favoured in contract law may stem from increasing doubts as to whether the
reasons of substance which bear more directly on the result have ever been properly weighed by
anyone" (1984: 119). Given these "increasing doubts", says Atiyah, each time judges are more prone
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to "unpick the transaction, to open it up, as it were, and go behind the formal reasons, and look at the
substantive reasons for the creation or the negativing of obligations" (1984: 116).
In other words, I want to say that 'ruleness' (if by 'rule' anything like 'exclusionary reason' is meant)
is not a feature of a normative standard (therefore called a ride) in virtue of what that norm is, but in
virtue of the peculiar (exclusionary) features of the application procedure the decision-maker uses
when deciding what to do. Recall Habermas' claim that mles are "norms with built-in application
procedures" (Habermas, 1996b: 220). In other words, the distinction, for example, between principles
and rules is not a classification of legal norms, but a typology of legal reasoning-, what a decision¬
maker has is a set of legal reasons. These reasons can be applied as rules, i.e. as exclusionary reasons,
but there is no reason to think that only because they are legal reasons they have to be so applied. If
legal norms were exclusionary reasons in virtue of their being legal, then we could not distinguish
between cases in which the mles can be applied 'without fresh official guidance or weighing up of
social issues' and those that were 'left open for future settlement'. The distinction can only be made on
the basis of the reasons of substance that apply to the case, reasons the legal norm (if understood as an
exclusionary reason) would exclude from consideration. Because we can and do distinguish, to say
that a given norm—say, (2) above—is to be applied as a rule (i.e. as an exclusionary reason) is to offer
a solution to the tension between certainty and appropriateness, a solution whose correctness will not
be established by any amount of conceptual argumentation, because it is not a conceptual question.
Hence,
the artificial conventionalization of legal norms as positivized 'mles' requires an additional
justification. It is only on this premise that one can justify, from an internal perspective, why
situational contextmay be left unconsidered when applying norms as mles (Gunther, 1993: 270).
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that (2) is a legal 'rule' (i.e. an exclusionary reason). It is wrong to
predicate money as 'profitable': only what you do with your money can be more or less profitable. It
is equally wrong to predicate a legal norm like (2) as an 'exclusionary reason' or a 'rule' (in this
sense). (2) is (for that purposes) the wrong kind of entity, it cannot be said to be a ride (meaning an
exclusionary reason). What can be more or less rule-like (exclusionary) is the nature of the procedure
(2) is applied through.
The previous remarks are not meant to be taken as stipulations like those offered in p. 64. Their point
is to note that the concept of a 'rule' (at least in legal positivism) hides away a cmcial problem for
legal reasoning: if mles are exclusionary reasons, then there is no conceptual spacefor the problem of
application. If, on the other hand, I am correct in saying that the property 'ruleness' (or exclusionary-
ness) cannot be attached to (at the very least legal) norms, then there is no such hiding away: how rule-
like (exclusionary) the application of a norm like (2) must be in a case like Fuller's example is the
issue that makes his an example of a hard case (if it is a hard case at all). But if a mle is an
exclusionary reason this problem would never appear, because to see it we would have to consider
precisely the kind of reasons that the 'mle' was meant to exclude.
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Hence, though (2) is not a rule (i.e. an exclusionary reason), it can be applied as one. The point I have
been arguing for in this section is that this can be done only after having decided that, for substantive
reasons, (2) should be granted exclusionary force (certainty trumps appropriateness). It can be the
case, however, that no good substantive reason to treat (2) as a rule can be found, and hence that it has
to be treated as (say) a principle. (2), in that case, will be taken as evidence for the existence of some
substantive reason that deserves the court's attention, and then it will go straight to that reason. Maybe
the substantive reason behind (2) is to keep railway stations clean; maybe the first man's behaviour did
not affect the reasons behind (2), while the second's did indeed. Maybe in this case the correct (legal)
solution for the case is to fine the second man and release the first, even though only the first was
'sleeping'.
Now we are in a position to see, I hope, where the problem of Hart's open-texture thesis (in its first
interpretation) lies: it assumes that interpretive problems are problems of ascertaining the precise
meaning of a given rule. On this (first) interpretation of the open-texture thesis, Hart has to assume
that legal norms settle their own status (i.e. that rules can do precisely what Hart would later deny they
can do, to wit, "provide for their own application"—cf. Hart, 1967: 106), that we only need to read (2)
to know that it is a rule, and we need only to know that (2) is a rule in order to know how it should be
applied (i.e. as an exclusionary reason). Only if it is assumed that (2) is (as opposed to 'is—or can
be—applied as) a mle (meaning an exclusionary reason), Hart's open texture thesis (on its first
interpretation) can be accepted.
In fact, if legal norms are considered to be exclusionary reasons the lack of clarity in the meaning of
the norm will be the only explanation available for the fact of legal disagreement. This is so because,
as we have seen, to say of some norm that it is a rule (meaning an exclusionary reason) is to solve the
problem of application: it is to say that you should not consider any other relevant feature of the case
than those enumerated by the mle; that is what (they say) following a ride means.
I think that an argument like the one presented in this section is the real gist of Fuller's criticism of
Hart. Because of this I think it would be useful to turn to that debate and to some recent answers that
have been offered on Hart's behalf.
Fuller Revisited
In a nutshell, Fuller's objection to Hart's distinction between core and penumbra was that it is not
possible to get the meaning of a mle without inquiring into the rale's purpose. Meaning, said Fuller, is
context-sensitive in a way that Hart seemed to neglect. If this is the case, it follows that no
straightforward distinction between clear and hard cases is available. In every situation it will be
necessary to ascertain the purpose of the mle to know its meaning: it will never be the case that rales
can be clearly applied without any inquiry into their purpose.
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Marmor's Round
In his critique of Fuller, Andrei Marmor has forcefully argued that "a distinction exists between (so-
called) easy cases, where the law can be applied straightforwardly, and hard cases, where the issue is
not determined by the existing legal standards" (1994: 124). Later he describes the purpose of his
argument concerning clear cases, as we have seen, as determining "whether the distinction between
easy and hard cases has any conceptual basis which is independent of the legal positivist doctrine"
(1994: 125). But before beginning the main argument, Marmor sets aside two "crude miscontruals"
regarding clear cases:
First, one cannot overemphasise the warning that the terms 'easy' and 'hard' cases are potentially
misleading. The distinction has nothing to do with the amount of intellectual effort required in order
to decide a legal case [...]. Nor is there any intended implication here that application of the law in
easy cases is in some way 'mechanical' or 'automatic' as it is sometimes suggested. There is nothing
mechanical about the application of a rule to a particular case, nor is there necessarily anything
complex or difficult about solving most ofthe hard cases (1994: 127).
The first remark is trivially hue. The intellectual effort I would have to use to solve a complex
mathematical operation is enormous (most likely beyond my capabilities), but this does not stop
mathematical operations from being "easy" in this sense (that is the reason why I, following Hart, am
using 'clear' instead of 'easy'). The second is more strange. Nobody wants to be called a "mechanical
applicator of rules", but if a clear case exists, then the person called to solve the case is performing an
activity which in some sense can be called 'automatic' or 'mechanical', just as in the situation of a
referee: if you see a foul, (automatically) award a free kick: don't think about it. The operation is
automatic because the only thing that the referee should do is to apply a pre-existing rule to a set of
facts that fits the rule's operative facts, without considering any other feature of the case. This follows
from Marmor's definition of a clear case ("where the law can be applied straightforwardly"). A
computer can 'play chess' only because rales of chess can be applied 'mechanically'—though to beat
Kasparov it will need more than a description of the rales. This is something Hart saw when he
contrasted "deciding cases in an automatic and mechanical way" with "deciding cases by reference to
social purposes" (Hart, 1958: 68) The fact that Marmor does not see anything 'mechanical' in the
application of a rale to a clear case seems to suggest that he does not understand the point of the
metaphor. When you are mechanically applying a rale, you just have to check whether or not the
operative facts of the rale are fulfilled: if they are, apply the rale; if they are not, do not (next case). In
fact, it seems difficult to see how an exclusionary reason can be applied at all if not in a mechanical or
automatic way52.
But let us not pause for long in minor skirmishes. Marmor's argument, as we have seen, is that Hart's
distinction between 'core' and 'penumbra' (in addition to Hart, 1994: 124ff, see Hart, 1958: 63)
provides the "independent conceptual basis" for the distinction between clear and hard cases both of
them are anxious to establish. Cases that fall into the core of a law are clear, cases that fall into its
52Maybe Marmor is just saying that there is nothing mechanical here because in any case a human being has to apply the rule.
I find the idea that human beings cannot do anything that is mechanical rather bizarre (1 shall come back to this point, when
discussing the relevance of deductive reasoning for an explanation of Haitian clear cases: see below, at 136).
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penumbra are hard. I will try to clarify this using Hart's famous example of the rule 'no vehicles shall
be taken into the park".
In using that example, Hart's point was that, while we may disagree about the application of the word
'vehicle' to many particulars in the world, we would not have understood the meaning of it if we are
not able to distinguish a kind of objects that are plain instances of it. Our grasping of the meaning of
that word is our acquiring the ability to recognise such instances:
A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what
about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about aeroplanes? Are these, as we say, to be
called 'vehicles' for the purpose of the mle or not? Ifwe are to communicate with each other at all
[...] then the general words we use [...] must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt
about its application (1958: 63)
Hart is here talking of the meaning of the word 'vehicle'. If you cannot at least imagine any standard
instance to which that word applies, you do not know the meaning of it (this is true by definition).
Fuller thought he had to deny this:
What would Professor Hart say if some local patriots wanted to mount on a pedestal in the park a
truck used in World War II, while other citizens, regarding the proposed memorial as an eyesore,
support their stand by the 'no vehicle' mle? Does this buck, in perfect working order, fall within the
core or the penumbra? (1958: 663).
Hart would have to say that a buck is a standard case of the word 'vehicle' (if you don't agree imagine
the same example with some kind ofWorld War II motor car, and remember Hart's assertion that 'if
anything is a vehicle, a motor car is'—1994: 126). Fuller's point could be read (though he did not put
it in such a way) as amounting to the fact that the elucidation of the meaning of a law is only part of
what the judge has to do when solving a case. Once he has learned that there is a mle against vehicles
in the park and that the memorial has been proposed, he has to ask himself 'how formal should the
application of this legal norm be? How many (and which) substantive issues are pre-empted by this
norm?'.
But Fuller, as a maber of fact, did argue that Hart's views were mistaken because Hart's theory of
meaning was mistaken. He did not, in other words, deny Hart's unstated premise that all that there is to
application is gebing the meaning right:
I have sbessed here the deficiencies of Professor Hart's theory as that theory affects judicial
interpretahon. I believe, however, that its defects go deeper and result ultimately from a mistaken
theory about the meaning of language generally. Professor Hart seems to me to subscribe to what
might be called 'the pointer theory ofmeaning', a theory which ignores or minimizes the effect on
the meaning ofwords of the speaker's purpose and the structure of language" (1958: 668-9).
Fuller's main objection to Hart's theory of meaning is that it does not account for the speaker's
intention and holds that meaning is 'context-insensitive' (I think this is what Fuller had in mind when
he wrote about 'the structure of language': the fact that meaning is context-sensitive, something he
thought Hart would deny. That this interpretation is faithful to Fuller's idea seems to follow from his
comment on Wibgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Fuller, 1958: 669), which he quoted as
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giving support to his own view: "[it] constitutes a sort of running commentary on the ways words shift
and transform their meanings as they move from context to context").
Wasn't Fuller, however, fighting windmills here? Hart could easily accommodate these two objections
without having to give up his core/penumbra account of meaning (and of legal interpretation). The
point has been persuasively argued by Marmor (1994: 129-135), so I will not go into the details of
it53.
Furthermore, Marmor has also shown that Fuller was wrong in thinking that the meaning of a norm
can only be understood in the light of its purpose. We do not need any information about the purpose
of the modification of the offside mle, nor about the purpose, if there is such a thing, of the mle about
the correct tense-formation in English. Even in the case of legal rules Fuller's claim is, I believe, often
false. Indeed, we know the meaning of (2): we know the kind of cases that would accord with the mle
and the kind of cases that would not. But the strength of Fuller's point (and conversely that of
Marmor's criticism of Fuller) changes radically if it is taken to be about application rather than
meaning: in this reading, Hart's account is insufficient not because his theory ofmeaning is wrong (I
have assumed it is not), but because he thought that problems of legal interpretation were problems of
getting the meaning of the relevant legal norms, while legal interpretive problems (at least also) arise
when it is unclear how formal the application of the norm has to be, when it is not clear whether or not
some substantive consideration prompted by some features of the case (e.g. the fact that the first man
fell asleep when waiting for a delayed train) are excluded or pre-empted. Fuller, no doubt, had this
problem in mind, but he mixed it up with that of the (correct) elucidation of the meaning of a legal
norm:
If a statute seems to have a kind of 'core meaning' that we can apply without a too precise inquiry
into its exact purpose, this is because we can see that, however one might formulate the precise
objective of the statute, this case would still come within it (1958: 663)
Note that Fuller is not saying something here about an abstract example taken to be in the core of the
meaning of the norm. He is talking of a particular and concrete case... he is saying that this singular
case is covered by the norm. In my reading of Fuller, we should read the passage just quoted as
follows:
If a statute seems to have a kind of 'core meaning' that we can apply without a too precise inquiry
into its exact purpose, this is because we can see that however one might formulate the precise object
of the statute, this case does not display any feature giving rise to considerations not excluded by the
mle.
This point is clearer if the literature about hard cases is kept in mind. If all that is relevant to solve
legal interpretive problems is to determine the meaning of legal norms, then these very cases suddenly
become crystal clear. Take the most famous of all hard cases, Riggs vs Palmer. Elmer was entitled to
the legacy, if we assume that the correct decision ought to follow from the meaning of the statute of
53Maybe this rejection of Fuller's argument is unwarranted. One could understand him as saying that the the context of the
'legal language-game' is one that has the precise effect of making the distinction betweeen core and penumbra invalid. That
would indeed be the case if the 'legal' language-game were one in which meaning is dependant upon purpose. I will briefly
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wills; Fuller's military motor car, was as standard an instance of the word 'vehicle' as any other car,
and the man was as standardly 'sleeping' as he could. Fuller seems to be committed to denying that his
military truck is a vehicle, and that the first man was sleeping (etc) and this seems very implausible
indeed.
On the contrary, these cases are rightly discussed as examples of hard cases not because we think that
a military motor car is not 'really' a vehicle when it is used for a memorial, nor because a man is not
'really' sleeping if he is waiting for a delayed train. In fact, they are hard even though (or precisely
because) we know that according to the (meaning of the) statute ofwills, Elmer Palmer was entitled to
the legacy; that the military car was a vehicle; and that the man was sleeping. These cases are hard
because we can easily see that they have features that at least might give rise to substantive
considerations that are not excluded by the rale. They are thought-experiments that enable us to see
that we are not in front of a problem of vague or ambiguous meaning, but precisely the opposite: the
meaning is as clear as it can possibly be, but the norm does not exclude some substantive
considerations triggered by somefeature ofthe case.
If I am right, Marmor's objections to Fuller's conception of meaning are correct, but he hit the wrong
target. No doubt it is possible to understand a rale without even knowing the purpose of it, in exactly
the same sense in which the military motor car is a core-instance of the word 'vehicle'. We saw that no
appeal to the purpose of the law was necessary in ancient Roman law, because legal norms were not
seen as universalisations of substantive reasons. You did have to answer spondeo and not another
synonym, not because that was the correct way to serve some substantive reason, but because there
was no other way of contracting. The possibility of legal systems like Ancient Rome's shows that no
general statement about legal norms being impossible to apply without grasping their purposes can be
true. But this is not to say that legal norms in the 20th century can be equally applied. For this you
would need an additional argument, an argument that Marmor, who did not see the point, was not in a
position to provide.
To clarify the argument so far, consider the following sets of theses:
(14) The meaning of a rule determines its application; legal problems of interpretation arise only
because of the ambiguity, uncertainty or vagueness ofthe meaning ofa rule;
(14.1) Ifthe meaning ofa legal rule is not ambiguous, uncertain or vague, the case is clear,
(14.2) Because ofstructural features ofnatural languages (open texture in its first interpretation), it is not
possible to get any rule with a completely certain, unambiguous and precise meaning;
(14.3) Wheneverrules (any rule) are expressed in natural-language words, problems of interpretation are
bound to arise.
(15) Meaning is use: to know the meaning of a word is to be able to produce on request standard
instances to which the word applies;
(15.1) To know what a rule (any rule) means is to be able to identify cases to which the rule plainly
applies without interpretation;
(15.2) As we are able to understand the meaning of legal rules, there must be legal cases to which rules
apply without question. Clear cases are bound to arise as well.
discuss this claim below (at 81 ff), where 1 will basically bypass this discussion. I will do so because even assuming that there is
nothing special about the legal language-game the distinction between clear and hard cases would not follow..
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Marmor, following in Hart's steps, finds (14) too obvious to offer any argument for it. If (14) is
correct, (14.1), (14.2) and (14.3) are correct insofar as we accept Hart's plausible remarks about
meaning, (15), a view I will not question.
In fact, it appears that once (14) has been granted the rest follows more or less naturally, if 'meaning is
use', that is, if (15) is true. My argument is that throughout his article (1958, passim) Fuller mistakenly
accepted (14) and felt that Hart's mistake was in (15). That is to say, given his acceptance of (14), the
only way in which he was able to object to Hart's view was to argue that (15) encapsulated a wrong
theory of meaning, hence both (15.1) and (15.2) were false. Marmor's arguments are (I believe)
enough to prove that Fuller was wrong here, that his arguments failed to disprove (15) or (15.1). I have
no quarrel with this. But my (reconstructed version of Fuller's) argument has been based upon a
rejection of (14), such that I do not need to reject (15). If (14) is rejected, (14.2) and (14.3) become
groundless. The crucial point here is that (15.2) cannot be derived from (15) + (15.1) without the
support of (14).
The rejection of (15.2) is a consequence of the distinction, offered in the last chapter, between two
models of institution (or, strictly, is the consequence of the rejection of (14), which is a consequence of
such a distinction). To insist: without (14), (15) still hangs in the air along with (15.2), and cannot give
it any support.
We can see how the distinction between two models of institution offered in the previous chapter is
crucially related to this issue. Marmor is right when he argues that
unless it can be shown that there is something unique to adjudication [...] we have no reason to doubt
that legal mles can often be simply understood, and then applied, without the mediation of
interpretive hypothesis about the mles' purposes (Marmor, 1994: 154).
But he failed to see that there is indeed something special to legal adjudication, something Marmor
fails to see: modem legal systems are regulatory institutions, and concerning the mles of regulatory
institutions (14) is false.
Schauer's Round
Let me briefly comment on Schauer's criticism of Fuller. According to him, Fuller was wrong because
he confused the problem of whether a case is covered by a given rule with the problem of whether the
results produced by the application of the mle to the case are too absurd or otherwise immoral. This
general argument will be dealt with in the next chapter. But from it Schauer extracts two particular
criticisms of Fuller's argument: in the first place, the fact that we sometimes think that the application
of a given mle to a particular case is absurd shows, instead of refutes, that there are clear instances of
application of the mle (we can think that the result is absurd only after we have understood that the
mle applies); in the second, sometimes judges are authorised not to apply a mle when these results are
absurd (or unjust etc) enough. How absurd or unjust they have to be, and whether or not judges will be
so authorised, is a contingent matter that varies from time to time.
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Note that Fuller could not accept the first of Schauer's points because he, as was said, seemed to
accept the thesis that interpretive problems in law were problems of getting the meaning right. Given
this concession, he could not grant, without conceding defeat, that the rule can have a meaning that is
independent from its purpose. If you hold
(16) It is not possible to apply a rule without determining its purpose
and
(14) Themeaning ofa rule determines its application
then the only way in which you could harmonise these two beliefs is having a notion of meaning that
is itself dependent upon that of purpose. This is because once the truth of (14) is granted, then (16)
becomes equivalent to
(17) It is not possible to understand themeaningofa rule without determining its purpose.
Now, as I argued in the last section, Marmor (along with others) is right in claiming that (17) is plainly
false. As Fuller's criticism relied on (14) and (16), he had to claim (17) by implication. Given that (17)
is false, it follows that (16) is false as well. And the fullerian case against Hart is closed.
What neither Marmor nor Schauer realised was that from the falsity of (17) all that follows is the
impossibility of holding both (14) and (16). I take (16) to be the real gist of Fuller's claim. I accept
that (17) is obviously false, hence I have to deny (14). Once (14) is rejected, (16) does not imply (17),
and Fuller's case can be reopened. In this reading, Fuller's crucial mistake was to accept (14). Once
this mistake is corrected, the rejection of (14) implies that neither I nor this somewhat reconstructed
Fuller is committed to denying that are core meanings of rules; it also implies that from the existence
of core meanings the existence of legal clear cases does not follow. As Marmor before, Schauer needs
(14) for his argument to stand, because he explicitly assimilates core meanings to clear cases: "there
are core meanings of rules (clear cases under the rule)" (Schauer, 1991: 213).
As before, it is interesting to note that Hart himselfwas aware of this complication:
it is a matter of some difficulty to give any exhaustive account of what makes a 'clear case' clear or
makes a general mle obviously and uniquely applicable to a particular case. Rules cannot provide for
their own application, and even in the clearest case a human being must apply them. The clear cases
are those in which there is general agreement that they fall within the scope of a mle, and it is
tempting to ascribe such agreements simply to the fact that there are necessarily such agreements in
the use of the shared conventions of language. But this would be an oversimplification because it
does not allow for the special conventions of the legal use of words, which may diverge from their
common use, orfor the way in which the meanings ofwords may clearly be controlled by reference
to thepurpose ofa statutoiy enactment which itselfmay be either explicitly stated or generally agreed
(Hart, 1967: 106; my italics).
Here Hart, faced with cases in which the correct legal solution is not that dictated by the meaning of a
mle, seems to accept some version of (17) instead of questioning (14). The problem with this strategy
is that once (17) is conceded his distinction between core and penumbra cannot hold (what the core is
is controlled by reference to the purpose of the mle, hence there are no cases to which the mle
obviously applies without reference to its purpose). In other words, this passage of Hart's has to be
read in the light of the second interpretation of the open-texture doctrine {supra, pp. 63f), and the
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italicised phrase has to be taken as an attempt to make the two readings of the open texture thesis
compatible. But it does not work, as Schauer, who thinks Hart was right in his doctrine of core and
penumbra, insists (commenting the same passage ofHart's):
Hart need not have conceded even as much as he subsequently did to Fuller. In acknowledging the
function of purpose in constituting the very idea of the mle itself, Hart too was incorporating what is
but a contingent choice made by most contemporary legal systems (1991:213).
If we understand Schauer's (rather cryptic) reference to 'the very idea of the mle itself as a reference
to the meaning of the rale, I think he is undeniably right, which is only a different way to say that (17)
is false. (14) and (16) cannot both be true without (17) being also true. Schauer and Marmor (and Hart,
though only sometimes) opted for a rejection of (16), which is surprising, given that they did not offer
any argument in favour of (14). And it is indeed (14), not (16), which is false.
The last part of Schauer's quotation links up with his second criticism of Fuller to be summarily
discussed here, i.e. the claim that the case of the first man in the station is hard because as a matter of
contingent truth modern legal systems empower courts not to apply the law when its consequences are
absurd (my discussion here can be summary because I am returning to this issue in the next chapter).
Ifmy argument so far has been correct, I have to reject this Schauerian claim. I have argued that there
is something in the way the law is understood that makes legal rales (or: norms) defeasible without
this necessarily being a consequence of a power explicitly granted to the system's officials by other
rales of the system. Obviously this is not to say that legal systems do not contain rales giving or
denying narrow or broad powers of interpretation to judges, but only that for millennia the law in the
West (and not only in the West) has been understood in such a way that judges do have that power. As
claimed before, it is a contingent fact that legal systems are so understood, but given that they are, it is
not contingent that their norms are defeasible.
In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, during the 19th century and in the heyday of the movement
of codification, many legal systems introduced rales precisely denying powers to the judges. In France
judges were instructed to refer to parliament hard cases. In Prussia, a Code was passed by Frederick
the Great that attempted to be comprehensive, etc. Needless to say, all these grand claims failed, and
inadequacies and pragmatic hard cases did not disappear. Schauer's 'contingent rale', then, is a very
weird rale: it is contingent, but it does not need to be passed to become one, and it does not lose its
validity because another rale is passed denying such powers to courts.
Furthermore, to say that some phenomenon is the result of a contingent decision is to say that it cannot
be explained in the context of the theory, but it has to be taken as a brute, external fact. Hence a theory
that reduces the scope of contingency is to be preferred, other things being equal, to one that does not.
What is a crucial and central feature ofmodern legal systems is relegated by Schauer to the status of a
contingent decision of particular legal systems (and a very peculiar contingent decision, as we have
seen). The account offered in the previous chapter allows us to see that the role of contingent decisions
is more restricted that Schauer thinks. If there are no other reasons, this seems to be a good ground to
prefer it.
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The minimum content ofscepticism
But it could be argued that I have conceded (qualified) defeat on Fuller's behalf too soon. Allan
Hutchinson has offered a criticism/interpretation of Hart as a post-modern legal philosopher.
According to Hutchinson, the "hart of the matter" was that he (Hart) did not take seriously enough
what Wittgenstein and the 'ordinary language' school said. Hart seemed to believe, Hutchinson says,
"that, at least as a metaphysical possibility, language is capable of being unambiguous, provided that
sufficient information could be generated to overcome 'relative ignorance of fact [and] relative
indeterminacy of aim'" (Hutchinson, 1995: 801. The last phrase is a quotation of Hart, 1994: 128.
Hutchinson wrongly quotes p. 121). Hutchinson's post-modem thesis, on the contrary, is that
the relation between core and penumbra is contingent and cannot provide the stability and fixity that
its proponents suggest and require; yesterday's penumbra is today's core which will be tomorrow's
penumbra. People bring different experiences to rules and, therefore, interpret and follow them
differently: there is no uniformity of experience, and, therefore, no uniform experience of what is to
follow a rule (Hutchinson, 1995: 796-797).
From this post-modem insight, according to Hutchinson, it follows "not so much that mles do not
exist, but that they do not exist as canonical directives whose meaning is available without
interpretation and which can impersonally dispose of cases. The meaning of a rule and its application
never simply is—it is something to be argued for or with and not something to be argued from" (1995:
797).
We can see that Hutchinson's criticism of Hart is the same offered before by Fuller (who did not,
however, use a post-modem rhetoric): Hart believes that there are, as a matter of hard fact, cases
covered by the 'core' of meaning of a mle, and that sometimes that meaning can be retrieved without
interpretation. Hutchinson's criticism endorses, as Fuller did before, Hart's diagnosis of legal
disagreement, based on the fact that meaning in natural languages is ambiguous (and that legal mles
are expressed in such languages). But he rejects Hart's claim that the ambiguity is "the result of
inadequate or imprecise attempts at definition"54. According to Hutchinson, language's ambiguity is
"a result of the systemic and structural problem that, as meaning depends upon agreement, there is no
sufficient or adequate common ground among users of the language as to what particular words mean
in particular circumstances" (1995: 803). He believes that this "prevents] the establishment of any
meaning that is fixed and beyond further interpretive contestation" (1995: 805). In this way,
Hutchinson claims to have squared (the circle of) a post-modem scepticism with Hart's theory of law
in Hartian terms, this translates into the acknowledgement that mles will be experienced as having a
core of accepted meaning and a penumbra of uncertainty, but the identity of each will shift and
change; what was once thought to be at the core will become penumbral and vice versa (1995: 805).
The different between a non-interpreted Hart and Hutchinson's post-modem Hart is to be adjudicated,
then, on the basis of whether or not the fact that meaning depends upon agreement 'prevents the
establishing of any meaning' that 'simply is'. To give further support to this claim, Hutchinson takes
up Hart's 'no vehicles may be taken into the park' mle, and argues that
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it takes little effort or imagination to illustrate this contingent and shifting relation between the core
and penumbral meaning of 'vehicle' [...]. Although, at any particular time in any particular place for
any particular purpose for any particular community, this delineation of vehicle's core [i.e. Hart's 'if
anything is a vehicle a motor car is one'] may accurately track the prevailing consensus, it is difficult
to sustain and defend this precise division as an enduring account ofvehicle's meaning" (1995: 806).
1 want to argue that, to the extent that it retains Hart's thesis that the key to the problem of legal
indeterminacy lies in the open texture of language, this post-modem scepticism fails for the same
reason Fuller's criticism did. In other words, my claim is that the problem with Hart's explanation of
legal disagreement lies not in the feature of language he chose to explain it, or in the characterisation
of language he offered, but in the fact (disputed neither by Hutchinson nor, as we saw, by Fuller) that
he did choose a feature of language to do so.
To begin with, I am not clear about the status of Hutchinson's claim that "there is no sufficient
common ground among users of the language as to what particular words mean in particular
circumstances" (1995: 803). This seems to be an empirical claim, and Hutchinson simply stated it. But
it cannot be the case that there is no agreement among users of language as to what words mean in any
particular circumstance, since in that case there would not be any meaning whatsoever. But the fact
that words sometimes do have meaning is proven by the fact that we communicate with each other, we
can know whether or not someone speaks a language on the basis of her (lack of) ability to use the
right words in the right contexts, etc. (Hutchinson would rightly complain if I were to describe his
article as a brilliant defence of rule-formalism in legal adjudication).
Be this as it may, it is not clear why Hutchinson's scepticism is so sceptical. Indeed, it seems odd to
suggest that to be non-sceptical one has to believe that a motor car was a paradigmatic case of the
word 'vehicle' even before the invention of the car (Hutchinson, 1995: 806). All that is needed, in my
view, is to think that there are cases in which the word can be used to refer to uncontroversial
examples of it. The fact that no 'enduring account of vehicle's meaning' (whatever that means) can be
offered is not an objection to this point. From the fact that two hundred years ago 'motor car' was not
a core instance of the word 'vehicle' nothing follows concerning the application of Hart's rule. Surely
it is bizarre to claim that the fact that the word 'vehicle' had, in 1880, as it core-instances "animals and
animal-drawn conveyances" implies that today a motor car is not a core instance of it (Hutchinson,
1995: 806). All that is implied by this fact is that we are not sure about what the core-instances of
vehicle will be in one hundred years time, but this in turn does not imply that we cannot be sure today
about it.
Maybe this is exactly what Hutchinson is saying: after all, he is at pains to deny that "anything goes"
on interpretation, but claims that "anything might go" (1995: 798). But who would deny that if the
word 'vehicle' comes to have a different meaning then a different interpretation of Hart's rule might
go? If this is Hutchinson's thesis it seems that nobody can be less sceptical than that (it could be
called: 'the minimum content of scepticism'). But it is equally clear that he wants to be more sceptical:
54Hutchinson does not offer a reference for this opinion of Hart's (i.e. that open-texture is a result of imprecise or inadequate
definitions). In fact, I do not think he could have offered one, for this was not Hart's view: see Hart, 1994: 128.
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"meaning's continuous slippage and instability does prevent the establishment of any meaning that is
fixed and beyond further interpretive contestation" (1995: 805. My italics). But in this he is surely
wrong. And for the same reason that Hart's first interpretation was wrong: it cannot explain the
existence of normative systems in which there is no space for 'interpretive contestation'. Any
explanation of legal indeterminacy has to explain why it is the case that the rules of games are
determinate and those of law are not (that is, it has, at least, to be able to explain what is specifically
'legal' in legal indeterminacy). And any explanation that looks at the language in which the rules of
the law are expressed is committed to the claim that any rule, of any kind, will be equally
indeterminate insofar as it is expressed in the same languages. And to that extent, any such explanation
would be wrong: maybe, ifwe give evolution enough time, in the future our successors (they may or
may not be still called 'human beings') will have nothing that resembles a hand. Would that mean to
say that today what is a handball in football is not fixed?
If we are speaking about law, and not about any mle expressed in words, then I am not denying
Hutchinson's contention that "there is no politically uncontroversial or historically independent way of
determining that interpretation was correct or that the appropriate constraints are operative" (1995:
805). My point is that this is so in law because of reasons that are related to our (modem or post-
modem) conception of law, not ofmeaning.
Fuller at Face Value
Maybe Hutchinson's (and Fuller's) position are stronger if we understand them in a different way.
Maybe they mean that there is a specifically legal meaning. Maybe my argument that what they say is
false because it is not true concerning games utterly misses the point, which is to emphasise the
particularities of the meaning of words when they are used in legal mles. In fact, there seems to be no
reason why this cannot be so, no reason why the legal can not be just another language-game, with its
particular mles:
Under a different (arguably Wittgensteinian) approach, the fact that words occur within a mle
changes their meaning. In particular, absolutes—'no', 'all', 'every' and so on—seem to have
different meanings in mles compared to what they have in descriptions [...]. In different 'language-
games' the extent to which terms are understood literally rather than metaphorically, 'rigidly' rather
than 'flexibly' varies along a spectrum. In exaggerations, 'no one in class is ever prepared!' probably
means that very few students are; in moral discourse, 'always do what you promise' is understood to
mean that one should do so unless one has a very good reason not to; and so on. Universals in mles
may be just another example of a language-game in which such terms are used 'flexibly' (Bix, 1994:
72).
(I will take the last sentence as meaning 'universals in legal mles may...etc.' to avoid the implication
that universals in mles of chess are to be understood 'flexibly').
I find it difficult to evaluate this argument since any objection against it could, I believe, be met by a
modification of the scope or the content of the legal language-game. After all, there is no reason why
there cannot be a criminal law language-game, a tax law language-game, and so on. Fortunately, I do
not have to offer such an objection, because this 'flexibility' of legal language would actually make
8 1
FERNANDO ATRIA
the argument presented so far easier to defend. Let me explain. The suggestion is that we are to ground
our intuition that in Fuller's case the first man should not be fined for sleeping in the station on the
basis that he is not encompassed in the meaning of 'Any person found sleeping in the station shall be
fined £5'55 because of the particular way words like 'any' or 'sleeping' are to be understood in the
legal language-game. But why do 'any' or 'sleeping' in the legal language-game not include this
particular businessman? The only answer that can deliver as Fuller wants is something along these
lines: 'because in this language-game the meaning of a word is sensitive to the purpose it is used for'.
We know this to be the case because though universals in legal rules might be 'flexible', they are not
just flexible, but flexible in some particular directions only: imaging a murderer saying 'since the
universal in the rule 'thou shalt not kill' has to be understood flexibly, and I am a businessman waiting
for a delayed train, my case is not covered by the rule'.
We are back, then, to the idea that purpose determines meaning, though this time the claim is restricted
only to the legal language-game. Now let us assume that Marmor's argument (which I have accepted)
is wrong, that he is guilty of "invokfing Wittgenstein's] authority falsely" (see Bix, 1994: 48) (or,
more daringly, that Wittgenstein himself was mistaken), and that there is nothing in the idea that
meaning is use that militates against the possibility of meaning being dependent upon purpose in the
particular way we are now considering. My argument would then be simpler: the law can not, 1 would
say, be applied without grasping its (specifically legal) meaning. To grasp the (legal) meaning of a
legal mle (any legal rule) one has to go back to the substantive reasons the rule was supposed to have
pre-empted.
I think, however, that it is rather too ad-hoc to claim that there is a specifically legal meaning, and that
I can understand the meaning of a mle like (2) even though Fuller did not find it appropriate to tell us
what the purpose of that mle was. Faced with the problem of the businessman waiting for his delayed
train, I would prefer to say that, though we know the meaning we do not know how formally the mle
has to be applied. I have labelled this the problem of 'application' as opposed to that of ascertaining
the meaning of a mle. If Fuller's original argument could be resurrected in this particular way, all I
would have to do would be to change my labels: Instead of 'meaning' and 'application' I would have
to distinguish between 'the problem of grasping the natural meaning' and that of 'grasping the
specifically legal meaning'. But nothing of substance would be lost in this translation. To apply a mle
one would have to grasp the specifically legal meaning of it. And to do so one would have to engage
in the kind of substantive reasoning the sources thesis does not allow.
In what follows I will assume that there is in general no such a thing as 'specifically legal meaning'
(the fact that sometimes a statute explicitly defines a term, giving it a special meaning is, if anything, a
confirmation rather than an objection to this assumption). If I turn out to be wrong in this, the labels
should be replaced as indicated in the previous paragraph.
55l have changed here the formulation of (2) to simplify the exposition.
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Conclusion
So let us retain the main conclusion of this section, and to do so recall Schauer and Marmor's mistake:
they assume that (14) is obviously true. They think that the point is one about whether or not core
meanings can exist. They believe that once it has been established that it is possible to understand a
rule without reference to its purpose Fuller's objections fall to the ground:
[T]he thesis that one always needs to determine the purpose of the mle in order to be able to specify
which actions are in accord with it, amounts to contending that the application of a mle always
requires its translation into another mle, which is an obvious absurdity (Marmor, 1994: 153).
[Ujnless we embrace an implausible particularist theory of meaning, under which the notion of
meaning collapses into what a decision-maker in a particular environment should do on a particular
occasion, it appears that Hart was correct. There are core meanings of rales (clear cases under the
mle) (Schauer, 1991: 213).
Schauer's argument explicitly assumes that a clear case under the mle is a case that is covered by the
'core' meaning of the mle, because it is covered by the 'core' meaning of it (a position that is only
reasonable if (14) is accepted). Similarly, Marmor's confusion of the problems of meaning and
application is patent, once (14) is distinguished from (15): the argument is not that one always need to
"determine the purpose of the mle in order to be able to specify which actions are in accord with it".
You can specify which actions are in accord with (2) without any enquiry into (2)'s purpose. This is
but a repetition of Hart's argument: you can't understand the meaning of a mle if you cannot
determine which actions are in accord with it. But one thing is to determine the meaning of a norm and
another is to determine whether it should be applied as a mle. This point cannot but be missed if the
focus is kept upon the concept of a mle (an exclusionary reason), a concept that has been taken from
autonomous institutions (language, games and the like: Raz introduced his concept of exclusionary
reason in Practical Reason and Norms which contains an extremely interesting discussion of games;
the title of Schauer's book makes this clear as well). In autonomous institutions the relation between a
mle and its application is indeed a grammatical one; this is taken by Marmor to follow from what
following a mle means: "to follow a mle, one needs to understand and act according to it [...]. [T]he
relation between a mle and its application is a grammatical one, that is, internal to language" (1994:
153). If this follows from anything, however, it follows from what following a mle is in autonomous
institutions; in regulatory institutions, on the contrary, there is more to the application of a norm than
getting its meaning. Marmor seems to have been misled by the fact that the superficial grammar of law
and games is similar, while their deep grammar is notoriously different. An important part of the
solution for this problem, as we shall see in the next chapter, is to follow Wittgenstein's advice when
choosing the correct description for Fuller's example: 'don't think, but look!' (Wittgenstein, 1958:
§66).
These remarks clarify the sense in which I have argued for Marmor's 'obvious absurdity': should the
mle 'no vehicles may be taken into the park' be translated into the mle 'this military truck may not be
used in this memorial' or in the norm 'this military truck can be used in this memorial'? The problem
cannot be grammatically settled: that would beg the question, because we know that grammatically the
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first 'translation' has to be preferred. The real question is that of determining how formal the
application of the norm has to be. And it is obvious that the norm itself cannot settle that problem.
Note that to select the second 'translation' is not to say that the norm contributes nothing to the
decision. This would be the case only if we had previously and independently decided that the norm
forbidding vehicles in the park is a rule, i.e. an exclusionary reason and that the reason for preferring
the 'second' translation is that the truck is not a vehicle (and this would in fact amount to a clear
mistake of English). There are other possibilities: the norm could be taken as evidence of some
substantive reason that deserves attention: the court could authorise the memorial only insofar, e.g. as
it is designed and build in such a way that the reasons for the 'no vehicles' norm are not greatly
affected:
if we accept, for example, that the norm 'speed limit 100 km/h' has an exception in cases of
emergency, then sometimes to drive faster that 100 km/h will be allowed. This does not mean that
any speed is allowed; here the norm works as a principle (Prieto, 1992: 48).
Only if Prieto's rule is an exclusionary reason will this not be the case: the only reason why an
exclusionary reason is defeated by first-order reasons is that given the scope of the former the latter
were not excluded in the first place (in truth, it is incorrect to say that the exclusionary reason was
'defeated', since it was not applicable in the first place).
At this point, three ways out for the sources thesis are still unexplored: the first is to go back to the
beginning, and claim that cases like Fuller's should be described according to (7)-(10) rather than
(11)-( 13), that is to say, that the question 'should this norm be applied as a rule to this case?' is not a
legal question, but a moral (or otherwise evaluative) question about whether or not the law should be
applied once it has been established what the law is; the second is to claim that the answer to this
question is given by social facts alone (i.e. facts about the legislator's intentions); the third is to argue
that some source-based rules are defeasible because further source-based rules make them so. The




In the last chapter I argued that the problem of application, or, in other words, of the level of formality
a given law must be taken to have cannot be settled by the (source-based) law itself. The only way in
which it can be solved (and the law applied) is using evaluative considerations. This view would lead
us to say that the law cannot ever be applied without using evaluative considerations, and hence to a
refutation of the sources thesis. But too many loose ends were left in the last chapter's argument to
allow us to jump now to that conclusion. In this chapter I will try to tie them up.
Most importantly, three ways of dealing with the problem of application (or, what amounts much to
the same thing, defeasibility) were not considered. Remember that the problem is to decide how
formal the application of a mle has to be (i.e., whether or not the rule excludes the substantive
considerations prompted by those facts of the case that are not listed in the mle's operative facts). To
use the example I have been using, if (2) is an exclusionary reason Fuller's case is not a problem at all:
we would have to say that the first man should be fined (and not the second), and whoever is not
happy with this result can call his MP to press her to change the law.
This is indeed the first solution: laws are exclusionary reasons; they establish the law that is (as
opposed to the law that ought to be) hence defeasibility is not a legal but a moral problem. The fact
that fining the first man is utterly absurd or grossly unfair does not by itself show that that is not the
law (remember the sources thesis: 'the fact that a directive—in this case an exception to (2)—ought to
have been issued does not make it an authoritative directive'). One thing is what the law requires from
the court and a different thing is what the court should (all things considered) do.
As mentioned above, however, the sources thesis is not necessarily committed to such a solution. It
could also claim that the level of formality of the application of a law must be established according to
social facts, i.e. facts about the legislator's intentions. The solution for the case of the men sleeping in
the station would be for the court to ask, 'What was the intention of the law-giver regarding a case like
this?'; 'Did they intend to cover the case of a businessman or woman waiting at 3:00 AM for a
delayed train?'. Suppose that the court finds that they did not have such an intention. The first man,
then, should not be fined, but this is not because fining him is unfair, but because, as a matter of social
fact, that case is not covered by the rule-maker's intentions.
This view also denies legal defeasibility. The canonical formulation of a norm can be defeasible, but
that only shows that that formulation is insufficient. Once the canonical formulation has (if needed)
been enriched with some enquiry into the legislator's (actual) purpose, then that formulation is
indefeasible.
Failing (or in addition to) all of this, one could claim as a last resort that rules are defeasible today
because, as a matter of contingent fact, most legal systems contain nowadays source-based rules
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granting courts the power not to apply a rule when such an application would produce absurd
outcomes (this was Schauer's argument, mentioned supra, at 78ff). This view does not deny that legal
rules are defeasible, neither does it deny that such defeasibility is legal, as opposed to moral,
defeasibility. Instead, it insist that it is a rule-based feature of rules, and it represent a political choice
that could be modified tomorrow.
The argument below is that none of these ways succeed. They, however, fail in some interesting ways,
hence it is worth the effort to consider them. After some general remarks on (a) what it is for a rule to
be defeasible, (b) what the 'conditions' of defeasibility are, and (c) Hart's early thoughts on the issue, I
will try to show why the explanations of defeasibility open to the sources thesis are wrong.
Rules and Exceptions
A norm is said to be defeasible when the requirement it expresses is to be followed generally, though it
can be defeated in some cases. Defeasibility is a property of (some) general norms. In MacCormick's
words,
[l]aw has to be stated in general terms, yet conditions formulated generally are always capable of
omitting reference to some element which can turn out to be the key operative fact in a given case
(MacCormick, 1995: 103).
Though this seems to be clear enough, it is not always easy to distinguish two different situations
which must, however, be distinguished. It is only too obvious that a rule is not defeated if the reason
why it was not applied is that it was not applicable. A rule is only defeated if it was not applied even
though it was applicable:
We do not speak of an action as an exception to the mle, of course, unless we believe or assume that
the mle applies to the action. If the mle does not apply, there can be no question of an exception; if
the mle applies, there could be a question about an exception and if the mle applies but we are
justified in not following it, an exception is allowed (Miller, 1956: 262).
Exceptions and rules
Now all of this appears to be clear enough, but it is somewhat tricky to determine whether the mle
does not apply or whether it does apply but it should not be applied. The only solution is, I believe, to
understand that a mle applies when according to its meaning it should be applied. To say that a rale is
defeasible is to say, then, that there are (or can be) cases covered by the (meaning of the) rale to which
it does not apply. It must be clear, then, why legal mles cannot be legally defeasible, once (14), that is,
the view that the meaning of a mle determines its application, is accepted.
The qualification 'legally' is important in this context: Miller was considering the issue of exceptions
to moral mles, hence his test to identify an exception: 'if the mle applies but we are justified in not
following it, an exception is allowed'. I think it is fair to Miller's point, and it is at any rate important
when discussing legal defeasiblity, to stress that the justification must stem, so to speak, from the same
kind of normative consideration as the applicable rale: if a moral mle is to have an exception, it is
because though the mle applies, we are morally justified in not following it; if a legal rale is to have an
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exception, it is because though the rule applies, we are legally justified in not following it, etc (this
points back to our stipulation supra, at 46).
To talk of 'exceptions' might be, however, misleading in one important sense: exceptions are clauses
that limit the scope of a rule, hence by definition if there is an exception the mle is not applicable. So it
seems that exceptions are impossible according to Miller's criterion: for an exception to a mle to exist
the mle must be applicable, but if an exception exists the mle is not applicable.
The solution to this puzzle is rather obvious, and to see it two different moments should be
distinguished (it is an important fact, to which I will come back shortly below, that the distinction
holds more easily in legal than in moral discourse). There is a legislative moment, in which the mle is
introduced, and also an adjudicative moment, in which it is applied. There is nothing particularly
interesting about exceptions introduced at the legislative moment: they are simply part of the mle, and,
as was said, limit its scope. The interesting problem (and the problem Miller had in mind) was that of
exceptions introduced to the mle at the moment of application: consider a mle like (2) above, but add
to it an exception of the first kind:
(2') It shall be a misdemeanour, punishable by fine of£ 5, to sleep in any railway station, except if the
defendant fell asleep while waiting for a delayed train.
In this case, it is obvious that Fuller's case would not create a lifting of eyebrows. The problem posited
by Fuller's example was precisely that there was no explicit exception: the mle was (2), not (2'). It is
in this context that Miller's test is useful: if, according to its meaning, the (legal) mle does not include
an exception for the case at hand, but we are nevertheless (legally) justified in not following it, then we
can say that the mle is defeasible (in Miller's terms, the mle has an exception—i.e. an exception which
was introduced at the moment of applying the mle, not at the moment of creating it). We can thus see
why a claim like Hart's "a mle that ends with 'unless...' is still a mle" (1994: 139) cannot but miss the
whole point: what we are dealing with is rales that do not, as a matter of fact, end with 'unles...'.
It is important further to notice that though what are defeated in concrete cases are legal norms, ifmy
argument is correct that is not an interesting fact about those norms, but about the system (or:
institution) they belong to, about the law (in the same sense, for instance, in which for a biologist is not
an interesting fact about me, but about human beings, that my brain is bigger than that of, say, a cat or
that I have exactly 46 chromosomes). A legal norm like (2) is defeasible not because of some
peculiarity of it, but because it is a legal mle and law is a regulatory institution (this point was shown
above by the fact that (1) was indefeasible). Given that law is a regulatory institution, legal norms (as
any norm of any regulatory institution) are necessarily defeasible, and it is this institutional feature of
the law for which the sources thesis cannot account.
The Case of the Curious Exception
In this section I want to discuss the conditions of defeasibility, that is the question of when and why it
makes sense to say that a rale is defeasible. I hope to connect the discussion with the distinction
between two models of institution offered above. Since the distinction will not be mentioned in the
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discussion of those conditions, if the latter is correct it will give independent support (if needed) to the
former.
As was said above, it is an important fact that talking of defeasibility seems to be more plausible when
legal rather than moral rules are concerned. In this section I will explore this point, with the hope of
showing why this is the case. There are at least two moral philosophies in which the idea of rules being
defeasible plays (or could play) an important role, and I consider them in turn. But before that, it
would seem useful to pause to think whether it makes sense to think of defeasible moral rules.
An initial argument against this suggestion is one provided, among others, by Paul Ramsey:
The case of the curious exception is a case of a most elusive thing: by grasping for the features
relevant to justifying it morally, one grasps nothing at all or else he grasps nothing exceptional. The
so-called exception disappears in the very process of trying to find warrants for it. If there are relevant
moral warrants for it, then the action can only be miscalled an 'exception' (in the theologians' sense
of the word). It is an action falling within moral principles by whatever ultimate norm, not an action
located beyond or outside principles. The effort to locate a justifiable exception can only have the
effect of utterly destroying its exceptional character. The deed is found to be morally do-able, it is
repeatable, it is one of a kind. How rare or frequent is of no consequence to the moral verdicts we
render. The same justifying features, the same verdict, the same general judgment falls upon the
alleged exception, if it is justified; and so that act falls within our deepened or broadened moral
principles (Ramsey, 1969: 78).
'One grasps nothing at all or else he grasps nothing exceptional': if in the particular circumstances an
exception has to be made to the rale, that only shows that the original formulation of the rale was too
rough: "the action violated a former principle, no doubt; but it did not violate a better principle. Instead
it may have been an instance of that principle more correctly apprehended and understood" (1969:
77). The grasping of the exception is not the grasping of an exception, but the realisation of the
inadequacies of the moral rule the subject believed in. Alternatively, it might be the case that, after due
consideration, the rale as it was all along has to be applied to the particular case: in this case 'nothing
at all' is grasped and the rale is applied to the case as it would have been to any other case.
From Ramsey's point of view, Miller's test for the existence of exceptions to moral rales (cf. above at
86) does not make sense: it cannot ever be the case that 'the rale applies but we are justified in not
following it': that the rale applies means that we cannot ever be justified in not following it; that we
are justified in not following it means that the rale as we knew it was defective, and a 'deepened or
broadened' version of it would show how it does not apply to the case:
The fact is that if one attaches an exception-making criterion at any point along a line of reasoning
from the more general to the more specific principles, all the moral insight that went before on the
scale is immediately suspended. If one adds to the verdict: 'never tell a he or steal except to save
life...' the exception-generating criterion: '...unless not-to-lie-or-steal-in-order-to-save-life would
accomplish greater good on the whole', this promptly undercuts one's grounds for saying that 'not-
to-lie-or-to-steal-in-order-to-save-life' would be wrong or one's ground for saying that to-lie-or-to-
steal-in-order-to-save-life would be right (1969: 86).
Therefore there cannot be exceptions to moral rales: the need for an exception can only arise because
of a badly formulated moral rale, that is, a rule that is not a correct moral rale. Conversely, what we
know as moral rales are not really rales but rales of thumb: an action is correct not because it follows
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from what we take to be a valid moral rule, but precisely the other way around: that the rule is a valid
rule is shown by the fact that it agrees with our intuitions about what is right to do in the circumstances
(this does not mean that every application of the rale is arbitrary: cf. infra at 98n)56.
Can a moral philosophy get around this problem and claim a function for mles in moral reasoning
other than as a rules of thumb? This is what I want to explore in the remainder of this section. First we
look at rule-utilitarianism and then at discourse ethics.
Act-utilitarianism and Rule-utilitarianism
As it is known, this distinction was introduced by J. O. Urmson as a defence of J. S. Mill's
utilitarianism. Urmson argued, against what he saw as 'the received opinion', that Mill did not hold the
ultimate test for the rightness or wrongness of an action to be "whether the course of action does or
does not tend to promote the ultimate end" (Urmson, 1953: 130). Mill's view, indeed, was quite
different (I quote only the bit that is relevant for the rule-/act-utilitarianism distinction):
A. A particular action is justified as being right by showing that it is in accord with some moral mle.
It is shown to be wrong by showing that it transgresses some moral mle.
B. A moral mle is shown to be correct by showing that the recognition of that mle promotes the
ultimate end (Urmson, 1953: 130-1).
That is to say, the principle of utility is not to be used to evaluate the correctness or otherwise of
particular courses of action; it rather justifies some mles. A course of action is justified or otherwise
when it is required or forbidden by a moral mle so justified.
Are these moral mles defeasible? Do they allow for exceptions? We have to be careful here, because
we already saw that in this regard to talk of 'exceptions' simpliciter might be misleading. A distinction
was introduced above between 'implicit' and 'explicit' exceptions, and the criterion for distinguishing
one from the other was whether or not the mle's formulation incorporates an exception. But moral
mles have no canonical formulation, because in moral reasoning no practical authority is involved (at
least not typically): hence the fact that an exception is needed for the case at hand immediately and
directly obliterates any normative importance the mle had, because it shows the mle to be a faulty mle.
We are back to Ramsey's 'case of the curious exception'.
This is a cmcial problem for rule-utilitarianism. To see it we can consider an example like Kant's: A
knows where B is. C asks A where B is, in order (he duly informs A) to go there and murder her. Does
A have a moral obligation to tell C the truth?
Let us assume that the principle of utility justifies the mle 'thou shalt not lie' (this means: 'recognition
of this rale promotes general happiness'). What is A to do in the example? If she uses the mle to
decide which course of action is the correct one, then she has to tell the truth. But the contribution to
the general happiness that her telling the truth in this case will produce is (let us assume) minor,
56'What we know as a moral rule': the point is an epistemic (about our knowledge of moral rules) rather than an ontological
one (about whether or not there are such things as moral rules). The argument is silent as regards the ontological question.
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particularly when compared with the evil she will visit or cause to be visited upon 557. If this
assumption holds, it seems that a utilitarian would have to lie. But if she is to use the principle of
utility, and not the mle, to decide how to act, then she is not a rule-utilitarian. IfA is a rule-utilitarian it
seems she will have the moral duty to tell the truth, thus bringing about (under our assumption) more
suffering than happiness. In other words, it seems that A can be either a rule-utilitarian or a utilitarian
simpliciter, but not both at the same time (see Singer, 1963: 210, who says of Paley's distinction
between 'general' and 'particular' consequences: "when properly defined, the distinction is a useful
one. The system resulting, however, is no longer utilitarian").
But let us continue to assume that A is a hue utilitarian. Her only way out seems to be for her to regard
the mle as a mle of thumb. This solution, however, causes rule-utilitarianism to collapse into act-
utilitarianism: it will never be the case that one has to do anything that is against the principle of
utility, all things considered. The mles do not have any normative force, they merely reproduce that of
the principle of utility: in any case of conflict between the two, the mles cannot win (see the discussion
about the Roman concept of regiila in the fourth chapter). So why should we bother with the mles in
the first place? Is it not perverse to do so?
This is precisely J. C. C. Smart's criticism of rule-utilitarianism (he calls it 'restricted utilitarianism'):
Suppose that there is a mle R and that in 99% of cases the best possible results are obtained by acting
in accordance with R. Then clearly R is a useful mle of thumb; if we have not time or are not
impartial enough to assess the consequences of an action it is an extremely good bet that the thing to
do is to act in accordance with R. But is it not monstrous to suppose that ifwe have worked out the
consequences and ifwe have perfect faith in the impartiality ofour calculations, and ifwe know that
in this instance to break R will have better results than to keep it, we should nevertheless obey the
mle? Is it not to erect R into a sort of idol if we keep it when breaking it will prevent, say some
avoidable misery? (Smart, 1956: 176).
Thus, rule-utilitarianism is argued to be incoherent: it either requires the agent to do what he knows is
not (all things considered) to the greatest benefit (i.e. to do what is immoral) or it collapses into act-
utilitarianism58.
Discourse Ethics
The second moral philosophy in which the idea of rales being defeasible plays an important role (the
list does not purport to be exhaustive) is discourse ethics, in the form of a distinction between
application and justification. In discourse ethics moral norms have to fulfil the condition (U)
that all concerned can accept the consequences and the side effects its universal observance can be
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and that these consequences are
preferred to those ofknown alternative possibilities for regulation) (Habermas, 1983: 71).
57Here A would have to weight the moral significance of the evil he will cause to be visited upon B, on the one hand, against
the utility (if any) her telling the truth will produce plus the utility of the fact that her telling the truth in such a case is likely to
reinforce a truth-telling society and so on. The assumption is, then, that taking into account all relevant considerations lying to
C would produce more utility than telling the truth. Surely this is not conceptually impossible.
58since utilitarianism as such is not the subject here, I am not interested in determining whether this is a final objection or not.
It might well be the case that rule-utilitarians can offer an answer to this point. What is important for my argument is that if
rule-utilitarianism is not to collapse into act-utilitarianism Smart's point has to be answered. It would have to be an argument (I
would claim) to the effect either that rules would not be defeasible or that the validity of rules can be ascertained using a
criterion other than the one used to establish the existence of an exception. As we shall see, this latter claim is the central point
of this section.
90
DEFEASIB I L I TY AND LEGAL REASONING
Let us assume that the norm 'thou shalt not lie' fulfils this condition (U). Does this mean that A has to
tell the truth? Not necessarily, because (U) might also ground the validity of a different norm that in
this case is to be preferred to the one forbidding lying. This further norm can probably fulfil the
condition set out in (U) "so that the validity of the norm forbidding lying would have to be nullified or
qualified by the restriction [...] that, in the case of the innocent person, priority has to be given to
saving his life" (Giinther, 1993: 33). This would imply that, for every norm requiring justification all
the situations to which it could conceivably be applied would have to be considered. This leads Klaus
Giinther, whose The Sense ofAppropriateness we shall be following rather closely in this section, to
propose a 'strong' version of (U), which I will label (Us):
(Us) A norm is valid and in every case appropriate if the consequences and side effects arising for the
interests of each individual as a result of this norm's general observance in every particular situation
can be accepted by everyone (Giinther, 1993: 33).
(Us) comprises two different ideas: impartiality in what Giinther calls the 'universal-reciprocal' sense
(between all those individuals to be affected by the consequences and side effects of the norm) and
appropriateness (to every possible particular situation). Because of this, (Us) is not workable: to justify
a norm under it we would need to know the consequences and side effects of the application of any
candidate in every particular case to which it could be applied. And "it is obviously the case that we
never have such a knowledge at our disposal" (Giinther, 1993: 34).
Giinther's solution for this problem is to introduce a new, 'weaker' version of (U), (Uw) that, instead
of comprising impartiality in the universal-reciprocal sense and appropriateness as (Us) does, makes
reference only to the former:
(Uw) A norm is valid if the consequences and side effects arising for the interests ofeach individual as
a result of this norm's general observance under unchanged circumstances can be accepted by
everyone (Giinther, 1993: 35).
Now the justification of a norm does not say anything concerning the appropriateness of its application
to any circumstances other than those actually considered. The necessity ofknowing in advance all the
possible situation to which it could conceivably be applied is removed, and (U) is made workable. But
this comes at a price: under (Us), to know that a norm was valid (justified) was to know that it was
appropriate for every situation to which it could be applied. Under (Uw), the application of a valid
norm to some of the situations covered by it is not necessarily appropriate, and it might well be
defeated. This allows Giinther to solve Kant's problem: the norm 'thou shalt not lie' is a valid norm,
i.e., one that can be justified according to (Uw), but its application to the particular situation ofA, B and
C is inappropriate.
To judge the appropriateness of the application of a valid norm to a particular unforeseen situation a
principle that incorporates the idea of appropriateness is needed: "we thus need yet another principle
[in addition to (Uw)] which obligates us to examine in every situation whether the requirement of the
rule, namely, that it be followed in every situation to which it is applicable, is legitimate too" (Giinther,
1993: 37). This new principle, however, is not part of (Uw): the validity of a norm can be ascertained
without considering all the features of every situation to which the norm could be applied. But
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reciprocally, (Uw) is not part of the application principle: the validity of a justified norm can be taken
for granted at the level of application and that has as a consequence that in application discourses the
participants need not consider all the aspects of every situation potentially covered by the rule. All that
has to be done is to consider the particular situation in question (e.g. the situation ofA, B and C only,
and not all situations to which the norm 'thou shalt not lie' could possibly be applied), "and for this
situation only" (ibid.).
In this way, discourse ethics can distinguish between two kinds of discourse: in justification
discourses, "what is relevant [...] is only the norm itself, independent of its application in a particular
situation" (Giinther, 1993: 37): is it, e.g. in the interest of everybody that everybody were under a
moral duty not to lie? No reference to any particular instance of norm-application is in order here. This
is taken up in application discourses, where "what is relevant [...] is the particular situation,
independent of whether a general observance is also in the interest of everybody [...]. The subject
matter is not the validity of a norm for each individual and his interests, but its appropriateness in
relation to all the features of the situation" (1993: 38).
This distinction between justification and application allows discourse ethics to distinguish between
the moral and the ethical point of view. A justified norm is valid universally, that is to say, is valid for
every possible context. Habermas believes that in this way he can defend "an outrageously strong
claim in the present context ofphilosophical discussion: namely, that there is a universal core ofmoral
intuition in all times and all societies" (Habermas, 1996c: 201). This core "stems from the conditions
of symmetry and reciprocal recognition which are unavoidable presuppositions of communicative
action" (ibid). These conditions constitute the moral point of view, which is strong enough to ground
the validity ofmoral norms, but their validity only:
Deontic, cognitive and universal moral theories in the Kantian tradition are theories of justice, which
must leave the question of the good life unanswered. They are typically restricted to the question of
the justification of norms and actions. They have no answer to the question of how justified norms
can be applied to specific situations and how moral insights can be realised (Habermas, 1985: 167-8).
This further question, i.e. whether or not a justified norm is appropriate to a given case cannot be
answered from the moral point of view, which is too thin to warrant such a judgement. Ethical
considerations, the form of life we belong to, and conceptions of the good life and the like are all
considerations that must be taken into account when judging the appropriateness of a justified norm.
And these considerations can defeat the application of a valid norm:
Would the English, on first entering India and encountering the ritual ofburning widows, have been
entitled to stop it? Hindus would have said that this institution—the burial rite—belonged to the their
whole form of life. In that case, I would argue that the English should have abstained, on the one
condition that this life-form was really self-maintaining (Habermas, 1996c: 204).
Can discourse ethics with its distinction between application and justification avoid Ramsey's
objection? Consider Albrecht Wellmer's critique:
Habermas's differentiation thesis [i.e. differentiation between application and justification—FA]
seems to me in itselfunclear. As far as the grounding ofmoral norms is concerned [...] the norms we
are talking about here can only be 'prima facie' norms (such as 'thou shalt not he'). But if that is the
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case, then the problems ofapplication largely coincide with the problems of exceptional situations or
situations ofconflict (which means much the same as morally complex situations). [... W]e might say
that the problem we are dealing with in the process ofmoral grounding is a problem of application;
what is being 'applied' is the moral principle itself [... W]e were looking there at principles like
'human dignity is inviolate' or 'every person has an equal right to the free development of his or her
personality' [...] and asking what they mean in connection with behaviour towards women or
homosexuals. In contrast to Habermas, then, I am of the opinion that in the case of morality, the
problem of grounding has the character of a problem of application; what moral discourse is
concerned with is the 'application' of the moral point of view, whether to concrete social problems
areas or to the situations in which individuals act (Wellmer, 1991:205).
What follows from a norm complying with (U)? Two answers are in principle possible, according to
Wellmer: it either follows that a norm is just or that it is right to act according to it in concrete
situations. (U) seems to link these two questions, but this is its weakness: "(U) succeeds in binding
justice to morality only at the price of assimilating moral problems to legal ones" (Wellmer, 1991:
148).
We have seem that according to Giinther (and Habermas) it does not follow from a norm being valid
under (U) (under (Uw) for Giinther) that it is right to act according to it in a concrete situation (to claim
otherwise would lead to absurd results, like A's having to tell C where B is). But if this is the case,
what does it mean to say that a norm is just (which is the remaining possibility)? Why should we care
about the justice of a norm if the fact that we have agreed to that does not by itself imply that we
should act according to it? It seems that (U) is implausible in either reading: if it is a guide to action in
concrete situations it is absurd, if it is not it is irrelevant. And Wellmer's critique of the Habermasian
(U) can be equally levelled, I suppose Wellmer would claim, against Giinther's (Uw).
Or could it? Giinther's answer to Wellmer's objection is to notice that "the distinction between rules
and modes of action does not however appear that plausible if one considers that norms can be reasons
for action" : the data that constitute the concrete situation draw their justifying force not from
themselves, "but only from their connection to the prescribed action in the form of a warrant or norm
(W) worded in non-singular terms" (Giinther, 1993: 52)59. Without justified moral norms, "the data
and the situation features can draw their justifying force, as reasons for or against an intended action,
really only from themselves". The answer to the question 'what should I do' thus becomes a matter of
Aristotelian judgement rather than discourse (Giinther, 1993: 53).
Thus norms can work as reasons for action, as 'warrants' (in Toulmin's sense) for the justifying force
of the data and situation features of a concrete case. In doing so, moral norms, Giinther claims, belong
to and define a form of life, thus shaping the way individuals see the moral universe:
norms belong to the form of life in whose context we interpret a application situation. When we
choose an appropriate mode of action in a situation, this occurs in the light of norms which claim
universal validity in the universal-reciprocal and applicative sense (Giinther, 1993: 57).
Precisely because justified norms can claim universal validity, they can be criticised "on a universalist
level, namely, independently of our contingent for of life" at the level of justification.
59Giinther is here using the scheme of moral argumentation as conceived by Stephen Toulmin (Toulmin, 1958: 97).
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I am not sure about Giinther's success against Wellmer in this regard, but fortunately we need not get
into that debate any further. The reason for my discussion of discourse ethics here lies not in the
intrinsic interest of discourse ethics but in the light it throws on what I called before the conditions of
defeasiblity. It is now time to advance the main conclusion of this section: for norms and exceptions to
exist without one of them eating up the other, there must be a difference in the criteria used to justify
the validity of a rule and those used to judge the existence of an exception to it. If the criterion to
ascertain the validity of a norm is encompassed by that needed to decide the existence of an exception,
then when learning about the latter we grasp a better version of the former. When this is so, to discuss
the existence of an exception (which in discourse ethics is done at the level of the application
discourse) would be the same as discussing the precise content of a norm (which in the same
vocabulary is done at the level of the justification discourse), and there would be no distinction
between the two forms of discourse.
This is indeed the problem of rule-utilitarianism, as identified above: learning the existence of an
exception amounts to leam that the mle was in some way defective. Rules can be nothing but rules of
thumb, and he who looks for an exception will find 'nothing exceptional', but at the most a better
formulation of the rule.
In discourse ethics Giinther's breaking down of (Us) into (Uw) and a principle of appropriateness
seems to fulfil this condition. I do not want to express an opinion on whether Wellmer's objection
does at the end carry the day, but only to notice how his point is that (to put it in my words) in ethics
the conditions of defeasibility are not present: everything that is morally relevant, he claims, should be
taken up at the level of application; whatever the principles guiding the justification discourse might
be, they have to be addressed at the level of application together with issues of appropriateness: "the
problem we are dealing with in the process of moral grounding is a problem of application; what is
being 'applied' is the moral principle itself' (Wellmer, 1991: 205).
At the outset of this section I said I hoped to connect this discussion on the conditions of defeasibility
with the distinction offered in the previous chapter between autonomous and regulatory institutions.
The connection should be clear now. It is not a coincidence that rules in regulatory institutions are
defeasible while they need not be in autonomous institutions. The explanation is precisely the
existence of different criteria to judge rales from exceptions in the former only, but not (necessarily) in
the latter. For consider: under what circumstances would we say that there is an exception to the rale
that no football player can touch the ball with his hands? The answer is: the exception exists if and
only if FIFA has passed a rale with that propositional content, like the one that authorises the
goalkeeper to do so inside his penalty box. But this is the same condition any ride has to pass to
become a ride of the game. Hence in this context the rale eats up the exception, and the rale is
indefeasible (if one looks for an exception, 'one grasps nothing at all'). This is the opposite problem to
that of rale-utilitarianism, where we saw that the exception eats up the rale ('he grasps nothing
exceptional').
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In regulatory institutions the rules exist because they have been created according to the institution's
institutive rules, but this is not all that there is to it. The regulatory direction of the institution creates
an independent criterion according to which the existence or inexistence of exceptions can be judged.
Any explanation of defeasibility has to show how different criteria are used to ascertain the validity of
a rule from those used to ascertain the existence of an exception to it (we saw that for Hart, e.g. those
criteria were "the need for certain rules [...] and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an
informed, official choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in
a concrete case"—1994: 130). If there is only one criterion, no norm can be defeasible: the exception
collapses into the rule, or the rule collapses into the exception: 'one grasps nothing at all or nothing
exceptional'.
We saw the importance of this plurality of criteria in the New Testament:
Alas for you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! You pay tithes of mint and dill and cumin; but you
have overlooked the weightier demands of the law—justice, mercy and good faith. It is these that you
should have practised, without neglecting the others" (Mt. 23: 23).
This is why the rule that forbids working on the Sabbath can be defeated on the basis of 'justice and
mercy and good faith'. Only because the weightier matters of the law should not be overlooked the
exception does not collapse into the mle; only because paying tithes ofmint and dill and cumin should
not be neglected, the mle does not collapse into the exception.
Normality and Defeasibility
The same point could be expressed in a rather different language. Following on the last section's
argument, we shall see that the idea of defeasibility is linked to that of normality. Rules have to be
applied in an exclusionary manner if the case is 'normal', but other considerations came in to play if
the case is abnormal:
Exceptions occur whenever a situation arises in which the particular events in issue bring into
operation some legal principle or value of sufficient importance to override the presumptive
sufficiency of the conditions stated expressly as conditions for the vesting of the right [...]. The
general statement of the right is adequate if it stipulates what is necessary and sufficient for
establishing the right in the common run of cases, subject to any express exceptions or provisos for
regularly occurring and readily foreseeable (or doctrinally well-documented or case-law established)
defeating factors. But the operation ofbackground principles can be seen as raising the possibility of
rather open-ended exceptions in cases ofan exceptional or unusual sort (MacCormick, 1995: 103-4).
The idea of normality, following MacCormick, allows us to account for the formality of rales: under
normal circumstances the rale is followed if the agent acts as the rale requires her to act, i.e. if she
does what the rale says she has to do without considering the substantive merits of the case. When the
case is out of the ordinary, on the other hand, the rale is not necessarily applicable: maybe it was never
designed to be applied in a case like that.
Now the problem naturally is, how can the agent know whether a particular case is 'normal'? If rales
can be applied without evaluative considerations, then the classification of the case as normal has to be
free of those considerations as well (because no application of the rale is possible before it has been
established that the case is normal).
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The last section's argument was that for mles to be defeasible two different criteria must be used: one
to identify a rule and its content, another to judge its appropriateness. The idea of normality is
grounded on this duality. Normal cases are those in which both criteria overlap: a rule the existence of
which is justified by the first criterion does not produce, when its application to a particular case is
judged according to the second, an inappropriate result. The case is therefore one in which the rule can
'simply' be applied60.
When the issue is looked at from this perspective, it is obvious that the ride cannot tell the agent which
cases are normal. In autonomous institutions, we saw that the autonomy of the institution implies that
there is only one criterion according to which the correctness of an applicative decision is judged. This
is crucially different in regulatory institutions, where the appropriateness of an applicative decision is
to be measured according to the beneficial or harmful consequences that acknowledging different
levels of formality of the mle in question will produce in the regulatory goals of the institution. Thus,
it is an interesting fact about the practice, not about the rules of games that mles are indefeasible.
Likewise, it is a fundamental question about legal practice, not about legal rides, whether and how
legal mles are defeasible.
This chapter does not contain an account of the considerations according to which legal cases are
judged to be normal or abnormal, mles defeated or not. Some thoughts on this issue will be entertained
in the last chapter. What I have argued is that these considerations are not to be found in the mle
whose application is at issue. I want know to consider some of H L A Hart's early claims on the
subject.
Hart on D efe a s ib ility
Hart's first publication on legal theory was "The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights" (Hart,
1948). In it, Hart claimed that legal concepts were 'irreducibly defeasible':
There is another characteristic of legal concepts [...] which makes the word 'unless' as indispensable
as the word 'etcetera' in any explanation or definition of them. [... T]he accusations or claims upon
60NB: it might well be the case that because we are brought up in a society and come to know its practices (or even, as
communitarians claim, those practices partly define our self-identity), in many cases we need not explicitly engage in moral
deliberation to 'simply' know whether or not the two criteria overlap. But this epistemic point, important as though it might be,
has no important consequence for an ontology of law.
Neil MacCormick has claimed that rules have "variable practical force" (MacCormick, 1998: 316-7). He argues that mles are of
absolute application if the "Operative] Tracts] must be attended unfailingly by 7V[ormative] C[onsequence], and NC may not
be put into effect except when either OF obtains or some other mle independently providing for NC is satisfied by virtue of the
ascertained presence of its operative facts"; ofstrict application if "the person charged with applying the rule and managing the
activity within which the mle has application is given some degree of guided discretion to make exceptions, or to override the
mle, in special, or very special cases"; and of discretionary application "if the decision-maker is expected to consider every
case in the light of all factors that appear relevant".
Now, what, according to MacCormick, determines the kind of mle a mle belongs to? "The answer is obvious—it depends not
on the content of the first-tier mles about a practice, but on second-tier norms laying down the terms of authorization or
empowerment of the decision maker" (at 317).
The variable practical force ofmles is an important feature of them (and fatal to any account ofmles as exclusionary reasons, as
we have seen supra, at 66ff), but if my argument is correct MacCormick's explanation cannot be enough, as we shall see
(below, at 108ff). The 'second-tier' rules arise when a person is appointed to monitor the application of the rules of the practice
(MacCormick, 1998: 312). But MacCormick's own example of mles of absolute application (mles of chess) shows that the
practical force of rules is determined even in the absence of second-tier mles. It is the nature of the institution what determines
the practical force of the mles of it (needless to say, second-tier mles, when they exist, can affect the practical force ofmles. But
even when they purport to do so, the nature of the institution sets them an important limit, since they also belong to it. See
below, at 110).
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which law courts adjudicate can be usually challenged or opposed in two ways. First, by a denial of
the facts upon which they are based [...] and secondly by something quite different, namely, a plea
that although all the circumstances on which a claim could succeed are present, yet in the particular
case, the claim or accusation should not succeed because other circumstances are present which bring
the case under consideration under some recognised head of exception, the effect ofwhich is either to
defeat the claim or accusation altogether, or to 'reduce' it, so that only a weaker claim can be
sustained (Hart, 1948: 147-8).
It should be noticed that this can bear two quite different interpretations (though there is no ambiguity
if the whole section of Hart's article is taken into account): legal concepts are defeasible, says Hart,
because they could be defeated by a defence based on circumstances that 'bring the case under
consideration under some recognised head of exemption'. If this statement is taken to mean that the
exceptions have to be previously recognised, then Hart is after all not talking of defeasibility nor about
anything interesting or important: he is merely saying that a rule does not apply when it does not apply
(this point has been discussed above: cf. supra at 86f).
As we saw (above at 87) Hart seems to have confused this point in The Concept of Law, when he
simply argued that "a rule that ends with 'unless...' is still a rule" (1994: 139). If this is the meaning of
the remark in The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, then it clearly does not support Hart's
conclusions in it about the irreductibility of legal language: in this case, it could be possible to give
necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of any legal concept, ifwe bother to list all the
possible exceptions to which it is subject.
But the article is clear enough for us to think that this was not Hart's intention when writing that
passage. Hart goes at lengths to show why such a strategy is bound to fail; therefore it does not seem
unreasonable to think that the problem he was dealing with was not that of the possibility of explicit
exceptions, but the different one of defeasibility of legal concepts (i.e. implicit exceptions to rules).
And it is precisely this point, I believe, that calls for further refinement. Hart's thesis in "The
Ascription of Responsibility and Rights" was that legal concepts were irreducibly defeasible. But is it
unclear why the fact that a new defence against the claim that there is, e.g. a contract between A and B
means that the concept of a contract is defeasible: "the statement that there is no contract between A
and B is an application of the term 'contract', albeit a negative one" (Baker, 1977: 34).
In my opinion the situation is clarified when we realise that what is defeasible is a rule, not a concept.
Only because the rule was not applied we could say that the application of the contract was defeated in
the case at hand. There are (legal) rules which define what a contract is. A 'new defence' is precisely a
defence against the application of this rule. In making the defence counsel will use the concept to say
that this case is not an instantiation of it.
As it is known, however, Hart disowned in 1968 the claims made in "The Ascription ofResponsibility
and Rights", because "the main criticisms of it made in recent years are justified" (Hart, 1968b: v).
One of the articles given as the source of such criticism contains, regarding Hart's claim that the
concept of human action is itself defeasible, an objection that could be read along these lines:
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The rejection of Hart's second thesis [i.e. that "the concept of a human action is what Hart calls a
'defeasible' one"] does not mean that the essence ofhis valuable insight needs be abandoned; on the
contrary, it can and it must be retained. It can be retained by maintaining that it is the concept ofbeing
deserving of censure or punishment which is really the defeasible one, not that of a human action.
That is to say, if a person performs some untoward action, then he deserves to be censured or
punished for having done it, unless he has a satisfactory defence. If he has such a defence, the claim
that he is censurable for doing what he did is reduced or perhaps even altogether destroyed (Pitcher,
1960: 235).
Note that 'being deserving of censure or punishment' is a consequence of the application of rules (or
other normative standards). Here again, it is not the concept which is defeasible, but the rules
according to which the judgement is made. The same goes indeed to Pitcher's remark: it is not the
concept of being deserving of punishment, but being deserving ofpunishment that is defeasible61.
I do not know whether Hart included this particular point when he disowned his article as a whole. In
The Concept of Law, however, what is subject to "exceptions incapable of exhaustive statement"
(1994: 139) is a rule, not a concept, as it is clear from the following paragraph (referring to the
example of a person who promised to visit a friend only to realise, when the day came, that the
promise could be kept only if neglecting someone dangerously ill):
The fact that this is accepted as an adequate reason for not keeping the promise surely does not mean
that there is no rule requiring promises to be kept, only a certain regularity in keeping them. It does
not follow from the fact that such rules have exceptions incapable of exhaustive statement, that in
every situation we are left to our discretion and are never bound up to keep a promise (1994: 139)62.
I do not think this can be denied, but it does follow that we should apply the rule and keep the promise
only after we have checked the reasons that could defeat the rule in the particular case, and arrived at
the conclusion that the situation at hand is normal enough for the rule to be applied63. This point is not
a sceptical one about the impossibility of having rules once they are acknowledged to be defeasible,
but the obvious one that a defeasible rule cannot be applied without deciding in the case that it was not
defeated. Nor am I arguing that in each instance of rule-application the agent will be aware of her
checking of all the potentially defeating circumstances. It is obviously true that she will not (because
he is far better a chess player than I am, Kasparov need not consider a huge number of bad moves I,
on the other hand, have to consider and (hopefully) discard. I suppose that this is at least part ofwhat it
is to be (really) good at chess). But a conceptualisation of rule-following that does not leave
61 Cf. MacCormick, 1995 for a similar view: "it is not after all the concept that is defeasible, but some formulated statement of
conditions for instantiating the concept in given cases, or some assertion, ascription or claim based on a certain understanding
of those conditions" (102). MacCormick argues that it is the claim not the concept that is defeasible, and 1 think that the claim
is defeasible because the rule upon which it is based is defeasible. Notice that in the last sentence of the quoted statement
Pitcher seems to agree with this: it is 'the claim that he is censurable' what is defeated, not the concept ofbeing censurable.
62The fact that the sentence quoted above (i.e. 'a rule that ends with "unless..." is still a rule') immediately follows this
statement makes the former even more intriguing: the point is precisely that, as I said before, the rule does not have an
exception, i.e. it does not 'end with "unless..." '.
63l am not claiming that no application of a defeasible rule can ever be conclusively justified. Answering this (mistaken)
criticism of the possibility of having exceptions to (moral) rules, Miller said that "If the rule is recognised, if its application to
the case in point is unquestioned, and if after careful examination no mitigating circumstances have been revealed—then the
judgement has been justified. It is not probably justified; it is justified. In such a case, to cite the rule is to give a conclusive
reason (Miller, 1956: 270). My claim is merely that before applying (to any case!) justifiably a defeasible rule we have to know
that there is not, in the case, a reason not to apply the rule, even when the case at hand fulfils the (explicit) operative facts of a
rule.
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conceptual space for this question is, because of this very reason, bound to be defective when applied
to defeasible rules.
Defeasibility and Legal Reasoning
We can now attempt to address the possible answer still open to the sources thesis to the objection
offered in the last chapter. As should be remembered, the objection was: if the sources thesis is true,
then it must be the case that rules can in a significant number of cases be just applied, applied without
considering the reasons for them (since they have been pre-empted). In the first chapter some reasons
to doubt that this is possible in legal systems other than those of ancient Rome and the Old testament
(and the like), but three independent replies were left unconsidered. I want to consider these replies
now.
First, I address the Razian-Marmorian argument that defeasibility is not a legal but a moral
phenomenon. That is (they say), one thing is to know what the rule is for the case and a different one
to decide that it should, all things considered, be applied to the case. Second, I take up a different
argument, offered by Carlos Alchourron, that could be used to claim that whether a mle should be
defeated in a concrete case is something that can be known by looking at a special sort of facts, i.e.
facts about the legislator's intention. Lastly, I will conclude this chapter by rejecting Schauer's
argument that rules are defeasible nowadays because an 'intolerance for absurd results' has been the
cause of the existence, in modem legal systems, of rules granting courts the power not to apply rules to
particular cases when so-doing would indeed produce such a result.
Raz and Marmor on Defeasibility
Marmor's formulation of the 'objection from defeasibility' is:
[sjince it is the case that any legal mle—if construed literally—might, under certain circumstances,
have utterly immoral or otherwise absurd results, a judge must always ask himself whether the case
before him is one in which the results would be unacceptable if the mle were thus applied (1994:
135).
Now, I do not believe this is best way to put it, but for the time being it will do anyway. It is, I think,
Fuller's decisive argument against Hart. For Marmor the argument is such that "immediate reflection"
should find it "puzzling: it seems to hold that since any mle, if construed literally, can result in absurd
consequences, it follows that no mle can be construed literally, which is an obvious fallacy" (1994:
136). As will be clearer later, this argument is obviously mistaken: it is difficult to deny that mles can
be applied literally: the point is whether a literal application (of a legal mle) is, as a matter of
conceptual truth, a correct application {i.e. correct in legal terms). Marmor also tries to downplay the
'objection from defeasibility' by making it appear rather dull: what can result in obvious absurdities is
the application of a mle literally construed. But this is just a rhetorical move: the whole point ofHart's
views on meaning is that, however context-sensitive (as opposed to 'literal') meaning is, we are bound
to find plain instances of (concept-) words64. If this is correct, the application of a legal mle to states
64This is indeed Marmor's claim (see above, at 74; see also Marmor, 1994: 130).
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of affairs that constitute plain instances of its meaning is equally bound to produce these absurd
consequences, however context-sensitive (again, as opposed to 'literal') we take meaning to be.
Be this as it may, and to solve his puzzlement, i.e. to 'save' the argument from being 'obviously
fallacious', Marmor modifies its conclusion, replacing the (descriptive) 'must' in its formulation for a
(prescriptive) 'should' (1994: 136).
After his charitable rescuing of the argument, Marmor is free to say that "it cuts no ice in the dispute
with Hart", because it confuses "the question of what following a rule consists in (which interested
Hart) with that of whether a mle should be applied in the circumstances" (1994: 136). Marmor
immediately continues:
Even ifwe concede that judges should always ask themselves the latter question (which is far from
clear), it does not follow that rules cannot be understood, and then applied, without reference to their
alleged purpose or any other consideration about what the mle is there to settle (1994: 136).
In terms of the example we have been using, Marmor is claiming that the question of whether or not
the first man should be fined (i.e. the question of whether or not the rule should be applied in the
circumstances) is not the relevant point, which is, rather, what following a mle consist in, i.e. what the
court must do if it is to follow the mle (or what the law—rather than the court's all-things-considered
duty—is for the case). And I believe it is only fair to Marmor ifwe understand him as saying that ifthe
court is to follow the mle, the first man should be fined. Maybe, we could continue along Marmorian
lines, a legal mle can never be applied in a morally justified way without judges asking themselves
whether or not there are moral reasons requiring them in the instant case not to apply the mle (though
this is 'far from clear'), but then they are asking themselves whether or not they should follow the mle
as a matter ofmoral duty (and, we could even say, as 'ought' implies 'can', the fact that judges can ask
themselves the question whether or not they ought to apply the mle shows that mles can be applied
without reference to their alleged purpose etc).
This distinction is particularly easy to draw in autonomous institutions: recall the referee facing the
problem of whether or not to award a penalty in the last minute to the visiting team (see above, at
65n), while knowing that if he were to do so there will be riots, even deaths, after the match. Marmor's
distinction between "the question of what following a ride consists in [and] that of whether a rule
should be applied in the circumstances" (1994; 136) fits perfectly well what we would say of that
case: that though we know what the referee has to do if he is to follow the mle (i.e. award the penalty),
we can see that his problem is whether he should apply the mle in the circumstances, and we can also
see that whatever reasons he has for not awarding the penalty, if he acts in such a way he would not be
following the mle.
The fact that we can so easily distinguish between Marmor's two questions is the reason why our
judgement of the behaviour in this case is, I think, not very controversial. We might agree that the
referee should not, on the balance of reasons, award the penalty. But this would not imply that we
would think that his duty in his capacity as a referee was not to award the penalty. The fact that the
referee's following of the mle can result in terrible consequences (riots and the like) can be neatly
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distinguished from the questions of what the referee has to do if he wants to follow the mles of
football.
Thus, Marmor's answer seems to be correct: you can understand and apply the rules of football
without availing yourself of any other evaluative consideration. Sometimes you will not be required to
apply a rule (sometimes you will even be required not to apply it) because of other considerations (i.e.
other than the rule itself), but this is not an objection to the first point. Hence, the crucial point here is:
is there a difference between the referee and a judge?
Before going into that question, however, it seems useful to reflect on why the case of the referee is so
clear. And the answer to this point seems to me to be that in these cases there is precisely no possibility
of disputing 'what following a mle consists in'. This is beyond reasonable contestation, because of the
kind of practices games are. The institutions defines what the referee is doing, and also defines 'what
following a mle consists in' in the context of a football match. A full description of what a football
referee is doing includes the fact that every mle has to be applied in every case in which the explicit
operative facts of the mle are fulfilled. As the referee is consciously participating in such an activity,
he cannot doubt what following the mle consists in without performative contradiction, since knowing
and accepting that is part of the definition ofwhat he is doing (i.e. refereeing a football match). Thus, I
am reasonably sure that if you go and ask a professional referee what would he do in such a situation,
the answer will be either that he must award the penalty (because this is what referees are supposed to
do) or that it would constitute a hard case—hard not because he would not know what the mle
requires him to do, but precisely because he does know that, and he might think it would be morally
wrong to follow the mle in such a situation; hard, in short, as solving any dilemma is.
Back to Marmor, now. He is right to point out that Fuller collapsed the two questions. Fuller had to do
it because he accepted (14), i.e. he believed that the meaning of a mle determines its application. Since
he wanted to claim that no application of the mle is possible without grasping its purpose, without
denying that the meaning of a mle determines its application, he had to claim that in order to
understand the meaning of a mle its purpose had to be ascertained. When (14) is hue (e.g. in chess),
mles need not be defeasible. Here we came across, again, Ba | kowski's observation of the normative
becoming, in a certain sense, descriptive.
Once (14) has been rejected, we can restate Fuller's point without having to collapse Marmor's two
questions. Only the first question, i.e.
(18) What does following a rule consist in?
concerns us here.
Marmor's answer to (18) is Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. As was said, he thinks that if
he can connect Hart's distinction between clear and hard cases to Wittgenstein's considerations an
'independent conceptual basis' would have been found for the former, a basis that would be strong
enough for him to reject most of the criticism such a distinction has attracted. This answer to (18) is,
however, problematic. For one thing, Wittgenstein considered only what I have called 'autonomous
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institutions', hence he did not address the problem of the exclusionary character of rules. Wittgenstein
was indeed aware of the distinction between what I call 'regulatory' and 'autonomous' institutions (or
at least of something close to it), as we have seen (supra, at 23). It cannot, therefore, be a mere
coincidence that all the examples he discussed were of (what in that passage he called) 'arbitrary'
rules. And though rules of, say, football are indeed exclusionary reasons, the fact that their strength
(i.e. which substantive issues they exclude from consideration) cannot be subjected to negotiation and
renegotiation without performative contradiction at the moment of application makes this feature of
rules of games uninteresting. As was said above: the defeasibility of mles is not an interesting fact
about the rules, but about the institution they belong to. If the focus is placed on the mles, then, this
feature does not come to light.
Following Wittgenstein we could remark that following a rule is a practice, and the practice of (for
instance) football defines how mles of football are to be applied: acknowledge them complete
exclusionary force. Nothing but the mle counts. The referee should not consider any substantive issue
whatsoever, unless he is explicitly authorised to do so by the mle (if we wanted to express this point in
Wittgensteinian terms, we could say: this is what 'mle' means in the language-game of games.
Marmor is, then, committing the very mistake Wittgenstein was so anxious to prevent: he is assuming
that concepts—like 'mle—remain the same across different language games). A referee can answer
'this is simply what we do' to explain his application of the mles of football, while a judge is supposed
to do precisely what Wittgenstein said was useless: to offer an interpretation. Generally speaking, then,
I think we can safely say: in what Wittgenstein called 'arbitrary systems' (and I am calling
'autonomous institutions'), because they are 'arbitrary' (autonomous) the answer to the question 'why
is the rale such-and-such?' can only be 'this is simply what we do'. In 'teleological' (i.e. 'regulatory')
systems, the answer is a justification in terms of the goals the system is supposed to advance.
In his discussion of Wittgenstein, Marmor was anxious to show that once the subject has got the
meaning of a mle she follows it acting according to it (to the mle, i.e. the meaning she has got65). The
rejection (in the previous chapter) of (14) implies that there is something else that, along with the
meaning of the rale, has to be grasped before any application of the mle is possible. And that
something else is the determination of how formal the application of the rale should be, of how many
(and which) substantive issues or reasons are pre-empted by the mle. This question is as much a part
of a full answer to (18) as the grasping of the meaning of the mle is.
Marmor did not address this possibility. His argument is designed to show that given that Fuller
accepted (14) his criticism of Hart was wrong. Doubtless, he was right in this. But given that is (14),
and not Fuller's criticism, which has to be abandoned, it remains to be seen ifMarmor's point can still
be sustained. An affirmative answer to this can only be given if it is the case that conceptual
considerations can show not only that legal norms are formal (i.e., that they exclude from
consideration some substantive reasons), but also how formal these norms are (i.e. which substantive
651 am collapsing here the rule with its meaning. This follows from (14). Cf. Schauer, 1990: 55ff.
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issues are excluded from consideration). Whoever wants to claim that rules can be applied without
evaluative considerations, has to claim not only that some evaluative considerations are to be
disregarded, but also which considerations are those that have been pre-empted. The need to answer
these two separate questions seems to have been also overlooked by Raz:
[Primary organs, i.e. courts] are institutions which are bound to act on certain reasons even if they do
not think that on the balance of reasons they ought to do so. That means that primary organs are
institutions which ought to act on certain reasons to the exclusion ofall others, namely institutions
which are subject to an exclusionary reason not to act on certain reasons. [...] The standards on which
primary organs ought to act even when they are overridden are the mles of the system under which
they operate and [...] they ought to exclude standards which are not part of the system [...].
Let us again use the law as our paradigmatic case. If a man is legally required to do A in C then the
courts are bound to hold that he failed to do what he ought to have done if he fails to do A in C. They
will refuse to listen to arguments to the effect that failing to do A in C is really what he ought to have
done since there were extralegal reasons which override the reason that the legal requirement
provides (Raz, 1992:142f, my italics).
Or will they? Of course they will if "extralegal reasons" are defined as those reasons the courts will
refuse to listen to. Though Raz argues something close to this ("if the primary organs do not regard
themselves as bound to apply a certain norm it does not belong to the system"—1992: 142), he rapidly
rejects the claim "that the law consists of all the standards which the courts do in fact apply" (1992:
142). Hence Raz's point is not a tautology: he is not first defining 'extralegal reasons' as those the
courts will refuse to listen to and then saying that courts will refuse to listen to extralegal reasons. The
question, then, presents itself: will the courts refuse to listen to (independently defined) 'extralegal
reasons'?
Raz is right in claiming that courts ('primary organs') are required to act on certain reasons even if
they think that on the balance of reasons they should not. But from this it does not follow (and he did
not offer any additional argument for this) that all the norms of the system exclude all possible
conflicting considerations, that courts are required to decide on legal reasons 'to the exclusion of all
others': all of these 'all's' are taken for granted on the basis of the (true) fact that courts 'are bound to
act on certain reasons even if they do not think that on the balance of reasons they ought to do so'.
This seems to place too much conceptual weight on a premiss that, though true, is of much more
limited consequences.
Consider a case like National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte Connor (1981 All ER at 769), in
which a woman applied for a widow's allowance under s 24 (1) of the Social Security Act 1975. She,
however, had been previously convicted (and put on probation) for the manslaughter of her husband.
S 24 (1), the rule whose application was in question, stated that
A woman who has been widowed shall be entitled to a widow's allowance at the weekly rate
specified in relation thereto in schedule 4, part 1, paragraph 5, if—(a) she was under pensionable age
at the time when her late husband died, or he was then not entitled to a Category A retirement pension
(section 28); and (b) her late husband satisfied the contribution condition for a widow's allowance
specified in schedule 2, part 1, paragraph 4 [...].
Ifwe insist on separating the questions ofwhat following a rale consists in from that of whether a rale
should be applied in the circumstances, we would have to say that if the court was to follow the rale,
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Ms Connor should have been given the pension, but that, because ofmoral reasons, the rule should not
be applied in the circumstances (assuming that, as a matter ofmorals, this is the case). The court, Raz
would have to claim, would have to 'refuse to listen' to arguments to the effect that denying the
pension is what ought to be done.
This understanding of the case implies a big distortion ofwhat the court saw itself as doing. It did not
conduct a moral debate about whether or not the rule had to be applied. What was under consideration
was, rather, whether the correct understanding and application of s 24 (1) of the Social Security Act
(1975) implied that the court had to apply it as a completely formal reason (i.e. excluding all the
elements that were not part of its explicit operative facts) or instead, as a formal-and-yet-not-
completely-formal reason.
To put it in another way, the court accepted that some substantive considerations were pre-empted by
the mle. The facts of the case, however, gave rise to a substantive consideration that is not normally
present in cases in which the application of s. 24 (1) is in question. For the court, the problem was
whether this substantive consideration was among those pre-empted by the mle. In normal cases, the
fact that some features of the case are not listed in the mle's operative facts is enough to conclude that
they are irrelevant:
Counsel for the applicant points out that nowhere in the wording of the Act is there any provision
disentitling the widow to her widow's allowance by reason of the fact that she may have been
responsible in some degree for her own widowhood (Lord Lane CJ, in National Insurance
Commissioner, at 772).
But in this case this consideration was not necessarily all there was to it, and the question was how
important the fact that the applicant had been convicted for the manslaughter of her husband was,
whether it was important enough to be relevant. The cmcial point for the court was precisely whether
this particular case is one of those, to use Hart's words, 'left open for later, official settlement when the
issue arises and is identified'. If it was not one of them, the court would not have any discretion: "there
is no doubt that those two conditions are satisfied and that had the situation been a normal one she
would have been entitled to the widow's allowance under that section" (Lord Lane CJ at 773).
According to Marmor's argument, in this moment Lord Lane CJ would have had to continue with
something like this: 'therefore, and now that we are all clear that ifwe are to follow the law we should
grant her the widow's allowance, it remains to be seen whether it is the (morally) right thing to do for
us to apply s 24 (1) of the Social Security Act (1975)' (doubtless, he would have used a better style).
This is, however, not the way in which the problem was presented. For the court, the question was to
ascertain whether the fact that the mle did not explicitly include a reference to public policy was
enough to exclude public policy as one consideration to be taken into account when applying the mle.
It was not up for discussion that the mle had some degree of formality, nor was it up for discussion
that if the solution turned out to be one that the court did not like it would have to adopt it regardless.
The point was how 'exclusionary' the mle was, i.e. whether or not its application had to be formal
enough to exclude public policy.
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The judges, in other words, accepted that they were, in Raz's words, 'bound to act on certain reasons
even if they did not think that on the balance of reasons they ought to do so', but they did not accept
that that meant they had to 'act on certain reasons to the exclusion of all others'.
And this is a problem that s 24 (1) of the Social Security Act (1975) could not be expected to solve.
Conceptual considerations about what following a rule consists in leave open both the argument that
because this particular Act which we are concerned [...] is [...] a self-contained modem Act the mles
ofpublic policy do not apply and that whatevermay have happened [...] nothing that the applicant did
can alter her plain entitlement under the words of s 24 (1) which I have read (ibid, at 773-4).
and the argument (eventually the court's view) that
the fact that there is no specific mention in the Act ofdisentitlement so far as a widow is concerned if
she were to commit this sort of offence and so become a widow is merely an indication [...] that the
draftsman realised perfectly well that he was writing this Act against the background of the law as it
stood at the time (ibid at 774).
The problem of Raz's argument, which is shared by Marmor's is that he selects one way of applying
the rule (complete formality) and claims that it is the only way in which the rule can be applied, if it is
to be applied at all. There is no conceptual warrant for this move, which is, at the end, completely
arbitrary.
I do not have to deny, of course, that courts sometimes do face Marmor's problem. Some laws are
unjust, and it might very well be (indeed it is) the case that sometimes courts should not apply them
because of this reason. In cases of this kind the court has to say 'this is the law, but it is too unfair to be
applied' The Chilean Constitution, e.g. gave General Pinochet the power to send people to exile
without due process of law. Think of a judge called Carlos having to solve a case ofjudicial review of
one such decision. It is, I believe, a strength ofmy argument that I do not need to collapse the case of
Carlos with that of Lord Lane CJ. Raz and Marmor and others would have to say that, in both cases, it
was clear what the law was for the case but the court had the moral duty not to apply it. The court in
National Insurance Commisioner did not believe that it was putting forward a moral critique of the
law. They were discussing the appropriate way of applying a reasonable piece of legislation. If Carlos,
on the other hand, is to fulfil his moral duty, he has to invalidate Pinochet's decision even though it
has been produced according to a constitutional power-conferring mle. Only the first case is one of an
application problem.
Carlos Alchourron's 'dispositional analysis' of defeasibility
I want now to explore a second source-based explanation for the problem of defeasibility. We saw that
a key idea to understanding the issue of defeasibility is that of 'normal cases': cases that are not
normal are not necessarily covered by the mle, however its canonical formulation might be. I have
argued that 'normality' in this context cannot be a value-free, statistical concept. An abnormal case is
one in which the application of a mle as a completely formal reason would produce a result that for
evaluative reasons the court is not willing to accept as a statement of what the law is in the case.
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We have also seen that if 'normality' were a non-evaluative concept, the issue of defeasibility could be
explained in the context of the sources thesis. Rules would be completely exclusionary reasons in
normal cases, and the courts would have discretion to solve those that are not normal. Courts would
know whether or not they should (I am still sticking to my stipulation on p. 46) use their discretion by
recognising this non-evaluative 'mark' of abnormality. If 'normality' in this sense were not an
evaluative, but a descriptive concept, then courts could decide whether or not a case is normal without
having to consider anything but social facts, and the sources thesis could be true.
Now, what makes a case normal or abnormal? The answer I want to consider and reject in this section
is: the rule-giver's intentions. To know whether a case is normal rather than abnormal we have, so the
argument goes, to consider, e.g. whether or not Parliament had in mind the case of the businessman
waiting for a delayed train, or the case of the murderous legatee, or that of the veterans' memorial.
Detailed historical research could in principle offer a correct answer to this question. In many cases
that answer would not be available, because of epistemological shortcomings, but this is not an
objection to this point.
A solution of this kind could be formulated along the lines of the late Carlos Alchourron's
'dispositional analysis' of defeasibility' (Alchourron, 1995: 16ff). According to him,
a condition C counts as an implicit exception to a conditional assertion 'ifA then 5' made by speaker
X at time T when there is a disposition ofX at time T to assert the conditional 'if A then 5' whilst
rejecting 'ifA and Cthen /?' (1995: 16)66.
So, the proper way to deal with implicit exceptions is, in Alchourron's view, that of asking counter-
factual questions: would the legislator have included this exception, had she foreseen the present
situation? The solution will depend on historical facts, and it would be possible to deal with issues of
defeasiblity in a way that is compatible with the sources thesis.
Alchourron quotes the US Supreme Court which, in The Church ofthe Holy Trinity vs. US said that
it has to bepresumed that the Legislature intended exceptions to its language [...]. The common sense
ofman approves the judgement mentioned by Pufendorf that the bolognian law which enacted that
'whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity' did not extend to the
surgeon who opened the vein of the person that fell down in a street in a fit (quoted by Alchourron,
1995: 17; my italics).
Alchourron invites us to ask the counter-factual question: what would the legislators have thought
about this case, had they thought about it? There are, unsurprisingly, three possibilities: a) they would
have thought that this case was not covered; b) they would have thought that the case was covered; c)
they would have thought neither (a) nor (b). According to Alchourron, if the court decides that the
case was not covered, "in the last two alternatives there would be a creative interpretation" (1995: 18).
So, according to Alchourron, if the court should apply the existing law at all (though there can be other
66Alchourron is not concerned in his article with the sources thesis. If Alchourron's dispositional analysis turns out to be
sound, however, it could be used to explain the problem of defeasibility according to the sources thesis. Hence, what follows is
more a critique of Alchourron's 'dispositional analysis' than one of Alchourron on defeasibility. It is also important to have in
mind that Alchourron says that a dispositional analysis is not the only way to deal with the subject, though he does think that it
is "particularly suitable for the analysis of legal interpretation" (Alchourron, 1995: 16ff).
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reasons why the judge should not apply it), it should ascertain what disposition the legislator had when
enacting the rule.
The problem with this approach is that it is simply false: the exception is based not in a counter-factual
question (answer, rather) but on an interpretative account of the rule in question. The (presumed)
legislator's intentions are referred to at the end of the reasoning. When the court has established
(according to evaluative arguments) its preferred interpretation, then it is "presumed" that the
legislator would agree. The gap between the court's interpretation and the legislator's intentions is
bridged by presumptions based upon evaluative concepts like "common sense":
What is said, of course, is that Parliament 'cannot' have intended so unjust a result. But the grounds
for the imputation of intention are the evaluation of the implications of the rejected interpretation; no
independent recourse is available to the otherwise mysterious concept of 'legislator's intention'
(MacCormick, 1984: 240).
Alchourron is aware of this objection, and says that although "what appears to be a historical
investigation hides the political preferences of the interpreter, this historical comparison is necessary to
know the kind of fitting existing between judicial and legislative interpretation" (1995: 18). But what
is the point of knowing that? In the 'Master system' model (Alchourron, 1995: 9f) that is important
because "judicial decisions must be grounded on legal norms of the state" (id, 10). So the fact that a
judicial decision "fits" the existing legal materials is a fact that controls the application of legal norms:
if a judicial decision is not "grounded" in legal norms, it is (legally) wrong. And this is supposed to be
so, in Alchourron's view, because of some requirement of the Rule of Law, according to which
legislation should be prospective.
If the reason to be interested in the dispositions of the law-maker is the Rule of Law, and even more if
the reason is to rescue the sources thesis, Alchourron's counter-factual questions can be useful if and
only if they are taken to be actual historical questions. If it is "presumed" that the legislator would
have acted with "common sense", then the reasons for the solution are to be found not in the
'otherwise mysterious concept of legislator's intention' (which, in this case, drops out of the picture)
but on the evaluative notion of common sense. It is still possible to try to determine if the judicial
decision is or is not creative in Alchourron's terms, but since we know that it is no longer an actual
historical question, it appears to be barely important.
Note the two italicised phrases in the above quotation of the US Supreme Court: the first ('it has to be
presumed...') shows that the fact of the legislator having the relevant disposition is not asserted as a
matter of historical truth, but as an evaluative judgement. The second ('the common sense of man')
shows what this evaluative judgement is based upon.
In a case like Riggs vs Palmer, we can see that there are strong reasons for thinking that the rule
should not be applied to the case. How can we see that? If the dispositional analysis were correct, the
reason why we are able to see that is sheer historical knowledge: because we have some reason to
believe that, as a matter of fact, the legislator did not intend this rule to be applied to this case. The
reality is, we believe this not because we think that the legislator did not intend this result, but even
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though we know nothing about which disposition the New York legislator actually had (I am fairly
sure that many of the commentators who have written about Riggs vs Palmer have no idea even of
how you go about finding New York's congressmen and women's intention).
This is obscured by the fact that legislators usually have commonsensical dispositions at the moment
of legislating. When this is true, an appeal to common sense is substantively the same as an appeal to
the legislator's dispositions. But when this assumption fails the obscurity is dissolved. Imagine that we
happen to know that the legislators that issued (2) did have a strong feeling against the particular
businessman the first person happened to be. They realised that because ofpolitical reasons they could
not enact a law against him just because they disliked him; they opted for a more surreptitious
approach. They knew they could make a law against people sleeping in railways stations look like a
reasonable piece of legislation. And they also knew of the habits of our businessman (and that trains
were usually delayed).
In other words, we have all the knowledge Alchourron would need in order to say that the case of the
first man does not constitute an implicit exception. And yet, that knowledge does not seem to be as
conclusive a reason to pass judgement against the first man as it should be, if Alchourron's claims
were descriptively true. Consider another case: the railway company is not very efficient; trains are
delayed most of the time. Many people are profoundly annoyed by the sight of others sleeping in the
stations while waiting for the (normally delayed) trains, and Parliament reacts to this public feeling by
issuing (2).
I submit that we would be more inclined to consider this latter piece of information about Parliament's
dispositions than the former as relevant for a legal decision. The reason is, in a way, obvious: only in
the second case it could be said that Parliament's dispositions accord with (some conception of) 'the
common sense of man'. But this shows that it is not the fact of Parliament having the relevant
disposition that is the ground for implicit exceptions; rather, it is the other way around: as we assume
that Parliament acts according to the common sense of man, when this common sense requires an
implicit exception we tend to think of Parliament as having had the relevant intention.
This last point is cmcial for our discussion, and shows that the difference between a normal and an
abnormal case is not given by the brute historical fact of the law-maker having intended to include a
given case under certain rule. A case is abnormal when the result to be produced by the application of
the rule as a completely formal reason would be too unfair or otherwise absurd enough for us (for the
court etc) to think that the prima facie applicable rule does not exclude some feature of that particular
case (a feature, that is, in turn prima facie excluded—because it is not listed in the rule's operative
facts).
'My Code is Lost'
I want to finish this chapter by considering Schauer's answer to Fuller's challenge. He argues, like
Marmor, that Fuller was wrong because he is led to "embrace an implausible particularist theory of
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meaning, under which the notion of meaning collapses into what a decision-maker in a particular
environment should do on a particular occasion" (1990: 213). As I have argued, this criticism is
correct against Fuller's article, but not against the somewhat reinterpreted version of Fuller's argument
defended here. But the general point Schauer made against Fuller could well be used against the latter.
Schauer notices that it is odd to say that the no-vehicles-in-the-park rule forbids the memorial, and that
the no-sleeping-in-the-station rule applies to the businessman. His explanation of this fact deserves to
be quoted in full:
an intolerance for absurdity has produced a legal environment in which judges are commonly
empowered to set aside the result indicated by the most locally applicable rule-formulation when that
result would be absurd. But that approach [...] is contingent and not necessary. Moreover, it is by no
means clear that the seemingly distasteful alternative has nothing to be said of. Wary of empowering
judges to determine purpose [...] some system might instruct judges simply to apply the mle, even if
the result seemed to them inconsistent with its purpose, or even if the result seemed to them absurd.
Such an approach would reflect a decision to prefer the occasional wrong or even preposterous result
to a regime in which judges were empowered to search for purpose or preposterousness, for it might
be that such empowerment was thought to present a risk of error or variance of decision even more
harmful that the tolerance of occasional absurd results. The question, therefore, is not only whether a
result is absurd, but whether decision-makers should have the jurisdiction to determine which results
are absurd and which not. When so recast, the argument for what is often pejoratively referred to as
'formalism' may still not be persuasive, but is far from absurd [...]. What we see, therefore, is a
persistent tendency, especially in judge-centred legal theorizing, to take the contingent empowerment
ofjudges as demonstrating the incompatibility of a mle with the tolerance of an absurd result (1990:
214).
To start with, the idea ofbeing empowered by the 'legal environment' is ambiguous. If the stress is put
on 'environment', it would mean that the environment in which the law exists is such that judicial
organs have the power not to apply the rules when the results it would produce are too absurd or
otherwise unfair; if stress is placed on 'legal' instead, it would mean that the legal environment in
which the courts exist grants them such power. In the first sense Schauer's point would be perfectly
compatible with the perspective argued for in these chapters: given that the law is (understood as) a
regulatory institution, legal rales are (necessarily) defeasible. In this explanation, it is a contingent fact
that the law is a regulatory institution, but given that it is one it is not contingent that rules are
defeasible (and hence, that courts have the power to declare them to be defeated in actual cases).
Notice that in this sense of the expression 'legal environment' the law cannot deny courts that power,
since the power is a consequence of the environment in which the law exists (and every law would
exist in the same environment, including the laws denying that power). In this sense, therefore, the fact
of legal rules being defeasible because of the legal environment is something that is, so to speak,
beyond the reach of the rules of the system to modify.
In brief, if 'legal environment' is to be understood as 'social environment in which the law exists'
Schauer's question ('not only whether a result is absurd, but whether decision-makers should have the
jurisdiction to determine which results are absurd and which not') is not a question that the legal
system can answer, and Schauer's power consequently, would not be a legal power, but a power
derived from the 'social environment' or, as I would prefer, from the way the subjects conceive of the
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law and legal practice {i.e. as a 'regulatory' social institution). In this sense, the fact that judges are so
empowered would not 'reflect a decision to prefer' non-application of rules when doing so would
result in absurd outcomes. It would, on the contrary, reflect social beliefs about the law (this will be
dealt with in detail later).
But this conclusion would imply that (in 'regulatory' legal systems) legal rules are defeasible even if
the legal system does contain rules denying courts those powers, even if rule-makers positively want
to do so. Schauer wants to claim precisely the opposite, that defeasibility is a contingent feature of
some legal systems because they happen to give courts more power. We cannot, therefore, understand
his reference to the 'legal environment' in this particular way.
What are we to make of it, then? Maybe the answer is that the reference to the 'legal environment' is
one to the environment of the court (not that of the law). In this second sense, the thesis is that it
happens to be the case that modem legal systems have rules granting courts the power not to apply the
law when the result would be too absurd. If the reason why legal rules are defeasible is that further
rules of the system empower judges not to apply the mles when that would produce too absurd a
result, then of course Schauer would be right, and from the fact that mles are defeasible nothing would
follow about 'the incompatibility of a rule with the tolerance of an absurd result' (the situation would
be entirely similar to the advantage mle in football, in which the referee has some discretion explicitly
given by the mle).
The main objection to Schauer's thesis of defeasibility as being explained by the contingent
empowering ofjudges is that it flies on the face of historical evidence. Granted, there are legal systems
that contain mles of the kind Schauer had in mind. Consider article 9 of the Louisiana Civil Code:
Art. 9. Clear and unambiguous law. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does
not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may
be in search of the intent of the legislature.
The fact that laws of this kind exist is only half of the proof Schauer's argument needs. He has to show
that we (and also, but not only, judges) are inclined to think that in some cases covered by the meaning
of a mle {i.e. those in which the results produced by the application of the mle are absurd) the mle
should not be applied because our systems contain mles like art. 9 (this is a point Hart developed
against Kelsen's thesis of the unity of international and municipal law: see Hart, 1968a). In other
words, it must be the case, for Schauer's argument to stand, that if a mle so empowering judges were
not found, and in its place we had a mle denying those powers, then we (and the judges in such
systems) would think that, because they do not have that power, mles should be applied regardless.
One of the cases quoted by Schauer as one of the situations in which the application of a rale is absurd
is Samuel Pufendorf s well-known example:
there was a law of Bologna, that whoever drew blood from another person in a public place should
suffer the most severe penalties. On the basis of this law a barber was once informed upon, who had
opened aman's vein in the square.
But Schauer does not quote Pufendorf s very next sentence:
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And the fellow was in no little peril because it was added in the statute that the words should be taken
exactly and without any interpretation (Pufendorf, 1688: 5.12.8, pp. 802-3 [547])67.
In Schauer's view, then, this should be a clear case: what the barber did constituted a 'clear case under
the rule' and according to the rule the words should be taken exactly and without interpretation. And
yet, it does not seem to be as obvious as it should be if Schauer were right, that according to
Bolognese law the barber should suffer the most severe penalties.
More generally, a brief look back to nineteenth century Western legal development is enough to show
that, though it was common for legal systems undergoing processes of codification to have rules
denying courts such powers, problems of application did not disappear.
The Louisiana Civil Code seems to be a good starting point, given its seemingly completely
Schauerian art. 9. The fact is, that article as was quoted above dates back only to 1987. The original
article (then art. 13) of the 1870 Civil Code was significantly different:
Art. 13.When a law is clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded, under
the pretext ofpursuing its spirit.
Note the crucial difference between the two enactments: only the first gives the courts the power
Schauer had in mind: the second cannot have any sense except to deny it, as clearly as it possibly can.
If Schauer is right, then, there must have been a huge difference in judicial practice before and after
1987. But this is not the case. In fact, the difference between the two is classified, by the commentators
of the Code, as "changes in phraseology and terminology [which] do not change the law"
(Yiannopoulos, 1989: 4). And however that might be, it is simply not the case that the Civil Code
transformed the courts into mechanical applicators of the law (Kilbourne, 1987, esp. ch. 3 & 5)68.
More decisive cases can be found in eighteen- and nineteenth century Europe, in the heyday of the
movement of codification. It is a known fact that in France the judicial establishment was not busted
by the revolutionaries, neither was it held in high regard by Napoleon himself. The Code Napoleon
purported to be a complete statement of the private law applicable in France, and judges were
supposed to be the 'mouthpiece of the law'. In fact, we are told, "Napoleon had tried legislatively to
prohibit tampering with [his] sacred text, outlawing those commentaries that, as one Bonapartist jurist
lamented, 'desboy the Code'" (Kelley, 1984). When he saw how commentaries on the Code were
growing in number, Napoleon is said to have cried 'mon Code est perdu'69.
67There are some minor differences between Pufendorf s example and Schauer's (e.g., a surgeon instead of a barber), because
Schauer is quoting from United States v. Kirby, 74 US (7 Wall) 482, 487 (1967).
68For the sense in which 1 am using the expression 'mechanical applicator' cf. above at 72. Kilbourne studies the impact of the
1808 Louisiana Digest and the 1825 Civil Code. Article 13 of the 1870 Civil Code, however, was introduced in 1825.
69Consider some of the examples discussed by Marcel Planiol (1939): according to art. 1382 Code Civil, "every act of what
nature soever, which occasions damage to another, obliges him through whose fault it has happened, to repair it". Planiol
rightly points out that this provision is "much too sweeping. If an exception were not introduced for acts which are the exercise
of a right, but which cause damage, there would be a great addition to the number of cases to which this provision would be
rightly applicable" (Planiol, 1939: § 216). Notice how effortlessly Planiol moves from the fact that the law ought to make a
distinction to the fact that it does distinguish, without being trouble by the obvious meaning of art. 1382. Other cases discussed
by Planiol are: art. 2194/Code Civil (it reads 'the date of the marriage contract' but it should say—hence it does say—'the day
of the marriage') and art. 408 (it reads to the effect that widows of ascendants should be summoned to family meetings, but it
should read—hence it does read—the ascendant widows).
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A similar situation happened in Prussia and in Austria during the codification. In the latter, the Codex
Theresianus could not be more explicit: "we forbid all judges to deviate in the least from the clear
precept of our law under the void pretext of some equity that differs from the sharpness of the law"
(see van Caenegem, 1991: 182).
In general, it does seem historically true to say that "codification was historically a weapon against the
judiciary" (van Caenegem, 1987: 152): what was intended was precisely to tie the courts up, not to let
them adjust the law. French courts, for instance, were instructed to apply the law, and when a
difficulty arose, they had to refer the problem back to the legislature. The legislators were indeed, as
Schauer says, 'wary of empowering judges to determine purpose and instructed judges simply to apply
the rule, even if the result seemed to them with its purpose, or even if the result seemed to them
absurd'. But they could not do it: every rule they passed to that effect existed in the same legal
environment, i.e. as part of a regulatory institution. Conversely, judges nowadays have that power
even on the face of rules like the old article 13 of the Louisiana Civil Code (see article 19 of the
Chilean Civil Code, transplanted from the Louisiana Code and still unmodified). As the Louisiana
Civil Code commentator rightly said, mles granting those powers 'do not change the law'
(Yiannopoulos, 1989: 4).
The point is not how prone French or Prussian or Chilean courts and commentators are or were to
break the law, but rather to show how, even when judges are denied powers not to apply the law
because of substantive considerations, even when most judges accept a version of the doctrine of the
separation of powers, problems of application, in the sense defined before, do not disappear and mles
are still defeasible. And the claim is that this fact teaches us something about the nature of the law.
*
One way in which the argument of the last two chapters can be resisted is by pointing to legal practice:
it is simply not true to claim, it is sometimes argued, that the law can never be 'simply' and
'straightforwardly' applied. Lawyers, judges, politician and others are all able (with more or less
accuracy) to recognise instances in which the law is clear from those in which it is not, even if they
disagree on which cases are in between. We only need to consider the huge number of cases that never
reach the courts to see that this argument needs to be addressed.
And addressed it will be. We begin by noticing that this is not necessarily an argument for the
positivist distinction. For all we know, it could be that all those cases are clear not because no 'fresh'
judgement is needed to apply the mles in them, but because people do make a fresh judgement and
they all come up with the same conclusion. Under this description, though those cases would still be
clear in the sense that they would not reach the courts etc, they would not be 'clear' in the technical
sense positivism gives to that term, because they would still require a fresh moral judgement to be
made.
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Now, I do believe this answer is sound and true, but I do not want to pursue it here because I want to
make a stronger claim (or perhaps I want to pursue what amounts to the same argument in the
following way): I want to say that there are values or normative beliefs (I will leave this vague until
the last chapter) that underlie legal practices, in such a way that without an understanding of them
there is no way in which we can know what the law is for any particular case (unless, of course, we are
told so by a person whom we have reason to believe knows what she is talking about). The problem is,
those values/normative beliefs are not specifically legal, they are part and parcel of a wider social
world we are brought up in; they are part of the volkgeist. It is therefore difficult to step out of them
and try to look at our legal system as ifwe did not know them. My claim is, however, that ifwe could
do that we would see that we could not know what the law is for any particular case.
This is to be the next chapter's argument. I shall use concrete legal problems taken from a setting far
removed from our own, so removed that we are not inclined to think the people who lived in it shared
our values/normative beliefs. My example will be Roman law, and the claim will be that it is difficult




En esas remotas paginas esta escrito que los animales se dividen en a)
pertenecientes al Emperador, b) embalsamados, c) amaestrados, d)
lechones, e) sirenas, f) fabulosos, g) perros sueltos, h) incluidos en esta
clasificacion, /) que se agitan como locos, j) innumerables, k) dibujados
con un pincel finisimo de pelo de camello, /) etcetera, m) que acaban de
romper el jarron, n) que de lejos parecen moscas.
j L Borges, El Idioma Analitico de John Wilkins (1941)70
When one thinks of the importance of Roman law for the evolution of the Western Legal tradition,
more often than not one's interest is focused upon Roman legal material. To some extent this is only
natural, since Roman institutions have been 'transplanted', to use Alan Watson's metaphor, to most
Western legal systems. Still today, thousands of years later, there is a strikingly clear continuity
between the content of the rules of the German BGB or the French Code Civil regarding, say, emptio
venditio and the relevant mles of Roman law. Though this point should not be overstated (of course
there are important differences between the two), it should also be uncontroversial: that is one of the
main reasons why most European law students have to study Roman law as part of their syllabus
(Zimmermann, 1995).
In an important article published in 1974, Tony Honore invites us to shift our focus, and to look not at
the mles, nor the concepts, ofRoman law:
A scholar interested in Roman law is sometimes asked to say in what the contribution ofRoman law
to our modem legal culture consists. When I am asked this I think first of the rules of Roman law
which, through the various sorts of 'reception' have found a niche inmodem European legal systems.
Then I turn to the concepts, like ownership, which have become embedded in our thinking and in our
social ways. But perhaps one should attach equal or greater importance to a third area of influence,
namely, the method of reasoning which modem legal cultures have inherited from Roman law
(Honore, 1974: 84).
This might seem to be a bold claim indeed. After all, everybody knows the importance of the rules and
the concepts of Roman law. Why was the Roman method of legal reasoning so peculiarly important?
After analysing the kind of arguments the Romans used, Honore concludes that they can be reduced to
two: "open arguments [i.e. principles] and appeals to mles of law" (Honore, 1974: 91). This is hardly
surprising. After all, every argument is either an open argument or an appeal to a rule of law. But this
is not the important point. What is important, according to Honore, is that the Romans developed a
"canon of unacceptable arguments" (Honore, 1974: 91).
The idea that there are certain arguments that in the context of legal justification, of legal discourse? l,
are out of place is linked to the idea of formality, as I am using the term here. It is not necessarily the
case that unacceptable arguments are completely irrelevant for a correct solution of the case (i. e.
70'On those remote pages it is written that animals are divided into a) those that belong to the emperor, b) embalmed ones, c)
those that are trained, d) suckling pigs, e) mermaids, f) fabulous ones, g) stray dogs, h) those that are included in this
classification, i) those that tremble as if they were mad,/) innumerable ones, k) those drawn with a very fine camel's-hair brush,
I) others, m) those that have just broken a flower vase, n) those that resemble flies from a distance'.
A ROMAN PUZZLE
morally correct), but they are nevertheless unacceptable as arguments for a legal decision. Honore tells
us that there were, broadly speaking, two kinds of arguments that the Romans, in opposition to the
Greeks, did not accept in legal argumentation. The first were, to adapt his terms, 'system-biased'
arguments, that is, arguments whose force depended upon "idiosyncratic features of religious, moral,
philosophical or political thought systems" (Honore, 1974: 93). The second were ad hominem
arguments. The point I want to focus upon is that from this viewpoint the constraints that limit legal
discourse are not rules but arguments: Ifwe were to adopt Honore's viewpoint we would see the law
not as a collection of (more or less general) solutions for cases, but as one of acceptable arguments.
Though Honore himself seems to have thought otherwise, the canon of legal argument is not one more
mle alongside the rules concerning, say, the validity of a will (like the regula catoniana), but
something that fulfils the role of justifying the application of the norms of the system. The canon of
legal argument will be the subject of the last chapter, so I will not have much to say directly about it
here.
Roman Common Sense
In the first chapter (supra, pp. 30ff) we encountered ancient Roman law because, if I was right, ancient
Roman law was what I called an 'autonomous' institution, i. e. one that was understood as existing
without relation to its regulative effects (this may seem a rather different way of putting the point.
Remember that the claim was that what distinguished autonomous from regulatory institutions was the
fact that only the existence of the latter was explained and justified by a social need to regulate a
particular sphere of the social life. The former was characterised as an institution the existence of
which is to be explained and justified because it allows people to engage in a activity that did not exist
before. Therefore, though autonomous institutions do regulate an sphere of social life, they regulate it
only to constitute their object, not because the regulation of that sphere is seen to have any
independent value). I claimed that the fact of an institution being autonomous implies that it can be
completely formal and have rules which completely determine the outcome of particular cases (recall
Bankowski, 1996: 33, 'the normative becomes, in a certain sense, descriptive'). Later on I argued that
rules belonging to this kind of institution could be indefeasible because all cases were classified as
'normal', or, to put it in another way, because the abnormality of a case was not something that was
considered to be relevant for the application of the rules. Therefore, though at first it may appear that
the reasoning is formal because the rules are formal, in fact the truth is exactly opposite: the mles are
(can be) formally applied because the arguments that the institution defines as 'acceptable' are (can
be) restricted to formal arguments alone, and only to some formal arguments (compare (1) and (2),
supra, p. 60). But as the parenthetical 'can be's show, there is not much that can be said in abstract
about legal reasoning, hence we need to consider particular instances of that form of reasoning.
An important consequence of an institution being autonomous is that the application of its mles does
not call for justification. We saw (in chapter one) that if the particular requirements of the stipulatio
711 will use 'legal argumentation', 'legal justification' and 'legal discourse' as related concepts: legal justification is what legal
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were challenged, the only correct answer would have been 'this is simply what you have to do'. The
same happens in games, as Wittgenstein argued some time ago (Wittgenstein, 1958: § 66). This does
not mean that the content of the rales could not be evaluated. What it does mean is that whatever the
result of that evaluation might be, it has no impact on the application of the rales. Some of the
formalities of the stipulatio might be extremely unhelpful, even damaging when looked at from a
sociological or economic point of view (as indeed they were: see Watson, 1985b). But this is
immaterial to the decision whether or not a particular stipulatio was valid. After all, if the law is not
seen as a regulatory institution—i. e. if its existence is not explained by its regulatory relation with
some sphere of social activity—why should the (less than perfect) regulation it necessarily implies be
an objection to its application?
A peculiarity of Roman legal development is that, although the Romans abandoned at quite an early
stage this formalistic conception of law, the old ideas about the law survived for centuries. What they
did was not only to adopt a regulatory conception of the law: a whole new, parallel system evolved, a
system that existed beside, not instead of, the old and formalistic ius civile:
When classical jurisprudence began its work it found, alongside the ius civile, the ius honorarium
already in a state of strong development: the ius civile strict and rigid in its basis though certainly
modernized in some details by later legislation and by borrowings from magistral law; the ius
honorarium progressive and subject to constant further development (Kunkel, 1973: 82).
The formalism characteristic of the ius civile was in striking contrast with the flexible ius honorarium.
While the ius civile kept its formalism throughout the centuries ofRoman legal development72, the ius
honorarium, under the authority of the Praetor's edicts, was moulded and refined until it reached high
levels of legal sophistication (notice, incidentally, that the praetors did not have authority to make new
law: what they could do was to declare, once a year, how they were going to apply the existing law.
Maybe this can account for the parallel existence of the two systems over time; maybe the fact that the
praetor was not seen as changing the law but simply accommodating its application, may explain both
the fact of the survival of the old ius civile and the extraordinary level of flexibility and progressive
development of the ius honorariumli).
The English Common Law is commonly thought of as a good analogy to the Roman legal system (see
Stein, 1992). The parallelism should not be overstressed, and we are at risk of doing just that if we
think of the existence of the ius civile and the ius honorarium as meaning the existence of two
different and separated sets of rales (in Rome there was only one system of 'courts'). The difference
was in the kind of arguments that were acceptable in disputes covered by one or the other. Good faith,
argumentation is about, and legal discourse is legal argumentation considered as a social practice.
72lf I am right, the law ceased to be an autonomous institution for Romans at quite an early stage in their legal development
(the precise point need not concern us). The later formalism of the ius civile could be explained a an outcome of legal inertia, of
an example of the ways in which legal traditions and (what I will call later) images of law are related (see infra at 179).
73Example: some of the problems created by the rigid nature of the stipulatio were solved by the granting of remedies for
extortion and fraud, in the form of exceptiones. Notice that "the point of a exceptio is precisely that the defendant is not denying
the validity of the plaintiffs case. He is merely claiming that there is another fact that ought to be taken into account. In other
words, extortion or fraud did not invalidate a stipulatio" (Watson, 1985a: 26). The Praetor did not modify the ius civile when
he decided to grant an exceptio. See also Watson (1981: 189).
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for example, was a good argument to rely upon in a case concerning sale, but not in a case concerning
the interpretation or enforcement of a stipulatio.
This is not to say that the parallel existence of both systems was completely irrelevant, nor that the ius
honorarium was infinitely flexible. And here we come across an intriguing feature of Roman law.
Romans are known not to have been interested in theorising about the law. They did not have, for
instance, a theory of obligations. It is true that in Justinian's Institutes we do find a systematisation of
the sources of obligations that could be said to be the starting point of a general theory of contract
(Inst. 3.13.2), but it is nonetheless also true that it reflects the particular reason the Institutes were
written for (as a textbook for students) rather than the general approach ofRoman jurists {see Honore,
1991: 506-7 for a different view). When Roman jurists bothered to hold general views about, for
example, the sources of obligations, they did so in an unsystematic fashion, merely listing different
sources: "Obligamur aut re aut verbis aut simul utroque aut consensu aut lege aut iure honorario aut
necessitate aut ex peccato" (Mod. D. 44. 7. 52. pr: 'we are bound either re, or verbally, or by both of
these at the same time, or by consent, or by statute, or by praetorian law, or by necessity, or by
wrongdoing'). This seems to be as systematic a classification of the sources of obligations as Jorge L
Borges' classification of animals.
This cavalier attitude with the theory of private law was related to the fact that they did not try to find
general rules to cover classes of cases but correct legal solutions for particular situations: as has been
claimed,
the great strength of the Roman mind lay not in theoretical construction but in the technically accurate
mastering of actual individual cases. In this sphere the classical jurists remained unsurpassed. With
sublime sureness of touch they applied the methods of logical reasoning, the technique of the
procedural formulas, and the complicated mles and conventions which resulted from the existence
side by side of legal institutions old and new, civil and magistral, elastic and strictly formalistic
(Kunkel, 1973: 111).
They had, most of the time, a very practically oriented method. Legal technicalities were not, most of
the time, an obstacle to their getting the solution they deemed convenient. Their approach to the
solution of legal cases was, most of the time, predominantly practical: legal doctrines were used when
they could serve some practical ends and after that they were dropped if that was necessary. Two
examples might be of use here. The first concerns servitutes (servitudes). They were thought of as a
burden a land carries in benefit of a neighbour land. Originally, the burden for the burdened land had
to be passive, i. e. the owner of the burdened land was under a duty not to do something (not to
interfere with someone's right ofway, right to drive beasts, right of light, and so on). Servitudes could
not impose a positive obligation on the owner of the servant land74. This, however, was soon
perceived as unsatisfactory, and a new kind of servitude was recognised, oneris ferendv.
I^See Pomp. D. 8.1.15.1: "Servitutium non ea natura est, ut aliquid facias quis, ueluti uiridia tollat aut amoeniorem
prospectum praestet, aut in hoc ut in suo pingat, sed ut aliquid patiatur aut non facial" (It is not in keeping with the nature of
servitudes that the servant owner be required to do something, such as to remove trees to make a view more pleasant or, for the




with reference to a servitude imposed for the purpose of providing support, an action is available to
us, to compel the servant owner to maintain the support and repair his buildings in the way provided
for when the servitude was created (Ulp. D. 8.5.6.2).
Ulpian then presents the objection that this runs against the nature of servitudes, servitus in faciendo
consistere non potest. But he answers immediately, without offering further argumentation:
However, the view of Servius has prevailed, so that in this particular case, a man can claim the right
to compel his opponent to repair a wall, so that it can support the load (ibid).
The case of the servitude oneris ferendi, we are told, "is [an] instance of the readiness ofRoman jurists
to abandon principle when principle was inconvenient" (Watson, 1970: 5; on the servitude oneris
ferendi in general see Watson, 1968: 191ff). Watson goes even further, and claims that the
explanations offered by some authors (he mentions Buckland and Solazzi) for the existence of oneris
ferendi are "unsatisfactory since they are all too subtle and over-sophisticated" (1968: 199). No special
theory is needed to explain its existence, since
there is [...] really no problem about the historical origins of this servitude. The utility of having such
a right of support from a neighbour's wall is obvious. And it is equally obvious that such a right to be
fully useful must be a real and not just a personal right. But in the Roman framework such a real right
could only be a servitude or at least be like a servitude. In the circumstances, the recognition of a
servitude of support was virtually inevitable—it would reflect nothing but discredit on the quality of
the Roman jurists ifno such right had been recognized (Watson, 1968: 199).
The second example concerns the in iure cessio, used to transfer ownership of certain things. Both
parties would appear before a magistrate. The transferee would claim the thing as his, the transferor (i.
e. the owner) would assent to this claim and the judge would declare the thing as being the property of
the transferee (Gai. 1.2.24). This being, technically speaking, a judicial proceeding, the decision could
only affect the parties to the action. "But here as elsewhere, legal logic, once it had served its turn, was
less important to the Romans than convenience, and the magistrate's decision was treated as meaning
that the transferee was in actual fact the true owner" (Watson, 1970: 52)75.
This is what has earned Roman jurists justly deserved recognition76. It is, though, only half of the
story. We must now turn to the other half.
Locatio Condvctio and the protection of the lessee
The first example has to be locatio conductio, i. e. the contract of hire. If we are to follow Watson in
this regard (Watson, 1985a: 16), locatio conductio was the residual category for all bilateral contracts
that were not sale and in which the obligation of one of the parties was in money. If no money was
due, not one but three contractual forms were used: mandate, deposit and loan for consumption (the
last two contracts were real contracts; mere agreement was not enough to bring them about: the actual
75Another example, if it were needed, of this attitude is provided by the case of hire-purchase, which was dealt with as
involving two transactions: locatio conductio (rei) and emptio venditio. The rights and duties of the parties were adjusted in a
"most flexible and undogmatic manner" (Zimmermann, 1990: 531ft).
76Cf. Watson (1972: 26): "I have tried to show by means of a few examples that, at least sometimes, the Roman jurists were
more concerned to reach a sensible practical result than to follow the dictates of a rigorous logic, that they were not ivory-tower
philosophers but sensible men dealing with contemporary problems of living. Though it may be felt that this diminishes the
claims of Roman law to be a system of universal unchanging validity, it must make us accept the Roman jurists as individual
human beings. And we must give credit to their sophistication".
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delivery of the thing was also required. Hence they were also unilateral: to use a technically inaccurate
language, they were born with one party's obligation already executed, therefore only the other had an
obligation under the contract. Mandatum was also unilateral, though for other reasons). Thus locatio
conductio was, along with emptio venditio, one of the main contracts in Roman law. Now, if we focus
mainly on locatio conductio (rei), we find that
the legal position of the lessee was [...] very precarious. The lessor could, during the life of the
contract and in contravention of the same, deprive him of the use of the thing leased, his only remedy
being the actio conducti. The classical jurists simply state the legal rule: the lessee is not the possessor
of the thing, and therefore cannot insist on its enjoyment in the face of prohibition by the lessor
(Schulz, 1936: 24).
The fact that the lessee was not a possessor had important consequences; not only could he not insist
on the enjoyment of the thing in the face of prohibition by the lessor, but he also could not use the
actiones in rem nor the possessory interdicts in order to protect his use of the property against third
parties:
If, for instance, the lessee lost the factual power [over the thing] through an unlawful act committed
by a third party, only the lessor had the interdict (provided he was possessor; in sub-letting the
principal lessor still had the interdict); the lessee could only hold the lessor liable under the contract,
but not directly the third party (Kaser, 1965: 86).
The owner could also evict the lessee at any moment, even if the parties had agreed upon a specific
term of tenancy (cf.. Zimmermann, 1990: 378). In all those cases the lessee had no protection except
his actio conducti against the lessor.
The fact that the lessee was not possessor is intriguing, given that Roman law granted possession to
many other holders of things: "why is the lessee not possessor while the pledgee, the tenant at will
(precario) and the sequester are possessors? This question is not put at all, nor are a dozen others"
(Schulz, 1936: 24).
At the same time, living conditions in Rome were rather bad, and the availability of houses for living a
constant problem. We are commonly tempted, Zimmermann warns, to judge living conditions in
Rome according to what we know about "leisurely country towns like Pompeii or Herculaneum"
(1990: 345). Only the well-off could afford to live on their own, while the rest had to live in rented
insulae, and they usually had to sub-let "every room in their cenaculum which they could possibly
spare" (Carcopino: cit. by Zimmermann, 1990: 346).
In this context, it seems strange that the position of the lessee was so weak. Zimmermann explains this
by reference to the fact that
jurists created the Roman lease law with only one segment of the market in mind: it was meant,
primarily, to resolve the problems arising from upper-class housing. It was not designed to oppress or
to relieve the lot of the poor: they simply did not feature. Roman law was actional law and where
there was no litigation, no law could be developed (Zimmermann, 1990: 348).
This explanation seems plausible indeed, but it alone cannot explain the whole issue. First, part of the
cause of the weak position of the lessee was that he was not recognised as having possession while
Romans were ready to grant possession in other situations. Second, stability in tenure is not only
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(though arguably mainly) a need of the worse-off. A buyer might be as interested in the thing not
having hidden defects (regarding which the Romans were ready to grant the buyer an action against
the seller) as a lessee in having some stability of tenure (concerning which they were not).
Summing up, then,
Roman lawyers dealt with the particulars of lease of residential space in very much the same manner
as they dealt with any other problem brought before them. They appear to have been insensitive to
the social dimensions of this type of contract, and certainly they did not make any special effort to
relieve the lot of tenants (Zimmermann, 1990: 348).
If this is true, then the sense in which the Romans were so concerned about the finding of appropriate
solutions for particular cases has to be qualified. They were not 'practical' in the sense we would use
that term today. They were indeed 'insensitive to the social dimensions of their opinions'. Their
attention to particular cases was driven by their concern to find the correct solution, granted, but that
was measured from a strictly legal point of view. Only arguments that could be classified as legal
could enter the debate and thus affect their decision.
Permutatio and Emptio Venditio
The second example I want to use, the case ofpermutatio (barter), shows this fact even more clearly.
For the Romans there was a significant difference between emptio venditio and permutatio. The
former is "one of the most remarkable achievements of Roman jurisprudence" (Zimmermann, 1990:
230). It was a purely consensual contract; it could thus be contracted by parties not present together,
through messengers, or even by correspondence (D. 18.1.2); the actions emanating from it (actio empti
and actio venditi) were bonae fidei. Among the claims that could be secured with the actio venditi we
find the "price for which the object was sold"; also "after the day of delivery, interest on the price"
(Ulp. D. 19.1.13.20), and any expenditures on the object of sale made by the seller (Ulp. D.
19.1.13.22. See generally, Zimmermann, 1990: 277ff). The vendor, on the other hand, had to grant the
purchaser habere licere (peaceful possession). He was not under the obligation of making the
purchaser owner. What if the vendor was not the owner? In that case the purchaser could not acquire
ownership: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potet, quam ipse habet (Ulp. D. 50.17.54), though he
would acquire possessio. If his habere licere was not interfered with, therefore, he would acquire
ownership by usucapio in what would seem to us a rather short term (two years for landed property,
one year otherwise); if it was, he could naturally not acquire by usucapio, but then the vendor was
liable for eviction, and this was also covered by the actio empti. The purchaser would not, however,
acquire possession if the thing was res furtiva, but in that case he could use the actio empti against the
vendor in so far as the latter was in bad faith (D. 19.1.30.1). The only real problem, as Zimmermann
points out, arose
where the object had been stolen and the vendor had not known about that either. But here we are
dealing with a situation that does not really allow for a smooth and easy solution: one of two honest
parties is ultimately bound to lose out (1990:280).
The Roman law of sale had, thus, a refined structure in which no serious defects can easily be spotted.
By the time of the classical lawyers, it was not only defensible from a policy point of view, but it also
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accorded with the modern sense ofjustice and fairness (see the references mentioned by Zimmermann,
1990: 280n). This is, in all likelihood, what was responsible for the extraordinary impact that the
Roman law of sale was to have in the Western legal tradition: "even where modem legislators have
chosen not to follow the example ofRoman law, the latter provides the background against which to
evaluate such a decision and to appreciate its implications" (Zimmermann, 1990: 230).
Permutatio, on the other hand, is substantively the same as emptio venditio. Both of them are
exchanges, but while in emptio venditio one of the things exchanged is money, in permutatio this is
not the case. The question, then, presents itself: are the actiones provided for emptio venditio available
to the parties to a contract of barter? The Sabinians claimed that they were indeed, based upon a
historical argument:
All buying and selling has its origin in exchange or barter. For there was once a time when no such
thing as money existed and no such terms as 'merchandise' and 'price' were known; rather did every
man barter what was useless to him for that which was useful, according to the exigencies of his
current needs; for it often happens that what one man has in plenty another lacks. But since it did not
always and easily happen that when you had something which I wanted, I, for my part, had
something that you were willing to accept, a material was selected which, being given a stable value
by the state, avoided the problem of barter by providing a constant medium of exchange (Paul. D.
18.1.l.pr).
This, along with a quotation from The IIiad77, was the Sabinians' argument to consider barter a form
of sale. The Proculians' answer (which according to Paul was the 'sounder one', D. 18.1.1.1) was that
one thing is to sell, another to buy; one person again is vendor and the other, purchaser; and, in the
same way, the price is one thing, the object of sale, another; but in exchange, one cannot discern
which party is vendor and which, purchaser (Paul, D. 18.1.1.1, infine).
This latter view did prevail in the end, and the consequence was that "permutatio remained within the
'no man's land' of unenforceable pacta" (Zimmermann, 1990: 532). The interesting point to notice,
however, is that the whole issue was dealt with without considering its practical consequences78.
Could it be that it had none? This seems difficult to believe (see Watson, 1985a: 23f): in Roman law a
nudum pactum was not enforceable unless it could be made to fit one of the categories of consensual
contracts (emptio venditio, locatio conductio); even when (later) the rise of the actiones praescriptis
verbis made it possible for the parties to a contract of barter to avail themselves of an actio modelled
upon the actio empti, barter was not a consensual contract, and an actio praescriptis verbis would be
granted only to the party that had already performed his share: ex nudo pacto non oritur actio. This
would mean that the parties had to be face-to-face to conclude the contract, i.e. that one of the main
advantages of the emptio venditio against the stipulatio could not operate. Further, and considering that
money was a late invention in Rome (dating back only to c. 275 BC), it could easily be argued that the
very same reasons that caused the development of the emptio venditio would have been reasons for
71Iliad 7,472ff: "then the long-haired Achaeans bought wine, some with bronze and others with shining steel, some with hides
and some with live oxen, others with slaves".
78See Schulz, 1936: "Why may a servitude not consist in faciendo? Why is the lessee not possessor? [...] Why is barter
(permutatio) not a consensual contract? Why does the rule semel heres semper heres exist? And so on and so forth. None of
these questions, to which one might add dozens of others, were so much as asked, let alone discussed and answered by the
jurists" (98-9). The fact that oneris ferendi was a servitude, though it consisted in faciendo, makes the whole thing more
intriguing: why were Roman jurists willing to derogate from their principles on some occasions, and on some occasions only'?
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applying its solutions to permutatio (on the rise of the actiones praescriptis verbis see Zimmermann,
1990: 532ff. On the consequences of the permutatio being nudum pactum, cf. Watson, 1985: 23f).
Regula Iuris
In these and other cases, what is intriguing is not only that the Romans reached legal conclusions so at
odds with 'the ordinary problems of living', but also that they did not seem to have thought that the
law was problematic. They did not use the kind of arguments that we would expect to hear from
practical-and-reluctant-to-theorise jurists; they did not suggest changes in the law; they did not
consider the economic, social or, in general, wider consequences of their opinions as these sorts of
arguments were, it seems, ruled out by the Roman canon of legal argument (Honore, 1974). Policy-
considerations were not arguments that a Roman jurist would use in grounding his position. In this
regard the Roman legal discourse is strikingly uniform:
The politico-economic conditions underlying the establishment of a legal mle are nowhere described
or even mentioned. No economic considerations enter into the law. The economic meaning of a legal
institution, the normal economic functions it is destined to fulfil, the economic reasons for its
introduction—all these are set aside on principle as non-juristic (Schulz, 1936: 24; see also Watson,
1985a: Ch 5).
The peculiar point, as I hope will be by now evident, is that the two features ofRoman legal reasoning
we have been considering seem perfectly opposite. We would naturally expect a theoretically-minded
jurist to assign great value to theoretical considerations, as we would expect practically-minded jurist
to dismiss theoretical arguments and go instead for the practical effects a given mling is likely to have.
But in the case of the Roman jurist, we find a very curious mixture: on the one hand, they did not have
much interest in theory, they were only concerned with the solution of particular cases. On the other,
they were not able to solve adequately some particular cases only because of their (underlying)
theories. They did not say they preferred one legal interpretation to another because of practical,
down-to-earth reasons. In some cases, however, practical considerations caused them to derogate from
their concepts (witness oneris ferendi), while in other the concepts proved more powerful
(permutatio). This different attitude to similar problems is not discussed, not even noticed, by any
Roman jurist (as Schulz said: 'these questions are not put at all, not are a dozen others'). Pace Watson,
sometimes they do seem to have been 'ivory tower' jurists, though some other times they indeed
behave like 'sensible men dealing with contemporary problems of living' (but the fact that practical
problems were approached in this widely different range of ways was itself not appreciated). They
seem to have been rather schizophrenic in this regard.
In other words, Roman legal reasoning was formal indeed, but not consistently formal. Sometimes
they paid attention to those problems of living, but sometimes they were completely oblivious to them.
One could say, though, that this is precisely what one would expect to find if the law is a system of
(badly designed) exclusionary mles. This section examines the explanatory power of this hypothesis. I
will be rejecting it, because of the very simple reason that, as a matter of historical fact, Romans did
not see the law as a system ofmles.
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We start with the Roman concept of 'rale' (regula), the definition of which opens the important last
title of the Digest, de diversis regulis iuris antiqui ('of various rales of ancient law'):
Regula est, quae rem quae est breuiter enairat. non ex regula ius sumatur, sed ex iure quod est
regula fiat, per regulam igitur breuis rerum narratio traditur, et, ut ait Sabinus, quasi causae
coniectio est, quae simul cum in aliquo uitiata est, perdit officium suum (Paul D. 50.17.1: 'A rale is
something which briefly describes how a thing is. The law may not derive from a rale, but a rale
must arise from the law as it is. By means of a rale, therefore, a brief description of things is handed
down and, as Sabinus says, is, as it were, the element of a case, which loses its force as soon as it
becomes in any way defective').
This seems to be as far as it could be from the idea of an exclusionary reason. Causae coniectio
(translated here rather cryptically as 'the element of a case') was a technical term of procedure (G. IV.
15. Cf. Stein, 1966: 69). Before presenting their case in detail to the judge in the second stage of the
legis actio procedure, the parties had to give the court a brief summary outline. If this summary (causa
coniectio) was satisfactory, the judge could reach a decision without further ado. If, on any point, the
causa coniectio was not, the whole exercise was useless, since the court "then had to proceed to the
next stage of the action at which the matter was submitted in extenso" (Stein, 1966: 69). Likewise if
the application of a regida to a particular case was not completely satisfactory, "it has lost its point
[and] there is nothing for it but to go through the whole field step by step" (ibid).
Stein claims that there were two conflicting views as to the correct understanding of a regida:
according to the first, Sabinian view, we have already seen that a rale was a brief description of the
subject-matter and did not have a normative force of its own. According to the second, which Stein
ascribes to Celsus, a leader of the Proculians, "a regula, despite the existence of exceptions, is not just
a neutral statement of facts; it is normative. Unless an exception can be justified, it applies to all the
cases which fall under its principle" (1966: 71). His main argument for the existence of these two
views is Celsus' claim, after stating the regula Catoniana, that'quae definitio in quibusdam falsa est'
(D. 34.7.1.pr in fine: 'in some cases, this statement of the rale is misleading'). Stein recognises that "at
first sight this seems to be another way ofputting Sabinus's view that if a regula is wrong in anything,
it is vitiated", but goes on to argue that
there is a difference of emphasis between saying that any exception vitiates a rule, which thereby
loses its officium, as does Sabinus, and stating the rale, but adding that in certain cases it is false, i.e.
does not correspond to the fact, as does Celsus (1966: 71).
The distinction is not entirely clear, however, since Sabinus' claim has to be understood as a case of
the rale losing its force (officium) for the case, not generally: if the solution offered by the rale to the
case is 'in any way defective', then the rale becomes completely useless for the solution of the case.
Celsus' dictum amounts to very much the same: in certain cases the rale is false (notice that Celsus
claims that in 'some cases' the rale is false—falsa est. This seems to cohere with the Sabinian view
that a regula is a description of the law. It seems to assume that the law can be known through other
means, and the function of the rule is to save the decision-maker the time this examination of other
means would take—we shall come back to this shortly). For Stein this tension is one that reflects the
grammatical controversy between analogists and anomalists (ibid). We need not get into this problem,
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since even if Stein is correct a regula would not have exclusionary force: it would be, as the tertium
comparationis in any analogical reasoning, the starting point, not the end, of the discourse (on analogy
I am following here Brewer, 1996). The force of the rule is given by its being a correct description of
the law, and if, for whatever reason, the description turns out to be false, the rule has no force
whatsoever: In his, quae contra rationem iuris constituta sunt, non possumus sequi regulam iuris (Jul,
Digest, book 27: 'we cannot follow a rule of law in instances where there has been a decision against
the ratio iuris'). How accurately the rule describe the facts is something that cannot, naturally, be
settled by the rule itself. It follows that all substantive considerations can be raised to challenge the
accuracy with which the regula briefly deals with its subject-matter: rules are not the law, but
descriptions of it. We are, in fact, explicitly warned against granting a regula exclusionary force:
Omnis definition in iure civili pericidosa est: parum est enim, ut non subuerti posset (lav, D.
50.17.202: 'Every definition in civil law is dangerous; for its is rare for the possibility not to exist of
its being overthrown'79).
Plautus and Sabinus, writing in the first century AD, were familiar with the concept of regula
(according to Stein the archetype of regula was the regula Catoniana, D. 34.7.1.pr, dating back to the
second century BC. Cf. Stein, 1966: 66). But it was not until the second century AD that the term
became common. By that time momentous changes in the structure and sources of Roman law and
Roman administration were under way, and to those changes we have to turn our sight to follow the
development of the concept (Stein, 1966: 74; see generally Wolff, 1951: 109ff).
The changes that should concern us here are related to the political structure of the Roman state. The
traditional Roman structure of sources of law was undergoing important modifications: Hadrian (117-
139 AD) had the praetorian and aedilian edicta cast in perpetual form by Julian in c 130 AD, after which
those magistrates lost their power to issue further edicta. Furthermore, the power of popular
assemblies to enact leges was gradually taken over by the Senate. But the most important innovation,
for our purposes, was that the Emperor came to be the principal source of law: in virtue of his
imperium he had the power to issue edicta; he had judicial powers and hence opportunities to issue
judicial judgements (decreta); and he was each time more frequently asked for advice which he gave
as rescripta (see generally, Stein, 1966: 74f)80.
The increasing legal workload undertaken by the imperial office made the bureaucratisation of the
Roman state necessary. Hadrian reorganised his advisory consilium, and appointed the heads of the
two schools, the Proculians Neratius and Celsus and the Sabinian Julius as members of it. At the same
time, a subordinate class of civil servants with knowledge of law was required, and thus a legal career
in the imperial civil service was made possible for the first time81. While these officials had no interest
11"Definitio is synonymous with regula" (Schulz, 1936: 40n). Stein's translation for the second phrase is 'for they give the
impression that they have a general application and cover all the cases, when in fact they do not' (Stein, 1966: 70).
80From the fact of the Emperor being the main source of law it does not necessarily follow that he was seen as creating the
law; this issue is (rather briefly) taken up below. For the time being, suffice it to say that since the times of Hadrian the imperial
civil service had to process a growing demand for legal advice. We leave open, for the time being, the question of whether this
growing demand was to be explained by the fact of the Emperor having power to create the law.
81 "After Hadrian's reforms, it was possible for a young man to spend his whole career in the legal bureaucracy. When his
training was completed he might become advocatus fisci or secretary of one of the chiefs of bureaux. One of these bureaux, ab
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in the law for its own sake, as many classical jurists seem to have had, they needed to tackle a growing
demand for imperial pronouncements on law (decreta, edicta and rescripta; collectively called
imperial constitutions).
This is the context in which the concept of regula iuris became common in Roman legal parlance. The
concept was not unknown before, as D. 50.17.1, quoting Sabinus, shows. But it was in the late
classical period that Libri Regulaium started to appear. The first book of rules (called Regulae) was
due to Neratius, leader of the Proculians and member of Hadrian's consilium. Two features of this
kind of legal literature are worth stressing: firstly, the rules are offered as dogmatic and precise
statements of the law, without the usual support of authorities or further arguments. Secondly, this
kind of literature is small compared with the huge bulk of the classical commentaries. Both of these
facts support Stein's interpretation of the rise of this type of legal literature as a consequence of the
increasing bureaucratisation of the Roman administration. As we have seen, one of the consequences
of this process had been the creation of an imperial civil service integrated by subordinate officials
who were not jurists but had some legal training, and who were, in Stein's view, the main addressees
of the regulae:
For what audience were these works intended? Not for students beginning the study of law. The
presentation is totally unsystematic even by the unexacting standards of the classical period. And the
subject matter is too detailed for those lacking a founding in law. Clearly the Regulae were written for
people who knew some law but who were not interested in arguments and reasons, i.e. people who
required working mles of thumb to guide them in the routine cases with which they had to deal. I
suggest that the typical reader whom the authors ofRegulae had in mind was a subordinate official in
the bureaux ab epistulis and a libellis (Stein, 1966: 80-1)82.
The statements of law had to be short and dogmatic, for this was precisely their point: to allow the
official to answer questions and give advice without having to study the whole subject-matter (hence
the analogy in D 50.17.1.pr, mentioned above, between regula and causa coniectio). The regulae were
not formal reasons for decision, but working rules of thumb: rules to be followed when no particular
feature of the case suggested that a straightforward application would not be appropriate, and to be
abandoned when such a feature was discovered. In this light, though a regula is clearly a reason for
action, it is not a reason to exclude any consideration whatsoever: all the relevant substantive reasons
apply, and the point of the regula is that, given the nature of the case, the right balance of reasons
would usually be the one reflected in the rule83. There is nothing in the rule, however, that warrants
the official not to consider any reason that could modify this prima-facie conclusion. We can now see
that the concept of a regula, as contained in D. 50.17.1.pr (attributed to Paul, who was a member of
Hadrian's consilium; see Stein, 1966: 82) makes perfect sense: an official could rely on a regula,
epistulis, handled the voluminous exchange of letters between the Emperor and the drafting of appropriate rescripts. Another
bureau, a libellis, dealt with petitions of private individuals. The majority of these would involve legal issues, and the head of
his bureau was therefore a jurist" (Stein, 1966: 78).
82As Honore has said, referring to "the average executor's manual'": "such works are written on the assumption that executors
do not need to understand the law but only to apply certain rules by rote" (Honore, 1974: 103). Regulae do not have a
normative force of their own; they are legal rules of thumb.
83This is not to say that, since the official would have to consider all the substantive reasons before arriving at his or her
decision, the regulae as regulae were useless. The bureaucrats might have other reasons not to consider (some) substantive
reasons: think, for example, of the need to solve a large number of cases in a limited amount of time.
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because it was a faithful (and brief) description of its subject-matter. But if for some reason the regula
turned out to be a false description, then it could (it would have to) be set aside altogether. This
explains Javolenus' warning (inZ). 50.17.202, quoted supra, p. 124) as well as the late-classical jurists
concern with the fraus legifacta (cf. D. 1.3.29 and D. 1.3.30).
Let me pause briefly on the subject offraus legifacta, defined by Paulus in the following manner:
D. 1.3.29 (Paul, libri singulari ad legem Cinciam). Contra legem facit, qui idfacit quod lexprohibet,
in fraudem uero, qui saluis uerbis legis sententiam eius circumuenit ('it is a contravention of the law
if someone does what the law forbids, but fraudulently, in that he sticks to the words of the law but
evades its sense').
And Ulpian repeats practically the same in D. 1.3.30. It is not a coincidence that Ulpian and Paulus,
both of them late-classical jurists and authors of libri regulae, were concerned about agere in fraudem
legis. Indeed, given their concept of regula, the tendency to think of the rule as being the law instead
ofmerely describing it was something that had to be resisted. Zimmermann points out that the idea of
frau legi fact was alien for pre-classical jurisprudence, characterised as it was by "a strictly formalistic
approach" (Zimmermann, 1990: 703).
To conclude: the legal materials were not considered by Roman jurists to be exclusionary reasons. Yet
their legal reasoning was formal to a remarkable extent; only certain arguments were used. Political,
economic or social consequences of their decisions were not something they would take into account
to modify their opinions. Some of the solutions offered by the law of the Romans were remarkably
reasonable: as we have seen, there is an argument to be made, in the case of the emptio venditio, to the
effect that the solutions afforded by Roman law to cases falling under the heading of the law of sale
were both adequate and reasonable (cf. supra, p. 120). But they failed to adopt this broader perspective
for many legal situations, with the consequence that those reasonable solutions they already knew
were not to be applied to substantively similar situations. Interestingly enough, they even failed to see
the problems that this attitude was bringing about. There is no suggestion that the fact that the rules of
emptio venditio were not applicable to permutatio was something negative; there is no complaint about
the hardship that the lessee's weak position in a locatio conductio (rei) could create; there is no
suggestion, more interestingly, to the effect that the law could be changed, and this is the attitude of
jurists which are famous for being inclined to look for appropriate solutions for particular cases rather
than formulating grand theories and overarching concepts.
The fact that some rules concerning locatio conductio, permutatio and many others seem so
incomprehensible to us is to be explained by the further fact that we do not know that much about the
Roman ways of thinking about the law. They clearly had a very strict canon of legal argument that
excluded most references to extralegal effects of legal decisions. But we are not in a position to
understand that canon: we can only attempt to reconstruct it from the material contained in the Corpus
Juris Civilis and other Roman sources. The Cotpus Juris Civilis is not a Code in the modem sense of
the word: it is, mainly, a collection of opinions about what the law requires in particular cases under
consideration (see Stein, 1992: 1595; Friedrich, 1956: 2-3). Alasdair Maclntyre's tale about Western
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philosophy in After Virtue (1985: 2) is literally true in the case of Roman law: "what we possess [...]
are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their
significance derived".
On the other hand, it is precisely because of the fact of the Corpus Iuris Civilis not being a codification
in the modem sense that we can reconstruct part of the Roman attitude and thus hope to have a
reasonably accurate understanding of the system of Roman law. Imagine that we have only the
regulae of, say, emptio venditio: would we be in a position to know whether these rules were to be
applied to permutatio? This is another way to see that understanding the meaning of some legal
material is not enough to apply it: to do the latter it is necessary not only to know the meaning, but also
how formally that 'meaning' should be applied. In other words, how many—and which—substantive
considerations are excluded.
We can see that a theory that explains the emergence of oneris ferendi is, contra Watson, crucially
important not only to know what the Roman law of servitudes was, but also and more importantly, to
understand Roman law itself. We need a theory that explains why the Roman jurists sometimes
derogated from their principles as a matter of course and why that appears not to have even occurred
to them in other cases. Such a theory needs to be (as we shall see shortly) not only a historical
explanation of the emergence of oneris ferendi and the denial of the status of possessor to the lessee in
the locatio conductio (rei). It must be a theory about the way in which the Romans thought about the
law. It must teach us when and why they would have been willing to derogate had they had the
opportunity to do so.
Our limited knowledge of the way in which the Roman jurists thought about Roman law is what
explains why it seems to us that they displayed a rather schizophrenic mixture of common sense and
formalism (and here I am using this latter word in its most pejorative sense). From our perspective,
Roman legal reasoning seems to be guided in some cases (e.g., inpermutatio and in locatio conductio)
by the wrong criteria. Though not every person who has any physical power over a thing deserves to
be possessor, it seems (to us) that if the tenant at will is granted possession the lessee should have it as
well. This is the assumption behind Schulz's already quoted criticism (supra at 119). Concerning
permutatio the problem was created by the fact that, as was argued above,'permutatio is (seems to us)
substantively the same as emptio venditio' (supra at 121). But, as this case shows, Romans would not
agree. Romans would say (as we saw: supra at 121) that there was a crucial distinction between
permutatio and emptio venditio: in permutatione discerni non potest, uter emptor, uter venditor sit
(Paul D. 18.1.1.1).
Everything boils down, therefore, to the sort of reasons that would be accepted by a Roman jurist as
showing the substantive similarity of two different situations. They distinguished between a tenant at
will and a lessee, between barter and sale, but not between oneris ferendi and older forms of
servitudes. If we apply our modem criteria to these cases problems will emerge, arbitrary distinctions
will appear here and there. But we cannot apply Roman law (as opposed to our interpretation of the
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Roman legal material) without understanding the rationale behind the ways in which Romans
classified particulars in the world84.
One could use history to explain these different attitudes. One could, for example, try to discover the
historical causes of the weak position of the lessee. Alan Watson, for example, suggests that the
development of the different contractual forms that constitute what we could anachronistically call the
'Roman law of contract' was a piecemeal development of particular forms from the most ancient and
abstract contract, the stipulatio. Every major contract the Romans knew is, in Watson's view, a
derogation from the strict requirements of the stipulatio (except societas).
This is not the place (and I am not the person) to discuss the historical accuracy of Watson's
hypotheses. What is important, though, is that what we needed to know was not only what the
historical causes of the evolution of each contract was, but also the reasons for it (on reasons and
causes, see Ewald, 1995a: 1924ff). In order to leam the way the Romans thought about the law, it is
not enough for us to leam that the Roman contracts evolved from stipulatio. We need to know the
reasons behind that development. Why did mutuum (loan) break loose from the ritualism of the
stipulatio, while it did not evolve in such a way as to be flexible enough to include commercial
lending? Why did the Romans never develop a written contract, one that would be similar to the
stipulatio in that it was defined by its form, not its function, but that could have solved many of the
problems and shortcomings of the stipulatio, while at the same time they were willing and able to
derogate from the stipulatio in so many other cases? The Romans did know about written contracts,
common in Athens and commented on by Gaius (G. 3.134). Why did they not derogate from the
stipulatio in this respect as they did regarding mutuum, depositum and the like?; Why did a contract of
barter (permutatio) not develop alongside emptio venditioni Questions of this Schulzian type could, as
Schulz claimed, be multiplied tenfold. Watson's explanation is a good explanation of the origins of
those particular contracts that did develop; it does not, however, explain the selectivity ofRoman legal
development, i. e., why only some (and sometimes in some respects only) contracts evolved towards a
more flexible and reasonable application while others kept the rigidities they were bom with. A sound
historical explanation will not do without some hypothesis about Roman legal thinking.
"Because men tend to do what they think they are doing" (Pound, 1958: 6), historical explanations are
useful tools in the reconstruction of Roman legal thinking: when they are true, they are a constraint
upon as well as a guide to the right hypotheses about legal thinking. If they cannot shed light on this,
historical explanations will be little more than mere anecdotes.
Watson acknowledges the role of legal thinking in legal evolution. Indeed, he argues that "law
develops by lawyers thinking about the normative facts, whether in the abstract or in relation to
hypothetical or actual societal facts" (Watson, 1985a: 33). Lawyers' thought is in turn shaped by legal
84i am not claiming that we know nothing about Roman law and that everything that is written on that subject is just 'our
interpretation of Roman legal material'. As argued before, we can reconstruct the Roman image of law from their opinions
concerning particular cases, and this reconstruction can be more or less successful. The point is merely about what needs to be
reconstructed for that enterprise to be successful.
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tradition. Hence "legal development is determined by their [i.e. lawyers'] culture; and social,
economic, and political factors impinge on legal development only through their consciousness"
(118). But Watson does not see that, as we have seen in this chapter, knowledge of this 'thinking' is
relevant not only to explain legal evolution, but also to know what follows for particular cases from
the existence of a general rule (these are the 'two souls' that dwell in Watson's writing, according to
William Ewald: the 'weak Watson' who emphasizes the relative autonomy of law from social forces
and the importance of legal culture, and the 'strong Watson', who claims that the law can be reduced
to black-letter rules. I will come back to this point in the next chapter; see Ewald, 1995b: 491 f).
Maybe this is something that we simply cannot know, if only because our knowledge of the Roman
mind is restricted to our sources. The Romans did attach, for example, much importance to the fact
that the obligation in a contract was to hand over a sum of money: Roman contracts are either
unilateral or one of the principal obligations is expressed in money. Why was money so important?
The answer is that we do not know. And without knowing that it is very difficult to understand the
Roman system of contracts.
At this point the reader might get impatient: we do know, understand and argue about the Roman law
of contract. Books are published and lectures given continually on the topic. Could not this very fact
be cited as a decisive objection to the argument presented here? In the face of all our ignorance about
the Roman understanding of the law (as opposed of what we know about the Roman legal materials)
we can know what the law was concerning, e.g. sale or hire or deposit or agency. In fact, the impact
Roman law has had in the development ofWestern legal systems could hardly be exaggerated. It thus
seem that there is no need to know anything but the rules of a system of law in order to be able to
make sense of it.
To answer this objection one can distinguish two levels of understanding, two senses in which we can
be said to having understood a legal rale (Ewald, 1995a: 2101f). We can understand the rule's
meaning, and in this weak sense of 'understanding' all we need is to master the relevant language. As
Ewald puts it, "this level of comprehension is available to any literate adult, ancient or modem" (1995:
2101). The distinction between meaning and application was designed to highlight precisely this point,
i.e. that we can understand the meaning of legal rales without knowing how to apply them.
'Knowing how to apply them' represents the second level of understanding. There is an obvious sense
in which someone who has only memorised that 2+2=4, 2+3=5, 2+4=6, and so on, has not understood
the rale of addition, however many operations 'and so on' stands for (see Hegel, 1971: 100-2, as
discussed supra at 38). The 'weak' understanding of Roman law is just like that: how can we know
which situations not described in the Digest would have been treated by Roman jurists with the
flexibility they displayed concerning oneris ferendi, and which ones would have been treated with the
rigidformalism they showed concerning locatio conductio or permutatio?
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This is this chapter's crucial point, and I hope its connection with the argument of the last two chapters
is obvious: we do not know how formal the application of the norms of Roman law was; we do not
know which sort of substantive considerations were irrelevant (i.e. pre-empted), etc85.
If we manage to achieve an understanding of Roman law that allows us to have at least working
hypotheses about the application ofRoman mles to cases not mentioned in the Digest we could be said
to be on our way to have understood Roman law in a stronger and more significant sense. To get this
level of understanding, however, knowledge of Latin will not be sufficient: we will have to try to
think, to see the world, as a Roman. This need is not evident when we are dealing with modem legal
systems (at leastWestern legal systems), because "the modem law student can take [it] for granted. [It]
ha[s] become part of the atmosphere, a part of the surrounding culture, a part of the Volkgeist, and
indeed a part of the language itself' (Ewald, 1995a: 2101-2).
85See Llewellyn, 1960: 42f, for a similar situation in the United States in the early decades of the twentieth century, when there
was not settled understanding of what I called (at the end of the previous chapter) 'values/normative beliefs' and he calls




If the argument so far is correct, legal rules as we know them are not the kind of standard that can be
applied to any particular case without recourse to non-legal evaluative considerations. I argued at some
length against the sources-thesis, which to my mind is the most clear and uncompromising claim to the
contrary (though whether or not I was correct in so believing is something we shall come back to at
the end of this chapter). The argument I developed illustrates the predicament of modem
jurisprudence, a predicament nicely summarised in the title (as well as the content, as we shall see) of
Neil MacCormick's book, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. But first, I want to explain the
background reasons for this predicament.
When Hart wrote The Concept ofLaw, legal reasoning as such was not in the philosophical agenda.
Consequently, he later acknowledged that in The Concept ofLaw he had "said far too little about the
topic of [...] legal reasoning" (1994: 259). This aspect of Hart's book was soon subject to criticism
because it appeared to some (most notably, Dworkin, 1967) that the implications of Hart's theory for
legal reasoning were clearly at odds with what lawyers and judges saw themselves as doing. What was
needed, in consequence, was a 'companion' to The Concept of Law, an examination of the way in
which a powerful explanation of the nature of law such as Hart's could further the understanding not
only of what the law is, but also of how the law works, or, better, how people work with the law: a
theory of the application of the law (i.e. legal reasoning). We are now told that Legal Reasoning and
Legal Theory was supposed to be such a companion (MacCormick, 1994: xiv). Before considering
that book, let me explain where the tension between legal reasoning and legal theory lies, as a way of
summing up the argument so far.
A (Hartian) explanation of legal reasoning has to be seen to flow from, or at the very least to be
consistent with, the central claims Hart made in the 'mother' theory. I hope it is not very controversial
to say that one of the central tenets ofHart's theory of law was that at a conceptual level (and however
messy that relation might be at the empirical level) law is independent from morality, that is, what the
law ought to be is not the same than what the law is86. These two questions are, in Hart's view, not
only different, but logically different: it is possible to establish what the law is without inquiry into
what the law ought to be; no conclusion about what the law is follows from arguments about what the
law ought to be. At the same time, Hart saw that any theoretical elucidation of the nature of law must
explain why and how it is possible for competent lawyers, judges and lay persons to disagree not only
about what the law ought (morally) to be, but also (and much more importantly in this context) about
86There is some discussion as to the precise content of what is sometimes called 'the separability thesis' (see, among others,
FuBer, 1996; Coleman, 1996). This has to be kept in mind, since my argument would not affect some versions of the thesis.
Consider Shiner's (admitedly 'crude') version: "the existence of law is one thing and its merit or demerit another" (Shiner,
1992: 59). I do believe (along with most positivists, natural lawyers, and realists of different denominations) that in this sense
the thesis is true. 1 think, however, that I can bypass this debate because in any plausible reading that thesis must mean, for legal
positivists, that the fact that the law ought to be different is not enough to establish that it is different.
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what the law actually is. Now, the explanation of the latter kind of disagreement cannot be grounded
upon the existence of disagreement about what the law ought to be, since if that were the case the law
as it is would not be conceptually different from the law as it ought to be (that is, it cannot be the case
that we disagree about what the law is because we disagree what the law ought to be, if these two
questions are conceptually different). Hence we got Hart's open texture thesis. The importance of this
thesis is that it performed the role of supplying a morally neutral explanation of legal disagreement,
thus allowing us to explain disagreement about what the law is in a way that was not parasitical on
disagreement about what the law ought to be. This was, therefore, the explanation (at least the kind of
explanation) required by Hart's theoretical assumptions, if his theory was to have any consistence. But
Hart noticed (or so I claimed) that the idea of open texture, important as it might be, did not explain
the whole of the fact of legal disagreement when looked at from a legal reasoning-perspective, i.e.
clarification of the meaning of words is not always the kind of information that would be useful to
lawyers and judges and lay persons when they are discussing what the law is in concrete cases. Hart
realised that in many of these cases what was discussed was not whether a particular x was an instance
of a general X, but rather whether or not a particular (otherwise clear and unambiguous) rule was, in a
legal sense, meant to be applied to the facts that configured some concrete case. Hence he offered, in
the same pages of The Concept ofLaw, a second explanation of the fact of legal disagreement, one
based on the claim that there is a built-in tension in law between (what I called) predictability and
appropriateness.
Now, it is in my view a crucial point that the legal theory-implications of this second explanation are
at odds with the central claim of Hart's book identified above. In the first explanation, what made a
case hard was a morally neutral feature, i.e. the open texture of the relevant words. From the universe
of cases courts will have to solve from now on, some of them are (or will eventually be) marked by a
non-moral feature (i.e. the fact that they belong to the penumbra of meaning of the relevant words);
the identification of those cases as hard will not imply, therefore, that moral ideas about what the law
ought to be will be smuggled in at the moment of ascertaining what the law is. When the 'mark' of
open texture is discovered the court will have reached the outer limits of the law: it can then discuss
about what the law will be after the court's decision, in the light of what the law should be, only
because there is no law in the matter. Notice that nothing guarantees that this will be uncontroversial.
There can be disagreement on whether skateboards and push-chairs are 'core' or 'penumbra' instances
of the word 'vehicle'. That is to say, I think Raz is correct when he says (Raz, 1985: 218) that it is
false "that all factual matters are non-controversial" and that "all moral propositions are controversial".
What is important here is not that according to the open texture thesis the application of the law is non-
controversial, but that any legal disagreement will not be moral but factual (or verbal, or conceptual)
disagreement: are push-chairs and skateboards, as a matter offact, vehicles?
The second explanation (legal disagreement as the consequence of the tension between predictability
and appropriateness) does not work so nicely, though it represents more faithfully the reality of legal
reasoning. In it, the 'mark' that singles a case out as hard is not a non-moral but a moral feature: the
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case is (will be) marked as hard if predictability's requirements are overridden by those of
appropriateness, i.e. if the solution offered by the rule is inappropriate enough for the demand of
predictability to be defeated in the case. But the point at which the balance between these two
(undoubtedly moral) values has to be struck is itself a moral question. Hence how pressing the
inappropriateness of a norm ought to be for the demand for predictability to be overridden is also a
moral question, whose answer will depend on the relative importance those values are taken to have.
From this standpoint the question of what the law is cannot be differentiated from that of what the law
ought to be. In other words, for the court the question 'is this pram a vehicle?' is linked to the question
'ought this pram be considered a vehicle?' (consider the common judicial way of posing this kind of
problems: 'should skateboards be considered as vehiclesfor the purpose ofthis /nw?'B7).
If this is correct, there is no way in which we can say that there is a logical distinction between these
two questions. To see why, it seems useful to divide Hart's view on hard cases up into two parts: one
that contains a test about what makes a hard case hard, and another that explains what is going on once
a case is recognised as such. We have seen that two answers can be found in The Concept ofLaw for
the first problem, the test that makes a case hard. The answer to the second problem is that in hard
cases there is no settled law, hence the courts have to exercise discretion. Now if the argument
developed in the last two chapters is correct, the non-moral test for the first problem, i.e. the open
texture thesis (in the traditional sense), has to be rejected, and something along the lines of the tension
between predictability and appropriateness must be placed there instead. If we then retain the original
second part, i.e. the claim that in hard cases courts have discretion, the incompatibility between what
we would then get and the core of Hart's philosophy of law (as identified above) is evident: In this
modified version, Hart's view on hard cases would be: (i) a case is hard when the application of the
(prima facie) law is deemed morally objectionable88 (i.e. when the (prima facie) solution is such that
the moral demand for appropriateness is stronger than the moral demand for certainty); (ii) when a
case is hard, the law is unsettled, and the courts have discretion. In short: when the application of an
otherwise clear legal rule produces a morally objectionable result, it is the law that there is no law on
the subject. What the law is for the case depends upon what the law (i.e. the balance between
predictability and appropriateness) ought to be for the case. When the (prima facie) law ought to be
different, it is different, lex iniusta non est lex\
The tension between legal theory and legal reasoning is explained, at least in part, by a difference in
perspective between the two: when building a legal theory, what is at the centre of attention is a set of
questions like 'what is the law?' 'when are we entitled to say that a legal system is valid (exists)?'
'how can we know whether a particular rule is part of this or that (or of any at all) legal system?' (see
87The fact that Hart himself sometimes (e.g.: 1967: 106) phrased the question in these terms (as one of ascertaining whether a
particular x is an instance of a general Xfor the purpose of a given law) shows that he failed to notice that he was offering two
explanations. If his open texture thesis (understood as a thesis about language) is true, then there are core instances that are
recognisable as such regardless of the purpose of any law, unless one were to claim that there is a specific legal meaning: see
supra, at 81 flf.




Raz, 1980: If, for a useful typology of the questions a legal theory must answer to be a 'complete'
legal theory). At this level it is hard to deny the difference between the law that is and the law that
ought to be. The mere fact that many people can sensibly think the law of their land to be unjust, that
is, different from what it ought ideally to be, shows that there is such a distinction.
But when the focus of the enquiry is shifted to legal reasoning, this clear difference is upset. It is still
possible to apply a law that is different from the law that ought to be, and many times judges decide
one thing while at the same time they think that a different decision ought to have been but for the
content of the applicable law89. But we have seen that in order to apply the law, the judge has to
determine which substantive issues are pre-empted by it. The obvious fact that judges are sometimes
compelled to decide a case in a manner they think is not (morally) the best shows that the law does
indeed pre-empt some substantive issues that would otherwise be prompted by the case. But the
equally obvious fact that a law does not exclude all the substantive considerations (e.g. the
consideration that the man who shed blood in the streets of Bologna was a barber, and that he was
shaving a customer), even when it prima facie appears to do so (e.g. the Bolognese statute said that the
words had to be taken literally, without interpretation) shows that there is more to the ascertaining of
what the law is than getting the meaning right. And it is somewhat ironic that Hart himself gave such
an accurate description of what this something else is, that is, the solution of a tension between the
(moral) values of predictability of judicial decisions and their appropriateness to the particular case at
hand (see supra, at 63). To repeat: what the law is for the case cannot be known before deciding how
the competition between predictability and appropriateness ought to be resolved.
One could, I suppose, insist on the idea that this is not a problem, and to do so one would have to
argue that an answer to the question 'what is law'? does not have any consequences for an answer to
that of 'what is the law for this case?'. If it could be argued that an answer to the first question does not
imply an answer to the second, this chapter's argument (based as it is on the fact that a sensible answer
to the first implies an incorrect answer to the second and vice-versa) would be conceptually mistaken.
And indeed, it has been claimed that "it has been a central presupposition [of analytical jurisprudence]
that there is a clear distinction between the philosophical question, 'What is law?' and the lawyer's
question, 'What is the law for this or that matter?" (Marmor, 1995: v).
Now, there is an obvious sense in which these are two different questions, i.e. in the same way that the
question 'What is cancer?' is different from the question 'Does this person have cancer?'. But this is
not to say that an answer to the first question does not imply (at least part of) an answer to the second,
in the same way in which the answer to the first of Marmor's questions implies (at least part of) an
answer to the second.
89Hence the italicised last phrase at the end of the penultimate paragraph was a rhetorical excess. But it was only exaggerated,
not plainly false: sometimes laws that produce unfair or unjust results when applied to a particular case are not laws for that
case, and that suffices to put in question any version of the separability thesis, according to which from the fact that a legal
solution is morally objectionable it does not follow that it is legally mistaken.
Remember what was argued at the end of the third chapter (supra, at 105): an approach to legal reasoning along
Razian\Marmorian lines cannot make the distinction between Carlos saying 'it is my moral duty to break the law' and Lord
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One could claim, however, that the relation is not that close. Consider Hans Kelsen's position:
This determination [of a lower-level norm by a higher-level norm] however, is never complete [...].
Even a meticulously detailed command must leave a number of determinations to those carrying it
out. Ifofficial A orders official B to arrest subject C, B must use his discretion to decide when where
and how he will carry out the warrant to arrest C; and these decisions depend upon external
circumstances that A has not foreseen and, for the most part, cannot foresee (Kelsen, 1934: 78).
That a judicial decision is based on a statute means in truth simply that the decision stays within the
frame the statute represents, means simply that the decision is one of the individual norms possible
within the frame of the general norm, not that it is the only individual norm possible (Kelsen, 1934:
80. The passage remains unaltered in the second edition of The Pure Theory ofLaw).
One could understand Kelsen here as saying that the Pure Theory ofLaw will never be able to answer
'the lawyer's question' if that question is 'When, where and how should B arrest C?'. But this is not to
say that the answer to the first question is not an answer to the second: in Kelsen's example, a
complete answer to the first question (something like 'a legal system is the set of all the laws enacted
by the exercise of powers conferred, directly or indirectly, by one basic norm'90) implies an answer to
the second ('for this case, the law is that C should be arrested by B, though the law does not specify
precisely where, when or how').
It is not clear to me whether Marmor was claiming that for analytic jurisprudence the two questions
were different in the sense that an answer to one did not imply an answer to the second, or only that
they were different, without any further claim. In the latter sense, he is surely right but it would not be
an objection to my main argument in this chapter; in the former, it would indeed be an objection but (I
would claim) it would not be true as regards 'analytic jurisprudence' nor would it be correct in its own
terms.
Deductive Reasoning, Clear Cases and Legal argumentation
The challenge for a complete Haitian (-like) theory of law (that is, a Haitian (-like) theory of law and
legal reasoning) is, then, to harmonise these two perspectives, that of legal reasoning and that of legal
theory. I want to consider now in some detail what is probably the most sophisticated attempt to meet
this challenge, i.e. Neil MacCormick's Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory.
That MacCormick's is an attempt to meet this challenge is clear from the new foreword of the
paperback edition, where he says that "the analytical positivist approach to legal theory espoused by
Hart is open to challenge, and has been challenged, for an alleged inability to give a satisfactory
account of legal reasoning, especially reasoning-in-adjudication. This book took up that challenge"
(MacCormick, 1994: xiv). In particular, I take his argumentation concerning the role of deductive
reasoning in law as constituting the best available analysis of clear cases in the tradition of legal
positivism.
This is the reason why, before considering MacCormick's argument, it is necessary to address the
issue of syllogistic (or deductive) reasoning in Herbert Hart's theory of law. Hart himself sometimes
Lane saying 'because of substantive considerations not explicitly mentioned in the rule to be applied, the proper way to apply it
is such-and-such'. Hence as an argument against the sources thesis, my rhetorical excess is not even exaggerated.
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showed little sympathy for the idea that legal decisions can be reached in a deductive manner: he
argued that "logic is silent on how to classify particulars" (Hart, 1958: 67). Commenting upon this and
related passages from Hart's work, Marmor claims that nothing could be farther from Hart's mind
than the idea of the application of a rule to a clear case being a matter of logic or analyticity91.
Defending Hart, Marmor has claimed that "it is easily discernible that whatever it is that connects a
rule to its application cannot consist of logic [,..]"92 and he then argues,
as Hart put it, 'logic is silent on how to classify particulars' but it is precisely this classification to
which his distinction between core and penumbra pertains. In other words, we must keep separate
what might be called 'rule-rule' and 'rule-world' relations; logic [...]93 pertain[s] only to the former,
not to the later kind of relation (Marmor, 1994: 128).
And he concludes by saying that "neither Hart nor any other legal positivist must subscribe to the view
that the application of legal rules is a matter of logical inference" (ibid at 128).
Marmor is right when he claims that the distinction between core and penumbra is not a matter of
logic, but let us ask the question: 'why is the core/penumbra important for Hart?' And the answer is:
because, in addition to the existence of a core and penumbra of meaning for most (all) concepts, Hart
claimed (at least in the traditional interpretation of the open texture thesis) that a state of affairs
constitutes a clear legal case when in some of its descriptions it is encompassed by the core meaning
of some applicable rule, and hard otherwise. It is with this further claim that a space for logic and
deductive reasoning appears: to put it in Marmor's terms, once the relation rule-world has been settled,
once the particulars of the case have been recognised to be in the core of meaning of the relevant
words, then all that is left is to perform a syllogism94. This is so because when the relation 'rule-
world' has been established then a relation between rule-rule has to be established, i.e. a relation
between a general rale (like 'it shall be a misdemeanour, punishable by fine of £5, to sleep in any
railway station') and a particular one ('the defendant should pay £5') has to be established. Logic does
not answer the question ofwhether a Cadillac is a vehicle; that question is answered by the meaning of
the words (and that answer, ifHart's core/penumbra distinction is correct, cannot be an issue in 'core'
cases). But once that question is answered, logic (in the positivist view) must be able to answer the
question of whether that Cadillac is to be allowed in the park.
A Theory of Legal Argumentation or a Theory of Legal Reasoning?
Neil MacCormick began his Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory with a forceful argument for the
importance of syllogistic reasoning in law, that is, for the idea that modus ponens alone can render, in
90This is Raz's version ofwhat he calls Kelsen's 'criterion of identity' (see Raz, 1980: 95; and Kelsen, 1934: 59ff).
91As we shall see, MacCormick does not mention the idea that the judicial syllogism is analytic. Of course it is, but this is not
to say that it is 'analyticity' (or 'logic') what connects a rule to its application. 1 will argue that what connects a rule to its
application is logic plus the distinction between core and penumbra. For this reason, I will follow MacCormick in not
discussing this at all in terms of analyticity.
92Following the previous note, 'and analyticity' suppressed.
93'And analyticity' suppressed.
94There is a significant difference in the way in which logical language is used by logicians and lawyers: for the latter
'syllogism', 'deduction' and 'logic' are, broadly speaking, synonyms, while for the latter they are quite different (however
related) things. See Kneale and Kneale (1962). I will follow the lawyers' usage.
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some cases, fully justified legal decisions. With this claim he faced the challenge of those (he did not
give references at this point) who would like to deny this:
If this denial [of the possibility of legal reasoning being deductive] is intended in the strictest sense,
implying that legal reasoning is never, or cannot ever be, solely deductive in form, then the denial is
manifestly and demonstrably false. It is sometimes possible to show conclusively that a given
decision is legally justified by means ofa purely deductive argument (1994: 19).
The importance of this claim should be by now evident. If it can be shown that in some cases at least
legal reasoning can be solely and strictly deductive in form, then all that will remain to be done is to
specify (as MacCormick tries to do in chapter 3 of his book) the presuppositions and limits of
deductive reasoning. Once we know these presuppositions and limits, we would be free to say that
those cases in which some of those presuppositions fail (or those cases that are beyond such limits) are
hard cases, where there is no difficulty at all to accept that the question of what the law is for the case
(or better: will be) can be linked to that of what the law ought to be for it. This is the reason why
MacCormick's argument, if successful, could be used to defend a positivist theory of law like Hart's.
Before examining MacCormick's argument with some detail it would pay, I believe, to pause for a
while on what precisely it is that MacCormick is claiming when he says that the Daniels decision was
justified in a deductive manner.
This is important because MacCormick's thesis is open to an interpretation that would make it trivial.
Indeed, we shall see that MacCormick himself sometimes seems to understand his argument in this
way.
For a start, consider Robert Alexy's theory of legal interpretation as set out in his A Theory ofLegal
Argumentation (1989). In it, he begins by distinguishing what he calls 'internal' from 'external'
justification:
Legal discourses are concerned with the justification of a special case of normative statements,
namely those which express legal judgments. Two aspects of justification can be distinguished:
internaljustification and externaljustification. Internal justification is concerned with the question of
whether an opinion follows logically from the premisses adduced as justifying it; The correctness of
the premisses is the subject-matter of the external justification (Alexy, 1989: 221).
For Alexy, the problem of internal justification is that of deductive reasoning: "problems associated
with internal justification have been widely discussed under the heading 'legal syllogism'" (Alexy,
1989: 220). Now the important point here is that no decision is fully justified if it has not been
externally and internally justified. For the external justification, non-deductive reasoning is typically
needed. Once the premisses have been (externally) justified (using whatever criteria is used to justify
premisses: consequential reasoning, purposive interpretation, authority reasons, etc), then it is possible
to say that the decision is fully justified if it follows in a formally valid manner from those (externally)
justified premisses.
Notice that for Alexy (unlike MacCormick) the requirement of the justification being deductive has
nothing at all to do with the fact of the case in which it occurs being clear or hard. The difference will
usually lie on the fact that the (external) justification of the premisses will normally be more
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controversial in hard cases than in clear ones; but however controversial the external justification of
the premisses is, once they have been justified, then the internal justification takes on in the same way
for one case or the other. Thus, in the context of a theory of legal argumentation, aimed at establishing
"how fully to justify a legal judgement" (Alexy, 1989: 2), deductive reasoning is to be used in every
case.
However important this distinction might be for a theory of legal argumentation, if MacCormick's
claim is understood as referring to the internal justification of legal decisions only the claim would be
either trivial or obviously false. It would be obviously false if we remember MacCormick's abundant
use of adjectives like 'solely', 'purely', 'ruthlessly' deductive when talking of the nature of the
reasoning leading to a decision in a case like Daniels. Syllogistic reasoning, in this sense, would never
come alone, since it would always require, to get started in the first place, that its premisses are
justified according to non-deductive reasoning.
But if those adjectives are dropped, and we retain simply the idea of a form of deductive reasoning
being somehow important to legal reasoning, then we would be trivialising the thesis. In any case
syllogistic reasoning can play a part. To see this imagine the mother of all hard cases, then settle
(according to your moral or legal intuitions) the controversial aspects of it and on you go! You are
now ready to solve the case with 'syllogistic reasoning playing a role'.
These are the reasons why I believe this is not a correct interpretation ofMacCormick's claim. But if
this interpretation is incorrect, then how are we to understand MacCormick's argument? To answer
this question recall Raz's distinction between the narrow and the wide sources thesis (above at 44). As
we saw, the wide sources thesis "claims that the truth or falsity of [pure and applied] legal statements
depends on social facts which can be established without resort to moral argument" (Raz, 1985: 214).
In these cases, all that is needed to solve the law is to find the applicable mle(s), and establish the
relevant facts. I believe that MacCormick's claim, as his analysis of Daniels makes clear, is precisely
that sometimes the justification of a legal decision can be purely and wholly deductive in form, and it
can be presented as a syllogism which features as major premisses only legal rules (and as minor
premisses only statements of fact): "all of the major premisses involved in the argument [in Daniels],
not all ofwhich were expressly stated, are rules of law for which contemporary authority can be cited"
(MacCormick, 1994: 29) or, as he claims just a couple of pages down the road,
It will be observed that in the above analysis of the argument each stage in the argument is a valid
hypothetical argument the premisses of which are either statements of propositions of law which at
the material time were true for legal purposes, or findings of fact which are also for legal purposes
taken to be true, or intermediate conclusions derived from such premisses (MacCormick, 1994: 32).
Thus MacCormick's argument is not one about what makes a legal justification a good and complete
one, as Alexy's was, but about the existence of some cases that can be solved in a deductive manner
using as premisses only statements of propositions of law and findings of fact. About, I believe we
could now say, the truth of the wide sources thesis.
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Actually, later in the book MacCormick seems to acknowledge that in the first sense (judicial
syllogism as internal justification) 'moments' of deductive reasoning exist even in hard cases, which
are characterised by the fact that "deduction comes in only after the interesting part of the argument,
settling a ruling in law, has been carried out" (MacCormick, 1994: 197).
In Alexy's terms, the internal justification starts off only after the external justification has taken place,
since only after the external justification (what MacCormick at 197 calls 'settling a ruling in law') the
major premisses to be used by the internal justification will be found. MacCormick's claim in chapter
2 of Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, then, amounts to saying that in some cases no external
justification is needed beyond that provided by what he calls 'the fundamental judicial
commandment': "thou shall not controvert established and binding rules of law" (MacCormick, 1994:
195). These are the cases that in jurisprudential jargon are called 'clear' cases, the cases that Hart
distinguished on the basis that in them, mles can be applied without courts being required to make
what he called "a fresh judgment" (Hart, 1994: 135): I take 'without the need for fresh judgement' to
mean here 'without premisses needing external justification (beyond MacCormick's judicial
commandment)'.
This might seem an instance of labouring the obvious, and indeed I think it is. My only justification
for it is that MacCormick himself sometimes equivocates between the trivial (deduction has a role to
play in legal justification) and the important (some cases can be decided following a strictly syllogistic
line of reasoning) claims. I will come back to this point later on in the chapter (infra at 145f), but for
the time being suffice it to compare the two following statements by MacCormick:
[Sjome people have denied that legal reasoning is ever strictly deductive. If this denial is intended in
the strictest sense, implying that legal reasoning is never, or cannot ever be, solely deductive in form,
then the denial is manifestly and demonstrably false. It is sometimes possible to show conclusively
that a given legal decision is legally justified by means ofapurely deductive argument (MacCormick,
1994: 19, my italics).
[Djeductive reasoning from mles cannot be a self-sufficient, self-supporting, mode of legal
justification. It is always encapsulated in a web of anterior and ulterior principles and values, even
though a purely pragmatic view would reveal many situations and cases in which no one thinks it
worth the trouble to go beyond the mles for practical purposes (MacCormick, 1994: xiii, my italics).
Daniels vs. Ta r b a r d
We are now ready to examine MacCormick's example of a case in which a purely syllogistic
justification of the decision is possible. His example was Daniels and Daniels vs R. White & Sons and
Tarbard (1938 4 All ER 258). Though MacCormick has made this case famous, it seems appropriate
to give a brief description of its facts: Mr Daniels bought a bottle of lemonade (R White's lemonade)
in the defendant's (i.e. Mrs Tarbard's) pub. He took the bottle home, where he and Mrs Daniels drank
from it. As a consequence, they both became ill, because (as was proven later) the lemonade was
heavily contaminated with carbolic acid. Mr and Mrs Daniels sued the owner of the pub and the
lemonade's manufacturer. While the latter was absolved from liability, the former was held liable and
ordered to pay damages to the (first) plaintiff. MacCormick's claim is that the court's decision follows
in a deductive manner from these facts plus the legal rules as they were in 1938.
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As a matter of fact (of logic, rather), however, MacCormick could not have shown that the court's
reasoning in Daniels was strictly deductive without using the relationship ofmaterial implication,
'3' is used instead of 'if in any case...then...' (1994: 29)95. But it has already been shown that legal
rales do not contain universal quantifiers, even if their language may induce one to think they do.
They do not rale 'in all cases, if...then...', but 'if in normal cases...then...'. This point, developed in the
third chapter, should not be particularly controversial against MacCormick, since the idea of legal
rales referring to 'normal', instead of 'all' cases we took from him (c/ above, 95ff). Furthermore,
MacCormick explicitly rejects in his book the move I rejected in chapter 3, made by some authors, of
explaining defeasibility on the basis of moral disagreement about the issue of whether or not the law
should (moral 'should') be applied. He thinks that in those kinds of cases what is an issue is not
whether there are moral reasons to break the law, but what the law actually is:
[A] positivistic description of the system as it operates cannot answer a particular kind of question
which may be raised internally to a legal system: the question as it might be raised for a judge in a
hard case: 'Why ought we to treat every decision in accordance with a rule valid by our criteria of
validity as being sufficiently justified? and that is a question which can be, and from time to time is,
raised [...]. For my part I should be reluctant to treat such questions as being non legal simply
because ofa definitionalfiat [...]. To treat such arguments as ideological-but-not-legal (which is what
Kelsen and, in effect, Hart do) on a priori grounds seems to me unsatisfactory (MacCormick, 1994:
63; only the fourth italics are mine).
To put it in the words used above: if rales are understood as referring to normal cases, then they
simply cannot be applied without assuming that the case is normal. It is still possible to say (with
Kelsen and Hart) that as a matter of law all cases are normal (or, what amounts to the same thing, that
legal rales are, according to the law, to be applied to all, instead of normal, cases), but this implies a
definitional fiat that begs the question: the fiat of saying that according to the law legal rales are to be
applied to all cases (or that according to the law all cases are normal), however absurd the result might
turn out to be. Only after this fiat will the decision not to apply the law because of these absurd
outcomes becomes an ideological one. MacCormick is reluctant to endorse this solution, and hence he
is committed to claim that, as a matter of law (and not as a matter of ideology or morals) legal rales
apply to normal cases (indeed, this is the view that MacCormick presently endorses: cf MacCormick,
1995).
But if MacCormick accepts that laws are to be understood as referring to normal, instead of all, cases,
then it is difficult to see how can he claim that that the decision in Daniels was strictly and solely
deductive. Lewis J held Mrs Tarbard liable 'with some regret, because it is rather hard on Mrs.
Tarbard, who is a perfectly innocent person in the matter' (cit. in MacCormick, 1994: 21). He thought
the application of the law to be inappropriate for the case. It is easy to see why: Lewis J assumed that
95This follows on from the previous note. MacCormick probably does not mean material implication in its technical sense. In
symbolic logic, (p^>q) "is true if 'not-p or q' is true. But 'not-p or q' is true in any one of the following cases: (1 )p is true and
q is true; (2) p is false and q is true; (3) p is false and q is false [.... S]o long as p is false, no matter what q is, 'p implies q' is
true; and so long as q is true, no matter what p is, '9 is implied by p' is true" (Cohen and Nagel, 1934: 127). This is because
"material implication is the name we give to the fact that one of a pair of propositions happens to be false or else the other
happens to be true" (ibid at 128). But MacCormick wants to say, I believe, that (p 3 q) means something else, to wit, that
because ofp then q. MacCormick mentions this problem, and claims that "nothing turns on that" (MacCormick, 1994: 28n). 1
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in a civil liability case it is normally the case that if the defendant is 'a perfectly innocent person in the
matter' judgement should not be passed against him or her. In other words, the 'innocence' of the
defendant is usually a relevant substantive consideration. Because in the court's understanding the
rules excluded this consideration, their application to this particular case produced some
inappropriateness: they demanded judgement to be passed against a perfectly innocent person. But this
inappropriateness was not, in Lewis J's view, important enough for the need for predictability to be
waived. In other words, he took the rules as being formal enough to exclude an important substantive
consideration (to wit, Mrs. Tarbard's innocence), that consideration not being strong enough to make
the case 'abnormal'. But this is a moral judgement and MacCormick's syllogism will not be valid
unless it is stated as a premiss. This can clearly be seen when attention is paid to MacCormick's
translation of the court's decision into logical notation:
(xvi) Ifa seller has broken a condition ofa contractwhich he was required to fulfil, the buyer is entitled
to recover damages from him equivalent to the loss directly and naturally resulting to him from
the seller's breach ofthe condition;
(xv) In file instant case, the seller has broken a condition of the contract which she was required to
fulfil;
(xvii) .".In the instant case, the buyer is entitled to recover damages from her equivalent to the loss
directly and naturally resulting to him from the seller's breach of the condition (MacCoimick,
1994:31-2)96.
This is translated as (the left column is MacCormick's, while the right one contains my translation of
MacCormick's logical notation back to English, according to his stipulations on pp. 23 and 28f, which
I will use thereafter):
(xvi) yoz (xvi) In any case, ify then z;
(xv) y (xv) In the instant case,y
(xvii) .".z. (xvii) Therefore in the instant case z
MacCormick is clearly correct in claiming that (xvii) follows from (xvi) and (xv). But the point is that
(xvi) is not a correct description of the law as it was at the time, and MacCormick elsewhere in the
book (and in other writings, most notably, 1995) agrees with this. If we correct (xvi) by introducing
the idea of 'normal cases', we would get
(xvi') In normal cases, ify, thenz;
(xv') In the instant case,y
(xvii') Therefore in the instant case, z.
And this is not a valid deductive argument: to be one it needs a further premise:
(xviii') The instant case is a normal case
MacCormick's preferred option (that legal rules establish what is 'presumptively' to be the case)
makes this problem even more noticeable. For consider:
take him to be offering an stipulation of the meaning of '3' (maybe better captured by the notion of entailment), so that it
means 'if in any case p, then (because ofp) q' (notice the important 'ifin any case').
96MacCormick's complete syllogism is considerably longer (cf. 1994: 30ff). The objection I am presenting now could,
however, be directed to any of its parts, therefore it is enough for me to quote a section of the reasoning. It is also worth
noticing that though MacCormick now believes that a judicial syllogism like Daniels's should be represented using predicate
rather than propositional logic, I have retained MacCormick's original representation of it (see MacCormick, 1994: xv;
MacCormick's change of mind was prompted by White, 1979). To individualise each step I have replaced MacCormick's
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(xvi") Ify, then presumptively z,
(xv'') In the instant case,y,
(xvii'') Therefore in the instant case, presumptively z.
(xvii") does not, of course, justify a legal decision. What could justify a legal decision is (xvii), but
(xvii) does not follow from (xvi") and (xv").
What MacCormick calls 'the pragmatics of law' (1994: xiii; 1995) would not be ofmuch use here. 'A
rale that ends with 'unless...' is still a rale', of course, but it cannot be applied unless the exceptional
circumstance is not present. The rale might be such that the 'default' position is that the exception
does not exist, but even in this case the justification would, from a logical point of view, be incomplete
(i.e. invalid) if this circumstance is not asserted. For consider,
(xvi''') In any case, ify, then z, unless the court is satisfied ofw,
(xv'") In the instant case,y;
(xvii''') Therefore in the instant case, z.
Again, (xvii'") fails to follow. For the argument to be formally valid, a premiss like the following is
needed:
(xviii'") w has not been proven.
Following Hart, we have already seen that 'vv' here stands for a moral judgement to the effect that the
inappropriateness of the application of the rale to the particular case is important enough for the
demand for predictability to be waived. As a premiss, therefore, (xviii'") is neither a rale of law nor a
statement of fact, but a moral judgement: 'in this case the result offered by the rale is not
inappropriate, or at least not to a significant extent'. In other words, even in as clear a case as Daniels
and even assuming that the court has the obligation to apply the law, no decision can be reached in a
syllogistic manner using only rales of law and statements of fact as premisses. The fact that the
absence of w need not be argued, important as it is from a pragmatic point of view (no external
justification is needed to regard it as absent) is immaterial from a logical point of view97.
In the chapter on deductive reasoning of Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory MacCormick addresses
what on the face of it seems to be a similar objection:
It would be wrong to suggest that the actual decision given by the judge in the case, ifby that is meant
the order issued by him to the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff, is logically entailed by the
premisses [...]. The judge's issuing an order is an act which he performs or does not perform, and in
so acting he either fulfils or does not fulfils his duty (1994: 30).
That and much which precedes itmay seem to be an instance of labouring the obvious. Indeed it is.
But the surprising fact is that although obvious, it has been misunderstood and misrepresented. For
example, in his Logic of Choice, Dr. Gottlieb takes the following set of statements:
'X didA'(fact)
Arabic numerals by Romans, to avoid confusion with the numeration 1 have been using. The values for the numbers are
maintained.
97<y MacCormick, 1994: 29, where MacCormick rightly points out that to the premisses stated by Lewis J a further one
should be added, one "which is so trivially obvious that its omission from the express statements of Lewis J is scarcely
surprising—namely that the transaction described in (i) above was intended by each of the parties to be a purchase by Mr. D.
From Mrs. T. And a sale by her to him". Maybe the premiss that states the normality of the instant case (or that the presumption
in favour of the solution offered by the rule according to its meaning is not defeated in the instant case) is equally trivially
obvious in many cases, but as MacCormick recognises the fact that a premiss is 'trivially obvious' does not mean that it is not
required for the formal validity of the inference.
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'All who do A are guilty ofB' (rale)
'Verdict: X is guilty ofB' (decision)
and he asserts that 'the conclusion of [that] set of statements does not follow from the two premises'
[Gottlieb, 1968: 70]. That is either total nonsense, or at best a very dim and obscure approach to the
truth (MacCormick, 1994: 34; quoting Gottlieb, 1968: 70).
It is important to notice why the argument presented here is not the same as Gottlieb's: MacCormick is
right in saying that the syllogism establishes only what the judge should do according to the law. It
does not predict what the court will do. This answer might (or might not) be enough against Gottlieb's
argument, but it will not do here. We are also trying to establish what the court has to do according to
the law. What MacCormick needs is to stipulate that the meaning of a rale determines its application if
his claim is to succeed: he needs to be able to say that, if a rule says 'all those who shed blood in the
streets will be punished with utmost severity', then all those who shed blood in the streets should be so
punished. If the rale, properly understood, says 'all those who, in normal cases, shed blood on the
streets will be punished' (or: 'presumptively, those who shed blood on the streets will be punished')
then no deductive justification of a particular decision under that rale is possible without a premise
establishing that the case is normal (or that there are no reasons defeating the presumption in the
concrete case). In other words, MacCormick needs in chapter 2 the definitional fiat he rejects in
chapter 3.
Now, it could be argued that I have missed the point, that the fact that the rule should be applied to the
particular case at hand is one of the presuppositions (and it thus constitutes a limit) of deductive
justification. In Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, MacCormick says that one of the presuppositions
of legal reasoning is that
every judge has in virtue of his office a duty to apply each and every one of those rules which are
'rales of law' whenever it is relevant and applicable to any case brought before him. And that
formulation reveals a second presupposition, without which the term 'duty' would lack identifiable
reference: that it is possible for the judge to identify all those rales which are 'rales of law'
(MacCormick, 1994: 54).
Hence, the counter-objection would continue, if it is doubted whether the rule should be applied to this
particular case, then we are going beyond one of the limits of deductive reasoning, while
MacCormick's thesis was meant for those cases in which those presuppositions are satisfied. But this
cannot be an answer to my objection to MacCormick's claim, since I am assuming that the court has to
apply the law; what I am contesting is that in finding what the law is, the court will necessarily have to
assume that the case is 'normal' if rules like those in Daniels are to be applied as they were in that
case. This, again, could be used to defend MacCormick's position only if one were to adopt the
solution that MacCormick is reluctant to adopt, i.e. if one were to claim that the rule applies to all
cases as a matter of law, however (morally) justified might the court be in not applying it to the
particular case (cf. MacCormick, 1994: 63, quoted above). Only given that assumption MacCormick
could say that the process of finding a solution is (or can in some cases be) deductive: given the
relevant rales as they were in 1938, and the facts of Daniels as they were proven in court, the
conclusion could be reached in a deductive manner. By the same token, however, he would have to
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say that given Pufendorf s report of the Bolognese law (and the facts as he told them), we could reach
the conclusion that the barber had to be punished in the same deductive manner. What we would add
in the latter case would be an ideological or moral argument to the effect that punishing the barber is
too absurd for the court to do it. MacCormick's argument cannot succeed without this a priori
distinction between the legal and the ideological, a distinction that he himself (and rightly, in my view)
thinks is unjustified.
Since I have argued against this distinction in the last chapter (and since MacCormick himself rejects
it), there is no need to repeat those arguments here. What interests me here is to point out the
incompatibility of MacCormick's legal theory with his account of legal reasoning98. We know that
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory was meant to be a Hartian explanation of legal reasoning. Hence,
it had to claim that some cases were in a hartian sense clear, that is, their outcome could be determined
according to the rules alone (that is the gist of Hart's criticism of rule-scepticism). If those cases are
completely determined by the rules, it must be possible to reconstruct the justification of a solution to
them according to the deductive model. That is to say: if it is the case that
the life of the law consist to a very large extent in the guidance both of officials and private
individuals by determinate mles which, unlike the applications of variable standards, do not require
from them a fresh judgement from case to case (Hart, 1994: 135)
then in those cases the court's decision can be represented in a syllogistic way, in which the only
presupposition needed (along with statements of fact and of legal rules) is that the law ought to be
applied. MacCormick's argument on deductive reasoning is, thus, a formalisation of a court's decision
in those cases, when no 'fresh judgement' is called for.
It seems therefore safe to think that MacCormick's argument in Chapter 2 of Legal Reasoning and
Legal Theory is offered as an analysis of clear cases according to Hart. But in the following chapters,
in which he undertook to build up a theory of legal reasoning, he was driven to positions which are
incompatible with the claims of the (legal) theory, and he ends up with something quite similar to the
argument I have been developing here.
Thus, when discussing the issue of clear and hard cases, he starts by noticing that "in truth there is no
clear dividing line between clear cases and hard cases" (MacCormick, 1994: 197). There is a spectrum
of cases, ranging from the hardest to the clearest, and across that spectrum "it could never be judged
more than vaguely at what point" interpretive doubts could become significant enough for the court to
have discretion. Now instead of offering (like Hart with his open texture thesis in its first
interpretation) a non-moral test to distinguish a clear from a hard case, he finds the explanation of this
uncertainty at the divide between clear/hard cases in "differences in the dominant style of different
periods in the history of legal systems" (1994: 198). Later on we are told that "when we talk of
differences between judicial styles [...] what we are talking about is or includes the degree of readiness
981 am referring here to MacCormick's legal theory as it can be found in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. His position is
nowadays different "[I] no longer accept nearly as much of his [i.e. Hart's] theses about law as I did in 1978" (1994: xv). My
own comments about Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory are not to be seen as a criticism ofMacCormick's legal theory, since
144
LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY REVISITED
which a judge manifest to permit that presumption [i.e. the presumption that 'obvious meaning should
be preferred'] to be overridden" (1994: 207).
I have no quarrel with this: in fact, this is the argument I have been trying to convey in the previous
chapters. How pressing the absurdity of the result produced by the application of the rule to the
particular case should be for the judge to permit the presumption in favour of the obvious meaning of
the words to be overridden is not something the rule can settle; it is a moral problem, generated by the
conflicting demands of predictability and appropriateness; a case cannot be decided before deciding
whether it will be treated as a 'normal' case (and given—and excluding—this decision a deductive
justification could be reconstructed) or as one in which substantive considerations (of the kind the rule
was there to pre-empt) show that the case is abnormal, that is, is one in which the presumption must be
overridden.
To emphasise: if what makes a clear case clear rather than hard (and vice-versa) is a judgment about
the right balance between two moral values (i.e. a moral judgment), then at least some (I would say:
all, but all I need for the argument to stand is to say 'some') hard cases are hard because they ought to
be so.
The only reason, I submit, why MacCormick thinks he can claim both that the decision in clear cases
can be justified in a syllogistic manner (using as premisses only statements of fact and of legal rules)
and that mles apply only to normal cases (or that they establish only what is to be 'presumptively' the
case) is that he (as we already saw) equivocates between the two different claims identified above
concerning what we could call the 'deductive element' in legal reasoning.
MacCormick's argument was originally presented against those who held the thesis that "legal
reasoning is [n]ever strictly deductive" (1994: 19). We are told that if this denial "is intended in the
strictest sense, implying that legal reasoning is never, or cannot ever be, solely deductive in form, then
the denial is manifestly and demonstrably false. It is sometimes possible to show conclusively that a
given decision is legally justified by means of a purely deductive argument" (1994: 19). Later in the
book, however, chapter 2 is supposed to have been directed against "those who deny that deductive
logic is relevant to the justification of legal decisions" (1994: 45), and in the new foreword to the 1994
paperback edition the argument has definitely changed: now it is presented against "recurrent denials
by learned persons that the law allows scope for deductive reasoning, or even logic at all" (1994: ix).
In the same piece MacCormick seems to reject his own claim that 'it is sometimes possible to show
conclusively that a given decision is legally justified by means of a purely deductive argument' when
he now claims that "deductive reasoning from mles cannot be a self-sufficient, self-supporting, mode
of legal justification. It is always encapsulated in a web of anterior and ulterior reasoning from
principles and values [...]" (1994: xiii; all the italics in this paragraph are mine).
(I would claim) his later work can accommodate most of the claims made here, but about the tension between the perspectives
of legal theory and legal reasoning, a tension that permeates his argument as originally presented.
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In my opinion, the quotations from the new foreword reflect MacCormick's present view of the
'centrality of deductive reasoning for legal reasoning' and they have to be understood in the light of
Alexy's distinction between external and internal justification. So understood, the claim refers to the
possibility of translating a given decision in syllogistic terms as being usually the clearest and safest
way to check whether or not the decision was fully justified, whether or not issues requiring external
justification had arisen (and if they had, whether or not they were settled according to the requirements
of the external justification).
But in this sense chapter 2 does not answer the challenge to legal positivism it was designed to answer.
If it is to provide an answer, it has to be taken as meaning that sometimes it is possible for legal
decisions to be fully justified through a syllogistic chain of reasoning that uses only statements of fact
and of legal rales as premisses. Only in this sense the thesis would imply, if correct, the rejection of the
argument presented up to now. Only in this sense it could help Hart to show that in some cases no
fresh judgement is needed for courts and officials to apply the rules. But for this argument to work, an
a priori distinction has to be made between the legal and the ideological. Since MacCormick is
unwilling to make this ad hoc distinction, the argument fails as a defence of a Hartian explanation of
legal reasoning, however successful it might be for other reasons.
As indeed I think it is. None of the previous remarks must be taken as negating the importance of
deductive reasoning when understood in Alexy's sense, i.e. as internal justification. In fact,
MacCormick's views on the subject are useful when a different anti-deductive claim is made, this time
from people working in the field of law and Artificial Intelligence. An example of these claims is Jaap
Hage's Reasoning with Rules.
Hage starts off with the problem of defeasibility. Then he points out that this is a feature of legal
reasoning that traditional logic has troubles accommodating, since in traditional logic the addition of
new premisses does not affect the truth of the conclusion:
If a rule seems applicable but its conclusion is nevertheless false, we can add one or more conditions
to the rale that are not satisfied in the case at hand. Then it turns out that the rale was not applicable
after all, and the falsity of the conclusion can be accounted for [...].
The flaw in this argument that the rule must be different from what it seemed at first sight, is that the
argument presupposes that rule application has the form ofmodus ponens (or some other deductively
valid form). Only on this presupposition does the falsity of the conclusion guarantee the falsity of at
least one ofthe premises.
The presupposition is not necessary, however. Either we adopt modus ponens as the form of rale
application, in which case we must be prepared to adapt the formulation ofrales if there turn out to be
exceptions. Or we stick to the formulation ofrales as they seem to be at first sight, and give up modus
ponens as the logical form of rale application (Hage, 1997: 5).
It is in this context that MacCormick's argument can be useful, if we understand his claim as being
about a theory of legal argumentation rather than one of legal reasoning. That deductive reasoning
'has a role to play' in legal reasoning, means that a decision can be reached using modus ponens once
the premisses have been justified.
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Hage is right in claiming that this implies a modification of the premisses. But why should it not be the
case that 'rales are different from what [they] seemed at first sight'?: that is, after all, what legal
interpretation is all about. Nobody would take the future indicative at its face value in a command like
'thou shalt not kill'. Given that rales do not exist in an autonomous universe (like rales of football),
this is not at all surprising. This is the crucial point for Hage's argument to stand, since if the premisses
can be modified (i.e. if the rales do not have to be taken at face-value), then he would have no
argument against modus ponens.
IfMacCormick's claim is understood in this weaker sense, then to accept his contention that deduction
'plays a role' in legal reasoning does not commit us to believe that modus ponens is 'the logical form
of rale application'. It rather is one form of legal justification, one that in particular assumes the
premisses to be used have been properly justified according to other modes of reasoning.
Legal Reasoning, Rules and Sources
The reasons for considering in some detail MacCormick's argument were, as stated above, not only
concerned with the intrinsic value of it; it also helps us illustrate the contemporary predicament of
legal theory: depending upon the perspective adopted at the beginning, one can reach, following
natural and plausible steps, incompatible conclusions. When MacCormick adopted the perspective of
legal theory, that is, the perspective of an enterprise directed to understanding what law is, when a
legal system exists and the like, he was driven to the Hartian view that sometimes rales are there, so to
speak, and can sometimes be 'straightforwardly' applied.
When he adopted the perspective of legal reasoning, that is to say, one that tries to understand how the
law is applied (to my knowledge, his book is still one of the few, not to say the only one, self-
avowedly positivist work in which the discussion of decisions given in actual cases plays a crucial
methodological role) he could not live up to that: the conclusions for legal reasoning that would follow
from the 'legal theory' thesis are just too implausible, too bizarre.
I want to claim that this is not a problem ofMacCormick's alone. This problem appears in one way or
another in the work ofmany of the most sophisticated authors writing today on legal theory. I want to
end this chapter by showing that this is the case concerning two other important philosophers who
have tried to develop a theory of legal reasoning. In the next section we shall discuss Frederick
Schauer's Playing by the Rules, while in the last I propose to tackle some of Joseph Raz's recent work.
Rules as entrenched generalisations
Schauer's main thesis throughout Playing by the Rules is that rales are 'entrenched generalisations'.
Generalisations, that is to say, because a rale singles out some states of affairs (i.e. those that match the
operative facts) on the basis that the purpose of the rale (what Schauer calls the 'underlying
justification' of the rale) will be served if the rale's consequence is applied to them. The generalisation
is entrenched, and the standard a rale, according to Schauer, if it "controls] the decision even in those
cases in which that generalization failed to serve its underlying justification" (Schauer, 1991: 49). If
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we ask why he thinks that rules are entrenched generalisations, we are told at the outset that this
entrenchment is what characterises a rule: rules "furnish reasons for action simply by virtue of then-
existence qua rules, and thus generate normative pressure even in those cases in which the
justifications (rationales) underlying the rules indicate the contrary result" (1990: 5). Rules cannot be
rules, thus, without being "necessarily sticky, resisting current efforts to mould them to the needs of the
instant" (1991: 82).
Thus, the watermark of a rale-based decision-making process is that it can be sub-optimal, since if the
standards to be applied are rules they must have some normative force that is not exhausted by their
underlying justification. Some cases therefore are to be solved by application of the rale even if they
would not be so solved were we to follow the rale's underlying justification rather than the rule itself.
How do rules achieve this sub-optimality? They do so, Schauer tells us (at 100), by preventing the
decision-maker from considering the full range of otherwise relevant considerations. It follows from
this that if the decision-maker can, when she thinks that the application of the rule to the case produces
unfair results, allow into the decision-making process considerations the rule was supposed to pre¬
empt no sub-optimality is possible, and the standard would turn out not to be, after all, a rale. If an
implicit exception to rule r is introduced every time the decision-maker comes across a case covered
by r but not by its substantive justification, then the normative force of the rule would be exhausted by
the reasons for it. No space for sub-optimality would be found and r, despite appearances, would not
be a rale (cf. the discussion on rule-utilitarianism, above at 89).
This conceptualisation of rales seems to imply, or so Schauer seems to think (at least sometimes, we
shall see), a definite answer to the problem of defeasibility: he accepts Hart's argument that 'a rale that
ends with 'unless...' is still a rale' (cf. Schauer, 1990: 115), but he sees that without the distinction
between implicit and explicit exceptions this answer misses the point. Thus, he argues,
the issue is not whether rales may have exceptions and still be rales, for of course they may. It is
whether rales may be subjected to exceptions added at the moment of application in light of the full
range of otherwise applicable factors and still be rules, and the answer to that question is 'no' (1990:
116).
Since to say that a rule is defeasible is to say that it can be defeated by the introduction of the kind of
exceptions that Schauer has just ruled out, what Schauer is effectively saying is that there is something
in the concept of 'rale' that makes them indefeasible. This is, as we have seen, the necessary
consequence of a conceptualisation of rules as exclusionary reasons: the problem of appropriateness
does not present itself, for the considerations that would prompt it are excluded from the outset.
This is Schauer-the-philosopher-of-rules. Schauer-the-philosopher-of-practical-reasoning, though, has
a rather different story to tell (I shall call them 'strong' Schauer and 'weak' Schauer, respectively).
Weak Schauer does not take long to introduce important qualifications to Strong Schauer's
conclusions: the important point for him is not (the strong claim) that rules cannot have exceptions
introduced at the moment of application and still be rules, but rather (the much weaker claim) that they
cannot be 'continuously malleable':
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this resistance [i.e., of a rule to a recalcitrant experience")') | need not be absolute. Still, if there is no
resistance, then no instances will occur in which rule-generated results differ from justification-
generated ones. For mle-based decision-making to be other than a different name for particularistic
decision-making, the mles employed in the former must pre-exist any particular application of them,
and must supply some resistance on that application (1990: 84n).
According to this last quotation, it seems clear that the answer to the question of 'whether mles can
have exceptions introduced at the moment of application in light of the full range of otherwise
applicable factors and still be mles', that for Strong Schauer was a resounding 'no', has to be, for
Weak Schauer, a cautious 'yes, but not concerning every recalcitrant experience'.
Weak Schauer also sees, however, that a characterisation of mles as exclusionary reasons distorts the
decision-maker's practical reasoning in many situations (cf. 1990: 90f). This is his argument for
rejecting Raz's claim that in cases of implicit exceptions the decision-maker can consider them only if
they are beyond the scope of the mle, i.e., only if they were not excluded in the first place. Schauer's
consideration of legal (or, in general, practical) reasoning according to mles leads him to accept that
mles are not as entrenched as they appeared to be.
In a way, the core of the book is a running commentary on the way in which mles cannot be
exclusionary, though they have to have some level of formality to be mles. Sometimes he seems to
reject (14), i.e. the idea that the meaning of a mle determines its application, even though he explicitly
collapses a mle with its formulation. He distinguishes applicability from validity, the latter being a
necessary though nor sufficient condition for applicability: "validity is of course not a sufficient
condition for applicability, for many perfectly valid laws do not apply to me" (1990: 120n). He argues,
following Hart, that what is left is the internalisation of the mle. An agent has internalised a mle when
she "treats a mle's existence as relevant to the question ofwhat to do" (1990: 121). Furthermore,
internalizing a mle qua mle supposes that it is the mle's status as a mle that is internalized, rather than
the mle's underlying justifications, and thus internalization of a mle is meaningful only if the reasons
for action produced by the fact of internalization persists even when the agent disagrees with the
content ofthe mle (1990: 122).
It is here that the question of whether (14) is true reappears: during my discussion of it I always
assumed that the decision-maker had internalised MacCormick's 'fundamental judicial
commandment': "thou shalt not controvert established and binding mles of law" (1994: 195). That
was never used as an argument against (14); it was assumed all along that courts recognised valid law
as binding and as giving rise to reasons for them to decide. The argument above was that after the
agent has internalised the mles, there is something else that has to be settled before any application of
the mle is possible. The question, then, is not "why should (or does) an agent take the existence of a
mle as a reason for action?" (Schauer, 1990: 122) but rather 'given that an agent recognises that the
existence of the mle is a reason for action, how should she understand that reason?'.
99Schauer calls 'recalcitrant experience' the case of a particular that, though included in a generalisation, should not be
included according to the generalisation's justification (Schauer, 1991: 39f). Thus, the justification for, e.g. the generalisation
contained in the Bolognese statute was (let us assume) that those who shed blood in the streets usually do so in the course of
violent behaviour. The purpose of the statute was to forbid violent behaviour in the streets. A 'recalcitrant experience' is the
barber's case, which is covered by the generalisation though not by the generalisation's justification.
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Schauer believes that grasping the meaning of an internalised rule is a sufficient condition for applying
it. Therefore, when he is confronted with the issue of defeasibility (i.e. in most of the book) he has two
answers: sometimes he argues that if a mle is a rule, exceptions to it cannot be introduced at the
moment of application; sometimes he says that they can indeed, provided that that does not happen
concerning every recalcitrant experience. Eventually, Weak and Strong Schauer try to reach a
compromise to speak with one voice, so they claim that implicit exceptions can be introduced only in
extreme cases, only when the application of the rule is "egregiously at odds" (1990: 205) with its
underlying justification, when the reasons for not applying the rule are "particularly strong" (1990:
204).
Now, why should that pressure be 'particularly strong'? Why should the rule-based solution be
'egregiously' inappropriate? Schauer's only answer for this is the need to preserve a distinction
between a rule-based and a particularist decision-making procedure: if in every case in which the
application of the rule is deemed to be inappropriate an exception can be introduced, then the mle
provides no guidance. But notice that from this obvious fact it does not follow that the pressure has to
be 'particularly' strong; all that follows is, as Schauer himself recognises elsewhere, that the mle
cannot be "inapplicable in every case" in which it is inappropriate (117; my italics), that it has to have
"some degree of resistance" (118: my italics). In other words, all that is needed is that the mle should
control the decision in some cases in which the solution it provides is not the most appropriate. Even if
the resistance of the mle is very weak, that does not mean that the mle offers no resistance. Even in
such a case we are likely to find some cases in which the result indicated by the mle is inappropriate,
though so slightly inappropriate that even a mle with very weak resistance would justify the decision¬
maker in disregarding that fact.
Schauer's demand that the inappropriateness of the mle for the particular case should be particularly
strong is strange, since he distinguished, in his discussion of Raz's exclusionary reasons, "the idea of
exclusion and the weight of the exclusionary force" (1991: 91).
Once these two ideas are distinguished there is no warrant to claim that the inappropriateness has to be
particularly strong: why cannot the 'weight of the exclusionary force' of different mles be different?
Though the internalisation of a mle consists in the internalisation of its status as a mle, the weight of
the exclusionary force that is attached to it is determined by reasons other than the mere existence of
the mle (in other words: how much exclusionary weight a given mle has is something that is said
about the mle, not by the mle).
Notice how Schauer's distinction between 'the idea of exclusion' and the 'weight of the exclusionary
force' undermines his critique of Fuller, based as it was on the idea that the meaning of a mle
determines its application, i.e. (14). The point here is that once the distinction between the idea of
exclusion and the weight of exclusionary force is introduced (14) must be abandoned. From the fact
that there are core meanings ofmles it does not follow that there are clear cases under the mle. Having
accepted this distinction, a clear case is one in which two (not one) conditions are met: (i) the facts of
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the case clearly fit the relevant rule's operative facts, and (ii) the exclusionary weight attached to the
applicable rule is such that the substantive considerations that could lead the court to a solution other
than the one offered by the rule are pre-empted.
To recapitulate: as with MacCormick's, Schauer's argument is subject to the tension between legal
reasoning and legal theory that is the subject of this chapter. When he looks at the law (at the rules)
from the point of view of a theorist trying to explain how is it the case that sometimes courts and
officials do what they know is not the best thing to do Strong Schauer is driven to endorse an
exclusionary-like account of legal reasons. When he is trying to explain how courts and officials can
be justified in so deciding, Weak Schauer has to accept that rules are not exclusionary after all, that
they can be overridden by the substantive considerations they were supposed to have pre-empted in
the first place. The Schauers try to solve this problem by demanding that in this latter case the
inappropriateness has to be "egregious" or "particularly strong", but we have seen that this is an ad
hoc move without warrant at all.
A Note on Raz on Legal Reasoning
I want to finish this chapter with a discussion of Joseph Raz's thoughts on legal reasoning, in which
we find the same tension we found in Schauer's and MacCormick's work between a theory of law and
a theory of legal reasoning. This will have the additional advantage of providing us with an
opportunity to go back to the beginning, i.e. to the sources thesis, though this time from the point of
view of legal reasoning: what, if any, are the consequences of the sources thesis for legal reasoning?
The question is important since, contrary to what I have been arguing all along, Raz believes that
"commitment to the sources thesis does not commit one to formalism or to the autonomy of legal
reasoning" (Raz, 1993: 3 1 7)100.
Part of the reason why Raz believes that what he calls 'formalism' is not implied by the sources thesis
is his belief that under the sources thesis courts can have discretion because of the existence of
regulatory gaps. He seems to believe that there can be (regulative) hard cases in which there is no law
and as a consequence of that the court has discretion or—to put it in his words—that it is not the case
that "the resources of the law are sufficient to provide the resources necessary for the courts both to
obey the law and to follow the formalist doctrine" (Raz, 1993: 314). I argued above (at 52ff) against
this: I defended the view that there might indeed be states of affairs that do not figure in the operative
facts of any rule, but that it does not follow from this that courts have discretion, if the sources thesis is
true. I claimed that the latter proposition does follow only if courts can distinguish the 'unregulated'
case of the orange juice-drinker from the equally 'unregulated' case of the first theft of electricity.
Neither the theft of electricity nor the drinking of orange juice are regulated by the law, but from this it
does not follow that the court will have discretion either to convict or to acquit the drinker if
prosecuted. The distinction between 'apparently' and 'really' unregulated cases can only be based
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upon non source-based considerations, like the purpose of the law and the like. In other words, it has
to be based on the very same kind of considerations the sources-thesis is supposed to exclude. It
follows that this distinction can be made only if the sources thesis fails. I argued that this point is given
further support by the fact that in autonomous institutions (e.g. games), which strictly comply with the
sources thesis, this distinction is not made (remember the case of the Rumanian team, mentioned
above at 60).
But let us disregard this argument. In "The Autonomy of Legal Reasoning" Raz offers two different
reasons why legal reasoning is not autonomous from moral reasoning: the first has to do with the fact
that, "if our sole concern is to work out what ought to be done in order to obey the intentions, purposes
or goals of the law-makers, we will often find ourselves faced with conflicting directives" (Raz, 1993:
315). In this case, a choice is necessary, and the choice cannot be guided by source-based
considerations. It follows that they have to be moral considerationslOl. But this in turn is not
compatible with the thrust of the authority-based argument for the sources thesis. Recall that the
argument was that if the authoritative directives claim legitimate authority, it follows that they can
have authority. If they can have authority, it follows that they must posses the non-moral conditions
for having authority, one of which was that the subjects must be capable of establishing the directives'
"existence and content in ways which do not depend on raising the vary same issues which the
authority is there to settle" (Raz, 1985: 203). But now Raz seems to be claiming that when applying
source-based material our concern is not to apply the directives thus recognised, but to decide 'what
ought to be done in order to obey the intentions, purposes, or goals of the law-makers'. Raz seems to
be claiming that our sole concern should be that of second-guessing the authority, going beyond the
meaning of the directive to check whether or not that meaning is a correct reflection of the authority's
'intentions, goals and purposes'. But we should not second-guess the authority, if the sources thesis is
truel02.
Let me pause for a while on the meaning of the 'should' that appeared in the last sentence. Since we
are considering whether or not legal reasoning is autonomous from moral reasoning, it seems
appropriate here to deviate from the stipulation offered above (at 46) and understand this 'should' in
its moral sense. Last paragraph's last sentence, so understood, assumes that the authority is legitimate.
lOORaz here means by 'formalism' the thesis that "the art of legislation, and more generally law-making, is that of moral
reasoning. But legal reasoning is reasoning about the law as it is. As such it is free from any infection by moral reasoning. One
can reason morally about legal reasoning but not in it, not as part of it" (Raz, 1993: 314).
101 Raz claims that non source-based considerations cannot but be moral considerations, "for there is no other justification for
the use of an autonomous body of considerations by the courts" (Raz, 1993: 318). Therefore the question of the autonomy of
legal reasoning can only be the question of its autonomy from moral reasoning. Interestingly enough, the distinction between
the narrow and the wide versions of the sources thesis is not mentioned in this article.
102Raz could claim here that I missed the point, which is the fact that the law displays "plurality of conflicting values [...] due
to the fact that [it] is a product ofhuman activity" (Raz, 1993: 315n). But consider a case like Fuller's, in which the application
of (2) {cf. above at 60) was at issue. Here it might well be the case that there is a 'plurality of conflicting values' (select the pair
of your choice: predictability against appropriateness, keeping railway stations clean against fairness, or whatever), but the fact
is, the source-based material does offer a solution: fine the first man and acquit the second. The problem created by the
'plurality of conflicting values' will only be seen by the court if the court does precisely what it is not supposed to do, i.e. if it
'raises the very same issues which the authority is there to settle' (cf. Raz, 1985: 203). No conflict is evident if the court follows
the law as identified according to the sources thesis.
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Needless to say, in many situations this will not be the case. Sometimes the authority will be a defacto
authority and courts will have no reason at all to follow its directives. But this is immaterial to the
discussion of the autonomy of legal reasoning, since, from Raz's point of view, this is a moral
question ('how, all things considered, should the courts decide the case?'), which is different from the
legal question ('how, according to law, should cases be decided?'). The fact that courts sometimes
have the moral duty to disregard authoritative directives does not show anything about legal reasoning,
since that is a question about whether or not the law ought to be applied, while legal reasoning deals
with the question of what is the law for the case (Raz, 1993: 312). If this is the only way in which
moral reasoning and legal reasoning are connected, the latter could still be autonomous from the
former.
But Raz wants to deny this, since he wants to claim that "legal reasoning is an instance of moral
reasoning". Therefore he has to show why legal reasoning is moral reasoning, even when the question
of whether or not the law should (morally) be applied is not taken into account. To do this he
distinguishes between 'reasoning about the law' and 'reasoning according to law'. The first (i.e.
'reasoning about the law') "is governed by the sources thesis" (Raz, 1993: 316), hence if we restrict
our view to it an autonomous form of legal reasoning will appear. But we should not leave the second
aspect of legal reasoning, i.e. 'reasoning according to law' aside, and once we pay attention to it, Raz
tells us, we shall realise that it is "quite commonly straightforward moral reasoning" (Raz, 1993: 317).
That reasoning according to law is different from reasoning about the law is shown by that fact that
The law itself quite commonly directs the courts to apply extralegal considerations. Italian law may
direct the courts to apply European community law, or international law, or Chinese law to a case
[...]. In all these cases legal reasoning, understood to mean reasoning according to law, involves much
more than merely establishing the law (Raz, 1993: 317).
This might be so, but that does not show that legal reasoning is a form ofmoral reasoning. The most it
could show is that Italian legal reasoning is a form of European legal reasoning (not that this makes
any sense). So let us consider whether legal references to morality rather than to Chinese law would
fare better for Raz. Would the fact that here and there a legal system may contain references to
morality show that legal reasoning is a form ofmoral reasoning?
I hope the answer to this question is evident: insofar as particular rules make references to morality,
then 'reasoning according to law' is more than 'reasoning about the law'. But this argument is not
enough to prove that 'legal reasoning is an instance of moral reasoning' any more that the fact that
sometimes engineers should consider aesthetic considerations makes engineering-reasoning an
instance of aesthetic reasoning.
Along with the authors considered in the first half of this chapter, Raz does not want to draw the
implications of his legal theory for legal reasoning. He tries to show that the sources thesis does not
commit one to the thesis of the autonomy of legal reasoning, and to say so he has to make space for
something to be left after the existence and content of the source-based material has been established.
In the end, he can only come up with the small space provided by the fact that sometimes the law
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instructs courts to apply extralegal considerations and he offers this as a ground for the grand thesis
that legal reasoning is moral reasoning. My argument all along has been that this latter claim is indeed
true, and because this is the case anything like the sources thesis cannot but be false.
To make this point clearer, let me consider a more recent effort by Raz to show that the sources thesis
does not commit one to what (in 1993) he called 'formalism'. In "On the Nature of Law" (1996) he
tried to defend his legal positivism against the charge that it misrepresents legal reasoning. The
'standard objection', he says, to it when its implications for legal reasoning are drawn, is that
would we not expect two clearly separate stages in legal reasoning: an interpretive-factual stage and a
(purely) moral one? First one would establish what authoritatively laid down law says on the issue at
hand, and then either it does not provide a determinate disposition of the issue, or if one wants to
determine whether the way it disposes of the issue is morally acceptable, one would move to the
second purely moral stage in the argument. In fact we do not find that legal reasoning divides in that
way. Legal reasoning displays a continuity through all its stages (Raz, 1996: 19)103.
To show how this objection actually reinforces rather than refutes his views on the nature of law, Raz
invites us to consider interpretation in the arts. A good interpretation of a play or of a piano sonata is,
he tells us, an interpretation that combines tradition with innovation in the right way, and because of
this reason there cannot be a general theory of interpretation: "innovation defies generalisation. A
theory of originality, in the sense we are considering, is self-defeating" (Raz, 1996: 20). What the
objection points to, says Raz, is that a theory of legal reasoning would be required to explain how best
to combine "the two aspects of legal reasoning. On the one hand legal reasoning aims to establish the
content of authoritative standards, on the other hand, it aims to supplement them, and often to modify
them, in the light of moral considerations" (Raz, 1996: 19). But how this combination should be
achieved is not something that any theory can answer, hence the fact that positivism cannot offer a
such a 'self-defeating' theory does not show it to be a defective theory of law.
Let us go along with Raz's thesis that there cannot be a theory of interpretation because 'tradition' and
'originality' defy generalisation. Before he can use this argument to support legal positivism, however,
he has to show why 'originality' is important in legal reasoning. Instead of explaining this, however,
he shows how this is the case when what is being interpreted is a piano sonata or a play and then
immediately (and rather surprisingly) he claims "hence its [i.e. interpretation's] importance in law"
(Raz, 1996: 20). I do not want to express here an opinion on the subject of the similarities and
differences between artistic and legal interpretation, but it cannot go unnoticed that, from Raz's point
of view there is a cmcial difference: law has authority. That the law has authority implies, we must
remember, for Raz that
courts will not entertain moral argument about the desirability of regarding a certain fact (e.g. a
previous enactment) as a reason for a certain action but will once the existence of the relevant fact has
been established through morally-neutral argument hold it to be a reason which they are bound to
apply (Raz, 1980: 214).
103Raz incidentally airs some doubts as to what he sees as the tacit assumption of this objection: "I believe that this point is
overstated, and that legal reasoning is not all of a kind" (at 19). The objection, however, does not need to assume that 'legal
reasoning is all of a kind'. Indeed, ifmy conclusions above (at 105) were correct it appears that insofar as he defends the wide
sources thesis it is Raz, and not the objector, who would be committed to the doubtful thesis that legal reasoning is all of a kind.
But I will not pursue this issue.
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And this in turn must mean, if anything, that courts are not supposed to 'combine interpretation with
tradition' when they are applying the law, they are simply supposed to identify the existence and
content of the directives and then apply them (except, of course, if the law explicitly grants them
powers to innovate. But, as was argued above, the theoretical consequences of this point cannot be too
grand). In short, Raz's claim that legal reasoning has two dimensions can help him only if he begs the
whole issue, which is precisely that the sources thesis does not allow for legal reasoning to display
those two dimensions.
Indeed, why should legal reasoning be interpretive? Raz answers:
The explanation lies in the authoritative nature of law: When trying to establish the legal status of an
action, we need to ascertain whether any of the authoritatively binding rules and doctrines bear on it
and if so how. That means establishing what has been done by the authorities, what decisions they
have taken and what they mean" (Raz, 1996: 19).
But, unless Raz wants to claim that ascertaining the meaning of an authoritative directive (or its
existence as such) is impossible without considering the moral reasons it purports to adjudicate (in
which case that authoritative directive would paradoxically lack 'authority-capacity'), the mere fact
that legal reasoning is about identifying the existence and ascertaining the content of authoritative
directives does not imply that legal reasoning must have two aspects (compare in this regard the
situation of a football referee). If we remember the importance Raz placed on the non-moral
conditions for authority capacity (cf above, at Iff) I suppose we could be tempted to say that precisely
because legal reasoning is about what authoritative directives there are and what they mean it cannot
be moral reasoning.
Towards the end of the article we are reminded that
the prominence of interpretive reasoning in legal reasoning results from the fact that in law the two
aspects of legal reasoning, that is establishing the content of authoritatively endorsed legal standards
and establishing the (other) moral considerations which bear on the issue, are inextricable interwoven
(Raz, 1996:22).
But were not these 'other' considerations pre-empted by the authoritatively laid down directives? Had
we not been told before (in Practical Reason and Norms) that from the legal point of view legal rules
are standards "all of which the primary organs [i.e. courts] are bound to act on to the exclusion of all
other conflicting reasons" (Raz, 1992: 143, my italics)?104
104Raz has recently touched upon this point again, in a reply to an argument by Gerald Postema (Postema, 1996): "1 reject any
thesis of the autonomy of legal reasoning, at least if that includes anything more than reasoning to the conclusion that the
content of the law is such-and-such" (Raz, 1998: 4, Raz's italics). He then goes on to say that "no such reasoning can by itself
support any judicial decision in common-law countries" since there courts can resort to a number of "devices to ensure that the
law as applied to the case is not unjust" (at 4). But, then again, this hardly suffices to ground the grand claim that, as a matter of
conceptual truth, legal reasoning is moral reasoning.
My central argument throughout this chapter is not that ofwhether or not Raz does believe in the autonomy of legal reasoning.
In this 1 would readily accept Raz's views, since he obviously has the final say upon what he does or does not, as a matter of
fact, believe. I have been claiming that in Raz's writings on legal theory one finds him supporting some (rather strong) form of
autonomy for legal reasoning: "an institutionalized system consists of a set of rules some of which institute primary organs and
all of which the primary organs are bound to act on to the exclusion of all other conflicting reasons" (Raz, 1992: 143, my
italics), something he denies when he is writing about legal reasoning: "[no reasoning to the conclusion that the law at one time
or another has this or that content] can by itself support any judicial decision in common-law countries" (Raz, 1998: 4, my
italics). This tension, by no means peculiar to Raz, has been the subject of this chapter.
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If the sources thesis is correct, legal reasoning cannot display these two aspects, because legal rules
would pre-empt all the considerations that would constitute the second aspect. It can, of course
(remember once again the stipulation above, at 46) be the case that once the content and existence of
those directives has been established the different question of whether or not they ought (morally) to
be applied can be entertained, but this could not be legal reasoning: it would be moral reasoning
simpliciter. And here we go back to the objection Raz tried to answer. He thought that he could answer
the objection simply by pointing out that no theory can solve the problem of how best to combine
tradition and innovation. But if I am correct, he has to explain why does legal reasoning displays those
two aspects to begin with.
*
We all know that judges sometimes decide cases in ways they feel are not the morally most adequate;
Lewis J held 'with some regret' that Mrs Tarbard was liable in Daniels. If we come across this fact in
middle of the process of presenting (or building up) a legal theory, that is, in the middle of an enquiry
that started, like The Concept ofLaw, with the question 'what is the law?' (cf also Schauer, 1990: 1;
Marmor, 1994: 1), the (natural) explanation will be different from the (natural) explanation we would
offer had we started with the question, 'how does the law require cases to be decided?', that is, were
we in the process of presenting (or building up) a theory of legal reasoning. The tensions we have
found in MacCormick's Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, a book on legal reasoning and legal
theory, in Playing by the Rules, a book on rales and rale-based decision-making, and in Raz's writings
on legal reasoning when placed alongside his views on legal theory, bear witness to that. It is time to
see whether these tensions can be avoided.
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Interlude
Let me briefly summarise the whole argument. In the first chapter we saw that the standard analogy
between games and the law was misleading because it ignored a crucial difference between what were
there called 'autonomous' and 'regulatory' institutions. From the existence of autonomous institutions,
however, we learned that the standard interpretation ofHart's open texture thesis (i.e. his claim that no
rule expressed in natural language's terms can fail to have an area of penumbra) had to be abandoned,
and that the explanation for the existence of hard cases in law had to be looked for elsewhere. I
suggested there that legal disagreement is a normal consequence of the law being seen as a regulatory
institution, since in regulatory institutions substantive reasoning has to be used to apply general norms
to particular cases.
This observation, however, was open to a strong objection, namely Joseph Raz's authority-based
argument for the sources thesis. According to it, the law has to belong to the kind of things that can be
understood and applied without using substantive reasons. In chapter 2 the thesis was introduced and
criticised on the basis that it does not allow for legal disagreement. We saw that Raz thinks that legal
disagreement is inevitable once the sources thesis is accepted because of three reasons: open texture,
incommensurability and legal references to morality. This claim, however, was examined and found
wanting since gaps in the law do not by themselves imply that courts will have discretion unless moral
arguments are allowed. This was given independent support by the observation that in autonomous
institutions, regarding which the sources thesis is maximally valid, there are no hard cases (or, better:
there is no conceptual reason to think that there must be hard cases) even though the three alleged
sources of legal gaps might still be present.
In chapter 3 the issue of the defeasibility of legal rules was examined. The conclusion there was that
the claim that legal reasoning is contingently defeasible was seen to be both true and false: it is true in
the sense that we can think of (and, as a matter of fact, find historical example of) legal systems of
indefeasible rules: any 'autonomous' legal system, as the law of the ancient Romans, would do in this
regard. But it is false if it is used to claim that it is a matter of contingent fact that modem 'regulatory'
legal systems are systems of defeasible norms: the contingent fact is that of the law being regulatory
but, given that it is, it is not contingent that its norms are defeasible.
This provides us with the first clue for the argument to be presented in the last chapter: the fact of a
norm being defeasible is not an interesting fact about that norm but about the system that norm
belongs to. The difference between autonomous and regulatory law is not to be found in the content of
the rules of each, but in different ideas that participants to a given practice have about that practice.
Given that the application of the legal material will be radically different in 'autonomous' and
'regulatory' law, it follows that understanding those ideas is necessary for the application of the law
(or for 'understanding' the law in the fuller sense distinguished above, at 129).
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Also in chapter 3, what makes a rule defeasible was given some attention, and there we got from Neil
MacCormick the second important clue concerning legal reasoning: general norms in regulatory
institutions are to be applied to normal cases. Normal cases, we saw, were those in which the results of
the application of the validity-criterion overlapped with those of the appropriateness-criterion. Hence
not only the former, but also the latter criterion have to be mastered to know what the law is for any
particular case.
But this seemed to leave us facing a dilemma: if no general norm can be applied without previously
(and perhaps, in many cases, tacitly) deciding that the present case is a normal case, and if the
normality of a case is to be measured using the same considerations that the norm was there to pre¬
empt, it seems that the idea of a general rule of regulatory law is self-defeating: rules are designed in
order that we do not have to discuss the whole issue again, but it seems that they cannot be applied
without doing just that. The only alternative to the sources thesis seems to be a completely sceptical
view of the law, in which it dissolves into particularistic decision-making covered up for reasons of
expediency as impartial application of general rules.
Before accepting that uncomfortable conclusion, however, consideration of legal reasoning as it is
actually carried out was necessary. Hence the analysis of some issues in Roman law, whence we got
the third important clue: though Roman legal reasoning was formal to a remarkable extent, Romans
did not think of their legal material as furnishing exclusionary reasons. We saw that it is sometimes
difficult to make sense of the particular forms those formal arguments adopted, which at least to a
modem observer seem to be based on the wrong kind of distinctions. All of this, however, does not
appear to have been even noticeable for Roman jurists, since they did not complain about the content
of their law, nor did they suggest modifications to it. It seems, it was argued, as though we are missing
some important piece of information about how the Romans thought of the law.
What kind of information are we missing? This is going to be the subject of the last chapter. As many
authors have realised (I consider below the work of Patrick Atiyah and Robert Summers, Roscoe
Pound, and Bruce Ackerman and Mirjan Damaska), there is a connection between ideas about the law
and the law itself. The task is to identify the sort of ideas that are relevant and the nature of that
connection. In brief, the argument will be that ideas about the law (which in the next chapter will be
called an 'image of law') have the direct consequence of determining the sort of argument that counts
as legal arguments; they shape what Honore called the 'canon of legal argument'. To this we now turn.
*
Before turning to the last chapter, however, a warning is in order: there is an important sense in which
the argument of this thesis is complete at this point. The last chapter attempts to offer a solution for
what in chapter 5 was called 'the predicament of contemporary jurisprudence', but I believe the value
of the argument so far does not depend upon my degree of success in so doing. The necessity of this
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warning steins from the fact that the argument to be entertained in the last chapter is much more
tentative that that ofprevious chapters.
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Images of Law and the
Canon of Legal Argument
Rules should be sufficiently sensible and sufficiently straightforward so
that anyone who so desires and is blessed with average powers of
application may be able to understand, on the one hand the useful ends
they serve, and on the other hand the actual necessities which have
brought about their institution.
SimoneWeil, The Need for Roots (1942-3)
Formal and Exclusionary Reasons Again
I argued above that an important feature of legal discourse is its formality, that is, the fact that legal
decisions are restricted with regard to the considerations that are deemed to be relevant for its
justification. Even in a system of substantive rationality, as Weber would call it, we would expect that
once a legal problem has been settled by an official organ, that decision by the official organ would
imply, among other things, that at the very least some of the considerations that the organ took into
account when it was deciding the point cannot be raised again at the moment of executing the organ's
decision 105. It was also argued that, if we keep in mind the fact that formality is not an all-or-nothing
concept but admits of degrees, we will not fail to see that, however grand this claim might look, it
actually is rather obvious.
How should this formality be explained? Some legal philosophers have argued, as we have seen in
chapters 2 and 5, that what explains the formality of legal discourse is some feature of the legal
material. Laws are mles, rules are exclusionary reasons. They cannot but conclude, then, that the
identification of the existence and content of those exclusionary reasons has to be possible without
considering the excluded reasons. I have argued against this line of thought in the previous chapters.
What I would like to emphasise now is that the undeniable initial plausibility of the exclusionary-
reasons account of legal mles and reasoning is given by this idea of the law's formality. If that account
is rejected, an alternative explanation for this idea has to be offered.
This alternative explanation, which will be explored in this chapter, looks at the social practice of legal
discourse, at what that practice looks like for the participants in it. On this view, it is not a feature of
legal material {i.e. laws) that explains the formality of law, but something about the legal practice as a
whole. Legal discourse becomes formal when the participants start seeing legal adjudication as being
about something in particular. This is what differentiates law from other social practices. Legal
discourse can be about the discovery ofmagical mles that are part of the fabric of the world, or the fan-
solution of interpersonal conflicts, or the implementation of state policies and so on. This alternative
explanation has two important advantages: First, it can explain differences between the law and
related social practices: why hard cases are important in law but not in other institutional practices, like
games. Second, it can also explain legal disagreement in a way that is crucially closed to the previous
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perspective: as disagreement about howformal the law is, that is, whether or not it is formal enough to
exclude those peculiarities of the case that would otherwise give rise to reasons for deciding otherwise.
This is a question that is not to be solved using any evaluative argument whatsoever, but only those
that can be presented as legally relevant, that is, arguments that are related to the participants'
understanding of the practice. This explanation is closed to the exclusionary-reasons perspective, since
those arguments point to substantive considerations that would be excluded if laws were indeed
exclusionary reasons. To explain the formality of law on the basis of laws being exclusionary reasons
cannot but misrepresent the phenomenon of legal disagreement, since in hard cases disagreement is
precisely about what according to that perspective could not be an issue: how many and which
substantive considerations are excluded.
How pervasive legal disagreement will be in a given legal practice is something that will depend upon
that self-understanding: in ancient Roman and biblical law, as we have seen, Romans and Jews
understood legal practice in such a way as to make legal disagreement almost completely non-existent.
In nineteenth century Britain or US, as we will see later, contract law was understood as being about
fairness in exchange, but since fairness (at least fairness as a relevant legal consideration) was
understood in formal terms the application of contract law was markedly formalistic. Changes in this
perception of what a fair exchange is have made contract law in the twentieth century far less
formalistic than it was a hundred years ago, at least in modem Western legal systems.
Take some of the (not very original) examples we have been discussing up to now. According to the
first perspective, Fuller's case (supra at 28) should be understood as one in which though what the law
requires is to fine the first man the court might be inclined to take the moral decision not to apply the
law to the case. All the reasons that could be offered not to fine the man are those that according to this
perspective are, as legal reasons, excluded. On the second perspective, the problem is created not by
lawyers' and judges' disagreement as to what the morally best solution is, but because they disagree
about how formally the 'no sleeping in the station' rule should be applied. Should it be applied as a
perfect exclusionary reason, in such a way that even babies sleeping in prams should be fined? Or
should it instead be applied as a Roman regula, i.e. with a very low degree of formality, meaning that
all those, and only those, who by their behaviour in the station cause the nuisance the legislator tried to
prevent with the rale, should be fined, regardless of their actually being asleep in the station or not,
and their sleeping only be taken as prima facie evidence of that? The case is not to be solved using any
argument: imagine a barrister saying 'he should not be fined because he is my friend'. This argument
would not be very persuasive, since the law is not seen as being about granting favours to one's
friends. 'He should not be fined because it is grossly unfair to do so' is a better legal argument, since
law is understood as having something to do with fairness. A fairness-based argument, however, could
be less persuasive in what Damaska (1986, discussed below) calls an 'activist state', in which the law
is seem as being about implementing state policies. The first perspective arbitrarily claims that that the
105lt could be claimed, indeed, that the more 'substantive' a system is the more formal the decision becomes once taken.
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correct reading of a rule like (2)106 can only give (2), as a matter of conceptual truth, complete
exclusionary force. Once we accept, following Atiyah and Summers, that formality admits of degrees,
then it is evident that a further reason has to be provided in order to prove that the only way in which
legal materials can be understood is as (perfect) exclusionary reasons, i.e. as rules.
Consider one possible interpretation of (2):
(19) The norm contained in (2) should be applied as a perfect exclusionary reason; the only substantive
considerations that are legally relevant for its application are (i) whether a human being is
sleeping, and (ii) whether he or she is doing so in a railway statioa
This could be defended on the basis that, after all, had the legislator wanted any other substantive
consideration to be taken into account she would have included it in the rule. This is true indeed: the
legislator could have introduced explicit exceptions to the rule, but no conceptual (as opposed to
substantive) argument can show that she did not do so because she did not want those situations to be
excluded from the application of the rule. Or to put this point in less controversial terms: from the fact
that no exception was explicitly included it does not necessarily follow that all exceptions were
implicitly excluded.
That in this sense (14) is false can be shown by a different argument: Atiyah and Summers (1987)
claim, as we shall see, that there is an important difference in the degree of formality used in the USA
to apply the law when compared to that used in England. In some matters (like stare decicis, they
claim at 119) the rides are basically the same, but their application is significatively different. If (14)
were true as a matter of conceptual truth, though, there would be no space for more or less formal
applications of the mles (exclusionary reasons). This would force us to choose one of two ways: either
American and English English are different languages (hence the mles mean different things, though
the words are the same), or in one country the law is systematically and regularly violated by the
organs called to apply it. I think both of these claims would be manifestly false.
To avoid this conclusion, (19) could be understood as a legal rather than conceptual argument. Its
force will then depend upon the force of the arguments supporting it. The force and acceptability of
these arguments, in turn, will depend upon the canon of legal argument, whose content will be
established by the participants' image oflaw. The concept of an image of law, which I have borrowed
(though with a somewhat different meaning) from Balkowski and Mungham (Balkowski and
Mungham, 1976), will be further developed below, but for the time being suffice it to say that as a
legal argument (19) is likely to be pretty ineffective in most legal systems, at least if we exclude
ancient Rome and similar ones (though this is only an empirical claim). If any modem Western legal
system contains a rule like (2), (19) is very unlikely to be a good legal argument for the application of
it. As we have seen, this would imply that even babies sleeping in prams are to be fined, since the fact
ofbeing a baby and of being asleep in a pram are both substantive considerations that are excluded.
Notice further that if (19) is a rule of the same system it cannot solve the problem, because the same
question of how formal its application should be could then be applied to it (Detmold, 1989: 453).
106'(2) it shall be a misdemeanour, punishable by fine of £ 5, to sleep in any railway station' {supra, at 60).
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Remember Pufendorf s rule: 'and the fellow was in no little peril because it was added in the statute
that the words should be taken exactly and without any interpretation'.
Now it seems that we are heading straight into a rather uncomfortable sceptical position. No mle can
pre-empt the substantive reasons rules are supposed to pre-empt, since no mle can determine the mode
(i.e. level of formality) of its own application. Hence no formal discourse (better: no discourse with
any relevant level of formality) can ever be attained.
But from the fact that a mle cannot determine the mode (viz., the level of formality) of its application,
it clearly does not follow that nothing can ever be settled. That merely shows that we cannot look to
the legal material for an answer, that we have to look instead to the background of the legal practice,
to what will be called below an 'image of law'. This is the reason why the argument so far does is not
a sceptical argument. There can be constraints on the legal discourse, but those constraints do not
come from the content of the legal material: What do you need to know to understand which and why
cases can become 'abnormal'? Answer: you need to master the canon of legal argument: you need to
know the sort of arguments the participants would consider a legal argument, i.e. arguments that
deserve their day in court.
The idea of 'normality' is the link between the evolution of ideas about the law and the content of the
law itself, between the law that is and the law that ought to be. That a case is normal is a question that
has to be answered before any application of the law is possible (needless to say, in the broad majority
of cases this question will not arise. But this does not show that it need not be answered. It only shows
that because ofpragmatic considerations it does not call for justification). But whether a case is normal
is something that is answered not by the laws, but by ideas about the law (an 'image of law'), hence
the link between the law and ideas about it. This is the reason why Watson is mistaken when he claims
that
If the rules of contract law of the two countries [i.e., England and Scotland] are already similar (as
they are) it should be no obstacle to their unification or harmonisation that the legal principles
involved come ultimately from different sources, or that the habits of thought of the commission
teams are rather different. It is scholarly law reformers who are deeply troubled by historical factors
and habits of thought. Commercial lawyers and business men in Scotland and England do not in
general perceive differences in habits of thought, but only—and often with irritation—differences in
mles (1974:96-7).
Insofar as the lawyer or businessman is concerned only with knowing the literal meaning of the black-
letter rules of the other country, this must be granted as a matter of course. But they would be lost
when faced with private law cases, because they would not know how the law is appliedl07. In fact, it
is completely unwarranted to think that 'commercial lawyers and businessmen do not perceive
differences in habits of thought', and if they do they do so at their own risk. It is a dangerous policy to
travel around Europe without trying to perceive 'differences in habit of thought' concerning, for
107As a matter of fact it could be claimed that they would not, because in the particular case of England and Scotland the
'habits of thought' are probably sufficiently similar. This is a controversial point, and many Scots lawyers would disagree (and I
would readily admit my complete ignorance on the subject). The main point, however, still stands: if those 'habits of thought'




instance, the application of traffic laws: any attempt to walk on a zebra crossing in Rome as you would
do it in Edinburgh would be considered suicidal (even for commercial lawyers and businessmen).
This, however, does not mean that legal questions cannot be settled for participants. Most lawyers and
judges (and citizens, for that matter) know that, though admittedly to different extents. Our question
has to be, then: what kind of information do they have? We already saw that it is not knowledge of the
language; neither is it knowledge of the legal material, the noi-ms of the system. What else could it be?
Ewald (1995a) deals with a similar problem, from the perspective of comparative law. He is engaged
in much the same enterprise as we are now (though he does not use silly examples): he wants to
understand the animal trials that were somewhat common in Europe during the Middle Ages. He
focuses on one particular case, that of the rats of Autun (1522), and on one particular lawyer,
Barthelemy Chassenee, counsel for the defendants (i.e. the rats).
Ewald argues that none of the traditional explanations of the rationale of the trials of animals really
makes sense (he discusses them in Ewald, 1995a: 1905-16). His conclusion is that
to recapture Chassenee's frame of reference we need to know more than just the legal rules; but what
else do we need? Certainly also the underlying principles, that is, the characteristic underlying pattern
of justifications and reasons that he would give for the surface rules. If our task were simply to
understand a modem Western legal system we might be able to stop here; but with Chassenee there
seem to be at least two further steps we need to take. We need to recover the wider pattern of beliefs
that underlies the legal principles—his beliefs about pain, animals, the person, responsibility, law—
broadly speaking, his metaphysics [...]. We need [...] to find a way into his cosmos, to excavate the
pattern ofbeliefs and sentiments that was characteristic ofhis age (Ewald, 1995a: 1941).
Until we have understood Chassenee's metaphysics, Ewald argues, we will not be able to understand
Chassenee's view of the law—and Chassenee stands here for any typical participant in a legal practice.
Granted, we may be able to understand the legal material,
and if all we expect [...] is a rough comprehension of the text of the code, such a knowledge can be
had without any special training in history. Indeed, it can be had without any special training of any
sort, for clearly this level of comprehension is available to any literate adult, ancient ormodem [...]. If
[a law student of the age of Justinian] is to understand the modem terminology and the underlying
concepts, he must, I think, however sketchily, try to comprehend their historical development. But the
modem law student can take them for granted. They have become part of the atmosphere, a part of
the surrounding culture, a part of the Volkgeist, and indeed a part of the language itself (Ewald,
1995a: 2101-2).
We cannot understand Chassenee's concerns with what we might call 'animal law' without
understanding what the law looks like to him. That being the case, a theory of law has to have room
for this element. Ewald does not discuss the implications for legal theory of his views on comparative
law. He only says that a "sophisticated positivist like H. L. A. Hart" would be more inclined to look
not at the primary rules but at the 'rule of recognition', "and this comparison would lead him into a
discussion ofmany of the issues" Ewald is dealing with (Ewald, 1995a: 2081n). But this possibility, if
my argument is correct, is not enough (as indeed Ewald seems to think: cf. ibid at 208 In).
1 64
IMAGES OF LAW AND THE CANON OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
An Image of Law
In this chapter, I will label what Ewald calls 'Chassenee's metaphysics' an image of law, a label I
borrow from Ba | kowski and Mungham (1976). Broadly speaking (I'll speak less broadly below), an
image of law is a set of beliefs about what legal discourse is about. An image of law determines what
kind of institution the law is, and also how its material should be understood and applied, and a study
of its content and function becomes, I believe, the sphere in which it is most useful to recognise that
"jurisprudence is [...] a joint venture of lawyers, philosophers and sociologists" (MacCormick, 1974:
74).
An image of law is related to an image of the world: we saw in previous chapters how legal practices
existed in which people believed, e.g. that a contractual obligation was a magical relation between two
parties; the law was a set ofmagical mles that existed with independence from their society, and legal
discourse was 'about' finding and applying them.
At some moment, however, this way of looking at the law changed: people started believing that legal
relations were not magical relations, and that there was some point in having legal rules that was not
only the magical possibilities the mles created. They started thinking that the explanation of the
existence and the justification of the law was linked to its regulatory effects, even though they might
still have thought that law was not a conscious creation of particular human beings (this is a much
more recent belief). When this transition had been achieved, normative beliefs about those regulatory
effects came to replace those old magical beliefs. I do not want to claim that those new beliefs have to
be moral beliefs (one could believe that the point of the regulatory effects of the law was not justice,
but beauty, for example 108), but as a matter of fact they appear to have been moral ever since ancient
Roman law was superseded (cf. Ulp. D. 1.1.1 .pr: ius est ars boni et aequi, the law is the art of
goodness and fairness).
An image of law is usually a complex set of different beliefs that when put together form a picture of
legal discourse. To make this point clearer, it might be useful to look at one particular example. In
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England what is called the 'classical theory of contract' was
developed. This theory is not a set of legal materials (rales and principles), though of course it shaped
the content of English contract law in a decisive manner. But the content of the rales of English
contract law is not the most important issue here. The English 'classical' image of law is (for what
follows, see Collins, 1986; Atiyah, 1995: 7-15). Lawyers and judges in those times believed (i) that
contract law was natural law, that is, something that was to be found in nature. This means that the
law was discovered, not created; now, what they read in that natural law was that contract law was
about (ii) commutative justice, a very old idea indeed. This in turn meant that in the application of
particular rales of contract law only arguments relating to the justice of the exchange could in
principle be heard. Considerations of efficiency, or of distributive justice, were excluded not
necessarily because a rale said so, but because that was not the business of the law of contracts. They
108Cf. Stein (1961: 3-10), for the relevance of the elegance of a legal argument in Classical Roman law.
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also had (iii) a strong belief in the laissez-faire ideology. As a consequence of this belief,
considerations of commutative justice could not be heard, but this time not because the law of
contracts was not about commutative justice (it was), but because the only way in which the justice of
a transaction could be assessed was by leaving the parties free to bargain. What commutative justice
demanded was to respect agreements freely entered into. Summing it all up,
By and large this meant that the law of contract was designed to provide for the enforcement of the
private arrangements which the contracting parties had agreed upon. In general the law was not
concerned with the fairness or justice of the outcome, and paternalistic ideas came to be thought of as
old-fashioned. The judges were not even greatly concerned with the possibility that a contract might
not be in the public interest. So the function of contract law was merely to assist one of the
contracting parties when the other broke the mles of the game and defaulted in the performance ofhis
contractual obligations. The judge was a sort of umpire whose job was to respond to the appeal
'How's that?' when something went wrong (Atiyah, 1995: 8).
The belief in a strong ideology of laissez-faire (a weaker version will be introduced shortly below) had
a related consequence: the interference of the state in the working of the market had to be reduced to a
minimum. This called for the separation of law and politics. Therefore a form of reasoning was
developed that Morton Horwitz, discussing American law, calls 'categorical thinking' (1992: 27).
Arguments that were excluded in the legal realm were categorically different to those that were
allowed. Today, for example, we would probably think that unequal bargaining power and duress
form a continuum. A classical lawyer could accept an allegation of duress, but not one of unequal
bargaining power. If a defence of unequal bargaining power was allowed in, contracts that were
agreed between free and equal persons would not be categorically separated from those void by
duress: the (substantive) concept of equality of bargaining power would bridge the categorical gap
between them, and political arguments would use that bridge to contaminate legal discourse (they
were indeed right, as things eventually turned out: today arguments are used before courts that they
would have considered obviously political):
Nothing captures the essential difference between the typical legal minds of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century America quite as well as their attitude toward categories. Nineteenth-century legal
thought was overwhelmingly dominated by categorical thinking—by clear, distinct, bright-line
classifications of legal phenomena. Late-nineteenth-century legal reasoning brought categorical
modes of thought to their highest fulfilment. By contrast, in the twentieth century, the dominant
conception of the arrangement of legal phenomena has been that of a continuum between
contradictory policies or doctrines. Contemporary thinkers typically have been engaged in balancing
conflicting policies and 'drawing lines' somewhere between them. Nineteenth-century categorizing
typically sought to demonstrate 'differences of kind' among legal classifications; twentieth century
balancing tests deal only with 'differences ofdegree' (Horwitz, 1992: 71).
It is today a commonplace to call this nineteenth-century attitude 'formalistic' (in the pejorative sense),
but this is not because contract law today is not formal at all. Many situations of unequal bargaining
power are seen, even today, as giving rise to no legal defence on that account; indeed "bargaining
power is nearly always unequal, and, in free markets, it must be unequal" (Atiyah, 1995: 302).
Classical lawyers were willing to acknowledge a defence in some cases of unequal bargaining power,
those in which duress could be proven: given that the law of contracts was seen as being 'about' the
enforcement of agreements freely entered into, an allegation of duress was obviously something that,
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if successful, could prevent the enforcement of any contract. Today, in modem Western legal systems
(of course with important variations among them), courts are willing to acknowledge a defence in
other cases as well, in cases in which though there was no duress, one of the parties was not free to
agree. Not all the cases in which the freedom of a person to enter into a contract is diminished are
important in this sense. What is different is the kind ofarguments available to defendants if they want
to claim inequality ofbargaining power as a defence. There is today less widespread confidence in the
idea that the parties to a contract are the most appropriate persons to decide what the benefits are worth
and that the courts should not interfere with the parties' decisions. There is, therefore a
correspondingly more widespread belief that the fact of an agreement having been freely entered into
is not necessarily a reason to exclude other substantive considerations (or: to decide whether or not a
contract was 'freely entered into' substantive considerations that were excluded before are today
allowed in legal discourse). This is what Atiyah (1982b: 118ff) called 'the decline of formal
reasoning'. As a result of this, the same rules of contract law yield, when applied to similar cases,
different results, since some features of those cases that would have been considered irrelevant in the
nineteenth century would not be so considered today.
An image of law can have different levels of complexity. It can be a very simple idea of the law being
part of the basic structure of the world: if Isaac uttered such-and-such words Jacob was blessed, even
though he was not the one who was entitled to the blessing, and as a result the world is different,
different exactly in the same way in which the world is different after Chernobyl because the relevant
safety rules where not followed. Or it can be a complex set of beliefs, comprising moral, political and
economic beliefs: it was not only the belief in natural law, not only a conception of the law of contracts
as being about justice in exchanges, and not only a strong laissez-faire ideology, but an elaborated
mixture of them all (and possibly other elements), which explains the dominance of the classical
theory of contract in nineteenth-century England and US.
Imagine, for example, that this latter belief (in a strong laissez-faire ideology) is rejected. That being
the case, the fact that an agreement has been freely entered into would no longer be considered as an
incontestable evidence of the substantive fairness of the exchange. Therefore, courts will be more
willing to make this latter point one subject to controversy, and consequently they will allow
arguments about the substantive fairness of the contract as legal arguments. There is no reason why the
other elements of the classical theory of contract (that is, the idea that contracts law is given by nature,
not created, and that of it being only about commutative justice) cannot be retained. This (partial)
modification of the image of law will effect a (partial) change in the canon of legal argument: while
lawyers and judges will remain equally formalistic as regards their exclusion of distributive-justice-
based arguments (because they still see contract law as being about justice in exchanges), they will be
more prone to 'unpick' the contract each time they feel that the parties were not (substantively) equal
and free when they struck their bargain. That is, they will be willing to hear arguments that would
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have been classified as non-legal before, arguments purporting to show the substantive fairness of the
contraction
Notice further that the point is not a point about a particular individual's beliefs. It is, rather, about the
political and moral beliefs that constitute the normative bedrock of legal discourse when considered as
a social practice. This point is important to understand the idea of the justification of legal decisions.
Once the law is regarded as a regulatory institution, legal decisions have to be justified. It is no longer
possible to answer a challenge by saying 'this is simply what we do' as we have seen. The idea of the
justification of legal decisions looks at the relevant reference-group (what Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1968 called the 'audience'), and asks the decision-maker to present her decision as grounded in
reasons that the members of that group would accept, even if they disagree with its particular content
(more on this infra at 180).
The importance of the understanding of this set of beliefs as a condition for the understanding of the
law has not, of course, gone unnoticed. In what follows I want to comment on the related issues of
Atiyah's and Summers' idea of a 'vision of law', Roscoe Pound's 'ideal element in law' and Brace
Ackerman and Mirjan Damaska's discussion of activist and reactive states and their impact on legal
practice.
Visions of Law
In their Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law, Atiyah and Summers set out to compare
English and American law on the basis of the formal/substantive divide. They found that "substantive
reasoning is used far more widely than formal reason in the American legal system when decisions
have to be made or other action taken, while in the English legal system the reverse is true" (Atiyah
and Summers, 1987: 1), this being their 'primary thesis'.
If this is the case, then this difference between English and American legal practice calls for an
explanation, and Atiyah and Summers put forward a 'secondary thesis' as such an explanation: "the
differences in methods of reasoning reflects a deep difference in legal style, legal culture and, more
generally, the vision of law which prevails in the two countries" (id. at 1). A 'vision of law' is defined
by them as
as a set of inarticulate and perhaps even unconscious beliefs held by the general public at large and, to
some extent, also by politicians, judges, and legal practitioners, as to the nature and functions of
law—how and by whom it should be made, interpreted, applied, and enforced (Atiyah and Summers,
1987:411).
At the outset of the book, then, we are offered a clear structure of the argument contained in it: the
primary thesis (hereinafter PT: different levels of formality in the application and understanding of the
law in England and the United States) is to be explained by the secondary thesis (ST: different visions
109To be sure, this shift might well have important distributive consequences. But the important point is not the consequences,
but the kind of argument that courts would accept. In the context delineated in the main text courts would not regard an
argument explicitly based on considerations of distributive justice as persuasive, though they might accept arguments with even
more radical distributive effects, provided only that they are presented in a way in which they respect the canon of legal
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of law). This clear picture becomes, however, less clear as the comparison proceeds. Throughout the
book, Atiyah and Summers sometimes affirm that the difference in formality they found between
England and the United States are reflections of different visions of the law (st explains pt), and
sometimes that the difference in visions of the law is itself a consequence of the different levels of
formality the law has in those countries (pt explains st). Thus, they claim that if the standards of
validity of a system are not only source-oriented, but also content-oriented "they may promote a
general vision of law in which law is less likely to be equated with formal authority, but tends to be
equated instead with reason and justice and morality" (1987: 52). As the standards of validity of a
system (in particular, whether they are 'source-oriented' or 'content-oriented') are one of the criteria
Atiyah and Summers used to measure the degree of formality of a legal system (1987: 42), they seem
to be claiming here that pt explains st. Later on they tell us that the different 'attitude' that American
legal practice has as opposed to the English concerning the formality of the rules ('if they are rules') of
stare decicis "could be seen as a difference in the general 'vision' of law to which the judges adhere"
(1987: 119). Concerning the truth-finding process, they argue that, while in some cases the finding of
facts may be complex and thus require a relatively less formal attitude than in others, "there are many
legal disputes in which facts can be found straightforwardly". They claim, however, that in the United
States courts are in general more willing to "carry over this methodology [/'. e. the methodology that is
suited to treat complex cases] to simpler cases where it may seem less justifiable" (1987: 161). And
then they claim that it is the 'vision of law' that defines, for fact-finding purposes, how 'complex' a
case should be to deserve the complex-cases methodology instead of the simpler-cases one (1987:
161). The difference "reflects a different vision of what law is" (176, my emphasis; cf also 196): st
explains pt.
Having said that, I do not think that there is any serious difficulty in understanding the idea Atiyah and
Summers have in mind when they speak of different visions of law. The explanation for the difference
in the American and English legal practices cannot be (only) a difference in the legal material for,
while there are of course differences in that regard, there are areas, they tell us, in which the rules are
"not on the face of it very different in the two countries, but the differences in [their] practical
operation are very great" (1987: 119; they are in this particular case referring to the rules on stare
decicis). Therefore, there must be something, which is not the content of these rules, that can account
for those differences. That 'something' is a vision of law: st explains pt. Needless to say, a vision of
law is not something static. It evolves, and it can perfectly well be the case that the content of
particular rules might influence that evolution (hence their remark on page 52, quoted above, which
apparently implied that pt explains st). But it is the vision, not the rales, that constitute the final
explanation. It is something that belongs to that vision which we should expect to hear if, say, an
English judge is challenged by an American colleague to justify her relatively more formal approach
to judicial decision making.
argument. In any case, formal arguments also have distributive effects, but this is not the reason why they are persuasive. On
this process ofevolution, cf. Horwitz, 1992: 19ff.
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And yet, when, in their concluding remarks (1987: 411-15), Atiyah and Summers develop their idea of
a vision of law they simply re-state their findings. We are told that a formal (as opposed to a
substantive) vision of law is one in which the identification of valid law is predominantly source-
oriented (as opposed to content-oriented); in which conflicts between valid laws are thought to be
resolved by reference to rules of hierarchical priority (as opposed to their being resolved by
substantive, policy-oriented considerations); in which 'the forms of law' are predominantly conceived
of as 'hard and fast' rules (as opposed to flexible legal rules granting discretion or incorporating
standards inviting substantive reasoning); in which legislators are assumed to enact 'precise, clear and
comprehensive statutory rules, and it is believed that most law consists of statute law' (as opposed to
legislators being expected to adopt broad directives 'which confer upon courts power to develop the
law in particular cases') and so on. But at the same time, these actually are the differences Atiyah and
Summers found between the two systems. Their concept of a 'vision of law' turns out to be, therefore,
not explanatory of those differences, but a synopsis of them (this is something they explicitly say: see
1987: 411, "the idea of a vision of law is synoptic in character"). It amounts to no explanation at all, or
at best to a small explanation: their concept of a vision of law warns the reader against looking to the
legal material alone, but their explanation of their concept is a mere restatement of the differences they
found: it thus cannot explain them. If you want to explain a, b and c on the basis of x, you don't
produce a very informative explanation if you go on and claim that x is whatever has a, b and c as a
consequence 110.
To say that English judges are more formal than their American counterparts is to say that the latter are
willing to accept, in legal discourse, arguments that the former would not consider 'legal'. Why this is
the case is the question a vision of law has to answer. If it is to explain, and not merely summarise, the
different levels of formality Atiyah and Summers found in England and the United States, it has to
show how it contributes to the definition of the canon of legal argument, how it specifies what counts
as a legal argument. Therefore, a concept of a 'vision of law' that is able to do the work that Atiyah
and Summers want it to do throughout the book has to be something more than a resume of the aspects
in which the understanding and application of the law can be more or less formal: it has to explain
why that is the case. It has to explain why in England most standards of identification of valid laws are
source-oriented and not content-oriented, why in England conflicts between valid laws are thought to
be solved by way of the application ofmles of hierarchical priority, and so on.
Atiyah and Summers furnished ample evidence for their primary thesis. In particular, they showed that
even in those areas where the black-letter law is substantively similar what the law is for actual cases
11OsGANARELLE. [to Lucinde]. Give me your arm. [to Geronte]. I can tell by this pulse that your daughter is dumb.
GERONTE. Yes, Monsieur, that is her affliction. You have discovered it at once.
SGANARELLE. Ha!
JACQUELINE. Just see how quickly he's found out her complaint!
SGANARELLE. We great doctors diagnose correctly at once. An ignoramus would have hummed and hawed. He would have
said: it's this or: it's that. But I put my finger on the trouble straight away, and tell you that your daughter is dumb.
GERONTE. Yes, but I want to tell me the cause.
SGANARELLE. Nothing easier. The cause of her dumbness is the loss of her power of speech.
(Moliere, Le Medicin malgre lui, act II. George Graveley trans, Oxford University Press, 1956).
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can be different. If this is the case, it follows that understanding the meaning of the black-letter rules
cannot be enough to know how they are to be applied, hence the importance of their secondary thesis.
Their particular explanation of a vision of law, however, turned out to be disappointingly empty. The
concept of an image of law can be seen as an attempt to develop their insight so that it can fulfil its
explanatory function.
Roscoe Pound's 'Ideal Element in the Law'
In his Tagore Lectures delivered at the University of Calcutta in 1948, Roscoe Pound started by
arguing that "whether there is an ideal element in law depends not a little on what is meant by the term
'law'" (Pound, 1958: 1). He then went on to distinguish three senses which could be given to the word
'law': (i) as an aggregate of laws, a 'legal order' (id. at 2); (ii) the "authoritative materials by which
controversies are decided and thus the legal order is maintained" (ibid.), what he calls the 'precept
element'; and (iii) a predictive sense, the use of which was a "consequence of development of the
functional attitude towards the science of law". Quoting Llewellyn, Pound argues that in this sense
"what officials do about disputes is [...] the law itself' (Pound, 1949: 2-3).
After dissecting the meaning of law in these three senses, Pound claims that "in arguing for and
discussing an ideal element in law one must look into all these meanings of 'law'. But one must be
concerned specially with one aspect of law in the second sense, namely, laws, the body of authoritative
norms or models or patterns of decision applied by the judicial organs of a politically organised
society in the determination of controversies so as to maintain the legal order" (1949: 3). He does not
explain why the 'precept element' enjoys this priority.
So what is the 'ideal element in law'? Pound answers,
The term ['ideal'] comes from a Greek word meaning basically something one sees. Applied to
action, it is a mental picture of what one is doing or why, to what end or purpose, he is doing it.
Postulating a good law maker and a good judge, it is a picture of how the one ought to frame the laws
he enacts and how the other ought to decide the cases that come before him. But behind these pictures
of what ought to be the enacted or the judicially formulated precept for the case in hand is a basic
mental picture of the end or purpose of social control—of what we are seeking to bring about by
adjustment of relations and ordering of conduct by social pressure on the individual and so
immediately of what we are seeking to achieve through adjustment of relations and ordering of
conduct by systematic application of the force ofpolitically organized society (Pound, 1958: 5).
These ideals do not need to be consciously adhered to: they "may be held and made the background of
their decisions by judges unconsciously or [...] half consciously, being taken for granted as a matter of
course without conscious reference to them" (ibid. For the ideal aspect of law, see also MacCormick,
1997: lOff).
I think we can see more clearly the importance of Pound's ideal element ifwe first focus, not upon his
Tagore Lectures, but upon a piece written by Pound some four decades before.
Pound's "Freedom of Contract"(1908), opens with a quotation from Justice Harlan in Adair v. United
States (208 U.S. 161, 174f):
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The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in is essence, the same
as the right of the purchaser of the labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such
labor from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the employee to quit the service of the
employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reasons, to
dispense with the service of such employee [...]. In all such particulars the employer and the
employee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty ofcontract, which no government can legally justify in a free land.
This is an interesting and controversial passage, and later we shall come back to it. Pound had
something to say on that controversy, but he was also interested in the fact that it expressed something
which was the culmination of a line of decisions going back some twenty-five years, and was accepted
without question by most American judges and lawyers at the turn of the century. And yet, it was
something that to "everyone acquainted at first hand with actual industrial conditions" would
obviously be "utterly hollow" and "surcharged with fallacy" (Pound, 1908: 454, quoting Taylor's
Science ofJurisprudence). How could something so obviously false be "a doctrine [...] announced
with equal vigour and held with equal tenacity by courts of Pennsylvania and of Arkansas, of New
York and of California, of Illinois and of West Virginia, of Massachusetts and of Missouri"? (Pound,
1908: 455). The 'ideal element in law' is Pound's answer to this question.
Let me translate the problem Pound is dealing with here to the language used in this chapter. Adair's
doctrine, as expressed in the case, does not have any relevance as a legal rule: it does not belong to the
ratio of the case, and it is not deduced from a valid law. It is, rather, something that will control the
ways in which the bulk of the rules concerning contracts will be applied. If, as we have seen, rules are
to be applied to normal cases, the doctrine fulfils the role of explaining when and why a case is normal
(strictly, all it is to exclude some reasons as grounds for 'abnormality', but in a way, this is part of a
definition of what makes a normal case normal): no case will be considered 'abnormal' because of
economic inequality between the parties. The all-important legal category is that of 'equality of right'
(notice the categorical difference between economic equality and equality of right). We can easily
imagine Pound and Harlan discussing a particular case, both of them recognising that contracts should
be enforced when they have been freely entered into (call this a legal rale). Harlan would claim that
the substantive considerations pre-empted by the rule are all but those showing whether or not the
parties enjoyed 'equality of right' at the moment of agreeing; Pound would point out that equality of
right is only one of the substantive considerations not pre-empted by the rule, (some measure of)
economic equality being another. The discussion is about how formal the rule is, how many (and
which) substantive issues it pre-empts. It is not a discussion that can be settled by a further (legal) mle,
but by considerations about what contract law is about and the substantive reasons that it allows: is the
law of contract about justice in exchange, about maximising utility, etc? What makes an exchange
unfair? How are we to understand utility? and the like.
Adair's doctrine reflects (part of) a canon of legal argument: it explains the sort of arguments that can
be used as a defence against the enforcement of contract. And how such a 'utterly hollow' canon of
legal argument could be accepted without question by so many lawyers and judges was the first point
Pound was concerned with in the 1908 piece. The second (and to my mind more important for Pound
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in 1908) was to criticise the idea of freedom of contract as presented in Adair's doctrine, to offer an
alternative image of contract law, one more in tune with the needs and the ethical beliefs of the time.
By 1949, Pound's emphasis had changed. He offered in his Tagore Lectures a more comprehensive
explanation of the role of the ideal element in law and also of different ideals and their evolution in
legal history. His main thesis, and the reason why this piece is interesting for us, was that
a body of philosophical, political, and ethical ideas as to the end of law—as to the purpose of social
control and of the legal order as a form thereof—and hence as to what legal precepts ought to be in
view of this end, is an element of the first importance in the work of judges, jurists, and lawmakers
(Pound, 1958: 108).
Pound then goes on to sketch four stages of legal development: (i) primitive law; (ii) strict law; (iii)
equity and natural law, and (iv) maturity of law (1958: 109111). In each of these 'stages' the law is
conceived in different ways, and the difference in the idea of law implies different attitudes as to the
application of the legal material.
I do not think it is useful to get into the details of Pound's theory of legal evolution, among other
reasons because I am unsure about the utility (or even the possibility) of finding 'stages' in legal
development that have been followed by all 'mature' legal systems (assuming that the 'maturity' of a
legal system is something that can be determined using a criterion other than by reference to one's
chosen stages of legal evolution). Having said that, I would like to take one of Pound's stages in order
to discuss, not his general claims about the path of legal evolution, but his more particular and
interesting ones about the relation between the 'ideal' and the 'precept' element in law.
In the second stage of legal development, what Pound calls the stage of 'strict law', "the legal order is
definitely differentiated from other modes of social control". The state has monopolised the settlement
of serious conflicts between people, and the idea of law is shaped by two 'causes': "(i) Fear of
arbitrary exercise of the assistance of the state, the rooted repugnance ofmen to subjection of their will
to the arbitrary will of others, and (ii) survival of ideas of form and literal application form the earlier
period" (Pound, 1958: 114). From this, Pound extracts the following features of the process of
application of the law:
(i) Formalism—the law refuses to look beyond or behind the form; (ii) rigidity and immutability; (iii)
extreme insistence that every one looks out for himself; (iv) refusal to take account of the moral
aspects of situations or transactions—to use Ames's phase, the strict law is not immoral but unmoral;
(v) rights and duties are restricted to a narrow category of legal persons—all human beings or natural
persons are not legal persons and legal capacity is restricted arbitrarily (Pound, 1958: 114).
There are two objections that can be made to Pound's claim here. The first is particular to the moment
of 'strict law'. It clearly fails to follow from the fact that the legal order is differentiated from other
mechanisms of social control, not even when the fear of arbitrariness and the survival of literal ideas is
accepted, that the law has to refuse 'to look behind the form' (or has to be rigid and immutable, or has
to be 'unmoral', etc). Pound's last characteristic of the strict law period makes this point all the more




evident: how can it be that the fear of arbitrariness is the 'cause' of 'arbitrary restrictions' in the legal
capacity of natural persons?
The second and more general criticism is related to this point. Pound assumed that, covering the whole
period of legal evolution from primitive law to 'socialisation of law' (a fifth stage to be reached after
legal maturity) there is something that remains unmodified: an instrumental conception of the law,
according to which the law is to be explained by the contribution it makes to the well-being of the
relevant society, however this is conceived (in other words, a 'regulatory' conception of the law).
Pound defined the concept of an ideal of law as a "basic mental picture of the end or purpose of social
control [...], of what we are seeking to achieve through adjustment of relations and ordering of conduct
by systematic application of the force of politically organized society" (1958: 5. Pound's entire
paragraph was quoted above, p. 165). Here Pound was, however, smuggling in part of his own ideal of
the law: he was working at the wrong level of abstraction. I have argued that the rigid formalism of
ancient Roman law (which was not uncommon for its time) can be understood on the basis of
(ancient) Romans not having an instrumental conception of the law. Whether the law is something that
is justified as an instrument to something else or in its own terms is an important part of an image of
law. Pound seems to have thought that the law was, so to speak, intrinsically instrumental, hence the
only ways in which legal ideals could differ were the ends to be attained with it, the specification of
the goals for which the law was an instrument. Ifmy argument so far is correct, this is clearly not true,
and Pound's scheme of the evolution of ideas about the law is seriously flawed.
Law in an Activist State
I would now like to consider Bruce Ackerman's Reconstructing American Law (1984) and Miijan
Damaska's The Faces ofJustice and State Authority (1986). The main theme of the first work is the
transformation suffered by American legal discourse in this century. This transformation, according to
Ackerman, was the consequence of a change in the political beliefs of the American people. To
explain the nature of that change, Ackerman uses two ideal types dubbed by him the 'reactive' and the
'activist' state (Ackerman, 1984: 25).
A reactive state is one in which
legal argument is restricted by something I shall call the reactive constraint no legal argument will be
acceptable if it requires the lawyer to question the legitimacy of the military, economic, and social
arrangements generated by the invisible hand (Ackeiman, 1984:25).
The reactive constraint was never a rule of American law. It rather was a consequence of a set of
moral and political beliefs belief about society, justice and the law; though the content of the law will
probably reflect this political belief in the invisible hand, the latter has a far more important
consequence: it specifies the arguments that can be accepted as legal arguments in the context of legal
adjudication: it defines a canon of legal argument. Only reasons that respect the constraint are legal (as
opposed to, say, political) reasons. In specifying what counts as a legal argument, the reactive
constraint specifies the sort of substantive issues that are pre-empted and in doing so it determines
what counts as a 'normal' case.
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According to Ackerman, the reactive constraint's first consequence for legal discourse will be that the
latter will be understood as dealing only "with the appraisal of particular actions against the
background of ongoing social practices" (Ackerman, 1984: 26). The legitimacy of the practice itself
cannot be contested in a court of law, because legal discourse is defined by its being a kind of
discourse in which that cannot be an issue. The application of the law is about determining and
correcting deviations: "each lawyer tries to provide a persuasive account of the ongoing practice that
makes the opponent's conduct appear deviant, his own client's behaviour innocent or justifiable or, at
the very least, excusable" (1984: 26). As such, there is a natural end to any conceivable legal case:
There is only so much that can be said about particular actions before the conversations gets
repetitive. The only thing left to do is for the jury to engage in a densely textured judgement upon the
defendant's conduct—either it was deviant or it wasn't. If it was the defendant should set things right.
Ifnot, not. Next case (1984: 28).
Consider a contract-law case in a community thoroughly socialised into the practice of keeping
promises. The efficiency or fairness of the practice itselfwill not be an issue, and the court will hear
each reactive lawyer "attempting to provide an interpretation of institutionalized expectations that
makes his client's actions seem appropriate, his antagonist's deviant" (Ackerman, 1984: 26). Once the
argument has been heard, the court will pass judgement, and the case will be closed definitively.
The situation changes quite significatively once the political beliefs ofwhich the reactive constraint is
an expression are modified:
assume that, for one reason or another, the dominant opinion amongst the citizenry no longer holds
that the country's military, economic, and social problems can take care of themselves without self-
conscious tending. Assume, further, that the citizenry insists that law and lawyers have a central role
to play in activist governance, and consider how these simple points will transform the profession's
conversational repertoire (Ackerman, 1984: 28).
At the most obvious level, it must be clear that the defining feature of the legal discourse will cease to
be that it assumes the validity and legitimacy of social practices. Now the law is seen as being about
the correction of existing practices, and that will have a profound effect on the canon of legal
argument. Arguments that were excluded from consideration in legal discourse because they were,
say, political not legal, will be deemed to be reasonable pieces of legal argumentation. The whole
point of the argumentation will no longer be the discrete one of assessing a particular action against an
unquestioned social practice, but sometimes at least the practice itself will be questioned. Arguments
designed to question the practice, therefore, will deserve consideration (though of course they might
be defeated in many cases by more 'traditional' arguments): the canon of legal argument, the whole
universe of what is excluded and what is included in legal discourse changes (Ackerman, 1984: 28).
The way in which the facts are to be described will also change. Under the reactive constraint, the facts
were relevant as a description of an individual and concrete action to be measured against the standard
given by unquestioned practices, but once the practices itself can be a subject of legal argument this
focus on the concrete and individual action will soon became inappropriate:
It would be incredibly time-consuming, for example, to describe the practice of driving an
automobile by reporting that Roe drove fromA to B, Doe drove from C to D, and so on. It would also
175
FERNANDO ATRIA
miss the point of activist concern, which is to assess the extent to which the practice, considered as a
whole, requires self-conscious legal regulation to operate in an acceptable fashion. Given this
concern, individualized descriptions seem nothing more than a series ofanecdotes (1984: 29).
In a way, this is only to be expected. Given that facts can receive numerous different true descriptions,
those that highlight the aspects that are significant from the point of view of the image of law will be
preferred: "it is interesting to note that generally when people are asked the 'facts' of Donogue v
Stevenson they almost always repeat some version of the neighbour principle. The lady with the
marriage problem and a snail in her ginger beer and ice cream has disappeared" (Ba | kowski, MS: 18).
Likewise, the implementation of the policy might be a much more important consideration than the
resolution of a particular dispute, and it will provide a yardstick against which the acceptability of
arguments could be measured. It can easily be thought, for example, that if the judicial process is an
instance of a much broader process of implementation of public policies it is the policies that cannot
be challenged before a court, and that any argument to that effect will be considered to be non-legal.
But while this can be true, it will nonetheless also be the case that
While activist law cannot be modified by the preferences of those whose conduct it purports to
regulate, it is malleable and flexible in a different sense, changing in turn with each failure or success
in carrying the government toward its ideals. Whether it takes the form of objective regulation or
model of conduct, it cannot be permitted to be so firmly fixed as to stand as an obstacle to the
realization of state programs. (Damaska, 1986: 82).
If the law is no longer seen as being 'about' the evaluation of individual behaviour against the
background of an unquestioned social practice as reflected in society's legal material (rales, etc), the
main goal of the judicial process also changes: in a reactive state the natural end and goal of the
judicial process is the settlement of private disputes according to the prevailing practices as reflected
by the legal material. In an activist state, on the other hand, "the activist state's conception of law as an
instrument for the realization of its policy makes the legal process independent of dispute resolution".
Furthermore,
requiring a controversy as a general prerequisite for the institution of the legal process clearly makes
no sense to an activist government. Disputes do not miraculously arise whenever a social event
suggests the need to enforce the law and thus to realize a policy goal in the concrete circumstances of
the case (Damaska, 1986: 84).
Summing up, we can say: people's beliefs about the law (i) determine what legal discourse is about;
(ii) since only arguments that are about what-legal-discourse-is-about are valid legal arguments these
beliefs shape the content of the canon of legal argument; (iii) since facts can be given different true
descriptions, the canon of legal argument will determine the way in which facts are to be described for
legal purposes: those descriptions that highlight the relevant (i.e. relevant from the point of view of the
arguments allowed in legal discourse) features of states of affairs will come to be preferred; and (iv)
the judicial process ceases to have as its main goal that of solving conflicts of interest between
individuals, and becomes a forum for (the discussion of some aspects of) the implementation of the
state's policy.
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Both Damaska and Ackerman made broader claims in their characterisation of the reactive as opposed
to the activist state. Ackerman, for example (1984: 13ff), offered an historical interpretation of Legal
Realism as a "culturally conservative movement" (it was the reactive lawyer's reaction to the birth of
the activist state), and undertook to reconstruct an activist ('constructivist') legal discourse (1984:
40ff), a program that has not been uncontroversial (see, for example, Peller, 1985). None of this,
however interesting in its own right, is directly relevant to my discussion. The only point I am
interested in, and the justification for the consideration of Ackerman and Damaska, is their claim that
legal discourse is shaped by political beliefs. The canon of legal argument is something that is defined,
or at the very least decisively shaped, by moral and political beliefs about what the law is and what it is
about. And what the law is for actual cases cannot be known without mastering that canon.
Images of Law
The question before us now is, can we allow for the authority of law once it has been shown that the
legal material cannot be applied without using the substantive considerations the law was supposed to
pre-empt?
The problem is created by one particular way in which an essential feature of the law is interpreted and
theoretically explained. Legal discourse is formal discourse, that is, a kind of normative discourse
where participants are justified in not considering substantive questions that are, or might be, relevant
for a correct decision. This feature of the law gives rise to the problem we now face when it is
explained on the basis of the exclusionary force of the legal material (mles). This only shows that this
is not a correct way of explaining the formality of law.
An enquiry into the nature and function of images of law is another attempt to explain the formality of
law, one that is not committed to thinking of mles as exclusionary reasons. It allows, instead, for
degrees of formality. These degrees of formality are determined not by the conceptual status of the
legal material (mles, principles and so on), but by the constraints that act upon legal discourse as a
result of the existence of a canon of legal argument whose content is given by an image of law.
We are now in a position to refine the definition of an image of law given at the beginning of this
section (supra, p. 165), and I want to do so on the basis of the already quoted explanation of Pound's
'ideal element' in law. As should be remembered, Pound claimed that
a body ofphilosophical, political, and ethical ideas as to the end of law—as to the purpose of social
control and of the legal order as a form thereof—and hence as to what legal precepts ought to be in
view of this end (Pound, 1958: 108, quoted above, p. 173).
We have seen that this definition of the 'ideal element in law' has to be purged from Pound's own
ideal of law. On the first hand, Pound's qualification of the relevant ideas as 'philosophical, political or
ethical' reflects contingent beliefs about the law. For nineteenth-century English or American lawyers
or judges, for example, their beliefs about the law were indeed seen as ethical and political, as clearly
reflected in Justice Harlan's opinion in Adair, or (to use an English case) in Jesell MR's opinion in
Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson (1875 LR 19 Eq. at 462):
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if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when
enter into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by the Courts of justice.
Therefore you have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere
with freedom ofcontract.
From this, however, it does not follow that an image of law can only be a set of political or ethical
beliefs. There was nothing necessarily ethical or political in the ancient Romans' belief that legal
relations were invisible objects that existed in the world just as trees and apples do. Needless to say,
those doctrines had political or moral consequences. It could even be shown that they fulfilled some
political function, helping, e.g. to reinforce the dominance of Patricians over Plebeians in the early
days of Rome. But this is not to say that the ideas themselves were political, i.e. that they were
believed in because of political reasons (as we can indeed say of the nineteenth-century laissez-faire).
Hence we have to drop (or at least qualify in this sense) the 'political or ethical' qualification in
Pound's definitionl 12.
Do we have to drop the 'philosophical' as well? This seems less important, and more a matter of
verbal convention. In a broad sense, it is clear that they are philosophical ideas, in the same way in
which any belief whatsoever can be said to be philosophical belief (even the belief that I have two
hands is a philosophical belief, as G. E. Moore famously showed decades ago). But in this sense the
adjective is uninformative.
A similar consideration is in order regarding Pound's parenthetical remark: those beliefs do not have
to be about 'the purpose of social control and of the legal order as a form thereof. The point here is
even clearer: that the legal order is a form of social control is part of the possible content of these
beliefs, not what characterises them.
It could be claimed that precisely because the ancient Roman image of law was not a set ofpolitical or
ethical ideas about the law as a form of social control we should not use the word Taw' to refer to
ancient Roman law. This would amount to say that autonomous 'legal systems' are precisely because
of this not legal systems at all. I think, on the contrary, that there is a great deal to be learned from the
possibility of their existence (and from the realisation of such a possibility in ancient Rome and in
ancient biblical law, among others), hence such an stipulation would prove unhelpful.
In addition to these corrections of Pound's definition, it would be useful to introduce a clarification
which, unlike the previous ones, is (I believe) merely an interpretation of his claim. The idea of 'of
what legal precepts ought to be in view of this end' allows us to introduce that of the canon of legal
argument. Since Pound was referring to an ideal element in law, I think it is only fair to say that this
'ought' should not be interpreted as a moral but as a legal 'ought'—it would not be clear, at least
without further arguments, why ideas about what the legal precepts ought (morally) to be is 'an
11 2nb: we need to drop the 'political or ethical' not because those beliefs are not political or ethical, but because they need not
be. Consider the belief in economic laissez-faire. It was certainly a political belief, because the reasons for it were political (or
ideological, or moral etc) reasons concerning fairness, the role of the government in a free society, etc. (It was not, I would
claim, a legal belief—it was part of an image of law not because it was a legal belief, but because it had decisive impact on
practices we, using our concept oflaw, would recognise as legal. This is discussed below, at 181).
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element of the first importance in the work of judges'. If this understanding is correct and Pound's
'ought' has to be interpreted as a legal 'ought', the whole phrase could be read as meaning: '...and
hence as to how the legal precepts should be applied to particular cases in view of this end'. The
application of legal precepts to particular cases can be, as we have seen, more or less formal. They
should be applied without considering irrelevant reasons, and taking into account all the relevant ones.
An answer to the question 'how should legal precepts be applied?' specifies which reasons for (legal)
decisions count as relevant reasons and which ones do not. In brief, specifies a canon of legal
argument. As Ba | kowski says as regarding analogy (I believe the point to be easily generalisable):
The notion of sameness and therefore reasoning by analogy is found in a complex interlocking of
principles, practices and mles which inform and create the particular instance and vice versa. At base
this is located in social practice and/or particular tradition. This means that though analogy involves a
creative leap which determines that 'this is like that', this leap is domesticated by the tradition and the
discourse in which it takes place (Ba | kowski, MS: 16).
An image of law, then, is a body of beliefs as to the nature of the law, and hence as to the kind of
arguments that should be considered when deciding how legal precepts should be applied to particular
cases. It is, following Atiyah and Summers, "an inarticulate or implicit legal theory" (1987: 5).
Who needs to hold this body of beliefs? Atiyah and Summers claim that it must be "held by the
general public at large and, to some extent, also by politicians, judges, and legal practitioners" (Atiyah
and Summers, 1987: 411). I will shy something on this issue shortly below. For the time being,
however, suffice it to say that an image of law is a social construct, hence there must be some degree
of (at least tacit) agreement between citizens and legal practitioners. An important distance between
one and the other group (or indeed any important controversy about images of law) will undermine the
legitimacy of the legal system, as Pound complained when criticising the American laissez-faire image
of law:
The attitude of many of our courts on the subject of liberty of contract is so certain to be
misapprehended, is so out of the range of ordinary understanding, that they cannot fail to engender
[...] feelings [of distrust and partiality]. Thus, those decisions do an injury beyond the failure of a few
acts. These acts can be replaced as legislatures learn how to comply with the letter of the decisions
and to evade the spirit of them. But the lost respect for courts and law cannot be replaced (Pound,
1908:487)113.
Is an image of law equivalent to the more common idea of a legal tradition? I hope that by now it is
evident why the answer to this question has to be in the negative. The idea of a legal tradition
emphasises the continuity of a legal practice. The existence of something called, say, 'the English legal
tradition' (or 'the common law tradition') is the continued existence of a legal practice (or parts
thereof) that can be identified as a unity over a number of years (or centuries). Few people would think
that contemporary English judges are not members of the same legal tradition as Edward Coke or
William Blackstone, though if my argument has been up to now minimally convincing it would be
impossible to say that they share the same image of law. While the concept of a legal tradition refers to
the environmental circumstances in which legal discourse is carried over, an image of law refers to a
113The disruptive effects of images of law being unsettled is also commented upon by Karl Llewellyn, who called images of
law 'jurisprudential styles': see Llewellyn (1960: 40-1), quoted above, at 130n.
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set of beliefs about that discourse. A legal tradition (or: a legal culture) is, like a habitat, something
someone can belong to, while an image of law is, like a religious doctrine, something someone can
believe in (or, like faith, simply have). This does not mean, of course, that traditions do not affect
images and vice-versa.
Let me pause for a moment on the link between an image of law and a canon of legal argument. As we
saw, beliefs about the end of the law—or about what legal discourse is about—shape the content of
that canon. If the law is about implementing the state's policies, then legal discourse will be about how
to pick up one rather than another way of implementing that policy, and it will exclude arguments
directed against the validity of the policy; if the law is about solving particular conflicts of interest
against the background of the accepted social practices, then legal discourse will be about the
judgement of particular actions against those practice, and the canon of legal argument will exclude
arguments designed to question those practices. An so on.
An image of law provides an independent criterion to establish what the content of a canon of legal
argument is. This in turn helps to escape a risk of circularity present in the use of the idea of a canon as
a key idea to the understanding of legal reasoning and law. This risk is exemplified in John Bell's
"The Acceptability of Legal Arguments" (Bell, 1986). In that piece, Bell argues that legal reasoning
can be understood only "when account is taken of the limits imposed by standards of what counts as
an acceptable legal argument" (1986: 47). He then goes on to claim that the canon of legal argument is
defined by what the relevant audience finds convincing (1986: 60-61: "what that audience accepts as
the criteria for rational debate provides the hints to how [a lawyer] can approach his justification"),
and he ends up defining the relevant audience as the legal audience, i.e. "those skilled and
knowledgeable in law" (1986: 50). To see the circularity one must ask: what is it to be 'knowledgeable
in law'? The answer seems to be to master the canon of legal argument, i.e., to be able to distinguish
good legal arguments from bad ones. Any other definition is liable to become formalistic and to miss
the point. But if 'those skilled and knowledgeable in law' means 'those who master the canon of legal
argument' the circularity is evident: the canon is whatever the legal audience finds convincing and the
legal audience is a group of all those who have mastered the canon: the canon is thus defined by the
legal audience and the legal audience is defined by the canon. If the idea of an image of law is
introduced in this picture, this circularity is avoided. The content of the canon of legal argument is
defined by the image of law—and who needs to believe in it is itself something that to some extent is
defined by the image itself. This is not a circular justification. It only shows something that hardly
needs to be said, i.e. that the fact of an image of law being dominant in a legal tradition at a given time
is a political issue), and the canon determines who is to count as a member of a legal audience.
Could it be not claimed that the argument is circular anyway? For consider: what makes an image of
law an image oflawl The only answer seems to be that the object of the image is something that is not
defined by the image, but my argument has been that the image defined what the canon is and the
canon defined the audience. Ifwe need an independent 'object' of the image, what can it be other than
what the audience recognise as legal?
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I think this conclusion can be avoided. We begin by noticing that our concept of law is part and parcel
of our culture. We think of the law as an independent form of discourse, independent in the sense that
is different from (though it might or might not—the question is not important here—be connected to)
other forms of discourse, like morality or politics. But this is by no means a generalised fact about
every conceivable society. In a society in which the law is not seen as something distinct, does it make
sense to say that they have an image of law?
In this point I think Raz's is the correct position: "the concept of law is itself a product of a specific
culture, a concept which was not available to members of earlier cultures which in fact lived under a
legal system" (Raz, 1996: 4). In order to understand an alien society, we must relate their concepts and
practices to our own ones:
To understand other societies we must master their concepts, for we will not understand them unless
we understand how they perceive them themselves. Their concepts will not be understood by us
unless we can relate them to our own concepts, so the understanding of alien cultures requires
possession of concepts which apply across the divide between us and them, concepts which can be
applied to the practices of other cultures as well as to our own. Only with the help of concepts which
apply to our own as well as to alien cultures can we understand the concepts used by alien cultures in
their own understanding of their own practices and institutions and not shared by us. The centrality of
law in social life makes it natural that the concept of law would be one of these bridge-building
concepts, i.e. one which we could apply to societies which themselves do not use it in their own self-
understanding (Raz, 1996: 5).
If we wanted to understand an alien society's image of law, we would have to start by trying to
understand their practices from their point of view. Once we understood them, we can try to relate
them to our concepts, like law. How do they conceive of practices that have features we recognise as
legal? The conceptions they have need not be legal in the sense that they may lack that concept. We
saw that there is a sense in which laissez-faire was not a legal but a moral or political belief, but it had
an important impact on practices we recognise as legal. Thus the image of law need not be an image of
law for the holders, since they can even lack that very concept. But it is a image of something we
recognise as law. Depending on particular historical traditions, it might be the case that an image of
law includes, as part of its content, awareness of the concept of law, but this definitively need not be
the case. Thus we avoid the circularity: an image of law, then, is an image of the world, or of that part
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